Worker replacement

Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure, productivity and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to employ workers. In this environment, the optimal wage policy prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior workers, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. The downward rigidity in the hiring wage magnifies the response of unemployment to negative shocks.     

Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage rigidity

Nominal wage rigidity has been shown to exist in periods of high inflation, while reduction in nominal pay has been hypothesized to occur in times of low inflation. Nominal wage rigidity would therefore become irrelevant because there is little need to cut nominal pay under high inflation, while the necessary cuts would occur under low inflation. We test this hypothesis by examining Swiss data in the 1990s, where wage inflation was low. Nominal wage rigidity proves robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. Real wages would indeed respond to unemployment without downward nominal rigidity. Moreover, wage sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity correlate strongly to unemployment, suggesting downward nominal wage rigidity fuels unemployment.     

Evaluating the economic significance of downward nominal wage rigidity

The existence of downward nominal wage rigidity has been abundantly documented, but what are its economic implications? This paper demonstrates that, even when wages are allocative, downward wage rigidity can be consistent with weak macroeconomic effects. Firms have an incentive to compress wage increases as well as wage cuts when downward wage rigidity binds. By neglecting compression of wage increases, previous literature may have overstated the costs of downward wage rigidity to firms. Using micro-data from the US and Great Britain, I find that the evidence for the compression of wage increases when downward wage rigidity binds. Accounting for this reduces the estimated increase in aggregate wage growth due to wage rigidity to be much closer to zero. These results suggest that downward wage rigidity may not provide a strong argument against the targeting of low inflation rates.     

The (ir)relevance of real wage rigidity in the New Keynesian model with search frictions

We develop a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. We show that the model generates counterfactual labor market dynamics. In particular, it fails to generate the negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment in the data, i.e., the Beveridge curve. Introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation, and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values. However, inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity. The reason is that labor market frictions give rise to long-run employment relationships. The measure of real marginal costs that is relevant for inflation in the Phillips curve contains a present value component that varies independently of the real wage.     

Capital market frictions and human capital investment: Evidence from workplace safety around regulation SHO

This paper examines the effect of capital market frictions on firms’ workplace safety. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we find a significant increase in work-related injury rates of pilot firms. The effect is stronger for firms in more competitive industries and with high financial constraints, and weaker for firms whose employees have high negotiating power and with good corporate governance. Further tests suggest that managers’ myopia shifts their focus away from investments in workplace safety when workplace safety is not related to firm performance. Overall, the results highlight how capital market frictions affect firms’ investment in human capital.     

Inflation Dynamics When Inflation Is Near Zero

We discuss the likely evolution of U.S. inflation in the near and medium terms on the basis of (i) past U.S. experience with very low levels of inflation, (ii) the most recent Japanese experience with negative inflation, and (iii) some preliminary U.S. micro evidence on downward nominal wage rigidity. Our findings question the view that stable long‐run inflation expectations and downward nominal wage rigidity will necessarily provide sufficient support to prices to avoid further declines in inflation. We show that an inflation model fitted on Japanese data over the past 20 years, which accounts for both short‐ and long‐run inflation expectations, matches the recent U.S. inflation experience quite well. While the model indicates that U.S. inflation might be subject to a lower bound, it does not rule out a prolonged period of low inflation or even mild deflation going forward. In addition, micro‐level data on wages suggest no obvious downward rigidity in the firm's wage bill, downward rigidity in individual wages notwithstanding. As a consequence, downward nominal wage rigidity may not be enough to offset deflationary pressures in the current situation.     

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.     

Performance Volatility and Wage Elasticity: An Examination of Listed Chinese A-share Enterprises

The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages. The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility, the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity. In firms whose current performance is on the upswing, the greater the volatility in past performance, the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity; the more stable past performance, the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity. In firms in which current performance is declining, greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity, whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Pollution, Factor Taxation and Unemployment

When consumers choose between clean and dirty goods and the labour market clears, a green tax reform may not bring about a double dividend in the sense of increasing environmental quality and increasing employment. However, when firms choose between clean and dirty factors of production, and when there is unemployment, such a result is very likely to occur. The paper investigates a model of a monopolistic firm where labour and energy are factors of production and trade unions negotiate the wage rate, accepting some unemployment as a result of aggressive wage demands. It is shown that, in such a framework, a green tax reform will boost employment provided it does not increase the net-of-tax wage rate by too much. This is the case when the elasticity of substitution between labour and energy is greater than one, equal to one or not too far below one.     

Downward wage rigidity and business cycle asymmetries

The growth rates of wages, unemployment and output of a number of OECD countries have a strongly skewed distribution. In this paper we analyze to what extent downward wage rigidities can explain these empirical business cycle asymmetries. To this aim, we introduce asymmetric wage adjustment costs in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Increasing wages is less costly than cutting them. It follows that wages increase relatively fast and thus limit vacancy posting and employment creation, but they decline more slowly, leading to a strong reduction in vacancies and employment. The presence of downward wage rigidities strongly improves the fit of the model to the observed skewness of labor market variables and the relative length of expansions and contractions in the output and the employment cycles. The asymmetry also explains the differing transmission of positive and negative monetary policy shocks from wages to inflation.     

A cross-country comparison of corporate governance and firm performance: Do financial structure and the legal system matter?

We blend the corporate governance and the financial structure/legal system literature streams to study whether firm performance is enhanced when its governance structure embodies the demands of the host country’s financial structure and legal system. Using a sample of 1736 unique firms representing 22 countries, we find that the joint effect of a country’s financial structure and legal system does matter when explaining the relationship between performance and the overall level of corporate governance in a given country. The results also suggest that firms operating in the market/common combination countries tend to command higher market valuations than firms with a comparable level of corporate governance that operate in the bank/civil combination countries.     

New Keynesian perspectives on labor market dynamics

We find that demand shocks play an important role for business-cycle fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies. The reason is that those shocks give a strong incentive to demand-constrained firms to adjust production and thereby labor input. Furthermore we argue that whether real wage rigidity à la Hall [2005. Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. American Economic Review 95, 50–65] helps explain the remaining part of the unemployment volatility puzzle depends critically on assumptions regarding the form of the wage bargain between firms and workers. Real wage rigidity tends to generate volatility in employment only in the case in which hours are chosen efficiently. If, on the other hand, the real wage is allowed to affect firms's choices of hours directly, the feature of real wage rigidity loses its ability to increase employment volatility.     

Relative-to-rival corporate philanthropy,product market competitiveness,and stakeholders

Unlike most of the literature that examines the relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance, this study investigates the mechanisms through which corporate socially responsible behaviors produce financial outcomes. We propose that corporate philanthropy improves corporate competitiveness by eliciting positive responses from stakeholders, who assess a firm’s philanthropic contribution in relation to its rivals to determine what level of support they wish to provide to the firm. We predict that a firm’s philanthropy relative to its rivals has a positive effect on its product market competitiveness, and that this positive effect is moderated by three conditions that influence stakeholder response: stakeholder attention to philanthropy, its perceived legitimacy, and expectations of corporate giving. Our predictions are generally supported by our analyses. Overall, this paper shows that strategic philanthropy has a quantitative dimension, and firms obtain the market competitiveness associated with corporate philanthropy by integrating their rivals’ positions into their decision making.     

The Most Beautiful Variations on Fair Wages and the Phillips Curve

This paper explores the connection between inflation and unemployment in two different models with fair wages in both the short and the long runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of the effort function, more inflation lowers the unemployment rate, albeit to a declining extent. This is because firms respond to inflation—which spurs effort by decreasing the reference wage—by increasing employment, thus maintaining the effort level constant as implied by the Solow condition. A stronger short‐run effect of inflation on unemployment is produced under varying as opposed to fixed capital, given that in the former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by an increase in investment. Therefore, I provide a new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions that find negative long‐ and short‐run effects of inflation on unemployment.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidities Bend the Phillips Curve

We introduce a model of monetary policy with downward nominal wage rigidities and show that both the slope and curvature of the Phillips curve depend on the level of inflation and the extent of downward nominal wage rigidities. This is true for the both the long‐run and the short‐run Phillips curve. Comparing simulation results from the model with data on U.S. wage patterns, we show that downward nominal wage rigidities likely have played a role in shaping the dynamics of unemployment and wage growth during the last three recessions and subsequent recoveries.     

失业保险与公司财务杠杆

我国劳动力市场化程度日益加深导致劳动者职业转换愈加频繁,失业保险的作用日益突出。本文探究了失业保险金水平对企业财务杠杆的影响。运用2009—2019年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果发现失业保险金上升会导致公司财务杠杆下降。渠道检验显示,提高失业保险金可以降低员工失业风险溢酬,公司劳动力成本下降,公司有更多自由现金流和盈利进行内源融资和偿还债务,公司财务杠杆下降。进一步分析发现,失业保险金的作用在失业率高的地区更加显著。主要结果在分别运用《社会保险法》和《关于调整失业保险金标准的指导意见》构造双重差分模型和工具变量解决内生性问题、更改模型设置、排除投资水平影响、删除特殊省份、更换样本期间后,依然成立。本文结果说明加大失业保险保障力度有助于降低企业财务风险。     

Financial Reporting Quality and Wage Differentials: Evidence from Worker-Level Data

We examine whether financial reporting quality affects worker wages using employer-employee matched data in the United States. We find that low financial reporting quality is associated with a compensating wage differential—that is, a risk premium—using three distinct approaches while controlling for worker characteristics by (1) regressing wages on firm-year–level and firm-level reporting quality, (2) documenting wage changes when workers switch firms, and (3) estimating a structural approach that separates reporting quality from performance-related volatility. We find evidence consistent with two channels: performance pay and turnover risk, where workers bear risks from noise in performance measurement and unemployment, respectively. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we show that—after the accounting scandals in 2002 and after the announcements of an internal control weakness (ICW)—former Arthur Andersen clients and ICW firms pay wage premiums to employees, with magnitudes between 0.9% and 2.8% of annual wages.     

Labor market dynamics under long-term wage contracting

Recent research seeking to explain the strong cyclicality of US unemployment emphasizes the role of wage rigidity. This paper proposes a micro-founded model of wage rigidity—an equilibrium business cycle model of job search, where risk neutral firms post optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers. Equilibrium contracts feature wage smoothing, limited by the inability of parties to commit to contracts. The model is consistent with aggregate wage data if neither worker nor firm can commit, producing too rigid wages otherwise. Wage rigidity does not lead to a substantial increase in the cyclical volatility of unemployment.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity Meets the Zero Lower Bound

We add downward nominal wage rigidity to a standard New Keynesian model where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is allowed to bind. Wage rigidity reduces the frequency of zero bound episodes but also mitigates the severity of corresponding recessions. As a result, previous studies abstracting from the presence of wage rigidity may have overemphasized the need for increasing the inflation target to offset the costs associated with hitting the zero bound. Moreover, our findings add to the recent debate on the presumed benefits of wage flexibility that has arisen in the aftermath of the Great Recession.