Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games

We present a short, geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one hand, we give pseudo-approximation results that depend on the class of allowable cost functions. On the other hand, we derive stronger bounds on the inefficiency of equilibria for situations in which the equilibrium costs are within reasonable limits of the fixed costs. These tighter bounds help to explain empirical observations in vehicular traffic networks. Our analysis holds in the more general context of nonatomic congestion games, which provide the framework in which we describe this work.     

The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

We study Stackelberg games in which the follower faces a cost for observing the leader's action. We show that, irrespective of the size of the cost, the leader's value of commitment is lost completely in all pure-strategy equilibria. However, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that fully preserves the first-mover advantage. In this type of equilibrium, the probability that the follower looks at the leader's action is independent of the cost of looking.     

Iterated strict dominance in general games

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS^*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS^* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS^* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS^*. We show by an example that IESDS^* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS^* preserves the set of Nash equilibria.     

博弈论在治理河流水污染中的应用

针对我国日益严重的河流水污染状况，本文通过对污染源企业和政府之间的关系进行博弈分析，建立监督博弈模型，并以此分析政府对污染源企业的监管力度及经济上的处罚力度。     

基于博弈角度的营销道德失范研究

随着市场经济的不断发展,营销活动日益繁荣,同时也出现了越来越多的营销道德失范问题。营销道德的失范不仅损害了消费者利益,而且劣化了市场资源的配置。本文以当前我国营销道德失范的现状为切入点,运用博弈论,首先在信息对称的条件下,建立了完全信息下企业与消费者之间的静、动态博弈模型,研究表明：在静态博弈模型中,企业是否生产低质量的产品关键取决于政府对企业的处罚力度;在动态博弈模型中,从长远来看,企业将立足于长期利益,为消费者生产高质量的产品;其次,在信息不对称情况下,建立了＂逆向选择＂和＂道德风险＂模型;最后给出了治理营销道德失范的几点建议和对策,指出造成企业营销道德失范的原因,不外乎政府、企业和消费者三方的共同作用。因此,加强企业营销道德建设,规范企业的营销行为,也要从这三方面寻找答案。     

The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost

A good is produced with increasing marginal cost. A group of agents want at most one unit of that good. The two classic methods that solve this problem are average cost and random priority. In the first method users request a unit ex ante and every agent who gets a unit pay average cost of the number of produced units. Under random priority users are ordered without bias and the mechanism successively offers the units at price equal to marginal cost. We compare these mechanisms by the worst absolute surplus loss and find that random priority unambiguously performs better than average cost for any cost function and any number of agents. Fixing the cost function, we show that the ratio of worst absolute surplus losses will be bounded by positive constants for any number of agents, hence the above advantage of random priority is not very large. I especially thank Herve Moulin for helpful comments and suggestions. I also appreciate the feedback from Justin Leroux and an anonymous referee.     

The determinants of market share for the `dominant firm' in telecommunications

The present study examines the factors affecting the market share of the dominant firm in long-distance telecommunications, AT&T. A theoretical model is specified which includes competing long-distance rates (e.g., those of MCI and U.S. Sprint), price-cap regulation and advertising expenditures as determinants of the dominant firm's market share. Using intercity long-distance carrier charges for 1984–1994, this study points out the importance of AT&T's own rate structure, those of its major competitors, and government regulations in determining AT&T's market share over time.     

基于博弈论的上市公司会计信息披露失真成因分析

笔者运用博弈论作为主要的分析工具,通过对证券市场各利益主体逐个分析,揭示了信息披露失真的主要成因。上市公司会计信息披露失真是各参与方利益冲突而相互博弈的结果,是由个体理性出发而导致的集体非理性。在分析信息披露失真原因基础上,给出了相应的治理对策建议和应达到的理想的纳什均衡。     

对“价值”概念的几种界定

在经济理论领域内,“价值”是使用得最广泛,同时也是最复杂的一个经济范畴之一。在各种价值理论或观点背后,如何理解“价值”是关键所在。其实,“价值”最初是同交换密切联系在一起的,在交换中人们首先要解决的一个问题是一个物品换取他种物品的数量是多少,亦即交换比例如何确定的问题,当然交换比例应在逻辑上先于交换行为而确定的。进一步的研究表明,在关于交换比例的确定的量的分析之前,还必须回答交换成立的基础这一更加重要的质的问题,然而,这一问题开始进入经济思想家的眼界并不容易,能否意识到并同意这个问题是造成价值理论分歧的根本原因之一。据此,考察经济史上各种价值或价格理论,并对“价值”概念进行了几种界定。     

Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games.     

药品集中招标采购中回扣现象博弈分析

我国从1999年实行药品集中招标采购制度,在规范医药流通领域等方面取得一定成效,但是药品集中招标采购制度仍然不能抑制回扣现象,导致药品集中招标采购方式往往失效.本文从药品价格指数下降而药品费用支出上升的现象引出回扣对集中招标采购的巨大影响,然后从工资博弈模型和纳什均衡模型分析集中招标采购各主体对待回扣的利益关系,最后基于分析结果对药品集中招标采购制度给出若干建议.     

马克思剩余价值理论视角下信息商品增值研究

信息劳动创造价值,如何在马克思剩余价值理论视角下研究信息商品增值是一个新的研究课题。信息劳动是复杂劳动,创建期投入巨大,一些信息商品具有独特形式。将信息生产的不同时期的区分引入复杂的劳动过程和价值增殖的研究：信息商品创建期和扩大生产期都属于生产过程,在生产中获得价值增殖的潜力,而通过流通过程,创造出巨大数量的消费受众,从而实现了剩余价值的获得。巨大的规模投资、极高的技术门槛和政府政策保护使信息企业获得超额剩余价值。     

Changes in the firms behavior after the opening of markets of allowances

This paper focuses on the influence on the general equilibrium of an economy of the opening of markets of allowances, such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Assuming there existed an equilibrium before the opening of allowances’ markets, we describe the changes in the firms behavior which guarantee that an equilibrium can be reached in the enlarged economy. Hence we describe under which conditions the economy can undergo the opening of markets of allowances. This paper is a substantial improvement of previous work in collaboration with Alexandrine Jamin (Jamin and Mandel 2006).The author is grateful to Professor Jean-Marc Bonnisseau for his guidance and to an anonymous referee whose comments led to substantial improvements of the paper.     

Labor theory of value and the uncertainty in capitalist economy

This article aims to offer a reply to Steedman’s critique of Marx’s labor theory of value. Although this critique having been there for about three decades, the anti-critiques from Marxists are up to date flawed with fatal limitation, losing sight of an important dimension of labor theory of value, i.e., without taking it as a theoretical tool of understanding the uncertainty rooted in capitalist mode of production. The first part of this article reviews the controversy initiated by Steedman. Part 2 discusses Marx’s dual theory of market value and Rubin’s interpretation. Our view is that, if Rubin’s interpretation is accepted, a refutation of Steedman’s critique towards Marx will be impossible. Part 3 of this article explores the possible reconstruction of market value in the perspective of the dynamics in the pivoting of market value. We concludes that, the relationship between the standard condition of production and value is not, as argued by Steedman, of deterministic and one-directional character. For Marx, labor theory of value is applied to analyze the uncertain relation between the means and the end, the condition and the result of capitalist production. Meanwhile, another reply is attempted towards the negative comment on labor theory of value made by contemporary evolutionary economist such as Hodgson. In our view, Marx’s labor theory of value is not irrelevant as claimed by Hodgson to the main topics of evolutionary economics such as variety and “natural selection.” It is through labor theory of value that Marx explains the co-evolution of technology and economy.     

项目投资决策风险分析方法研究——一种基于现金流量的边际分析方法

传统的投资项目评价理论中,对项目现金流量的评估和分析未能揭示现金流量构成在结构上的特征,因而难以刻划出项目投资决策的系统性风险所在。运用边际分析的方法,将现金流量的结构特征体现出来,可以更加突现对项目投资决策性风险的识别和化解方法。本文基于现金流量机构变化分析的这种研究方法构建了从决策风险到决策后果——现金流量系统的一种新的分析理论,我们可称之为“RiskofInvestment-CashFlow(RI—CF)理论”。作为一种新的尝试,这种分析方式也可以被运用到其他更多对象上去。     

中国煤炭流动格局与利用效率的空间关联分析

在煤炭市场更加开放的背景下,各地区间煤炭价格联系和煤炭贸易关系更加密切。在对中国煤炭产消格局和区域间供求平衡分析的基础上,运用空间均衡模型分析区域煤炭流动格局合理性,研究表明:中国煤炭严重短缺趋势仍将持续,煤炭流动格局日趋合理。同时,运用探索性空间数据分析方法对中国各地区万元GDP煤炭消耗量的空间关联特征进行分析,研究表明:中国各地区万元GDP煤炭消耗量存在明显的空间集聚性,全国各地区的煤炭资源利用效率均在不断提升;煤炭由资源利用效率低且经济欠发达地区流向资源利用效率高且经济较发达地区,煤炭资源赋存和煤炭利用效率与经济发展水平均呈负相关。