NOMINAL GDP TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK CONSERVATIVENESS

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the ‘inflationary bias’ result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this ‘inflationary bias’. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an ‘inflationary bias’, and there also exists the possibility of a ‘dis‐inflationary bias’.     

Inflation Targeting versus Nominal Income Targeting

In this paper we analyze two different target regimes, flexible inflation targeting and nominal income targeting, under discretion in a simple dynamic macro model. The key results of our paper are: First, for both targeting regimes optimal monetary policy response leads to a shock-dependent feedback rule. Second, a demand shock is completely offset by both monetary strategies. Third, in case of a supply shock there is a significant difference between the two different targeting regimes. Under inflation targeting the policy makers face a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. This trade-off depends on the weight Φ the policy makers attach to output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the loss function. In contrast, under nominal income targeting policy makers face a constant trade-off between inflation and real output growth: an increase in inflation leads to a fall in real output growth by an equal amount. Furthermore, in Appendix A we analyze a (linear) commitment solution for inflation targeting and compare it with the discretionary case. Under commitment, inflation is smaller and the output gap is larger than under discretion. In Appendix B, we investigate inflation targeting in a two-period time-lag version of the model. The qualitative results on the trade-off between inflation and output growth remain the same as in the basic model without time lag. Received May 3, 2000; revised version received December 3, 2001 Published online: February 17, 2003     

Does wage-inflation targeting complement foreign exchange intervention? An evaluation of a multi-target,two-instrument monetary policy framework

We assess the inclusion of wage inflation as an intermediate target of an emerging central bank using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky wages and prices calibrated for the South Korean economy. The model includes wage inflation as an additional target jointly with domestic price inflation and the output gap in a Taylor- type interest rate rule operating with a sterilized foreign exchange (FX) intervention rule. Our results show a complementary relationship between wage inflation targeting and price inflation targeting. That is, by supplementing price inflation targeting with wage inflation targeting, welfare improves for cases with and without sterilized FX intervention. When intervention is in place, wage inflation targeting has the added advantage of reducing the volatilities of nominal exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves thereby promoting a more sustainable conduct of FX intervention.     

Comparing Different Central Bank Targets

In this paper we analyze different target regimes for a central bank. First, we determine the main macroeconomic variables under inflationtargeting and nominal income targeting in the context of a Mundell–Flemmingtwo country model. We then investigate under which conditions onetarget regime is superior to another if supply or demand shocks occur.The main result of this paper is that there exists a unique boundary for theweight on employment in the objective function of the centralbank. If the actual weight is smaller than this bound, inflation targetingis superior to nominal income targeting. For a weight larger than thisbound, nominal income targeting causes a smaller loss. For the two extremecases of the weight, namely zero or infinity one target regime coincideswith the loss-minimizing solution: inflation targeting for a weight of zeroand nominal income targeting for a weight of infinity.     

Foreign output shock in small open economies: A welfare evaluation of monetary policy regimes

We examine the impact of negative foreign output shocks, which entail negative demand side effects by lowering exports and positive supply side effects by lowering oil prices, on the welfare of non-oil producing, small open economies under five exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with parameter values calibrated for Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. We find that welfare levels among the five policy regimes depend on the economy's share of oil imports in world oil consumption. Hong Kong, Singapore and Israel, which have smaller shares, maximize welfare under the Taylor rule, which targets both CPI inflation and real output. South Korea, with higher shares, and Taiwan, with more rigid prices, maximize welfare under real output targeting. CPI inflation targeting, nominal output growth targeting and fixed exchange rate regimes generate lower welfare. However, optimal monetary policy, which generates the highest welfare, gives greater weight on real output than CPI inflation.     

MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL INFLATION‐TARGETING IN HONG KONG

The present paper evaluates macroeconomic adjustment in Hong Kong with an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model under a fixed exchange rate regime. We find that exports and world inflation shocks are the dominant sources of GDP volatility, with the risk premium taking on importance during the Asian crisis after 1997. A counterfactual simulation, assuming a flexible exchange rate regime with inflation targeting, shows that inflation would have decreased slightly, but interest‐rate volatility would have increased significantly. The welfare gains from switching out of the currency board system appear to be marginal.     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Inflation Expectations and the Stability Properties of Nominal GDP Targeting

Ball (1999) uses a small closed economy model to show that nominal GDP targeting can lead to instability. This paper extends Ball's model to uncover the role inflation expectations play in generating this instability. Allowing inflation expectations to be formed by the more general mixed expectations process, which encompasses Ball's model, we show that nominal GDP targeting is unlikely to lead to instability. We further show that in Ball's model where exact targeting causes instability that moving to inexact targeting restores stability.     

Nonlinearity in monetary policy: A reconsideration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

The proponents of the ‘opportunistic’ approach to disinflation suggest that, when inflation is close to the target, the central bank should not counteract inflationary pressures. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) formalize this idea through a simple policy rule that prescribes a nonlinear adjustment to a history-dependent target for inflation. This embodies a regime change in monetary policy, which reacts to inflation only when this is far from the inflation target. Here we study the opportunistic approach in a New-Keynesian model with sizeable nominal and real rigidites in the form of a positive money demand and adjustment costs for investment. We find that the welfare gains delivered by the opportunistic rule arise from the time-varying inflation target, when welfare is measured by a quadratic approximation of household utility. The nonlinear zone of inaction on inflation improves welfare outcomes only when a central bank loss function with the absolute value of the output gap is used, as proposed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).     

Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective

This paper investigates the performances of an inflation targeting regime in a learning economy framed as an Agent-Based Model (ABM). We keep our ABM as close as possible to the original New Keynesian (NK) model, but we model the individual behaviour of the agents under procedural rationality à la Simon. Accordingly, we assume that their behaviour is guided by simple rules of thumb – or heuristics – while a continuous learning process governs the evolution of those rules. Under these assumptions that also allow the emergence of agents heterogeneity, we analyze the dynamics of the economy without assuming rational expectations, and study the role that a central bank, implementing an inflation targeting regime via a monetary policy rule, can play in the orientation of these dynamics. Consequently, our main goal is to analyse the interplay between the learning mechanisms operating at the individual level and the features and performances of the inflation targeting regime. Our results point to the prime importance of the credibility of central bank's inflation target regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, as well as the beneficial role played by that target as an anchoring device for private inflation expectations. We also establish the potential welfare cost of imperfect public information and contribute to the current debate on optimal monetary policy rules under imperfect common knowledge and uncertainty.     

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.     

When does the cost channel pose a challenge to inflation targeting central banks?

In a sticky-price model where firms finance their production inputs, there is both a lower and an upper bound on the central bank's inflation response necessary to rule out the possibility of self-fulfilling inflation expectations. This paper shows that real wage rigidities decrease this upper bound, but coefficients in the range of those on the Taylor rule place the economy well within the determinacy region. However, when there is time-variation in the share of firms who finance their inputs (i.e. Markov-switching) then inflation targeting interest rate rules frequently result in indeterminacy, even if the central bank also targets output. Adding a nominal growth target to the policy rule can often alleviate this indeterminacy and therefore anchor inflation expectations.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting with financial market imperfections

Abstract Price‐level targeting (PT) is compared with inflation targeting (IT) in a DSGE model augmented with imperfections in both debt and equity markets. The PT regime outperforms the IT regime, and the gain depends on the degree of financial market frictions. This is because inflation is better anchored under PT, owing to the expectation channel, and therefore the monetary authority has more leverage to deal with the financial market distortions. We also find that the gain is higher if the optimal rule reacts to asset prices instead of the output gap, and the rule requires a positive response to asset prices.     

Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions

This paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks. The transfer rules target regional differences in nominal GDP, consumption spending, labor income, and fiscal deficits. Targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing, but the overall welfare effect is negative. In contrast, targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains, but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real GDP. It is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities. The optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting, and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing.     

Monetary policy and transmission mechanism in Brazil: an empirical model

We propose an econometric model for the transmission mechanism in Brazil after the inflation target regime (IT) implementation. We follow the statistical approach based on the LSE methodology by means of the Spanos (J Econom 44:87–105, 1990) categorization. Our proposed model includes the ratios of the debt and primary surplus to the GDP representing the government fiscal effort. We identify two long run relationships that produce new information on how to evaluate the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate links, respectively, with the output gap and the nominal inflation derived from the IS and the interest rule theoretical models. Such specification explores the role played by fiscal variables in monetary transmission; considering the government fiscal effort, a relevant issue for Brazil. We were also able to identify a third long run relationship that might help to uncover how output gap is related not only with nominal variables but also with the debt to the GDP ratio.     

Inflation and Relative Price Variability in a Low Inflation Country: Empirical Evidence for Germany

Abstract. The recent literature on the welfare cost of inflation emphasizes inflation's effect on the variability of relative prices. Expected and unexpected inflation have both been proposed to increase relative price variability (RPV) and, thereby, to distort the information content of nominal prices. This paper presents new evidence on the impact of inflation on RPV in Germany. Our results indicate that the influence of expected inflation disappears if a credible monetary policy stabilizes inflationary expectations on a low level. Yet the significant impact of unexpected inflation suggests that even low inflation rates can lead to welfare losses by raising RPV above its efficient level.     

Monetary policy uncertainty and interest rate targeting

This paper studies the issue of monetary delegation in the case where central banker’s preferences are uncertain. A distinctive feature of the analysis is that it introduces nominal interest rate targets to the monetary delegation scheme in addition to linear contracts, quadratic punishments, and inflation targets. This paper shows that the implementation of interest rate targeting will improve social welfare since it leads the central bank to make smaller interventions, which limits the scope for the central bank’s uncertain preferences to impact the economy.     

Stability of Money Demand and Monetary Policy in Papua New Guinea (PNG): An Error Correction Model Analysis

An error correction model (ECM) is used to study the Properties of money demand and to evaluate the appropriate monetary policy in PNG. The study confirms that the determinats of money demand are real GDP, nominal interest and inflation rate. The income elasticity of money demand is very low. The demand for money in PNG was stable during 1979-95, suggesting that the monetary targeting regime by the PNG Central Bank is feasible. However, as PNG proceeds with economic reforms that Includes financial sector reform and a floating exchange rate regime, the stability of the demand for money may have to be re-examined periodically. The best approach for conducting the monetary policy in PNG is to target the inflation rate. [E41, E52, C22]     

Hybrid Inflation-Price-Level Targeting in an Economy With Output Persistence

This paper investigates hybrid inflation‐price‐level targeting (HT), employing a Phillips curve with output persistence. By HT we mean that a central bank targets a weighted average of the optimal inflation rate and its corresponding price level. The analysis shows that if output is persistent to some extent, it is desirable to adopt HT because, relative to the case of alternative regimes such as inflation targeting (IT) and price‐level targeting (PT), it will reduce the variability of inflation and thereby social loss. In addition, it is shown that the optimal hybrid‐type target is uniquely determined according to the degree of persistence in output.     

INTEREST RATE RULES AND WELFARE IN OPEN ECONOMIES

This paper analyses the welfare performance of a set of five alternative interest rate rules in an open economy stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. A rule with a lagged interest rate term, high feedback on inflation and low feedback on output is found to yield the highest welfare for a small open economy. This result is robust across different degrees of openness, different sources of home and foreign shocks, alternative foreign monetary rules and different specifications for price-setting behaviour. The same rule emerges as both the Nash and cooperative equilibria in a two-country version of the model.