Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We measure governance quality using broad-based comprehensive governance metrics provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The empirical evidence reveals a robust inverse association between leverage and governance quality. Firms with poor governance are significantly more leveraged. It appears that leverage substitutes for corporate governance in alleviating agency conflicts. Further, we utilize empirical methods that control for endogeneity and show that poor governance quality likely brings about, and does not merely reflect, higher leverage. Our results are important as they show that the overall quality of corporate governance has a material impact on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.     

Market concentration, macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy

This paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy. We motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that: (1) investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and (2) high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks. The empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the US using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. The results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions.     

Financial Frictions and Risky Corporate Debt

We offer clarifications on Cooley and Quadrini (2001) regarding financial frictions and risky corporate debt pricing. Even in a frictionless world, the promised rate on corporate debt is not identical across firms and across capital structures and it is not equal to the risk-free rate. Frictions are unnecessary for credit spreads to arise. Only if the macroeconomy is in actuality risk free or risk neutral do interest rates on corporate debt reflect default probabilities. To the extent that the firm's entire financial structure is traded, a bias in credit spreads introduces an exploitable arbitrage opportunity. Re-establishing no-arbitrage, firm dynamics move in the opposite direction to Cooley and Quadrini's.     

Dividend policy and investor pressure

The economics of dividend policy has focused on the single tight narrative that dividends keep managers honest, mitigating concerns that they over-invest. This article provides a critique of that agency narrative, arguing that pressure from short-term focused investors, executives and board members pushes the firm into preemptive actions of returning too much cash via dividends. We analyze three channels of influence for investor pressure through 1) threat of takeovers, 2) shareholder value oriented corporate governance, measured by director independence and board equity incentives, and 3) trading and institutional ownership patterns. We find that firms adopt a higher dividend payout to discourage takeover bids. Also, FTSE 100 firms, that are most focused on shareholder value governance in the form of equity-based compensation and a higher share of independent directors, display a higher dividend payout. Frequency of trading and ownership by transient investors seeking current profits also predict increased dividend payout. Traditional agency theory, focused on dividends as a tool for managerial discipline, is not strongly supported by the results, which rather support a narrative of short-term investor pressure on firms irrespective of investment opportunities.     

Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration

The German system of corporate governance is often thought to be effective at addressing problems arising in large firms. In addition to the usual emphasis on the role of German banks, it is increasingly recognized that the German system also involves a high concentration of the ownership of large firms. We analyse the relative significance of these two features of the German system and conclude that high ownership concentration is more important. Although banks may influence corporate governance via their control of proxy votes, positions on supervisory boards, and provision of loan finance, in practice they do not play a role in the governance of large German firms which is distinct from that of other types of large shareholders. Any case for the superiority of German corporate governance of large firms must therefore be based on high ownership concentration rather than a special role of banks, and must consider the costs of ownership concentration as well as the benefits.     

Estimating the Term Structure of Credit Spreads on Euro-denominated Corporate Bonds

In this paper, we estimate the term structure of credit spreads on Euro-denominated corporate bonds with a modified version of the Duffee (1999) intensity-based model. The empirical analysis considers monthly observations for a sample of investment-grade euro-denominated corporate bonds analysed for rating classes. The model is estimated with a maximum likelihood – Kalman filter approach over different sample periods ranging from January 1999 to August 2006. The estimation results, in general, support the application of the theoretical model to the euro-denominated bond market and exhibit some interesting characteristics of this relatively recent market.     

Debt and corporate governance in emerging economiesEvidence from India1

We analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large emerging economy, India, where debt has been an important source of external finance. Using cross‐sectional data on listed manufacturing firms we estimate, simultaneously, the relation between Tobin's Q and leverage for three years, 1996, 2000 and 2003. Our analysis indicates that while in the early years of institutional change, debt did not have any disciplinary effect on either standalone or group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appeared in the later years as institutions became more market oriented. We also find limited evidence of debt being used as an expropriation mechanism in group firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. In general, our results highlight the role of ownership structures and institutions in debt governance.     

Monetary policy and dividend growth in Germany: long-run structural modelling versus bounds testing approach

This study examines the long-run relationship between monetary policy and dividend growth in Germany. For this purpose, cointegration is tested for between both variables in the period 1974 to 2003. However, problems related to spurious regression arise from the mixed order of integration of the series used, from mutual causation between the variables and from the lack of a long-run relationship among the variables of the model. These problems are addressed by applying the bounds testing approach to cointegration in addition to a more standard long-run structural modelling approach. In principle, both procedures are capable of dealing with the controversial issue of the exogeneity of monetary policy vis-à-vis dividend growth. However, the structural modelling approach still leaves a certain degree of uncertainty about the integration properties of the interest rate and the dividend growth. Hence, one feels legitimized to refer to the bounds testing procedure and to conclude that in the longer term short-term rates drive stock returns but not vice versa.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending: Evidence for Germany and the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper analyzes the dynamic response of loans to the private sector and of economic activity to aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy shocks in Germany and the euro area based on a standard macroeconomic VAR using sign restrictions to identify the structural shocks. The main results of this analysis are that (i) with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant; (ii) the 2000–05 credit slowdown and weak economic performance in Germany were primarily driven by adverse supply shocks; and (iii) the marked slowdown in credit creation in Germany over this period actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level. In order to assess the role of bank lending in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks, we further perform counterfactual simulations and analyze the dynamic responses of German loan subaggregates in order to test the distributional implications of potential credit market frictions. These exercises do not indicate that credit market frictions play an amplifying role in the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

Cash policy and the bank-firm relationship

Bank health affects a firm's cash holding - a healthy bank can result in either more (because of the influential bank power) or less (because of precautionary motive) firm-level cash holding. Motivated by the contrasting views in the existing literature, this paper investigates whether bank policy determines firm-level cash policy. Using Japanese firm-level data over 2000–2014, we find that the difference in bank health effects stems from the firm's investment status. We find that healthy banks induce growing firms to hold more cash while declining firms hold more cash when borrowing from unhealthy banks. Furthermore, we find that banks with more liquidity also induce their growing borrowers to have more cash. Our results are robust to the endogeneity of bank selection. Our study indicates that bank-firm relationship can serve as an advance-signalling device for a firm's shareholder-wealth-maximizing investments and contributes to the literature that explains the cash holding puzzle.     

公司治理与国有企业改革

公司制改革加快了现代企业制度建设的进程，但是公司治理结构不完善是一个亟待解决的问题。目前要从维护中小股东合法权益，逐步建立定位合理和投资者信任的独立董事制度，从制度上保证发挥董事会作用以及建立健全董事、经理的束激机制四个方面，完善上市公司的治理结构。     

Managerial Ownership and Company Performance in German Small and Medium-Sized Private Enterprises

Abstract. We analyse the relationship between managerial ownership and company performance, testing the incentive and entrenchment hypothesis. Differently from previous literature, we focus on small and medium-sized private enterprises which constitute an important part of the German economy. We use a panel of 356 companies in the German business-related service sector for the years 1997–2000. Our findings are that performance, measured by survey-based profit information, is increasing in managerial ownership by up to around 40 per cent. We do not find a significant entrenchment effect, possibly because, at levels at which managers could become entrenched, they already bear a large proportion of the costs and have therefore an incentive to maximize company value.     

Corporate governance as religion

This paper, examining five different corporate governance topics, considers whether certain corporate governance reforms—perhaps because of the passion with which their advocates advance them—have increasingly become articles of faith rather than matters of intellectual analysis and empirical evaluation. The paper proceeds on the premise that good corporate governance is very important, but that it is not always easy to determine whether any particular proposed reform actually constitutes good or bad corporate governance. It concludes that sound corporate governance reforms can only be forged on the anvil of close and rigorous examination—wherever that examination might lead.      

Corporate tax policy and heterogeneous firm innovation: Evidence from a developing country

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the causality of corporate tax policy on firm innovation in a developing country. We exploit the China’s 2006 corporate income tax base reform to integrate the tax system between foreign-invested and state/collective-controlled firms as a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences strategy documents a positive effect of corporate tax deduction on firm patenting. The effect is particularly significant if a firm is of larger size or locates in eastern provinces. We also examine possible channels behind the findings, including changes in R&D and capital investment, intangible assets, financial constraints, and new product sales.     

公司法人治理结构以及我国的对策

公司法人治理结构是我们一直以来强调的科学治理公司的模式,它和一般经济学或管理学上所说的公司治理含义不同,作为现代公司制度的核心,它所承载的功能主要是促使公司本身的良好运转和内部的有效制衡,它所要应对的主要问题在于大股东的滥权和代理成本,了解代理成本产生的根源才能更好地从法律层面对其有效规制.研究世界各国,特别是美国日本德国等发达国家是如何构建公司法人治理结构,对我国有非常重要的借鉴意义.     

Monetary policy in open economies

The recent literature on monetary policy in open economies has produced a strong presumption in favor of activistic policy and flexible exchange rates. We argue that this result may owe much to the combination of two commonly made assumptions: That nominal goods prices are rigid. And that the monetary authorities have a lot of information about the economy. When the source of nominal rigidity is found in wages and monetary policy is conducted according to less information demanding rules (such as a standard interest rate rule) policies that stabilize the money supply or the nominal exchange rate may perform better.     

Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation

Abstract. Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder, the beneficial effects on minority shareholders of increased ownership (greater monitoring of management, and reduced incentives to exploit minority shareholders due to greater cash‐flow rights) are at least as large as, and sometimes significantly larger than, the harmful effect (greater private benefits of control due to greater control rights).     

The Liquidity Premium in the Money Market: A Comparison of the German Mark Period and the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper investigates to what extent the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) of interest rates receives some support since the launch of the European single currency. Empirical evidence shows that in general this theory applies to most European countries, and to Germany in particular. The objective of this paper thus is twofold. First, the EHTS for the German money market and for a larger sample including the German mark period and the euro money market is tested in order to check whether the results for the former are affected by the new financial environment since January 1999. Second, the implications of the results for the monetary policy assessment are discussed. We estimate cointegrating vector autoregressive models in order to quantify the level of the liquidity premium. The results suggest that financial markets do not consider the monetary policy of the European Central Bank simply as the one prevailing during the German period.     

Corporate governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32)