POSTING MULTIPLE PRICES TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER PRICE SEARCH*

In a model of competition with imperfect consumer price information and incomplete price search, some consumers may end up comparing prices originating from the same supplier: either because one firm sets multiple prices or because a group of firms colludes. This leads to added monopoly power for these firms, and average prices in the mixed strategy equilibrium become higher. There is a shift in welfare from consumers to producers, both with exogenous and endogenous consumer search behaviour. However consumers might search more or less with multiple prices. The implications for the price‐setting equilibrium, competition policy and recent judgements are considered.     

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Competitive targeted online advertising

This paper examines how an online publisher utilizes its information about consumer preference to target advertising. In our model, two firms first bid for a prominent ad position in a publisher-organized position auction, and then compete on price in the subsequent product marketplace. We consider two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers are heterogeneous in product preference. Based on their tastes, some consumers prefer one product over the other, whereas other consumers may rank the products in an opposite order. Second, consumers differ in search preference, i.e., “nonshoppers” only consider the advertised product, while “shoppers” always search both firms’ products before buying. We show that targeted advertising based on product preference will mitigate price competition in product markets as well as competition in position auctions, the latter to the detriment of the publisher. In contrast, targeted advertising based on search preference always benefits the publisher, as the winning firm can charge monopoly prices to nonshoppers. We show that the publisher’s optimal choice is to utilize only the information about consumer search preference. We also explore the welfare implications of targeted advertising based on different types of consumer preference.     

Transaction costs and competition policy

This paper evaluates current antitrust policy in light of our current understanding of how transaction costs influence the ability of firms and consumers to deal with market power. The paper shows how the failure to consider transaction costs can lead to erroneous policy decisions. Many models employed today make simplifying assumptions about transaction costs that can lead to biased results in analyzing vertical and horizontal issues. The increased ability to monitor the effect of promotional behavior should cause us to reexamine whether free riding justifications, previously accepted as justifications for various vertical restrictions, still hold. Nash bargaining and Nash-in-Nash models raise concerns about the simplified assumptions assumed in which supposedly high transaction costs restrict the choice and form of the assumed competitive alternatives. The increasing importance of two-sided markets together with an understanding of transaction costs is needed to understand antitrust conduct in those markets. The recent Amex case is likely to lead to confused litigation in these types of markets. Finally, the establishment of property rights for a consumer to his or her data could fail to remedy antitrust concerns that certain dominant firms are immune to competition because consumers do not own their data unless that property right is limited so that consumers cannot exclusively sell their data to one firm.     

Transparency regulation in broadband markets: Lessons from experimental research

This article presents a research project in experimental law and economics about transparency regulation in markets for experience goods, with implications for the implementation of transparency requirements in broadband markets. European and American regulators have introduced transparency policies in the broadband sector, although their effects on market actors are not fully understood. The experiment evaluates the effects of increased transparency on various market outcomes. Four scenarios are compared in which end-users have different amounts of information about quality. Findings of this research suggest that (1) more information about quality leads to higher total surplus and higher consumer surplus; (2) quality provided by firms increases with the level of transparency; and (3) quality and efficiency are marginally higher when full information about quality is only available to some consumers, than when all consumers have imperfect information about quality. To these findings a number of conclusions are attached relevant for broadband policy.     

Price competition when three are few and four are many

I examine price competition in a market for a homogeneous good when consumers observe prices subject to a random shock (perception error). When firms have symmetric costs, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, which is symmetric. When there are up to three sellers in the market, the sellers extract the entire consumer surplus. However, with at least four firms, assuming that the marginal cost is sufficiently low relative to consumers’ valuation, both consumers and producers may enjoy a positive surplus. The marginal-cost pricing is never observed in an equilibrium with finitely many firms. Potential policy implications are discussed.     

消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机

消费契约具有长期契约特征，不但企业对消费者的购买激励具备投资特征，消费者也会在购买过程中形成专用性资产。通过转移成本壁垒，企业和消费者被封闭在一种双边的长期契约关系当中，这种关系造成了消费契约的相对稳定性。但同时由于契约的不完全性，一旦消费者预期专用性资产变为沉没成本，潜在消费者将转投其他企业，造成企业的迅速倒闭。如果大企业不能采取有效措施，小的失误可能会演变成大的危机；由于大企业存在着危机的外部性．因此需要相应的公共政策。     

Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption

We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anti-competitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market, consumer welfare under a laissez-faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which RPM is banned. Government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry-wide adoption of RPM can have adverse welfare effects in the model. We further show that proposed guidelines in the United States and Europe may come close to minimizing welfare.     

Asymmetric Price Effects of Competition

When price dispersion is prevalent, a relevant question is what happens to the whole distribution of equilibrium prices when the number of firms changes. Using data from the gasoline market in the Netherlands, we find, first, that markets with N competitors have price distributions that first‐order stochastically dominate the price distributions in markets with N+1 firms. Second, the effect of competition is stronger for the medium to upper percentiles of the price distribution. Finally, consumer gains from competition are larger for relatively well‐informed consumers. To account for these empirical patterns, we extend Varian's [1980] model by allowing for richer heterogeneity in consumer price information.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts

This paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add-on insurance for their products. We develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown. Some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices, but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale. Under retail competition, the consumers’ option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss-leadership. Inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard, which can even reduce consumer surplus. The results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by UK legislators.     

Curbing obfuscation: Empower consumers or regulate firms?

This paper develops a market model where consumers refrain from buying products that they are unable to understand and a firm can influence the probability of a consumer understanding its offer. In equilibrium, firms artificially increase product complexity, and firms that offer more transparent products choose on average higher prices. We study two sets of public policies. We show that consumer side policies may have the unintended consequence of encouraging obfuscation while firm side policies are always effective in curbing obfuscation. Interestingly, a consumer side policy can even harm consumers when it protects consumers so much that it greatly increases the marginal effectiveness of obfuscation. Policies on both sides can either increase or decrease social welfare depending on the marginal effectiveness and the marginal cost of obfuscation. Our main insights hold in both asymmetric and symmetric obfuscation equilibria.     

Consumer search and income inequality

Competition and consumer search costs can lead to price dispersion in an oligopoly. IO research has long identified the existence of search costs and estimated their distribution and is now beginning to study which consumers sit where in the distribution. This paper argues for a view of consumer protection and competition policy that considers distributional outcomes along with efficiency. We discuss the evidence on how consumer search varies over the income distribution and provide a literature review that summarizes research on (i) the search-income gradient; (ii) mechanisms for the gradient; and (iii) how search-based price discrimination can give rise to regressive price dispersion. Through our review, we collect evidence from a wide range of industries that shows that low-income consumers tend not to search. We then draw on research from IO, marketing, finance, urban, and behavioral economics for explanations as to why this pattern persists. Finally, we conclude that IO researchers have much to offer in identifying and quantifying the distributional impacts of market power, thereby contributing to current academic and policy debates on efficiency-equity trade-offs in policy design.     

CUSTOMER POACHING AND ADVERTISING*

This paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets, where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness. When a firm is able to recognize customers with different purchasing histories, it may send them targeted advertisements with different prices. It is shown that only the firm which advertises the highest price in the first period will engage in price discrimination, a practice that clearly benefits the discriminating firm. This poaching gives rise to ‘the race for discrimination effect,’ through which price discrimination may act actually to soften price competition rather than intensify it. As a result, all firms may become better off, even when only one of them can engage in price discrimination. This paper offers a first attempt to evaluate the effects of price discrimination on the efficiency properties of advertising. In markets with low or no advertising costs, allowing firms to price discriminate leads them to provide too little advertising, which is not good for consumers and overall welfare. Only in markets with high advertising costs, might firms overadvertise. Regarding the welfare effects, price discrimination is generally bad for welfare and consumer surplus, though good for firms.     

What types of switching costs to create under behavior-based price discrimination?

We study firms' incentives to create switching costs using a four-period model consisting of two consecutive price-competing stages intervened by options to create switching costs early (before price competition) and late (during price competition). Acknowledging that many real/social switching costs need to be created early while many contractual/pecuniary switching costs are set up late during the competition, we show that firms are better off minimizing real/social switching costs while maximizing contractual/pecuniary switching costs. The results highlight the importance of timing of creation that is embedded in different types of switching costs. We also show that switching costs can actually benefit consumers when firms practice behavior-based price discrimination because consumers can enjoy benefits of deep price discounts without the hassle of actually switching. Therefore, an observed lack of consumer switching should not be immediately interpreted as lack of competition in markets where both switching costs and behavior-based pricing exist.     

User Toolkits for Innovation: Consumers Support Each Other

User toolkits for innovation were recently proposed as a means to eliminate (costly) exchange of need-related information between users and manufactures in the product development process. The method transfers certain development tasks to users and thereby empowers them to create their own desired product features. This article examines the implications of different levels of opportunities for consumer involvement (OCI) in product development to learn what happens when firms pass design tasks on to consumers. It explores this issue by studying the relation between the employment of user toolkits and the need for firms to support their consumers. An analysis of 78 computer games products and the amount of support given by firms to the consumers of these products suggests that a share of the costs firms save on information acquisition by letting consumers "do it themselves" may eventually reemerge as costs in consumer support. In other words, an increase in opportunities for consumer involvement seems to increase the need for supporting consumers. A promising solution to the problem of support costs is identified, namely, the establishment of consumer–consumer support interaction. A case study of an outlier in terms of firm support to consumers—Westwood Studios—shows that consumers who use toolkits may be willing to support each other. Such interactive problem solving in a firm-established user community is advantageous to the firm, because the process reduces the amount of resources that the firm itself needs to dedicate to the support of consumers using toolkits. Generally, consumer-to-consumer interaction can facilitate problem-solving in the consumer domain, can aid the diffusion of toolkit related knowledge, and potentially can enhance the outcomes produced by the toolkit approach.     

MARKET SEGMENTATION WITH NONLINEAR PRICING*

We study the benefits and drawbacks of allowing firms to offer different price‐quality menus to captive consumers and to consumers more exposed to competition (market segmentation). We show that the effect of market segmentation depends on the relationship between the range of consumer preferences found in captive and competitive markets. When the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘wide,’ segmentation is quality and (aggregate) welfare reducing, while the opposite holds when the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘narrow.’ Segmentation always harms captive consumers, while it always benefits consumers located in competitive markets.     

Should You Really Produce What Consumers Like Online? Empirical Evidence for Reciprocal Voting in Open Innovation Contests

In open innovation, firms increasingly rely on online consumer votes to evaluate ideas for new products and services. Votes can represent cost‐effective external information about idea quality that can inform and facilitate a firm's task of evaluating and screening of ideas at the early stages of the innovation process. Challenging this perception, we proposed that consumer votes provided in open innovation contests can be socially biased by reciprocal voting. On the basis of theories related to cooperation and social influence, we argued that both gregarious consumers (those who solicit social ties) and consumers who initiate direct reciprocity (those who vote for others) signal a willingness to cooperate that stimulates reciprocal voting from peers. We empirically investigated consumer voting behavior using a unique dataset with information obtained from actual open innovation contests in which consumers could submit their own ideas and see and vote for the ideas of others. We found that both gregariousness and the initiation of direct reciprocity positively influence votes received. Such cooperation pays off for consumers because firms indeed use votes to inform internal idea evaluations. We also found, however, that the votes an idea receives during an innovation contest cannot significantly explain its later revealed quality. Reciprocity may be an effective form of cooperation among consumers, but it has potentially negative implications for firms' evaluations. Our results also indicated that beyond reciprocity, consumers and firms value different types of ideas, which further differentiates their evaluations. Thus, firms should not only be aware of social biases in votes but also account for the diverging idea preferences of customers.     

Brand versus generic advertising and the decision to advertise collectively

This study uses Lancaster's (1966, 1979) characteristics model of consumer theory, combined with imperfect information, to support a firm's advertising choice of a combination of brand and generic advertising. However, as consumers become well educated about a firm's product, spillovers from generic advertising become large. When spillovers are large, firms have a greater incentive to collude on generic advertising. The firm's decision to include advertising collectively with its competitors will follow from its own analysis of the benefits versus the costs of such a union. The success of collective advertising may, however, depend on the control of free-riders.