Learning strategic cooperative behavior in industrial symbiosis: A game‐theoretic approach integrated with agent‐based simulation

This paper investigates the negotiation phase of industrial symbiosis relationships, where companies exchanging wastes for inputs need to develop strategies on how to share the additional costs to operate the industrial symbiosis business. The business behavior is approached as a “coopetition” problem where companies need to cooperate to reduce waste discharge costs and traditional input purchase costs and dive into competition to pay a minimum share of additional costs (i.e., waste treatment, waste transportation, and transaction costs) of operating industrial symbiosis. A noncooperative game‐theoretical model for sharing the additional costs is proposed that highlights the two strategies that companies can adopt aimed at sharing costs: a fair strategy and an opportunistic strategy. Then, an agent‐based model is used to simulate the game iterated over time and investigate how the players can adapt their strategies according to their past experience. Simulation results show that players learn that playing the fair strategy is beneficial in the long period, despite in the short period they can gain more benefit by playing the opportunistic strategy. Findings of the paper are critically important to reduce the business and managerial barriers against the formation of industrial symbiosis networks and to stimulate innovative thinking of company managers to foster the development of the circular economy. The paper proposes theoretical, managerial, and policy implications, which are discussed in detail in a comparative manner between linear and circular economy.     

基于CVaR与平均离差波动限制的投资组合模型

提出了一种基于CVaR的投资组合模型,对组合资产收益率不做正态分布假设,用MAD模型作为一个约束条件,实现波动性度量限制,用上凸效用函数作为一个约束条件,表示风险资产交易费用。实验结果表明,该模型满足实际投资要求,符合实际投资规律,与M-V模型和原始CVaR模型相比具有波动性和风险价值最小化的优势。     

Competition in Regulated Markets with Sluggish Beliefs about Quality

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish beliefs about quality. We take a differential‐game approach, and derive the open‐loop solution (providers choose the optimal quality investment plan based on demand at the initial period) and the feedback closed‐loop solution (providers observe demand in each period and choose quality in response to current demand). If variable costs are strictly convex, and the degree of cost complementarity between quality and output is not too strong, the steady‐state quality is higher under the open‐loop solution than under the feedback solution. In both solutions, quality and demand move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the steady‐state. While lower transportation costs or less sluggish beliefs lead to higher quality in both solutions, the quality response is weaker when players use feedback strategies.     

Direct perturbations of aggregate excess demand

We complement the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu results by establishing that an exchange economy, i.e., preferences and endowments, that generates a given aggregate excess demand (AED) function is close to the economy that generates a perturbation of this AED. As a consequence, genericity and determinacy results obtained by direct perturbation of an AED are as strong as results obtained by perturbing preferences and endowments.     

‘High potential’ programs: Let's hear it for ‘B’ players

Organizations implement ‘high potential’ (HiPo) programs to identify, develop and retain their most talented employees (also known as ‘A’ players). However, there is still not much known on how these programs affect other employees (i.e., ‘B’ players) who are not included. Drawing on Bowen and Ostroff's (2004) framework on the strength of HRM system and attribution theory, we theoretically examine the impact of HiPo programs on ‘B’ players’ attitudes and behaviours. Specifically, we propose that ‘B’ players use various information and contextual cues to make attributions about these programs. We also propose that trust moderates the relationship between various meta-features of HiPo programs and ‘B’ players' perceptions about these programs. Further, we examine the role of an employee's motivation profile (i.e., achievement motivation and power motivation) in forming his/her attributions about these programs, which then affects his/her commitment and organizational citizenship behaviours. Future research directions and practical implications are presented.     

Discrimination,technology and unemployment

I study the interaction between discrimination and investment using a directed search model where firms decide the capital intensity of their production technologies before being matched. Discrimination makes some workers cheap to hire. As a consequence, some firms might save on capital costs adopting labour intensive technologies. This framework allows one to reconcile search models with three well-known facts regarding the labour market outcomes of minority workers: low wages, high unemployment and occupational segregation. Furthermore, the model questions the role of equal pay legislation in reducing inequality since removing this restriction, i.e., allowing firms to post type-contingent wages, eliminates the negative effects of discrimination on investment and wages.     

Linear cumulative prospect theory with applications to portfolio selection and insurance demand

Abstract The present paper combines loss attitudes and linear utility by providing an axiomatic analysis of corresponding preferences in a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework. In a sense we derive a two-sided variant of Yaari’s dual theory, i.e., nonlinear probability weights in the presence of linear utility. The first important difference is that utility may have a kink at the status quo, which allows for the exhibition of loss aversion. Also, we may have different probability weighting functions for gains than for losses. We apply the model to both portfolio selection and insurance demand. Our results show that CPT with linear utility has more realistic implications than the dual theory since it implies only a weakened variant of plunging. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B08, 91B28, 91B30 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81, G11, G22     

Diversification preferences in the theory of choice

Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper analyzes axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion.     

Planning horizons for master production scheduling

Production and operations planning in organizations quite often is a multi-level sequential process, involving aggregate planning, master production scheduling, and detailed operations planning and scheduling. To obtain good planning results, it is desirable to have a proper planning horizon for each level of planning. There have been a considerable number of studies dealing with planning horizons for aggregate planning or production smoothing problems. There are also many planning horizon studies for single-item lot sizing problems. No study has addressed the issues associated with the planning horizons for master production schedules (which is a multi-item lot sizing problem in nature), particularly with respect to the relationship to the aggregate plan.This study addresses the issue of planning horizons for companies employing a make-to-stock competitive strategy facing a seasonal demand for their products. We formulate the aggregate planning problem and the master scheduling problem as two separate mathematical programs to approximate the two-stage process that typically takes place in practice. Rolling planning horizons are used to approximate the periodic updates of the plans commonly done in practice. The models also incorporate resource requirements planning concepts to estimate loads on the critical work centers.The planning process is simulated as a single pass procedure where the results of aggregate planning are passed to the master production scheduling model once per month and the results of the master scheduling model (i.e., the portion of the master schedule actually implemented) are passed back to the aggregate planning model for the next planning session.The experimental results show that when the planner faces extreme cost structures such as high smoothing costs/high setup costs or low smoothing costs/low setup costs, the planning horizon effects are reduced to a minimum. Master schedule planning horizons need not be as long as aggregate planning horizons. Alternatively, non-extreme cost structures such as high smoothing costs/low setup costs and low smoothing costs/high setup costs should be handled with equal planning horizons for both aggregate planning and master scheduling.It is also found that the firm's cost structure has an impact on the appropriate planning horizon for both aggregate planning and master scheduling. Some cost conditions allow for smaller master schedule horizons. The best horizon choice seems to be equal planning horizons for both aggregate planning and master scheduling, even though the cost savings is slight in some cases.Finally, the proper length of the planning horizon for master scheduling is affected by the planning horizon of the aggregate plans.     

证券投资的风险偏好与期望效用决策模型

本文把期望效用理论用于投资决策分析，按实际风险偏好的系统分类构造模型，据此证明决策人效用函数必为线性函数和指数函数；前者对应风险中立，后者对应风险厌恶和风险追求；函数参数的不同取值，唯一确定了各类风险偏好的性质和程度。由此产生的分析方法和模型，可同时适用于正态或非正态收益分布的证券组合，为投资价值的评估提供有效而实用的程序。     

Null players,solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values

The Shapley value probably is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition’s worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. Within this characterization, additivity and desirability can be replaced by strong differential monotonicity, which translates higher productivity differentials into higher payoff differentials.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Differences Between Short‐ and Long‐Term Risk Aversion: An Optimal Asset Allocation Perspective

This paper studies the long‐term asset allocation problem of an investor with different risk aversion attitudes to the short and the long term. We characterize investor's preferences with a utility function exhibiting a regime shift in risk aversion at some point of the multiperiod investment horizon that is estimated using threshold nonlinearity methods. Our empirical results for a portfolio of cash, bonds and stocks suggest that long‐term risk aversion is higher than short‐term risk aversion and increases with the investment horizon. The exposure of the investment portfolio from stocks to bonds and cash increases with the degree of risk aversion.     

Linking forward and reverse supply chain investments: The role of business uncertainty

This paper explores managerial efforts in reverse supply chains (RSC), where the focus is on the capture and exploitation of used products and materials. The RSC can potentially reduce negative environmental impacts of extracting virgin raw materials and waste disposal. If so, investment in the reverse supply chain should not be made in isolation, but instead must be integrated with investments selected to improve the forward supply chain. After defining and operationalizing these constructs, a survey of plant managers was used to empirically assess the linkages between supply chain investments, organizational risk propensity (i.e., willingness to take risk) and business uncertainty. Reverse supply chain investment had two primary dimensions: reconditioning (i.e., high-value recovery) and recycling and waste management (i.e., low- or no-value recovery). Ongoing investment in the forward supply chain was significantly related to investment in recycling and waste management, but not to investment in reconditioning. Moreover, risk propensity was found to mediate the relationship between the external business uncertainty and investment in the forward and reverse supply chain.     

Investment Frictions and the Aggregate Output Loss in China

Investment frictions reduce, delay or protract investment expenditure that is necessary for firms to capture growth opportunities. Using a capital adjustment costs framework, this article estimates the gap between China's actual and frictionless aggregate output. It applies the method of simulated moments to a fully structural investment model on a panel of Chinese firms and takes into account potential unobserved heterogeneities and measurement error in the data. The estimated capital adjustment costs imply that if Chinese firms had faced a lower level of adjustment costs such as in the US, China's aggregate output would be 25% higher.     

(Non-)Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models

This paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods. We show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions, the basic structure of multicommunity models (i.e., perfect mobility, majority rule, single crossing property) implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist. Stratification equilibria—with sorting of the population according to income classes—are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested. Mechanisms that can serve to support stratification (i.e., tight housing markets, returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods) are discussed.     

On the nature of certainty equivalent functionals

We explore connections between the certainty equivalent return (CER) functional and the underlying utility function. Curvature properties of the functional depend upon how utility function attributes relate to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) type utility functions. If the CER functional is concave, i.e., if risk tolerance is concave in wealth, then preferences are standard. The CER functional is linear in lotteries if utility is HARA and lottery payoffs are on a line in state space. Implications for the optimality of portfolio diversification are given. When utility is concave and non-increasing relative risk averse, then the CER functional is superadditive in lotteries. Depending upon the nature of association among lottery payoffs, CERs for constant absolute risk averse utility functions may be subadditive or superadditive in lotteries. Our approach lends itself to straightforward experiments to elicit higher order attributes on risk preferences.     

On the nature of certainty equivalent functionals

We explore connections between the certainty equivalent return (CER) functional and the underlying utility function. Curvature properties of the functional depend upon how utility function attributes relate to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) type utility functions. If the CER functional is concave, i.e., if risk tolerance is concave in wealth, then preferences are standard. The CER functional is linear in lotteries if utility is HARA and lottery payoffs are on a line in state space. Implications for the optimality of portfolio diversification are given. When utility is concave and non-increasing relative risk averse, then the CER functional is superadditive in lotteries. Depending upon the nature of association among lottery payoffs, CERs for constant absolute risk averse utility functions may be subadditive or superadditive in lotteries. Our approach lends itself to straightforward experiments to elicit higher order attributes on risk preferences.     

Risk shocks and housing supply: A quantitative analysis

This paper analyzes the role of stochastic uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with financial frictions. We include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that affect housing production and provide estimates of the time-series properties of risk shocks by using firm level productivity data. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing production sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for understanding housing price movements. Specifically, the model can match the volatility of housing prices observed in the data. It is also demonstrated that adjustment costs are important in replicating the contemporaneous correlation of housing prices with GDP and residential investment. Critically, bankruptcy costs act as an endogenous markup factor in housing prices and are an important determinant of house price volatility. However, in comparison to housing demand shocks, risk shocks have low explanatory power for real quantities.     

Robustness of statistical inferences using linear models with meta-analytic correlation matrices

To examine complex relationships among variables, researchers in human resource management, industrial-organizational psychology, organizational behavior, and related fields have increasingly used meta-analytic procedures to aggregate effect sizes across primary studies to form meta-analytic correlation matrices, which are then subjected to further analyses using linear models (e.g., multiple linear regression). Because missing effect sizes (i.e., correlation coefficients) and different sample sizes across primary studies can occur when constructing meta-analytic correlation matrices, the present study examined the effects of missingness under realistic conditions and various methods for estimating sample size (e.g., minimum sample size, arithmetic mean, harmonic mean, and geometric mean) on the estimated squared multiple correlation coefficient (R²) and the power of the significance test on the overall R² in linear regression. Simulation results suggest that missing data had a more detrimental effect as the number of primary studies decreased and the number of predictor variables increased. It appears that using second-order sample sizes of at least 10 (i.e., independent effect sizes) can improve both statistical power and estimation of the overall R² considerably. Results also suggest that although the minimum sample size should not be used to estimate sample size, the other sample size estimates appear to perform similarly.