Single versus multiple banking: lessons from initial public offerings

A vast research in banking addresses the question of the costs and benefits of multiple bank relationships versus a single bank relationship. Although no clear-cutting conclusion is reached, several contributions suggest that multiple bank relationships might lead to a sub-optimal level of monitoring, compared to a single bank relationship, as a result of free riding and coordination problems. We take a novel approach to tackle this research question, by looking at the role, if any, played by the number of lending relationships in initial public offerings (IPOs). We look at the short-term performances of IPOs as measured by underpricing and find that firms that go public with multiple bank relationships exhibit more underpricing than those that go public with a single bank relationship. This finding is independent of the number of bank relationships and/or whether any of the lending banks also acts as underwriter in the offering. We interpret our results as suggesting that the market attributes a weaker certification role to multiple bank relationships because of their less effective monitoring of IPO firms.     

Banks and bubbles: How good are bankers at spotting winners?

This paper examines the bank lending relations of a large sample of technology and nontechnology firms that went public during the 1996–2000 period. We use a unique hand-collected data set to examine the characteristics of firms that establish pre- Initial Public Offering (IPO) bank lending relations and whether post-IPO performance is related to the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. We find that the majority of IPO firms have banking relations before they go public. Firms with banking relations are older, more profitable or, in the case of tech firms, have lower losses, and are more likely to have funding from venture capitalists than firms without banking relations. We also find that banks lent aggressively to technology firms in the sense that current earnings and cash flows were significantly less important in determining banking relations for technology firms than for nontechnology firms. Consistent with the importance of so-called soft information in lending decisions, we find that, controlling for ex ante observable risk measures, there is a positive and significant relation between improvements in post-IPO operating performance and the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. Overall, our results indicate that firms with the best current and future prospects establish banking relations. Our findings provide an explanation as to why investors could interpret lending relations as a positive signal of firm quality.     

Banking Relationships and Syndicated Loans during the 2008 Financial Crisis

The research shows that banking relationships are important to lending. However, few studies focus on the banking relationships in syndicated loans, although these loans have became a major source of financing. The last financial crisis clearly shows the impacts of credit rationing and tightening credit conditions, even in the syndicated loans market. We investigate whether banking relationships help firms to benefit from better terms for syndicated loans in a chaotic financial environment. Using a sample of syndicated loans arranged from 2003 to 2008 in North America and Europe, we find that firms with a previously developed relationship with a lead bank obtained a lower spread and a longer maturity during the financial crisis but did not benefit from larger loan facilities.     

Bank interest rates and credit relationships in Italy

When evaluating the performance of a financial system in supporting the investment activity of the corporate sector, a distinction is usually drawn between “banking economies” and “market economies”, the former being characterized by long-term relations between banks and the industrial sector. Although theoretical studies and empirical results seem to agree that lending relationships increase the available quantity of capital to firms, they have little to say on the cost of bank credit: it is not clear whether a close relationship with a main bank would allow the borrower to pay a lower interest rate or expose him to a monopolistic rent. Using a unique data-set reporting detailed information on the evolution over time of individual bank–borrower relationships in Italy, we show evidence that a main bank provides credit at a lower cost and that some competition helps to reinforce the commitment between the borrower and the bank.     

Do small businesses still prefer community banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.     

Relationship and Transaction Lending: New Evidence and Perspectives

In this article, I try to answer three questions: (1) How do relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the cycle? (2) How do economic systems that are more “bank oriented” perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? (3) What are the consequences on relationship banking of the recent structural bank regulation reforms adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities? Building on some recent evidence, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) Relationship banks protect their clients in normal downturns; (2) when recessions coincide with a financial crisis, countries that rely relatively more on bank financing tend to be more severely hit; (3) the effects of structural bank regulation initiatives on relationship banking are uncertain.     

Credit rationing and the relationship between family businesses and banks in Italy

We investigate whether family businesses (FBs) suffer stiffer credit rationing in the post-crisis Italian economy. FBs are, in fact, typically more opaque than other firms, possibly deterring bank lending to them. Moreover, regulatory changes may lead many banks to abandon relationship lending, weakening their ability to evaluate opaque firms. Using detailed firm data, our estimates reach nuanced conclusions. First, credit rationing is not more intense at FBs. However, it systematically intensifies if FBs engage in firm-bank arrangements less able to overcome information asymmetries either coupling with a main bank that uses transactional lending or diluting relationships across various banking partners.     

Lending competition and credit availability for new firms: Empirical study with the price cost margin in regional loan markets

In this paper, I present statistical evidence of the impact of lending competition on credit availability for new firms. A discrete-time duration analysis with respect to the years from the start-up to the first loan approval by a commercial bank or a cooperative bank, which is collected from survey data in Japan, shows that the higher price cost margin (PCM) of banks, which reflects the existence of a quasi-rent for a bank, improves the credit availability for younger firms. Additional analysis to detect the regional determinants of the PCM of banks shows that the share of larger banks in each local credit market has a negative and significant impact on the PCM. In light of the existing empirical finding that smaller banks are more likely to provide relationship banking, these findings provide indirect evidence for the hypothesis that the intensity of relationship banking in each local credit market increases the PCM and this encourages banks to extend a loan to new firms so that they can pre-empt the opportunity to establish lending relationships that are expected to yield such quasi-rents.     

The impact of competition on bank orientation

How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.     

Credit market concentration,relationship lending and the cost of debt

We investigate how the banking industry concentration and the strength of credit relationships (relationship lending) jointly affect the cost of borrowing of firms. Our results indicate that relationship lending is not associated with the rent extraction mechanism deriving from informational lock-in. Conversely, market concentration appears to be associated with firms' higher cost of funding. But the effect is fully compensated if the relationship between the firm and the bank is long and comprehensive. Controlling for a number of covariates and for endogeneity concerns leaves results unchanged. Our results shed some new light on the unclear effects documented by Kysucky and Norden (2016) of relationship lending on the cost of financing.     

Bank competition,concentration and EU SME cost of debt

Despite the plentiful debate on the effects of bank competition on SME access to finance and growth, only few studies have explored the impacts on SME cost of debt. This study examines how bank market power affects the credit costs of SMEs by using unique matched SME-bank data from 17 EU countries. We show that bank market power reduces the cost of debt for SMEs. Such a favorable effect is stronger for SMEs that are less informationally transparent, and in the economies subject to less credit information depth and business extent of disclosure. These findings support the Information-based Hypothesis, whereby market power motivates banks to invest in soft information acquisition and to build lending relationships to reduce information costs. In addition, we show that despite the favorable effects of relationship lending brought by bank market power, SME credit conditions worsen in a more concentrated banking market.     

The effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks – The case of China

Although the relationship between bank ownership and performance is the current focus of much research, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership and the prudential behavior of banks. Using Chinese data, I show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by joint-equity banks, but has improved over time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accountability to shareholders and depositors gives joint-equity banks a better incentive than state-owned banks to engage in prudent lending, and with the hypothesis that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently in their lending.     

Bank Lending Standards and Access to Lines of Credit

This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre‐existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that “credit crunches” are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre‐existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.     

银行竞争与银行业稳定研究述评

近期有大量文献分别从竞争与银行风险转嫁激励,竞争与银行授信行为, 以及竞争与银行危机传染等不同的角度研究了银行竞争与银行业稳定之间是否存在权衡关系。虽然理论研究和实证研究并未就此达成一致的看法,但某些观点对于制定银行管制政策却给出了新的思路。     

Do Declines in Bank Health Affect Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures? Evidence from International Propagation of Banking Shocks

I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.     

Consolidation in banking and the lending channel of monetary transmission: Evidence from Asia and Latin America

This paper examines the relationship between increased consolidation in banking and monetary policy transmission in eighteen Asian and Latin American economies, using bank-level data from 1996 to 2006. Our results provide consistent evidence that as concentration in banking increases, the bank lending channel is weakened, leading the monetary policy transmission mechanism to be less effective. We also investigate how this relationship between concentration and the strength of the lending channel depends on bank-specific characteristics. Using bank-level balance sheet and income statement data allows us, first, to better identify the effects of banking consolidation on the supply-side bank lending channel from those of the demand-side interest rate channel, and second, to test for any systematic differences in the impact of consolidation on monetary policy transmission across banks of different size and financial strength. We also discuss potential explanations for and policy implications of the main findings of this paper.     

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract:   This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.     

The spread of deposit insurance and the global rise in bank asset risk since the 1970s

We construct a new measure of deposit insurance generosity for many countries, empirically model the exogenous international influences on the adoption and generosity of deposit insurance and use a novel econometric method to explore the causal chain from the expansion of deposit insurance generosity to increased overall lending, increased lending to households, increased banking system leverage, and more severe and frequent banking crises. Greater deposit insurance generosity robustly produces greater overall lending relative to bank assets and more lending to households relative to both bank assets and GDP, and results in higher banking system leverage. Our estimates, however, are not conclusive regarding whether greater deposit insurance generosity resulted in greater total loans relative to GDP or in more frequent or severe banking crises.     

Credit information,consolidation and credit market performance: Bank-level evidence from developing countries

Paying particular attention to the degree of banking market concentration in developing countries, this paper examines the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. Using bank-level data from African countries over the period 2004 to 2009 and a dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, it is found that credit information sharing increases bank lending. The degree of banking market concentration moderates the effect of credit information sharing on bank lending. The results are robust to controlling for possible interactions between credit information sharing and governance.     

Monetary policy and bank lending:: Evidence from German banking groups

This paper analyses the impact of monetary shocks on bank lending in Germany. We follow a cross-sectoral approach by looking at six different banking groups. In general, smaller banks hold a larger buffer of liquid assets which they can use to offset monetary shocks. In addition, the response of bank lending after a monetary contraction is very different across banking sectors. Lending by the credit co-operatives, which are on average the smallest banks, declines most, whereas big banks are able to shield their loans portfolio against monetary shocks. Overall, our results provide support for the existence of a bank lending channel.