On the informational size of message spaces

In a recent paper, Mount and Reiter established that, in a certain sense, the competitive mechanism is an “informationally most efficient” procedure for allocating resources. This result, of course, depends upon the way in which we characterize the notion of informational efficiency. Several alternative characterizations, and the relationships among them, are given here, and it is shown under which characterizations the above result is true, and under which it is false. It is shown that there is an intuitively appealing “best” characterization for which it is true.     

Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty

In McLean and Postlewaite (Econometrica 56, 1992, p. 2421), we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We defined a notion of informational size and showed that, when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict between incentive compatibility and (ex post) efficiency can be made small if agents have sufficiently small informational size. This paper investigates the relationship between informational size and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present, i.e., when significant uncertainty about the world persists even when the information of all agents is known.     

Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies

In this paper we show that in quasilinear economies the incentive compatible coarse core is non-empty if agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and the strict core in each state is non-empty.     

Informational efficiency properties of rational expectations equilibria in non-convex economies

Summary. A simple example shows that although non-convexities might prevent the existence of a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, they need not prevent the existence of a non-informative one. Indeed, the economy in this example does not possess any fully revealing equilibria, but does have a continuum of non-informative ones. Received: February 9, 1999; revised version: October 20, 1999     

Distortions,efficiency and the size distribution of firms

We develop a model of firms’ growth in which the tax and credit environments act as selection mechanisms. Such a model, parametrized and validated using a variety of data restrictions, can rationalize observations about input choices and size patterns typical of many developing countries. Using counterfactual experiments, we show that firms’ optimal responses to the tax environment are effective in reducing efficiency losses. As a consequence, tax distortions only account for 13% of the gap in output per worker between an undistorted economy and the benchmark. Credit constraints account for 44% of this gap. However, the interaction between the cost of capital and credit constraints appears to be the most important source of misallocation and can explain up to 85% of the difference in output per worker between the benchmark and first-best.     

Sticky wages,efficiency wages,and market processes

Work on this article was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

Group size and the (in)efficiency of pure public good provision

Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controlled conditions, the presence and direction of a possible group size effect in pure public good provision by large heterogeneous groups. Employing subjects drawn from the general population and introducing Internet-based procedures to study this question, we collected experimental evidence from 1110 subjects playing a linear public goods game in groups of 10, 40, and 100 members. We find a positive and significant group size effect: Increasing group size by a factor of 10 (4) increased efficiency by 10 (6) percent. The effect arose at the intensive margin and with repetition. Those who contributed contributed more in larger groups. Larger and smaller groups had similar initial contribution levels, but cooperation rates declined more slowly in the larger groups. Free-riding was invariant to group size, despite subjects׳ persistent beliefs of a negative group size effect at the extensive margin. Further econometric examination of the data supports these findings and provides starting points for future theoretical and experimental research on the group size effect.     

Informational spillovers and the coordination of speculative investments

Abstract. The influence of informational spillovers on the entrepreneur's incentive to undertake reversible investment opportunities is considered. It is shown how investment activity can be driven by the influence that the prospect of social learning has on the option value of investment. In this context, episodes of high investment activity result from a speculative motive, and the expected short‐run profitability of new investment opportunities may inadequately reflect the entrepreneurs’ incentive to invest.     

Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.     

Informational diversity over time and the optimality of monetary equilibria

The temporal realizations of a random state variable in an overlapping generations model create an informational diversity between members of different generations and require a reexamination of the optimality that competitive equilibria might display in such an environment. Using an optimality criterion that reflects this informational diversity we prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium in a model with a fixed stock of fiat money, a single-spot market, and good endowments that follow a Markov process. The need for an optimality criterion that incorporates informational diversity is further motivated by studying the same model with the operation of complete contingent commodities markets.     

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.     

现阶段中小企业信息化建设相关问题研究

中小企业信息化建设仍然存在着许多问题,突出的问题是投资不足、IT黑洞等,文章认为最根本的原因是中小企业管理者忽视了信息技术应用能力这一核心能力的培养和中小企业普遍缺乏信息技术文化。文章提出了加快实现中小企业信息化的相关措施和方法。     

Population size and the size of government

We examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies).     

Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems

This paper analyses the sustainability of inter-generational transfers in Samuelson's consumption-loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events. We find that with mild informational constraints, transfers cannot be supported by pure-strategy equilibria. Mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information, so that a version of the Folk theorem holds. However, these equilibria are not robust. If each agent's utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in Harsanyi (1973), these mixed strategy equilibria unravel, and only the zero-transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome. This result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified.     

The relationship between efficiency and profitability with respect to the size of firms: An empirical investigation for Austria

In this paper, an attempt is made to investigate the performance of Upper-Austrian firms by size class. Considering the six derived hypotheses, why small firms have a better performance measure, some of the hypothesis with respect to profitability and labour cost efficiency are confirmed. On average, the gross residual quota (profitability measure) of small firms is higher than the one of medium-sized and large firms. However, a similar result could not be found for the productivity development. Considering the influence of the firm size on the productivity measure, there is in three out of four cases no statistically significant influence at all and in one case the opposite result is obtained indicating the larger the firm, the higher is the productivity. In the case of labour cost efficiency, the hypothesis (the smaller the firm the lower the labour cost per employee) is clearly confirmed.