The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Swiss watch cycles: Evidence of corruption during leadership transition in China

This paper presents evidence of corruption during China's leadership transitions when governmental positions are open for competition. The import value of luxury watches, a popular medium for corrupt exchanges, peaked during regular leadership transitions in 1996–97, 2001–02, and 2006–07. However, imports of nonluxury watches and other luxury items unpopular for corrupt exchanges did not exhibit the same cycle. Nor did imports of luxury watches increase in Hong Kong, Singapore, or the US. During the leadership transition of 2011–12, since wearing a conspicuous luxury watch was by then likely to be exposed on social media and trigger an anti-corruption investigation, this “Swiss watch cycle” vanished.     

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.     

Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest, while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms' investment decisions. Additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats' rotation are provided.     

Corruption and legislature size: Evidence from Brazil

This paper studies whether and how legislatures affect political corruption. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Brazilian municipalities, we find a positive causal impact of council size on corruption levels, as detected by random federal audits. This indicates that an extra councilor represents an additional political actor potentially interested in diverting public resources, which we define as a rent extraction effect. However, we find further evidence that, in some contexts, larger councils enhance the representation of opposition parties and effectively increase monitoring over the executive, attenuating the rent extraction effect. Namely, in municipalities where opposition parties are typically underrepresented, the additional seat in the council is absorbed by the opposition and corruption outcomes do not worsen. In addition, only in such context, mayors are more commonly sentenced for misconduct in office by judicial authorities, whose investigations anecdotally often originates from councilors denouncing mayors to local courts. Overall, our findings show that legislature size is detrimental to corruption outcomes but less so where the representation of opposition parties improves with the enlargement of the legislature.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

The influence of political fragmentation on public enterprises: Evidence from German municipalities

This study investigates the influence of politically fragmented municipal councils on the investment behaviour of municipally owned public enterprises. We argue that common public choice theories can also be applied to public enterprises. For our observation period (2002–2014), we use a data set encompassing 8,685 municipally owned enterprises subject to commercial accounting located in 3,237 municipalities drawn from all 13 German federal area states. On average, our results point to a negative effect of fragmentation on investment per capita, supporting a war of attrition or veto player approach. Effects are heterogeneous among different sectors, possibly due to higher visibility to voters. Thus, veto players might actively try to block prestigious and publicly perceivable investment projects to hinder their opponents. Political budget cycles additionally influence this effect for some sectors. However, testing non-linearities reveal that the common-pool hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out.     

Committing to transparency to resist corruption

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.     

Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties

We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent's corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor. The principal's objective is to minimize the overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage in monetary side-transfers, the principal may stand to benefit by allowing supervisor–agent collusion. This benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor.     

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than that announced. We compute equilibrium corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: (i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, and (ii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence equilibrium corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection.     

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

We explore how electoral rules and the degree of civicness of the voters interact in shaping elected officials' behaviour. We examine the expenditure proposals sponsored by Italian Senators from 1994 to 2013 and exploit the 2005 electoral reform that transformed a mainly majoritarian system into a mainly proportional one. First, we find that legislators elected in first-past-the-post districts are more likely to sponsor pork-barrel bills and to put effort into legislative activity than those elected with a closed-list proportional system. Second, more importantly, we show that the effects of the electoral rules are muted in areas with high civicness.     

Term limit extension and electoral participation. Evidence from a diff-in-discontinuities design at the local level in Italy

We study the effect of term limits on voter turnout in Italian local elections. Since 2014 the Italian law allows mayors in municipalities with a population size lower than 3,000 inhabitants to re-run for a third term, whereas mayors in cities with a number of residents above the cut-off still face a two-term limit. The introduction of the reform permits us to implement a difference-in-discontinuities design exploiting the before/after with the discontinuous policy change. We find that voters negatively react to the introduction of the reform: electoral participation decreases by about 5 percentage points in municipalities eligible to the treatment compared to municipalities in the control group. This negative effect is essentially driven by a decrease in the political competition. We also find that relaxing term limits does not improve the quality of politicians running for election.     

Crime,incentives and political effort: Evidence from India

Political representatives with criminal backgrounds are considered a great problem in many countries. In India, public disclosure of the large share of politicians currently facing criminal charges has sparked a heated public debate and emerging literature assessing the causes and effects. We develop two hypotheses based on our theoretical considerations. Based on the coding of published affidavits and a comprehensive set of three proxies to measure effort in the 14th Lok Sabha over the 2004–2009 legislative period, we put these hypotheses to an empirical test. Members of the parliament (MPs) facing criminal accusations exhibit on average about 5% lower attendance rates and lower utilization rates in a local area development fund, but only insignificantly lower parliamentary activity. In line with our hypotheses, these differences decline in the development level of the constituency - a proxy for higher rent-seeking possibilities and monitoring intensity. We argue and demonstrate why these negative relations should constitute an upper bound estimate of the causal effect, and show that even under conservative assumptions the effect is unlikely to be caused by unaccounted selection-bias.     

Political openness and armed conflict: Evidence from local councils in Colombia

In this paper, I empirically investigate how the openness of political institutions to diverse representation can impact conflict-related violence. Regression discontinuity estimates that exploit plausibly exogenous variations in the number of councillors in Colombian municipalities show that political openness substantially decreases conflict-related violence, namely the killing of civilian non-combatants. Empirical evidence suggests that the lower level of political violence stems from parties with close links to armed groups having greater representation on larger municipal councils. Using data about the types of violence employed by these groups, and government representation, I argue that armed violence has decreased not because of power-sharing arrangements involving armed groups linked to the parties with more political representation, but rather because armed groups with more political power deter other groups from initiating certain types of violence.     

Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary

I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.     

Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.     

Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

I examine whether elections influence perceived corruption in the public sector. Perceived corruption in the public sector is measured by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI). The dataset includes around 100 democracies over the period 2012–2016, a sample for which the CPI is comparable across countries and over time. The results show that the reversed CPI was about 0.4 points higher in election years than in other years, indicating that perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. The effect is especially pronounced before early elections (1.0 points) compared to regular elections (0.4 points). Future research needs to investigate why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections.