A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

MARKET STRUCTURE,CHANGING INCENTIVES,AND UNDERWRITER CERTIFICATION

Early studies find that higher quality underwriters are associated with lower underpricing; however, more recent evidence suggests the opposite relation. By controlling for influences associated with the changing market structure of the underwriter industry, I provide a potential explanation for this conflict, that is, that higher quality underwriters do certify initial public offerings, resulting in lower underpricing. However, effects associated with increasing market shares tend to offset certification benefits, particularly for issues underwritten by the largest investment banks.     

Single versus multiple banking: lessons from initial public offerings

A vast research in banking addresses the question of the costs and benefits of multiple bank relationships versus a single bank relationship. Although no clear-cutting conclusion is reached, several contributions suggest that multiple bank relationships might lead to a sub-optimal level of monitoring, compared to a single bank relationship, as a result of free riding and coordination problems. We take a novel approach to tackle this research question, by looking at the role, if any, played by the number of lending relationships in initial public offerings (IPOs). We look at the short-term performances of IPOs as measured by underpricing and find that firms that go public with multiple bank relationships exhibit more underpricing than those that go public with a single bank relationship. This finding is independent of the number of bank relationships and/or whether any of the lending banks also acts as underwriter in the offering. We interpret our results as suggesting that the market attributes a weaker certification role to multiple bank relationships because of their less effective monitoring of IPO firms.     

The Competitive Impact of Commercial Bank Underwriting on the Market for Municipal Revenue Bonds

This paper examines the impact of commercial bank entry in the market for municipal revenue bonds. We show that issues underwritten by commercial banks have lower underwriter spreads but not lower yields relative to issues underwritten by nonbank investment firms. In particular, this is more significant for non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by commercial banks. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that bank entry has resulted in increased competition in the municipal revenue bond market and that the lower yields observed for bank-underwritten commercial bonds may be due to banks having private information. Overall, our results suggest that policy changes leading to the relaxation of restrictive provisions concerning bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds have had beneficial effects.     

On the importance of retail banking relationships

We use proprietary data to analyze the importance of retail banking relationships to commercial banks and their depositors when banks underwrite securities. We find lead underwriters’ retail customers benefit as they demand and end up with significantly more of the highly underpriced issues. We find it is actual underpricing beyond that predicted by grey markets that drive the differential demand from the lead bank retail clientele, suggesting that banks pass on information about underpriced initial public offerings to their retail depositors. We analyze banks’ incentives for such behavior and find evidence of banks benefiting through retail cross-selling—both brokerage accounts and consumer loans increase significantly.     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

The performance of new equity offerings in Hungary and Poland

This paper documents the short- and long-run price performance of 103 initial public offerings (IPOs) in Poland and 33 in Hungary during the 1991–1998 period. The empirical analysis reveals significant first-day underpricing of 15.12% in Hungary and 54.45% in Poland. The long-run performance of the new offerings in these markets is less conclusive. The cross-section regression analysis finds that market momentum is a significant and primary determinant of initial returns in both countries. The evidence suggests that over the study period, the degree of underpricing is determined by the intensity of demand driven by investor interest where offering prices do not fully adjust to the prevailing market conditions.     

THE UNDERPRICING OF “SECOND” INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity represents a well-documented empirical phenomenon. One prominent explanation for this underpricing relies on the uncertainty investors feel about the value of the issuer. In this paper, this asymmetric information hypothesis is tested by examining the underpricing of IPOs of seventy-four firms for which the uncertainty about the value of the firm is likely to be substantially reduced. These firms were once publicly owned, then taken private, and subsequently returned to public ownership. Findings show that the IPOs of these “reverse leveraged buyouts” are significantly less underpriced than typical IPOs. These results support the asymmetric information hypothesis.     

DO BANK RELATIONSHIPS MATTER IN PUBLIC DEBT OFFERINGS?

Finance theorists have argued that banks have a comparative advantage over public debtholders and other suppliers of debt both in gathering information about and in monitoring corporate borrowers. Although underwriters of public debt issues and private placements have access to inside information when executing specific transactions, commercial bankers have ongoing relationships with their corporate borrowers that have often been built up over years. Perhaps more important, banks are also often in a better position and have stronger incentives than a dispersed collection of bondholders to keep tabs on what the borrowers do after receiving the capital.
This theoretical argument received striking empirical support from a study by Chris James published in 1987 in the Journal of Financial Economics. Entitled "Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans," the study documented that announcements of new bank lending aggreements by public firms are received positively, on average (and in a large majority of cases) by the stock market. This finding offered a pointed contrast to the neutral to sharply negative stock-price responses that accompany announcements of almost all other kinds of securities offerings, including private placements of debt and public offerings of straight debt.
In this article, the authors discuss their own recently published study that provides another piece of evidence of the value added by banking relationships. Specifically, the authors report that the first public debt offerings of companies with bank relationships carry spreads that are 85 basis points less than the spreads of initial debt issues by comparable firms without bank relationships. As the authors interpret their findings, a banking relationship not only helps to "certify" the value of corporate borrowers to their stockholders, but also provides other lenders with valuable "cross-monitoring" benefits that are reflected in lower borrowing costs.     

The market structure effects of commercial bank entry into underwriting: Evidence from the league tables

This study investigates the market structure effects of the deregulation of the US underwriting industry that allowed commercial banks to expand into investment banking activities. Specifically, it analyses the gains of commercial banks in market rankings and market share, the market position of the traditional top-ranked firms and changes in market concentration. The overall evidence suggests that (a) commercial banks were successful in gaining market share in underwriting, especially in debt offerings; (b) the commercial bank entry into underwriting eroded the dominance of bulge-bracket firms in debt underwriting, but not in equity offerings, where their dominance intensified; and (c) the commercial bank entry helped reduce market concentration in debt but not in equity underwriting. Finally, the study finds that the market share of commercial banks in equity offerings increases when equity underwriting volume rises, whereas market concentration in debt offerings increases when debt underwriting volume falls.     

Narcissistic managers and IPO underpricing

Using hand-collected data on the signature size of managers in Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2007 to 2019 as a proxy for managerial narcissism, we examine how IPOs with narcissistic managers (narcissistic IPOs) affect IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that narcissistic IPOs have higher underpricing than non-narcissistic IPOs. Specifically, we find that on average, a narcissistic IPO exhibits approximately 11.3% higher underpricing than a median IPO firm. Our results are robust to alternative metrics of narcissism and underpricing after controlling for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that narcissistic IPOs are more likely to engage in earnings management than non-narcissistic IPOs. The former exhibits excessive risk-taking behavior, gauged by earnings volatility pre-IPO and a higher beta post-IPO. In the cross-sectional analyses, we document that the impact of managerial narcissism on IPO underpricing is more salient for IPOs facing unsophisticated investors, high market sentiment, or poor corporate governance.     

Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship‐Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services

The question of whether optimal provision of these services comes mainly from established relationships between banks and client firms or can result from arms'‐length market transactions has been the topic of considerable recent debate. This discussion has paralleled the debate in the commercial banking literature on the “specialness” of banks and whether lending can and should be relational or purely transactional. Whether the provision of investment bank services is relationship‐based or transactional is especially relevant now thanks to recent trends that have blurred the distinction between commercial and investment banks, and changed the competitive landscape for investment bank services. In their study summarized in this article, the authors examine whether investment bank‐client relationships create valuable relationship‐specific capital using stock market evidence from the period surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Specifically, they studied the effect of the Lehman collapse on companies that used Lehman for (1) underwriting equity offerings, (2) underwriting debt offerings, (3) advice on mergers and acquisitions, (4) analyst research services, and (5) market‐making services. The study addressed two specific questions. First, which investment bank services, if any, are associated with the creation of relationship‐specific capital; and second, what are the value drivers of this relationship capital? The authors report finding that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for public equity offerings experienced significantly negative abnormal stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy announcement. By contrast, they find no significant reaction to the announcement for Lehman's debt underwriting clients or any of the other client categories they examine. While most of these investment bank services have at least the potential to create relationship‐specific capital, the authors' findings suggest that except for equity underwriting, all the other investment bank services appear to be transactional rather than relationship‐based, at least in the average case. Moreover, the authors report significant differences even among different groups of Lehman's equity underwriting clients. An equity underwriting relationship with Lehman appears to have been especially valuable for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms—those firms which presumably had a high degree of dependence on Lehman to access the capital market.     

The Performance of Internet Firms Following Their Initial Public Offering

We find that initial returns were more favorable for Internet initial public offerings (IPOs) than non–Internet firm IPOs. Since the demise of the Internet sector, the underpricing of Internet–firm IPOs is not significantly different from other IPOs.
Initial returns of Internet firms are positively and significantly related to underwriter prestige and to pre–IPO market conditions. However, initial returns after the demise of the Internet sector are not significantly related to these characteristics.
The aftermarket performance of Internet firms is initially favorable but weakens over time. Firms that experienced higher initial returns during the strong Internet cycle experience weaker aftermarket performance.     

Underpricing in the Corporate Bond Market

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings(IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market.We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution toan information problem or a liquidity problem. We find thatunderpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings andis highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggeststhat information problems drive underpricing, with support forboth the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetricinformation theory. We do not find evidence in favor of theRock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquiditycauses underpricing.     

Growth fixation and the performance of bank initial public offerings, 1983–1991

Numerous banks and thrifts went public amid the favorable regulatory climate and strong capital market of the mid-1980s. A sample of 393 bank initial public offerings from 1983 to 1991 lagged three benchmarks of returns over a five-year post-offering holding period. This poor performance is concentrated among larger institutions with more aggressive loan growth. Following the IPO, many of these banks also recorded dramatic increases in loan losses. The evidence suggests the market may have fixated on the rapid growth of these institutions or did not adequately account for changes in the post-IPO risk of their loan portfolios.     

The Pricing of Initial Offerings of Privatised Companies on the London Stock Exchange

This paper investigates UK privatisation issues as initial public offerings (IPOs) of equities on the International Stock Exchange (London). Excess returns on such issues are compared with private sector initial public offerings. The results, which are unaffected by firm size and underwriting commission, indicate that, on an ex post basis, the issues provide excess returns above those of private sector firms on average by about 31% over a 32-week period. None of the existing theories of underpricing of IPOs is consistent with our results which imply wealth transfer to those who acquired the shares in privatised issues. After-market pricing was, however, found to be consistent with secondary market efficiency.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

Dual Class IPOs ARE Underpriced Less Severely

We analyze a sample of dual and single class initial public offerings (IPOs) to investigate whether empirical estimates of underpricing determinants are consistent across alternative measures of firm size and alternative techniques intended to account for underwriter price stabilization efforts. We find that results from long‐standing methods for estimating underpricing relations are generally robust to one's choice of size proxy and are consistent with estimates obtained from censored regressions of first‐day returns and from least squares regressions of longer horizon initial returns. We also confirm an existing finding in the literature that dual class IPOs endure less underpricing than do single class firms.     

Initial Public Offerings in Australia 1994 to 1999, Recent Evidence of Underpricing and Underperformance

This paper analyses whether financial and non financial characteristics of Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain observed underpricing and long term underperformance over the period 1994 to 1999. A number of previous Australian studies have investigated initial day underpricing and longer term underperformance of IPOs and this study updates those papers. We find that initial day underpricing can in part be explained by market sentiment, forecast dividend per share yields, underwriter options and share options. Our longer term analysis supports the finding of previous studies in that IPOs on average, underperform the market in the first year following their listing.     

Firm Transparency and the Costs of Going Public

We demonstrate that firms that are more transparent pay less, in all components of issuance costs, to go public. We employ a sample of 334 previous leveraged buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample to test the hypothesis that greater firm transparency before the issue decreases the flotation costs of the initial public offering. These flotation costs are divided into initial underpricing, underwriter discount, administrative expenses, and the overallotment option required to take the firm public. Our results provide further evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as it applies to initial public offerings.