机制设计中的履约理论研究综述

显示原理和履约理论是机制设计理论中的两大基石。履约理论把社会选择规则和博弈论联系起来,确保计划者预设的社会目标可以实现。马斯金首先提出了纳什履约理论的充分必要条件,即马斯金单调性和无否决权,随后其他学者提出了其它均衡策略的履约条件。文章论述了履约理论的产生背景和过程,分析了完全信息和不完全信息两种情形下不同的均衡策略履约条件及其精炼,并讨论了履约理论的局限性和未来的研究方向。     

Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem

This study considers a situation in which agents choose the location of a public facility from a street according to a given mechanism. Agents have single-dipped preferences over a set of feasible locations. We analyze coalitional behavior for any given mechanism for this situation. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to possess a strong Nash equilibrium by applying the minimax theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). We introduce a class of core solutions and show that these solutions are characterized by strong Nash implementability. As a byproduct of these results, we propose a simple mechanism that implements any core solution in strong Nash equilibria.     

Repeated implementation and complexity considerations

A game form is commitment-free if single actions of players do not have physical consequences, i.e., affect the continuation game. Such game can be thought to represent inifinite interaction with complete patience. A choice rule can be Nash implemented via a commitment-free mechanism if and only if it coincides with the feasible set of a normal form game. However, when players are complexity averse (in the lexicographic sense), then any Nash implementable choice rule becomes available. I am very grateful to Matt Jackson and a referee for their comments. I also thank Klaus Kultti and Hannu Salonen for useful conversations.     

Competition in the public school sector: Evidence on strategic interaction among US school districts

This paper provides evidence on strategic interaction among local school districts. The analysis makes use of a significant change in the institutional environment for school districts in Michigan in 1996, when the state established a voluntary inter-district choice program. The school districts' participation decisions are modelled as discrete choice decisions using a spatial latent variable model. Strong effects are found saying that lagged adoptions of neighbors positively affect the current probability of participation. A simple test exploiting limitations of student mobility in inter-district transfers suggests that the driving force for interdependencies among adoption decisions was competition for students.     

Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution

We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Pareto-efficient allocation to be implemented. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of Lindahl prices is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium, and implements the corresponding Lindahl allocation. Finally, besides being balanced, our mechanism is simple. Each agent has to declare a desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers of initial endowments (across other agents).Received: 9 May 2003, Accepted: 22 October 2003, JEL Classification: C79, H21, H30, H41We wish to thank Jeremy Edwards, Andrew Postlewaite and Emanuela Sciubba for helpful comments. Of course, any remaining errors are our own.     

Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms

We consider the problem of designing an economic mechanism for reallocation of endowments. In this class of economic environments, an additional restriction can be imposed which prevents agents from overstating their endowments. We explore the extent to which the additional information gained from no overstatement can be used to reduce the informational cost of an endowment mechanism. The ideas are also extended to production environments. We would like to thank Leo Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter, Matthew Jackson, Thomas Palfrey and Yan Chen for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Preserving religious identity through education: Economic analysis and evidence from the US

This paper models the decision of religious parents to send their children to private religious schools as reflecting their desire to shield their children from external influences and thus preserve their religious identity. It follows that when the share of the minority in the local population grows—and outside influences become less threatening—the demand for separate religious schooling among the members of the religious group decreases. This pattern implies concavity in the relationship between enrollment in private and religious schooling and the share of the religious group in the population. We present empirical evidence from United States county data on Catholic and private school enrollment that strongly supports our theory. The paper contributes to a better understanding of the demand for religious education.     

Efficiency in public schools: Does competition matter?

The focus of many recent school reforms has been on changing the incentives faced by school administrators, mainly through increased competition. In this study, we assess whether competition amongst public schools influences the efficiency in which these schools operate, using a two-stage estimation procedure and data from the state of Illinois from 1997–1998. We find some evidence that public school districts become more efficient as neighboring districts become more efficient. However, such spillovers only occur if districts operate within a financially flexible environment.     

Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects. Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997     

陆上风电装备物流模式选择及实施初探

以风力发电为代表的可再生能源是应对未来能源和气候变化压力的主要途径。作为占风力发电投资主要组成的风电装备,其物流特征和模式选择越来越受到重视和关注。文中对其物流基本特征、物流模式进行分析,提出模式选择及实施的建议。     

从美国判例入手探讨重要性遵循机制问题

美国法院在一些判例中诠释了重要性概念。这使我们得以探究重要性的遵循机制,并促使我们关注我国新的会计、审计准则体系的实施问题。     

Urban density and pupil attainment

We explore the association between urban density and pupil attainment using three cohorts of pupils in schooling in England. Although—as widely recognised—attainment in dense urban places is low on average, this is not because urban environments disadvantage pupils, but because the most disadvantaged pupils with low average attainments attend the most urbanised schools. To control for this, we exploit changes in urban density faced by pupils during compulsory transition from Primary to Secondary school, and measure educational progress at the end of the Secondary phase, relative to attainment at the end of Primary schooling. Our results suggest that there are small but significant benefits from education in schools in more densely urbanised settings. We detect this density advantage even amongst pupils moving relatively short distances between Primary and Secondary schools within urban areas, so we cannot attribute it to broad urbanisation effects experienced by pupils making rural–urban school moves. A more likely explanation lies in greater school choice and competition between closely co-located educational providers.     

数字经济时代我国新业态的形成机理与发展路径

新业态是数字经济背景下通过产业融合、产业分化、产业网络化三种途径从现有经济活动领域中衍生而出的新型产业组织形态,对促进我国产业转型升级、推进经济高质量发展具有重要意义。数字经济时代,我国新业态的培育重点在于激发数字业态创新活力、完善基础设施与制度供给、推进传统实体经济的数字化改造、探索数字化服务新模式、鼓励发展新型用工形式。目前我国新业态发展尚处于起步阶段,成长潜力巨大,必须尽快解决发展中可能存在的各种问题,坚持业态推陈出新与业态优化升级相结合、宽松开放的市场准入机制与包容审慎的监管机制相结合、权责明晰的法律法规体系与覆盖全民的社会保障体系相结合,以促进未来新业态健康成长,充分发挥新业态潜能。     

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Abstract. The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution. Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002     

Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player

The paper contributes to the perfect Bayesian implementation problem when the planner selects an outcome after agents send a signal profile. In our problem, the planner always selects the outcomes that maximize her expected utility, given her posterior belief about the state. The paper explicitly models the problem and shows a full characterization of SCF set that can be perfect Bayesian implemented in FGP equilibrium.     

Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way. Received: 16 April 1996 / Accepted: 25 April 1997