A bargaining set for roommate problems

Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibility of blocking pairs. We adopt the weak stability notion of Klijn and Massó (2003) for the marriage problem and we extend it to the roommate problem. We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept based on the credibility of the deviations for the roommate problem: the bargaining set. We show that weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. We generalize the coincidence result for marriage problems of Klijn and Massó (2003) between the bargaining set and the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings to roommate problems. Finally, we prove that the bargaining set for roommate problems is always non-empty by making use of the coincidence result.     

Probabilistic sophistication,second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion

We study the interplay of probabilistic sophistication, second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion, three fundamental notions in choice under uncertainty. In particular, our main result, Theorem 2, characterizes uncertainty averse preferences that are probabilistically sophisticated, as well as uncertainty averse preferences that satisfy second order stochastic dominance. As a byproduct, Proposition 2 highlights a fundamental tension between probabilistic sophistication/second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion in the presence of nontrivial unambiguous events.     

Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining “set inclusion results” on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.     

Agreement toward stability in matching markets

For firms with responsive preferences, we prove that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to any firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. This follows from a generalization of the Decomposition Lemma. The result does not hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. Nevertheless, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously least preferred by workers, and most preferred by firms. When a firm quasi-stable matching is fed into our extension of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (where firms propose), the existence of this matching guarantees the success of the algorithm.     

On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties. Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000     

Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem

Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations admits one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be small. But examples exist such that the set of stable matchings with respect to a Nash equilibrium may contain more than one matching. Nevertheless, each Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. If, indeed, there is a true stable matching at a Nash equilibrium, then the only possible equilibrium outcome will be the true stable matching, no matter how different are players' equilibrium strategies from the true preferences and how many other unstable matchings are there at that Nash equilibrium. Thus, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibria by the direct revelation game induced by a stable mechanism is that every Nash equilibrium profile in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001 This paper is a revision of the paper “Manipulation and Stability in a College Admissions Problem” circulated since 1994. I thank Rich McLean, Abraham Neyman, Mark Satterthwaite, Sang-Chul Suh, and Tetsuji Yamada for helpful discussions. I thank the associate editor and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments that have greatly improved the paper. I am grateful to the Kellogg G.S.M. at the Northwestern University for the hospitality for my visit. Any errors are mine.     

Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market

I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 31 January 1997     

Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items, when the buyer’s valuations are independent and additive. We obtain two sets of structural results of the optimal mechanisms, which can be summarized in one conclusion: under certain distributional conditions, the optimal mechanisms have simple menus.The first set of results states that, under a condition that requires that the types are concentrated on lower values, the optimal menu can be sorted in ascending order. Applying the theorem, we derive a revenue-monotonicity theorem which states that stochastically dominated distributions yield less revenue.The second set of results states that, under certain conditions which require that types are distributed more evenly or are concentrated on higher values, the optimal mechanisms have a few menu items. Our first result states that, for certain such distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 4 menu items. The condition admits power density functions. Our second result works for a weaker condition, under which the optimal menu contains at most 6 menu items. Our last result in this set works for the unit-demand setting, it states for uniform distributions, the optimal menu contains at most 5 items.     

来华留学生突发事件处理机制的研究

随着中国经济的发展,留学生教育也随之发展起来,有越来越多的国外学生来华学习。近几年,留学生突发事件发生率不断增加,严重影响了学校正常教学管理工作的正常进行。通过对留学生突发事件的调研和分析发现留学生心理问题是导致突发事件发生的主要原因,建立完善的突发事件处理管理机制和科学的预防手段是留学生教育健康发展的重要保证,是维系高校稳定、社会和谐的重要因素。     

Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power

We allow departures from IIA in Arrow’s framework. Our measure of the extent of a departure is the amount of information needed to socially order a pair of alternatives. We also propose a measure of the scope of an individual’s power. The scope of at least one individual’s power increases in step with a reduction in the amount of information that has to be gathered to socially order two alternatives. This result is also established for correspondences, which select a subset of the feasible set as a function of individual preferences.     

Academic scholarship,organization prestige,and the earnings of U.S. business school deans

This study models the market for business school deans as an outcome of a differential game between a university's central administration and the job candidates in the market for business school deans. In our model, the ability of a business school dean to advance the organization is enhanced by his or her own scholarly reputation, such that a job candidate chooses an optimal level of scholarship that relates to his or her marketability. In this way, the supply of scholarship (by job candidates) can be seen as the supply of job candidates in the market for business school deans, whereas the demand for scholarship can be seen as the demand for business school deans. The main features of our game‐theoretic model are tested using data from both national and regional business schools and colleges in the U.S. Econometric results indicate that each additional scholarly contribution by a business school dean generates a wage premium ranging from $1,000 to $1,200, whereas in the case of national institutions, each additional student enrolled at the doctoral (master's) level raises the wage by $671 ($56). Lastly, the production of between nine and 10 scholarly contributions is found to be necessary in order to face a 50% probability of holding a business school deanship at a national institution, whereas production of about 37 scholarly contributions leads to a 50% probability of holding a deanship with a named business school at a national institution.     

Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems

In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in preferences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced. We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank-enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who becomes higher ranked by the original partner should not be punished. We show that this property cannot always be met if the matchings are required to be stable. However, if only one agent changes his preferences, the above requirement is compatible with stability, and moreover, envy-minimization in stable matchings can also be attained. The other property is a solidarity property, requiring that all of the “irrelevant” agents, whose preferences as well as whose original partners’ preferences are unchanged, should be affected in the same way; either all weakly better off or all worse off. We show that when matchings are required to be stable, this property does not always hold.     

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which firms’ preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q-separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference profiles if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of profiles.     

学生党员、党支部在优良校风、学风建设中发挥作用的途径研究——基于赫赛—布兰查德的情境领导理论

校风、学风,就是一所学校的风气,是指一所学校的全体教职工和学生在教学和学习过程中经过长期积累所形成的稳定的、鲜明的、被社会公众所公认的行为倾向。本文通过将组织行为学、管理学引入学生党员、党支部在优良校风、学风建设发挥作用的途径研究中,论证高校学生党员、党支部在形成和维系优良校风、学风等优秀组织文化中,应根据学生群体的不同类型采取不同的领导方式。     

高校研究生院学籍管理系统的设计与开发

学籍管理系统作为综合教务系统的一个基本组成部分,是高校实现教育教学管理信息化必须要建立的信息系统之一。本文深入探究了研究生院学籍管理的用户需求,并研究学籍管理子系统和研究生综合教务系统中其他子系统之间的关系,采用Delphi 7+My Eclipse+Tomcat+Oracle+PLSQL Developer系统开发平台,结合缜密的开发思路,开发了一套适合高校研究生院使用的学籍管理系统。     

Assessing the efficiency of secondary schools: Evidence from OECD countries participating in PISA 2015

One of the most important issues accompanying the publication of the main results of the well-known Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is the classification of countries according to student attainment. However, this ranking does not take into account some highly relevant factors, such as the different resource endowments of each education system or the heterogeneous context in which schools operate. This study aims to provide a fuller picture of education system operation worldwide by assessing the managerial efficiency of secondary schools in a cross-country framework. To do this, we use data from OECD countries participating in PISA 2015 and apply a robust nonparametric approach that accounts for the fact that schools were operating under heterogeneous conditions before the efficiency measures of performance were estimated. Our results suggest that the consideration of both school resources and environmental factors significantly modifies the country ranking based solely on student results.     

高校学生合法权益的行政救济现状及对策研究

文章对我国高校学生合法权益的行政救济现状进行了分析,并采取有效对策来完善高校学生合法权益的行政救济,即加强法律教育,树立法治理念和维权意识、完善学校行政救济机制,对进一步维护学生合法权益或有一定的理论意义和现实意义。     

A characterization of the nonlinearity of d-stability

A set of equilibrium prices in a multiple commodity market is stable regardless of the adjustment rates in each market if and only if the Jacobian of the system is D-stable. In this note we show that a stable matrix is D-stable if and only if a certain pair of simultaneous nonlinear equations does not have a common zero over the range of positive n-vectors.     

Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance

We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty (C), meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue further that dominance has to be replaced by path dominance (P) along the lines of van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009). This results in the pairwise CP vNM set in the case of pairwise deviations and the CP vNM set in the case of coalitional deviations. We obtain a unique prediction for both types of stable sets: the set of matchings that belong to the core.     

浅析高校学生干部积极性缺失与激励机制的运用

据调查,新生在刚入学时,都有过争当学生干部的经历,新生竞聘学生干部的比例大,积极性强,热情高,但是随着时间的推移会出现积极性缺失的现象。这要求高校教育管理者们在选拔和任用学生干部时进行严格把关,还要在更长久的时间里提高他们的服务意识,并建立一种长期有效的、符合自己校园当下环境的激励机制来激发学生干部的积极性。