Firm-specific learning-by-doing in semiconductor production: Some evidence from the 1986 Trade Agreement

Studies of the economic effect of learning-by-doing in production have been hampered by the difficulty in obtaining firm-specific cost of production data. After the 1986 Trade Agreement between the United States and Japan, the U.S. Commerce Department made public masked versions of the cost of production of many semiconductor products sold in the U.S. by Japanese firms. This paper presents some of these masked, quarterly, firm-specific production cost data for different densities of DRAMs and EPROMs. The data do not give much support to the hypothesis of strong firm-specific learning-by-doing in semiconductor production. The rate of learning-by-doing may also differ significantly across firms, which also casts doubt on the impact of learning-by-doing on market structure.     

Public Procurement of Innovation: Evidence from a German Legislative Reform

Using public procurement to promote private innovation activities has attracted increasing attention recently. Germany implemented a legal change in its procurement framework in 2009, which allowed government agencies to specify innovative aspects of procured products as selection criteria in calls for tender. We analyze a sample of 3410 German firms to investigate whether this reform stimulated innovation in the business sector. Across a wide range of specifications – OLS, nearest-neighbor matching, IV regressions and difference-in-differences – we find a robust and significant effect of innovation-directed public procurement on turnover with new products and services. At the same time, our results demonstrate that public procurement mainly stimulates innovations of more incremental nature rather than true market novelties.     

Resident Bid Preference,Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.     

Adoption of a Process Innovation with Learning-by-Doing: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

This article analyzes the adoption of a new process technology in the global semiconductor manufacturing industry. The paper extends research on the relationship between learning-by-doing and technology adoption by examining the stability of learning effects across technological generations. While the results indicate that production experience with the immediately preceding technological generation is associated with a higher likelihood of adoption, we find no evidence that experience with older technologies or regional knowledge spillovers influence adoption. Finally, the results indicate that large firms and memory manufacturers have a higher likelihood of adoption than small firms and non-memory manufacturers, respectively.     

Career Concerns,Inaction and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation

We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value‐increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities and show that career concerns may lead to a reduction in surplus‐increasing market transactions during periods when the benefits of trade are likely to be greatest. We show that data from natural gas markets are consistent with this prediction and difficult to explain using alternative theories.     

How much to make and how much to buy? An analysis of optimal plural sourcing strategies

While many theories of the firm seek to explain when firms make rather than buy, in practice firms often make and buy the same input—they engage in plural sourcing. We argue that explaining the mix of external procurement and internal sourcing for the same input requires a consideration of complementarities across and constraints within modes of procurement. We create analytical foundations for making empirical predictions about when plural sourcing is likely to be optimal and why the optimal mix of internal and external sourcing may vary across situations. Our framework also proves useful for assessing the possible estimation biases in transaction level make‐or‐buy studies arising from ignoring complementarities and constraints. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm-specific time preferences and postmerger firm performance

This study investigates the role of firm-level discount factors in evaluating the impact of mergers on market outcomes. Discount factors reflect time preferences for future cash flows and are used to determine the present value of investment projects such as mergers. Firm-specific discount factors imply that firms may attach different present values to mergers. We elicit firm-specific time preferences and identify firms’ discount factors using firm-specific production data while building on the existence of learning-by-doing in the semiconductor industry. Our estimation results show that firm-specific discount factors explain firms’ production decisions. We also find that firms’ discount factors and merger acquisition strategies explain heterogeneous merger outcomes. Our results show that acquiring firms characterized by low discount factors (impatient firms) are highly efficient and merge with highly efficient and innovative firms. Impatient acquirers achieve relatively higher efficiency gains in the short run than patient acquirers and adopt acquisition strategies that put more weight on achieving instant efficiency gains. In contrast, patient acquirers are least efficient and merge with firms that are larger than themselves. Patient acquirers place more value on achieving efficiency gains in the more distant future.     

The impact of sustainable public procurement on supplier management — The case of French public hospitals

In the public sector, procurement managers are now required to comply with new sustainable regulations and to look for suppliers able to provide a sustainable offering. Stating that contracts can only frame part of the interaction and that parties often turn to more negotiated agreements, we investigate whether sustainable expectations within public hospitals could impact supplier management and imply rearrangements between public buyers and private providers. Data were collected from fifteen French hospitals through semi-structured interviews. Findings first highlight the sustainable expectations of public buyers from global key providers, and, second, that sustainable procurement does impact the relationship by creating new rules. Building on these results, managerial implications are suggested.     

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.     

Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement

In this paper, we investigate the interaction between two firms, which are involved in a repeated procurement relationship modeled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auctioneer (a government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection criteria. Our main result is that favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders operating in a stochastically changing environment. A most simple allocation rule where firms take turns in winning, independently of stochastic social preferences and firms’ costs, achieves full cartel efficiency (including price, production, and design efficiency). In each period the selection criteria is fine-tailored to the in-turn winner: the “environment” adapts to the cartel. This result holds true when the expected punishment is a fixed cost. When the cost varies with the magnitude of the distortion of the selection criteria (compared to the true social preferences), favoritism only partially shelters the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost for society. Our analysis suggests some anti-corruption measures that could be effective in curbing favoritism and collusion in public markets. It also suggests that the much-advocated rotation of officials is likely to be counter-productive.     

Dynamics of the transition process towards partnership thinking in centralized public procurement

This research paper seeks to increase the knowledge of the transition process from transactional arm's length tendering towards partnership thinking in centralized public procurement. In centralized public procurement, the professional public purchaser forms a triadic partnership relationship with the public unit managing the procurement implementation and the private organization. A triadic partnership relationship in a home nursing procurement setting is investigated to further the understanding of the relationship dynamics related to the transitioning of public and private actors towards partnership thinking. The research shows how transactional procurement logic hinders the transition to partnering by establishing challenges for initiating and nurturing public–private partnerships (PPPs) and how partnership thinking changes this procurement logic. It illustrates the transactional procurement logic of single actor and the logic underlying the relationship of two actors to engender and intensify the problems of triad in the centralized public procurement process and vice versa; that is, a shared understanding from jointly agreed procurement goals between two actors is identified as promoting triadic partnering. Managerial implications are given for those public and private organizations engaging in PPPs and seeking to understand the ways of managing them in the context of centralized public procurement, particularly during the transition towards partnership thinking.     

Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005-2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.     

Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals

In many procurement auctions bidders do not know how many rivals they face at the time that they incur the cost of preparing their bids. We show in a theoretical model that regardless of whether the procurement is characterized by private or by common values an increase in the potential number of bidders may lead to higher procurement costs. This raises potential policy questions of whether and how entry should be encouraged or limited in public procurement auctions. We use evidence from auctions of construction contracts to estimate the effect of an increase in the pool of potential bidders on entry and auction prices when entry and bidding decisions are made sequentially with no knowledge of the number or identity of the actual competitors.     

Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement

A “low-balling strategy” by bidding contractors has increasingly been recognized as an important issue in public infrastructure procurement. Public works contracts are often imperfect and renegotiated after the contract award. Given the expectation for ex post adjustments, bidders seem motivated to take advantage of the low-balling strategy. This paper analyzes the endogeneity between the bid strategy and ex post adjustments. Using procurement data on rural road projects in Nepal, it shows that the bid strategy and adjustments are determined endogenously in the system. Anticipating cost and time overruns, firms would likely undercut normal bid prices. Then, ex post contract adjustments actually happen, because of their too aggressive bids.     

The home bias in procurement. Cross-border procurement of medical supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Public procurement markets are often national despite a general agreement against national preferencing. I exploit shocks occurring during the Covid-19 pandemic to two important factors, crisis urgency, measured through local infection rates, and increased buyer discretion, to study home bias in public procurement. Two causal difference-in-difference analyses on novel data for medical supplies in Europe show that home bias is not inevitable. An increase in local infection rates by one standard deviation locally increases the share of cross-border procurement by 19.3 percentage points over a baseline of 1.5 percent. Also, deregulation that allowed for buyer discretion caused cross-border procurement to increase by more than 35 percentage points. A simple theoretical model systematizes these findings.     

Sourcing strategies of U.S. service companies: a modified transaction–cost analysis

Global procurement of services has been receiving an increasing amount of managerial attention in recent years. Service firms seem to have begun sourcing part of their service activities from abroad in much the same way as manufacturing firms have sourced components and finished goods in the past 30 years. However, little is known about the nature of service sourcing strategy. In this study, we employ a modified transaction–cost analysis to examine empirically the locational (domestic vs. global sourcing) and the ownership (internal vs. external sourcing) aspects of service sourcing strategy. In addition, performance implications on both the locational and ownership aspects of service sourcing are investigated. The results show that, similar to components and finished goods procurement, supplementary services are sourced globally, either internally or externally. Furthermore, the relationship between asset specificity and internal sourcing of supplementary services is moderated by the level of inseparability and transaction frequency. Finally, internal sourcing and foreign sourcing of supplementary services are negatively related to a service’s market performance. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of global and local cohesion on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry

In this paper, we examine how the configuration of intraorganizational networks, and in particular, cohesion among members of an organization, influences organizations' innovative output. We argue that the cohesion among R&D scientists could be at a local level or a global level, and that local and global cohesion may have different impacts on firms' innovation performance. We test our hypotheses by examining the structure of the R&D collaboration networks within firms that operated in the pharmaceutical industry between 1981 and 1989, and their innovative outcomes—patents that led to new product launches. We find that local cohesion has a positive impact on the innovative performance of a firm, and global cohesion has a negative impact. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic procurement, openness and market structure

We examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its effect on market structure in sectors, such as defence and pharmaceuticals, where the government is the dominant consumer. In a world economy with trade between producer countries, and between producers and non-producers, we use a modified Dixit–Stiglitz utility function with an independent taste for variety. There is free entry and exit by firms, but by anticipating their participation constraint governments can indirectly choose the number of domestic firms and their size through its choice of procurement price. Unlike the standard model with no independent taste for variety and no external sector of non-producer countries, there are incentives for subsidies, openness impacts on industrial structure and procurement coordination between producer countries affects firm numbers.     

DOES THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF APPROPRIABILITY?*

We explore the interaction between public support for R&D and appropriability using a dataset constructed from the Spanish Community Innovation Survey, for the period 2000–2005. We find that public support policy is less able to stimulate privately financed internal R&D in firms where appropriability mechanisms are more effective. On average, the effect of public support for R&D is three times larger for those firms reporting a level of appropriability below the median vis‐à‐vis those firms for which appropriability is above the median level. Furthermore, for supported firms with the highest degree of appropriability, crowding out cannot be ruled out.     

Incumbent firm invention in emerging fields: evidence from the semiconductor industry

Incumbent firms are often thought to focus on incremental innovations and only respond to a major technological change once its impact on established markets and/or dominant designs becomes clear. We argue, however, that incumbent firms have many reasons to proactively invent early in cycles of technological change. Our interest is in the strategies that allow incumbents to be successful in this endeavor during the infancy of an emerging field—the period before it is clear how the field will affect dominant designs. Our evidence counters the stereotypical view that incumbent firms play a passive role in major technological changes by adhering to incremental inventions in the existing dominant designs. Rather, we find significant inventions by incumbents outside the existing dominant designs and relate their success to their willingness to search novel areas, explore scientific knowledge in the public domain, and form alliances with a balanced portfolio of partners. We find support for our hypotheses using data from the global semiconductor industry between 1989 and 2002. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.