Information-based contagion and the implications for financial fragility

This paper explores a global game model of information-based financial contagion. By revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors, the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm. The model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights. While contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms, its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous. I consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero. Moreover, the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental, but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure.     

The wealth effect and diamond risk structure of financial regulation

The objective of this article was to evaluate the effect of announcements of financial regulation on risk and return in the Vietnamese equity market. The techniques used for the purpose of analysing risk and return include event study and non-parametric tests, as well as asset pricing models supplemented with interaction variables and a variety of ARCH-like specifications such as GARCH, TARCH, EGARCH and PARCH. We find evidence for the wealth effect, the presence of delayed response and a risk shifting behaviour in the form of diamond risk structure. Our results show that abnormal returns are present around the announcements of operating rules and other stock market regulations. Abnormal returns can also be obtained after considering legal documents such as circulars and decisions.     

The impact of financial regulation on current account balances

Both global imbalances and financial market deregulation feature prominently among the potential causes of the global financial crisis, but they have been largely discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different angle and investigate the relationship between financial market regulation and current account balances, an area for which limited empirical evidence exists. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980–2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. We find robust evidence that financial market regulations affect current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the current account. In particular we find that easing bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account balance. In contrast, bank privatization and securities market deregulation tend to raise current account balances. Our results also highlight the importance to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of current account theories in contrast to previous studies accounting for model uncertainty.     

Environmental regulation and U.S. states' technical inefficiency

Using data on 48 states from 1982–1994, we estimate the impact of environmental regulation on technical inefficiency of U.S. states' manufacturing sector. The result indicates that environmental stringency has significant and positive impacts on U.S. states' technical inefficiency.     

The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations

This paper contributes to our understanding of post-crisis financial regulation by reasserting the centrality of domestic politics in defining government preferences and explaining regulatory outcomes. It draws on Robert Putnam's two-level game approach and Foreign Policy Analysis to develop a model of a three-level informal ratification game. This adds value to existing approaches by capturing the contested nature of government preferences and delineating the causal mechanisms through which domestic groups shape international negotiations. The model is used to explain the UK's pivotal role in the reform of bank capital requirements in the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that governments are able to take advantage of a narrowing domestic ‘win-set’ by marginalising the influence of industry and building political momentum for regulatory reform. In particular, the paper shows how UK negotiators were able to exploit the increased domestic costs of agreement and synergistic strategies between negotiations to successfully oppose the maximum harmonisation of capital rules across the EU.     

Reserve accumulation and financial crises: From individual protection to systemic risk

This paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries׳ international reserve holdings and financial crises: while the “local” view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises, it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre, which is transmitted globally. According to this “global” view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system. Since the crisis affects all countries alike, the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non-accumulating countries.We integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality: the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves. Moreover, if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves, it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves. A macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution. Our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant: they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45%.     

Charter value,risk-taking and systemic risk in banking before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008

ABSTRACT

We investigate how bank charter value affects risk for a sample of OECD banks by using standalone and systemic risk measures before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Prior to the crisis, bank charter value is positively associated with risk-taking and systemic risk for very large ‘too-big-too-fail’ banks and large U.S. and European banks but such a relationship is inverted during and after the crisis. A deeper investigation shows that such a behaviour before the crisis is mostly relevant for very large banks and large banks with high growth strategies. Banks’ business models also influence this relationship. We find that for banks following a focus strategy, higher charter value amplifies both standalone and systemic risk for large U.S. and European banks. Our findings have important policy implications and cast doubts on the relevance of the uniform more stringent capital requirements introduced by Basel III.     

Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets with financial transaction taxes

Our article develops a game theory model of interaction between speculative and hedging behaviors in the oil and US dollar markets, in the presence of a severe taxation on speculative financial transactions. From this microeconomic analysis, we derive a regulatory policy. This policy has two consequences at the macro level: on one hand, it has a certain stabilizing effects on oil and US dollar markets, limiting the number of speculative transactions and their size; on the other hand, it induces the speculators to find agreements with real economic agents, which are profitable for both parts. Moreover, we propose that the tax is mostly re-directed to support the real economy. So, the aim of this paper appears twofold: by using Game Theory, we suggest to a pair of economic agents a way to gain in a market, also in presence of a hard taxation on the financial transactions, proposing, at the same time, to normative authority, a method to limit the instability of oil and U.S. Dollar markets and to help real economy. Our idea, at the micro-economic level, is to exploit the hedging actions to obtain a profit, limiting, at the same time, at a macro-level, the speculative attacks on oil and U.S. Dollar markets. These goals are reached by the introduction of well designed financial transactions tax. In particular, we focus on a real economic subject (Multinational Air) and on an investment bank (Bank). The solutions collectively efficient are determined, at a micro-level, by certain agreements between the two economic subjects. Specifically, after an agreement which allows to obtain the maximum collective profit of the interaction, we propose and analyze four different possible fair divisions of this gain, by adopting the Kalai–Smorodinsky method.     

New financial markets: who gains and who loses

Summary. We evaluate the effects of new financial markets in a two-period incomplete markets model with heterogenous agents. For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case where utility is exponential and risks are normally distributed. We provide a complete characterization of life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice. The effect of new financial markets on individual welfare equals the sum of what we call the portfolio effect and the price effect. The portfolio effect is proportional to the square of the difference between the average exposure to the new asset in the economy and an individual investors exposure adjusted for risk aversion. The portfolio effect is always positive and measures the improved ability of investors to transfer consumption across states. The price effect captures the effect on individual welfare of changes in asset prices. We show that new financial markets drive down the prices of all assets which raises the interest rate and thus affects the ability of investors to transfer consumption across time. The price effect is positive for net savers but can be negative for net borrowers. For net borrower households, the price effect can wipe out the portfolio effect and lead to welfare reductions.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D52, G11, G12.Paul Willen: Thanks to Viral Acharaya, Alberto Bisin, Steve Davis, John Geanakoplos and a thoughtful anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to seminar audiences at Stanford, Berkeley and at the 2001 Stony Brook workshop on incomplete markets for comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.     

Price connectedness between green bond and financial markets

We study price connectedness between the green bond and financial markets using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model that captures direct and indirect transmission of financial shocks across markets. Using heteroskedasticity to identify the structural VAR model parameters, our empirical findings reveal that the green bond market is closely linked to the fixed-income and currency markets, receiving sizeable price spillovers from those markets and transmitting negligible reverse effects. We also show that, in contrast, the green bond market is weakly tied to the stock, energy and high-yield corporate bond markets. These findings have implications in terms of portfolio and risk management decisions for environmentally aware investors holding positions in green bonds.     

Inflation targeting and financial stability in emerging markets

This paper aims at investigating whether emerging market inflation targeters are more financially vulnerable than their non-targeting counterparts. It further assesses the extent to which targeting central banks are less responsive to financial imbalances, compared to those implementing alternative policy strategies. Based on a sample of 26 emerging countries, including 13 targeters, the analysis suggests that monetary policy in targeting countries is relatively more sensitive to financial risks. However, despite stronger central banks’ responses to financial imbalances, the financial sector appears to be more fragile for targeters. Our conclusion therefore challenges the view that central banks, through their policy interest rates, can guarantee the stability of the financial system. It rather suggests that the control of inflation should remain the primary monetary policy objective, while a (macro)prudential authority would be in charge of the financial stability objective.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

国外学者在后危机时代关于金融创新“悖论”的综述

20世纪80年代以来的金融创新,所取得的规模是惊人的,对金融市场和金融风险的影响已经超越了人们的想象。2008年金融危机的爆发使得金融创新受到了人们的质疑,部分学者开始讨论其对金融和经济的冲击和影响。本文首先阐述了国外学者关于金融创新在生产力、经济增长、金融风险和交易成本等四个方面最新的观点,论证其悖论的含义及体现。然后,从金融产品、系统风险、金融立法与完善市场等四个方面归纳总结了目前学术界与实务界对金融创新监督管理和合理使用的观点。最后,本文提出了对于化解金融创新"悖论"的观点和建议。     

金融市场发展与金融风险防范研究

随着防范和化解金融风险问题研究的深入,揭示和探讨金融风险的深层原因及根本性防范化解措施非常重要。本文分析了金融市场效率、信息不对称引发金融风险的两个深层原因及治理策略,并认为资产证券化是防范和化解金融风险的重要举措     

Canadian and U.S. financial markets: testing the international integration hypothesis under time‐varying conditional volatility

Abstract.  This paper evaluates the international integration hypothesis, that is, that risk‐adjusted anticipated returns are identical, even when financial instruments are traded in different countries. Under time‐varying conditional volatility, this hypothesis is tested by verifying the equality between domestic and foreign risk prices associated with a multi‐factor analytic specification. The maximum‐likelihood and Kalman‐filter estimates are used to assess the national risk prices and interpret the factors. Empirically, the integration of Canadian and U.S. financial markets depends on the risk prices of two factors, which are related to certain non‐monetary events and to the conduct of monetary policies. JEL classification: G15, C32     

Evidence of cross-asset contagion in U.S. markets

This study examines evidence of cross-asset contagion among REIT, money, stock, bond, and currency markets in the US from 2006 to 2012, which covers the subprime and European sovereign debt crisis. We apply the Granger causality test and a vector auto-regression to examine the change of causality structure. Our results show that contagion exists from medium-term bond markets to equity markets; REIT, money markets and short-term bond markets show little evidence of cross-asset contagion with other markets; and the currency market shows high co-movement and contagion with equity markets. Our findings provide more rewarding asset reallocating strategies for the investors who invest in both bond and equity markets before a crisis to consider reallocating their portfolio into REIT and money markets to benefit from diversification during a crisis period.     

The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation

The paper empirically examines the implementation record of international financial regulation of the banking sector. The study finds that the size of the banking sector and the presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are positively associated with a stronger implementation record. These results suggest that cooperative motives of internalising externalities, creating a level playing field and preserving financial stability play a role in explaining the implementation record. We find evidence that this cooperative behaviour may be driven by the self-interest of global players as the positive record is particularly strong in countries where large banking sectors and big banks are both present, and where regulation only applies to large players. Sectoral concentration, bank health and the share of foreign ownership yield more mixed results as regards their impact on implementation.     

The telecoms boom and bust 1996-2003 and the role of financial markets

Financial crises are still as much a part of the modern, information-and-communication-technology-based (ICT) economy as they were of previous economies. Why are we apparently unable to learn lessons from the past and avoid what Charles Kindleberger (2000) has called manias, panics and crashes? Why is it that our sophisticated stock of information, made readily and relatively cheaply available to us by our investment in ICTs, and our abundant theories and models, have not allowed us to steer clear of these financial excesses? The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the processes and mechanisms that have played a significant role in causing the Telecoms Boom and Bust, 1996-2003. The question of whether anything can be done about these processes and mechanisms in order to try and modify such financial excesses in the future is taken up in the conclusion.JEL Classification: A12, D8, E3, G1, L63, L96, N2, O30The author would like to acknowledge, without implicating, the helpful discussion with Richard Burns, Fred Bleakley and others who commented on an earlier version of this paper at Institutional Investors European Institute meeting in Berlin in March 2003, and with Stan Metcalfe on other occasions. In addition, thanks are due to many friends in NTT and InfoCom who assisted my learning about the Telecoms Industry and its dynamics.     

中国系统性风险综合指数构建与评估研究--基于主成分分析方法

2008年的全球性金融危机引发了世界各国对系统性风险的格外关注。文章讨论系统性风险含义及其识别指标,基于2004-2012年中国宏观经济与金融系统的实证数据,采用主成分分析方法构建了系统性风险评估指标体系,实证评估分析了中国系统性风险综合水平与结构分布的演绎特征。分析表明在研究期内系统性风险综合水平经历了下降、震荡与上升三个阶段,2009年中期至2012年属于系统性风险上升期,其中,房地产市场泡沫、政府债务、经济增长方式与金融体制效率等风险形式是现阶段系统性风险的主要构成因素。因此,研究认为系统性风险防控极为必要,而且从改革财政税收体制、完善政府债务管理制度、理顺收入分配机制以及推动金融自由化等方面提出了系统性风险防控的具体措施。