Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.     

Earnings Announcements and Market Depth*

Abstract. This paper investigates how strategic trading around the time of earnings announcements affects market liquidity (e.g., bid-ask spreads). We model an investor with private information in advance of an earnings announcement (e.g., inside information). The investor trades before and after the earnings announcement in a market populated by liquidity-motivated traders who have some discretion over the timing of their trades. The main result of the analysis is that an earnings announcement that reduces an insider's private information may lead to a less liquid market in the postannouncement period.     

Does board gender diversity matter in the banking sector? Evidence from Tunisia

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of board gender diversity on banks’ performance and risk for the case of a developing African country. Our sample includes a unique data set of Tunisian banks during the period 2005–2018. We use the two‐way cluster regression proposed by Petersen. This approach corrects for the unobserved firm effect (time‐series dependence) and time effect (cross‐sectional dependence). It gives robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and cross‐sectional correlation. Our results support a positive relationship between gender diversity and banks’ performance measured by ROA and ROE, while women board members are associated with more default risk measured by Z‐score. Our results remain robust to various measures of gender diversity, banks’ performance and risk. The findings contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence from Tunisia, an African emerging economy, where the examination of the role of board gender diversity on bank governance is unexplored.     

A Better Measure of Institutional Informed Trading

Although many studies show that the presence of institutional investors facilitates the incorporation of accounting information into financial markets, the evidence of informed trading by institutions is rather limited in the extant literature. We address these inconsistent findings by proposing PC_NII, percentage changes in the number of a stock's institutional investors, as a novel informed trading measure. PC_NII is better able to detect informed trading than are changes in institutional ownership (ΔIO)—the measure commonly used in previous studies—because (i) entries and exits are usually triggered by substantive private information and (ii) only a small fraction of institutions have superior information. As conjectured, PC_NII subsumes the information content of ΔIO and other institutional trading and herding measures in the forecast of stock returns, and its strong predictive power for stock returns reflects mainly its close correlation with future earnings surprises. We also show that PC_NII helps address empirical issues that require a reliable measure of institutional informed trading.     

The Effect of CFO Personal Litigation Risk on Firms’ Disclosure and Accounting Choices

In Gantler v. Stephens (2009), the Delaware Supreme Court makes explicit that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duty to the firm and shareholders as do board members. The decision increased the risk of non‐board‐serving officers being added as named defendants to investor litigation but did not change the risk of corporate litigation. Analyzing the effect of the Gantler ruling on non‐board‐serving CFOs, we find a significant change in their behavior as well as in their firms’ disclosure and accounting choices. Specifically, speech tone during earnings calls of non‐board‐serving CFOs becomes more negative when compared to board‐serving CFOs and the firm's CEO, and non‐board‐serving CFO firms disclose bad news earlier and report more conservatively. Results are stronger for firms incorporated in Delaware. Our findings suggest that CFOs respond to personal litigation risk over and above corporate litigation risk.     

Trading Prior to the Disclosure of Material Information: Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure Form 8‐Ks*

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material. Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.     

上市公司治理与中小投资者保护

根据投资者保护的有关理论,分析导致我国中小投资者弱势地位的原因,讨论我国在投资者保护方面所存在的问题。在此基础上提出政策建议：完善相关立法,创建一个有利于广大投资者的法律环境；赋予小股东的股东会自行召集权、采取累计投票制以及股东表决权的排除规则等,适当限制大股东的权利；完善独立董事制度,规范董事会运作；强化监事会的作用；建立投资者权益保护协会等。     

公司内部治理与投资者保护

公司内部治理是公司投资者保护的重要手段,其中股权结构、董事会制度、经营者激励是组成内部治理的重要要素。本文分析了股权结构、董事会制度和经营者激励与投资者保护的关系,研究了三种关系之间的联系,并指出要统筹考虑三种关系,构建竞争型的大股东股权治理结构,培养机构投资者,完善独立董事制度,推广经营者股票期权制度,切实保护投资者利益。     

完善我国证券投资者保护基金制度的探讨

基于证券投资者保护基金公司多年来的运营实践,乘资本市场法制改革之东风,将证券投资者保护基金制度的立法层级从部门规章上升至国家法律的时机已经成熟。同时,在将保护基金制度整合到统一的法律体系之时,其具体内容不但要体现符合SIPF市场化运营要求以及审慎监管需要的董事会组织模式,还要对资金的筹集和使用有更科学合理的安排。     

论代办股份转让系统投资者保护的优化

目前国际上对三板市场投资者保护已具有较为成熟的理论并建立起了较为健全的制度,国内已有的文献多是就整个证券市场谈投资者保护,专门结合现阶段或未来一段时间我国三板市场发展的阶段性特征及体现出三板市场与主板市场和二板市场发展的差异性来谈投资者保护的理论较少或不够深入。三板扩容正当时,加强投资者保护被提上日程。优化代办股份转让系统投资者保护具有理论和现实意义。代办股份转让系统投资者利益得到有效的保护是一个系统工程,需要在体制、法律、政策以及教育等多个方面采取相应的有力措施,需要政府有关部门的大力支持,需要上市公司、中介机构和投资者等主体的积极配合参与,分阶段、动态地、多维度地构建起立体保护框架。     

投资者保护、剩余公司治理与我国资本市场省际差异

投资者保护是影响资本市场发展的重要因素,它可以解释我国资本市场发展中存在的区域差异吗？本文探讨在相同的立法环境中,由法律执行和以地方性法规为代表的省际剩余公司治理的差异所引起的我国31省份投资者保护程度的不同,对资本市场省际差异的影响。研究发现：（1）投资者保护是影响资本市场省际差异的一个重要因素。（2）投资者保护构成中,法律执行对资本市场省际差异产生显著正向影响,而省际剩余公司治理的影响并不确定。     

Shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and the information content of stock prices

In recent years, corporate investment rate has been declining, and they have been allocating financial capital to the shadow credit market, which lead to accumulation of financial risks. Based on the annual data of non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019, this paper explores the impact of non-financial companies’ shadow banking on the information content of stock prices. Results show that shadow banking of non-financial enterprises reduce the information content of stock price, and the above effects are more significant in regions with lower social trust and higher policy uncertainty, private enterprises, and enterprises without political connection. Enterprises engage in shadow banking can impact idiosyncratic information content of stock price through channels of earning management, irrational investor behavior, creditor risk concerns and informed trading; Analysts over-optimism and insider trading can also have an impact on the relationship between shadow banking activities and synchronization of stock price. This paper analyzes economic consequences of non-financial enterprises’ shadow banking activities, thus providing important theoretical support and policy guidance for enhancing signal mechanism of securities market, improving capital market efficiency of resource allocation, deepening financial market-oriented reforms.     

Bankers on the Board,Market Competition,and Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Bankers on the board are expected to act as a fund-raiser and to help lowering financial costs, but they can impose conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. We empirically analyse the impact of banker-directors on corporate leverage and investment, using Korean firm data during the period from 2000 to 2012. Bankers on the board turn out to play different roles depending on market competition and macroeconomic circumstance. In less competitive industries where banks are less concerned about financial distress as a creditor, the presence of bankers on the board has higher leverage and more active investment, which can align with the interest of shareholders. However, in more competitive environment where firms are more concerned about financial distress and external financing, bankers on the board do not always increase leverage and investment, which can be divergent from the interest of shareholders.     

Creditors’ and Shareholders’ Reporting Demands in Public Versus Private Firms: Evidence from Europe*

In this study we investigate whether the importance of accounting information in contracting and communication with shareholders and creditors affects earnings timeliness in publicly disclosed general‐purpose financial statements. To operationalize the relationship between timeliness demands and the importance of accounting information to shareholders and creditors, we compare the (asymmetry in) earnings timeliness of public firms with that of private firms. We attribute public versus private firm differences in timeliness to shareholders’ demands when a country’s institutions provide strong investor protection. Similarly, we attribute these differences to creditors’ demands when the institutions provide strong creditor protection. Our analysis of public and private firms in 13 Western European countries suggests that creditors and shareholders have different timeliness demands. In particular, we find that the public versus private firm difference in asymmetric timeliness is not associated with a country’s degree of investor protection but positively associated with a country’s degree of creditor protection. The results further suggest that shareholders demand symmetric rather than asymmetric timeliness. An important implication of our study is that general‐purpose financial statements are responsive to creditors’ reporting demands, which contrasts with the idea that these — primarily private — creditors would use special‐purpose reports.     

Trade-size clustering and price efficiency

Using a sample of 26 markets, this paper investigates if trade-size clustering affects price efficiency. Our results suggest that more clustering trades are associated with greater resemblance of a random walk, less pricing errors, and shorter price delays. Moreover, we examine three underlying mechanisms to explain how clustering improves efficiency. First, we show that clustering trades are informative, consistent with the idea that stealth traders leverage such tactics to convey private information to prices. Second, we discover that clustering trades are positively related to investor attention (stock liquidity), implying that informed clustering trades happen at the presence of enormous uninformed investors. High attention and liquid markets help reduce the trading friction, thereby prompting quick price adjustments to private information released by the stealth trading.     

Regulatory Protection and Opportunistic Bankruptcy*

We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre-bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post-filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.     

股市中的过度反应与反应不足

过度反应与反应不足是股市投资中的两个异常行为,本文认为除了“输家——赢家效应”、“市盈率异常”以外,“井喷现象”也是过度反应的典型表现;反应不足则主要表现为“魅力股”或“价值股”等。过度反应与反应不足产生的主要原因是投资者存在过度自信、自我归因及保守性偏差等,常见的对策是反转策略和动量策略,本文分析了运用反转策略和动量策略的时机选择,以使其更具可操作性。     

Home Country Investor Protection,Ownership Structure and Cross‐Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX‐Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX‐mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICDs during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICDs in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.     

The implications for suppliers of the spread of supermarkets in southern Africa

ABSTRACT

The growth of supermarkets in southern Africa opens local and regional markets to suppliers through participation in supermarket supply chains. Supermarkets in the region provide an important route to market for processed foods and household consumable products. Through a regional value chain lens, this article provides an assessment of the implications of the growth of supermarkets for the participation of suppliers in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The research finds that, while supermarkets provide important opportunities for suppliers, they also exert considerable buyer power that limits supplier development and upgrading. High private standards, onerous requirements and costly trading terms negatively affect supplier participation in value chains. Long-term investments are required to build the capabilities of suppliers to meet supermarket requirements in terms of quality, consistency, volume and cost-competitiveness.     

控制权及投资者保护对掏空风险的影响——基于融资规模的经验证据

基于中国上市公司融资规模数据对上市公司的控制权与掏空风险的关系进行了实证分析,并探讨了投资者保护对掏空风险的抑制作用。研究发现:与国家终极控制的上市公司相比,私人终极控制的上市公司中掏空风险更高,因而融资规模显著高于前者;控股股东持股比例越高,掏空上市公司的动机越小,从而导致上市公司融资规模越低;其他大股东的制衡能力越强,控股股东掏空上市公司的可能性越小,因而上市公司融资规模越低;投资者保护水平越高,越能起到抑制掏空风险的作用。