Platform competition with free entry of sellers

We study platforms setting access prices and commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition with free entry, such as the app providers on the app stores of Apple and Android devices. The link between prices on different sides induces the platforms to redistribute all the commission revenues through lower access prices and to set the optimal commission rates from the point of view of consumers, taking into account the pass-through on the prices of sellers, the elasticities of demand and surplus for their services and the elasticity of entry with respect to profitability. We discuss the role of heterogeneous sellers, substitutability between sellers’s products and limitations of the basic alignment of interest due to direct channels for sellers and consumer myopia.     

Motivation matters: Corporate scope and competition in complementary product markets

Research summary : We argue that a pure capabilities‐based view does not accurately explain the competitive dynamics of increasingly common settings in which firms act as both complementors and competitors. We propose that the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability framework is more appropriate for these settings. We derive predictions from both a pure capabilities view and the AMC framework, and test those predictions in the U.S. auto leasing market, in which the leasing subsidiaries of car manufacturers directly compete with the same independent lessors who provide complements to the manufacturers. Although our results are consistent with capabilities playing an important role, motivation appears to be a critical factor explaining the competitive dynamics of the market. Managerial summary : Firms that compete with business units owned by larger corporate parents face additional considerations. Such subsidiary competitors can be motivated by broader corporate considerations, shifting their objectives, and consequently, their strategic actions. Expecting subsidiary competitors to pursue business unit profitability can mislead managers toward pricing, product mix, or market entry errors. We present an important example from consumer finance, where independent auto lessors, such as Bank of America (BoA), compete with captive leasing subsidiaries like Ford Motor Credit (FMC). Since FMC is motivated to subsidize and support vehicle sales for its manufacturer parent, a cost advantage is not enough for BoA to dominate the market. Understanding broader corporate motivations of competitors helps managers anticipate competition levels in potential markets, thereby improving decision‐making and performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing decision for substitutable products with retail competition in a fuzzy environment

This paper studies the pricing problem of substitutable products in a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competitive retailers. The consumer demands and manufacturing costs are of uncertainty, which are described by fuzziness. Based on different market structures, one centralized pricing model and three decentralized pricing models are developed, and the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions are obtained using the game-theoretic approach. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results, and to gain additional managerial insights.     

Platform competition: Strategic trade‐offs in platform markets

Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribes rapidly expanding a network of platform users and complementary applications to capture entire markets. We challenge the unconditional logic of a winner‐take‐all (WTA) approach by empirically analyzing the dominant strategies used to build and position platform systems in the U.S. video game industry. We show that when platform firms pursue two popular WTA strategies concurrently and with equal intensity (growing the number and variety of applications while also securing a larger fraction of those applications with exclusivity agreements), it diminishes the benefits of each strategy to the point that it lowers platform performance. We also show that a differentiation strategy based on distinctive positioning improves a platform's performance only when a platform system is highly distinctive relative to its rivals. Our results suggest that platform competition is shaped by important strategic trade‐offs and that the WTA approach will not be universally successful. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality

The tablet PC market is dominated by two platforms: iOS and Android. In this paper, we combine tablet-level data with data on the quality of the top 1000 mobile applications from these platforms and estimate a structural demand model. We exploit variations over three periods and five European countries to find whether the application quality affects tablet demand. We then run two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual suggests that an improvement in application quality benefits the tablet producers on that platform with a more pronounced effect on the demand for Android-based tablets. The second counterfactual discusses the policy of leveling the app quality of the two stores. It shows that such a policy favors the tablet producers adopting the lowest quality app store (Google) and stimulates the adoption of tablet PCs. This generates consumer surplus in tablet demand.     

Quantity competition with access fees

We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal marginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus. As the number of firms increases, access fees fall below net consumer surplus and toward zero. Existence is guaranteed if Marshallian consumer surplus is not too concave. With open entry, quantity competition with access fees may be less efficient than without access fees.     

All-pay competition with captive consumers

We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the highest investment attracts all consumers. On the one hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive element: holding fixed the behavior of its rival, a firm with a larger captive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand, the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high quality introduces a pro-competitive element: a high investment becomes more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic effect on the investment levels of both firms and on consumer surplus. We relate our findings to competition cases in digital markets.     

Market structure and quality determination for complementary products: Alliances and service quality in the airline industry

This paper explores the effect of market structure on quality determination for complementary products. The focus is on the airline industry and the effect of airline alliances on flight frequency, an important element of service quality. With zero layover cost, the choice of flight frequencies has the same double-marginalization structure as in the usual alliance model, leading to a higher frequency in the alliance case as double marginalization is eliminated, along with a lower full trip price and higher traffic. The surprising result of the paper emerges with high-cost layover time, where double marginalization in frequencies is absent and where an alliance reduces service quality via a lower frequency, with the full price potentially rising (in which case traffic falls).     

Reprint of: Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality

The tablet PC market is dominated by two platforms: iOS and Android. In this paper, we combine tablet-level data with data on the quality of the top 1000 mobile applications from these platforms and estimate a structural demand model. We exploit variations over three periods and five European countries to find whether the application quality affects tablet demand. We then run two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual suggests that an improvement in application quality benefits the tablet producers on that platform with a more pronounced effect on the demand for Android-based tablets. The second counterfactual discusses the policy of leveling the app quality of the two stores. It shows that such a policy favors the tablet producers adopting the lowest quality app store (Google) and stimulates the adoption of tablet PCs. This generates consumer surplus in tablet demand.     

Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity-constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We show that consumers may benefit from price discrimination whereas the firms make the same profits as with uniform pricing. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis.     

An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing

Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations.     

Consumer satisfaction with food products

An important problem facing public policy makers is how best to measure market performance. Economists have traditionally used criteria such as the existence of monopoly forces, entry barriers, and externalities in production and consumption. Increasingly, however, policy makers are viewing the measurement of consumer satisfaction as an important additional approach to the assessment of market performance, even though consumer attitudes may lack some of the precision and objectivity of the economist's measures.¹ Responding to the growth of the consumer movement, policy makers are assigning a relatively high priority to the development of programmes designed to protect the consumer interest. Effective consumer protection programmes depend on the availability of information which can provide a basis for comparing levels of consumer satisfaction across a range of products and services, for identifying problem areas, and for effectively allocating limited consumer protection resources. Given the number of alternative foods on the market and the central role of food consumption in everday life, effective resource allocation is of special importance to policy makers concerned with food and agriculture.     

Cooperative R&D with product market competition

A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.     

Multiple point competition

Situations where firms compete against each other simultaneously in several markets abound in real life. However, there is very little conceptual or theoretical literature on multiple point competition. This paper offers a first attempt at developing a conceptual framework for analysing and understanding situations involving multiple point competition. Several examples are discussed to provide insights into the options available to the competitors and the equilibrium outcomes of such competition.     

R&D and technology purchase through licence agreements: complementary strategies and complementary assets

This paper reports on a major UK-wide investigation into the role of inward technology licensing and in-house R&D as alternative and complementary strategies in new product and process development.The role of licensing in the technology strategy of the firm can be viewed as the 'buy' in the context of 'make or buy' technology decisions. Such technology purchases may be made for a number of reasons including insufficient in-house resources or gaps in R&D provision stemming from small scale, risk, low investment in research or diversification away from existing research competencies. However, technology markets might have substantial information imperfections and transaction costs. The tasks of finding a technology provider, transferring the technology inwards and absorbing it into commercially successful new products and processes, can inhibit the use of licensing agreements for technology acquisition.
This research, using a sample of 128 manufacturing companies (including both licensees and non-licensees), examines some key propositions around the use of technology licensing. Data was collected on technology strategies, complementary assets, internal organisation and market structure. Analysis of the data suggests that strategies of 'buy and make' are complements rather than alternatives, and that extensive use of licensing requires substantial complementary assets to be in place. The nature of product-market positioning was found to be a significant driver of technology strategy, with firms that pursue product differentiation being the most likely to license. Whilst a priori it might be expected that internal organisation would influence technology strategy, this study was only able to provide weak support for this.     

Timing decisions of new product preannouncement and launch with competition

We develop a game-theoretic model to study the timing of new product preannouncement and launch under competition. We derive firms’ optimal timing choices and conducted a numerical analysis to evaluate the role of various factors. Our analytical and numerical results showed that anticipated competitor’s timing choices are the most significant factors. A firm should not preannounce early unless the preannouncement is effective in creating pent-up demands. However, the preannouncement and launch should be rushed if the quality or profit margin of the new product is high, and postponed if the market share of the existing product is high. The market leader should preannounce earlier in a simultaneous game than in a sequential game, but the opposite for the market follower. Data collected from the microprocessor industry validated our model.     

Imperfect competition law enforcement

Competition policy is a subject of often heated debate. Competition authorities, seeking to prevent or battle anticompetitive acts in complex cases to the best of their abilities, regularly find themselves advised by rival economic theories and disputed empirical analyses. As a consequence, there is a real possibility that they may occasionally err, missing true violations of competition law or finding firms liable that actually had no other intentions than good competition. In this paper, possible consequences of such imperfect competition law enforcement on firm strategies are considered. In a simple model of collusion, it is found that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforcement errors: Type II errors decrease expected fines, while Type I errors encourage industries to collude precautionary when they face the risk of a false conviction. Hence, fallible antitrust enforcement may stifle genuine competition, thus stimulating the very behavior competition policy is meant to deter. When enforcement errors are non-negligible, competition authorities run the risk of being over-zealous, in the sense that welfare is best served by an authority that is selective and conscientious in its targeting of alleged anticompetitive acts.     

SEBS软胶玩具用新产品填补国内空白

巴陵石化合成橡胶事业部开发的用于软胶玩具生产的SEBS新产品,综合性能与全球知名企业美国科腾公司的同类产品相当,填补了国内空白,打破了境外产品对SEBS软胶玩具领域的垄断。在中国石化2009年度     

Computing welfare losses from data under imperfect competition with heterogeneous goods

We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms. We find that price–marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration.