Small business and online training in Australia: who is willing to participate?

This paper investigates small business employers' willingness to participate in online training based on survey of 716 Western Australian small business employers. The results indicate that those small business employers with aspirations towards business growth and who are existing Internet users are more likely to participate in online training than those without growth aspirations.     

Modelling the incentive to participate in open source biopharmaceutical innovation

The open source model provides a valuable framework for collective knowledge production and dissemination. Open knowledge networks and other cooperative strategies (classified as open source discovery initiatives) are enabling biopharmaceutical companies to access disembodied knowledge‐based resources critical to downstream drug development. The objective of these cooperative strategic alliances is to preserve the downstream technological opportunities for multiple firms. When upstream discovery research cannot yield commercial products and when the costs associated with excessive upstream competition are too high, companies jointly benefit from cooperative knowledge production and open knowledge dissemination. An analysis of 39 open source initiatives (consortia) provides us with information on: the likely participants in such initiatives, the focus of knowledge production activities, the characteristics of the knowledge generated, and the management of joint knowledge assets. Based on this analysis, we use game models to understand the decision to participate in such strategic alliances better. Our game models provide a simple but elegant framework for understanding the impact of changing knowledge structures on the payoffs associated with cooperation and defection in knowledge production, and therefore on behaviour.     

Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm

This paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common (privately informed) regulated firm under various degrees of coordination. In the model, the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self-dealing, and incentives can be input-based (monitoring) and output-based (demanded cost targets). Full coordination between the regulators leads to the second best allocation. A setting in which the regulators do not fully coordinate leads to (i) higher overall monitoring (more aggressive input-based incentives) and (ii) higher demanded cost targets (i.e., more lenience in terms of output-based incentives). As a consequence of (i), in all possible equilibria, the effort toward cost reduction will be smaller when the agent reports to two regulators who do not coordinate. (i) and (ii) imply that the impact on the effort toward self-dealing activities is ambiguous. In our leading example, self-dealing will be larger if the regulators coordinate on monitoring levels but smaller if they choose monitoring levels independently.     

Licensing a technology standard

I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider inventor or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopting a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner also sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.     

Cooperating with competitors: Patent pooling and choice of a new standard

I examine the efficiency of patent pooling in a setting that allows for the interplay between the standards process, in which owners of essential intellectual property (IP) develop a new product, and the subsequent pooling decision, in which IP prices are coordinated. If one of the IP owners is also the incumbent of a product that employs the current competing standard – referred to as overlapping ownership – then the relationship among the IP owners will be both vertical through their IP, and horizontal through their competing interests in the final products. Consumers are better off when IP owners cooperate, even when these owners are effectively competitors, because of lower prices and greater product variety. Consumers prefer, however, that the agreements not admit firms with overlapping ownership. These results inform antitrust policy on cooperative agreements among competitors.     

Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability tocoordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants.Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viablemechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

国家物资储备系统协同对策分析

本文以国家物资储备系统实现协同效应为目标，通过分析国家物资储备系统协同效应产生的机理，指出目前国家物资储备系统协同存在的问题。在此基础上，从业务、资源、组织、信息等方面提出国家物资储备系统实现协同效应的途径。     

金银花饮片—标准汤剂量质传递研究

为了阐明金银花饮片—标准汤剂量质变化及其分布规律,采用UPLC建立金银花饮片—标准汤剂特征图谱方法,并根据质谱分析进行化合物推断;利用新公式-K值分析化合物传递过程中的规律。结果表明,UPLC特征图谱方法重复性、精密度、稳定性良好;对11个特征峰进行结构推断,确定了9个特征峰：新绿原酸（峰1）、绿原酸（峰2）、断氧化马钱苷酸（峰3）、隐绿原酸（峰4）、獐牙菜苷（峰5）、断氧化马钱子苷（峰6）、异绿原酸B（峰8）、异绿原酸A（峰9）、异绿原酸C（峰11）;由K值分析可知,15批金银花饮片—标准汤剂过程各峰都进行了传递,新绿原酸和隐绿原酸K值大于1,绿原酸K值小于1,与绿原酸异构化生成新绿原酸和隐绿原酸有关;异绿原酸B和异绿原酸C的K值大于1,异绿原酸A的K值小于1,与异绿原酸A异构化生成异绿原酸B和异绿原酸C有关。由此,通过K值可分析金银花标准汤剂中量质传递规律,且符合有机酸类化学成分特性。建立的特征图谱方法准确、稳定、可靠,金银花饮片—标准汤剂新公式-K值能够辅助分析饮片—标准汤剂的量质传递规律,可为后续以标准汤剂为基准的配方颗粒或经典方制剂质量控制提供依据。     

Innovation without me: why employees do (not) participate in organizational innovation communities

A key issue in community research is the set of motivations stimulating individuals to participate and contribute voluntarily to communities. This article examines the motivations of employees, who are traditionally not involved in the innovation process, to (not) participate in organizational innovation communities. Building on an in‐depth single case study, we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) What motivates participants of organizational innovation communities to participate? and (2) What motivates nonparticipants of organizational innovation communities to not participate? We find and categorize multiple factors that motivate non‐research and development employees to participate and to not participate. Moreover, we find an overlap as well as differences in the set of motivations of participants and nonparticipants. With nonparticipants normally being a large but barely explicitly recognized group, we argue that the found deviations contribute to the understanding of motivations in the context of organizational innovation communities and allow for direct design implications for innovation managers.     

Coordination of a production network with a single buyer and multiple vendors

This article considers a single buyer sourcing a single product from a network of homogeneous suppliers. We assume a close and cooperative relationship between buyer and vendors and suggest two coordination mechanisms, which differently affect where inventory is held in the system. Accordingly, we derive analytical and heuristic solutions for both alternatives and study the relative advantage of the models in a sensitivity analysis. Finally, propositions for future research are presented.     

国家棉花标准修订对纺织业的影响

对棉花新标准修订部分予以剖析,提出新标准的实施,必将有效地提高棉花质量,促进棉改和对外贸易发展,尤其对推动纺织业的发展,意义重大,应认真贯彻。     

Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

This paper studies how communication is used by a retail gasoline cartel in Australia to coordinate price increases, a role of communication in collusion not highlighted by Genesove and Mullin (Am Econ Rev 91(3): 379–398, 2001). A unique data set from the trial record allows for quantifying not only the pricing dynamics, but also the communication patterns. Both empirical and narrative evidence suggests the collusive communication and pricing behavior is well captured by the price cycle equilibrium of the Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56(3): 571–599, 1988) model.     

基于生态位的城市发展协调度评价

城市各子系统相协调是实现可持续发展的基本要求,科学评价其协调发展程度和发展状况是城市发展研究中需要解决的关键问题.本文在城市生态住分析框架下,参考城市发展协调度相关研究成果,提出了一个简明而实用的城市复合生态系统协调度评价模型,并以东北地区城市为例说明模型的运用与分析,以期对城市协调发展评价和发展对策制定提供参考和依据.     

油气田单井效益评价分类标准研究

2005年发布的《中国石油勘探与生产公司已开发油气田效益评价细则》提出油气井按效益划分为五类,即效益一类井、效益二类井、效益三类井、边际效益井、无效益井.充分考虑中国石油单井效益评价数据的继承性和可对比性,在现行油气井效益评价标准的基础上,依据最低运行费、基本运行费和营运成本的界限建立了三个油气井效益评价模型,将油气井划分为高效益井、有效益井、边际效益井和无效益井四类,使油气井效益评价与分类的思路更清晰,含义更确切,方法更简洁,评价结果更符合油田生产经营实际.     

Chinese institutions and standardization: The case of government support to domestic third generation cellular standard

There are unique and distinct institutional processes associated with the Chinese government's support of the domestically developed third generation (3G) cellular standard, TD-SCDMA. After postponing several times, China awarded three third generation cellular licenses in January 2009: a TD-SCDMA license to China Mobile, a CDMA 2000 license to China Telecom and a WCDMA license to China Unicom. The Chinese government has demonstrated a clear bias in favor of TD-SCDMA. This article examines the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping the Chinese 3G landscape. This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, this work extends studies on institutional theory focusing on standardization to the context of China. Second, unlike most ICT research which deals with standards originated in the West, this paper's focus on developing country-originated standard provides novel and unique insights related to institutional processes.     

Coordination in inter-network co-opetitition: Evidence from the tourism sector

In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent formal governance forms such as contracts are a necessary condition to manage coopetitive interactions among networks. We situate our analysis within the tourism sector where we gain insights from an in-depth exemplar case of co-opetition among nearby Italian tourism destinations conjointly developing and marketing an event, the Pink Night Festival. We suggest that coordination mechanisms with varying degrees of formality seem to play a crucial role to manage coopetitive interactions. Subsequently, we identify eight key drivers of formalization of coordination mechanisms in inter-network co-opetitition: 1) leadership; 2) brokerage and pivotal attitude; 3) power asymmetry; 4) focus on strategic thinking; 5) maturity of network management approach; 6) maturity and distance of the marketing approach; 7) past experience working together; 8) cultural, functional and organizational similarities. Last, we develop a conceptual framework highlighting that each stage of the evolution of an inter-network coopetitive relationship has key features in terms of the underlying coordination mechanisms.     

如何提高工程造价编制水平

文章介绍了我国工程造价管理现状及存在的问题,并对在我国新的经济形势下如何提高工程造价编制水平提出了建议。     

实施煤炭资源整合促进中小煤矿规范有序健康发展

中小煤矿是我国煤炭工业的重要组成部分。改革开放以来，特别是近几年，中小煤炭企业市场竞争能力有所增强，原煤产量稳定在全国的50％左右，为缓解我国煤炭供应紧张局面做出了贡献。     

Stakeholder Influence and Radical Change: A Coordination Game Perspective

Organizations often find it hard to change their corporate strategy radically, even if the need for change is widely recognized as in the Asian crisis of 1997. Such change requires large numbers of stakeholders to change their individual behavior, yet complex governance structures limit the applicability of agency-based models of governance. Rather, the coordination of stakeholder is at the core of governance during radical environmental change. Based on the game-theoretic concept of a ‘coordination game’, the paper analyses conditions that may inhibit the coordination of stakeholders to shift from an existing corporate strategy to a new one. I thus consider coordination failure that inhibit restructuring, and argue that radical change requires leaders to communicate and create common knowledge about the organization's future strategy.