Improving market performance in the digital economy

The digital economy has substantially reduced market frictions but also posed new challenges for the efficient functioning of markets. In particular, the drastic reductions in the costs of search, entry, transportation, and reproduction have profound implications for the role of platforms, the value of innovation, and the balance between firms' data needs and consumer privacy. I review some recent economic research that sheds light on these issues, and discuss how well-designed policies on competition, regulation, IP protection, and consumer privacy can improve market performance in the digital economy.     

Pricing on the Internet

It is often claimed that e-commerce has created a more competitiveenvironment by encouraging the entry of new online firms andby enabling buyers to search easily for the lowest prices. Thelimited evidence that exists paints a mixed picture. Many onlinemarkets are advertising- and technology-intensive, creatinga tendency towards growing concentration. Price search is imperfectand firms can dampen price competition by increasing productheterogeneity and switching costs. In many sectors, online firmsmay come to acquire some market power. We look at the formsof pricing that are likely to emerge in such markets, includingthe greater use of price discrimination and auction-like tradingarrangements.     

Why We Should Stop Being Surprised that Lightly Regulated Markets Fall Short of the SEC's Goals for Market Quality: A Discussion of “Private Intermediary Innovation and Market Liquidity”

The stated goals of the SEC are to protect investors, maintain orderly markets and facilitate capital formation. These goals can be achieved with very light regulation if, as assumed by traditional economic theory, investors process information costlessly and protect themselves from informational disadvantages, and firms optimally balance the costs and benefits of committing to make their reports reliable. A growing body of research demonstrates that light regulation fails to achieve the SEC's goals, because investors find information processing costly and fail to protect themselves. After reviewing theory and prior evidence, I discuss new lessons learned from Jiang, Petroni, and Wang ( 2016 ), who show that Pink Sheets^® reduced the liquidity of firms with low reporting quality and increased the liquidity of firms with high reporting quality, merely by highlighting the quality of their listed firms’ disclosure. While the Pink Sheets^® innovation might have occurred through many causal channels, all of them entail a violation of costless processing and self‐protection, and lead to the conclusion that this lightly regulated market did not initially meet the stated goals of the SEC. I conclude by arguing that markets can achieve the SEC's goals only if they exhibit a particularly strong version of “dynamic” market efficiency, which requires that each individual trade on the path to even incomplete revelation occurs at the then‐optimal price. Because dynamic efficiency is unlikely, we should stop being surprised to see evidence that lightly regulated markets fall short on key dimensions. Instead, we should use our well‐developed understanding of market inefficiency to guide regulation.     

Financial Market Competition: The Effects of Transparency

European and US financial markets are faced with increased competition for order flow. Fundamental in the competition process is the organization of the trading process, since this directly influences the performance and trading costs of those markets. In this paper we examine the effects of public quote disclosure and the disclosure of transaction information on market liquidity and price efficiency. Our results indicate a clear trade-off between efficiency and liquidity. These findings could explain why a variety of co-existing trading structures can be optimal among competitive financial markets.     

Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

Implicit Prices of Indigenous Bull Traits in Crop‐Livestock Mixed Production Systems of Ethiopia*

Abstract: This study examines the bull trait preferences of cattle buyers and estimates the relative willingness to pay for the preferred attributes. Data were generated using choice experiment method in five markets in central Ethiopia. Standard and Heterogeneity in Mean (H‐M) Random Parameters Logit (RPL) models were used to analyze buyers’ preferences for traits, while kernel density estimators were employed to examine the distribution of the willingness to pay for the individual traits. The results show that cattle buyers of central Ethiopia assign high values for good traction potential, big body size, disease resistance, calf vigor, and for places of origin when choosing bulls in the market. The preferences cattle buyers have for these attributes do vary essentially due to differences in occupation, education and age. The main implication of the findings is the necessity of identification and reckoning of trait preferences while designing crossbreeding efforts meant to sustain development of cattle production. Comprehensive and informed approach in this regard will also contribute in reducing the erosion of the genetic diversity of the indigenous animal genetic resources.     

流动性风险与资产定价:来自中国股市的证据

LCAPM（基于流动性风险的CAPM模型）是Acharya和Pedersen（2005，Journal of Financial Economics）提出的．它将流动性风险可能影响资产价格的多种方式纳入一个统一的框架。本文利用LCAPM对中国股市进行检验．在该模型中，证券的收益依赖于它的期望流动性及其与收益（包括个股与市场收益）之间的协方差。检验结果发现，我国股市的风险升水在大盘升降区间体现了不同的特征：无论在总区间还是分时段，LCAPM都能更好的拟合资产收益；在控制公司规模之后，效果依然稳健。这说明流动性在我国股市的资产定价上有重要影响。     

The Rationale for Occupational Pensions

Employers and employees have no incentive to include pensionsas part of employment contracts unless the pension completesa missing market, or ameliorates an imperfection in existingcapital or labour markets. We examine the influence on the choiceand design of occupational pensions of capital- and labour-marketimperfections. In capital markets, we focus on basis risks,taxation, employer default risks, transactions costs, portfoliorestrictions, and liquidity constraints. Aspects of labour marketsaffecting occupational pensions may be the presence of firm-specifichuman capital, asymmetric information between firms and potentialhires, the presence of moral hazard, and internal labour marketsin firms which cause employers to attempt to control the retirementbehaviour of workers. The implications of this analysis of occupationalpensions for public policy towards pensions are briefly examined. Footnotes ¹ E-mail address: dg.mccarthy{at}imperial.ac.uk     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

On the heterogeneous short‐term effects of minimum wages on labor demand

A strand of the literature documents no effects or even positive effects of a higher minimum wage on employment. This evidence is frequently linked to the existence of monopsonistic labor markets or search frictions. However, empirical studies show that these findings could be related to a low short‐term minimum wage–employment elasticity in a competitive labor market. We show that mixed theoretical employment effects of a minimum wage policy can be predicted in the short term in assignment economies with price‐taker agents and no search frictions.     

Contagion or Real Linkages？ Some Evidence from China＇s Emerging Parallel Markets

This paper empirically tests the existence of contagion using data on China's five parallel markets with different entry barriers for foreign capital. Taking the 1997 stock market crash as our experiment and using data on A, B and H shares, red chips and American depository receipts, the present paper tests whether these China‐backed market returns respond differently to foreign shocks during the pre‐1997 and post‐1997 crash period. Evidence suggests that the contagion effects are stronger in markets with fewer entry barriers. An important implication of our findings is that countries vulnerable to contagion could be justified to impose some limits on capital flows.     

Optimal Contracting,Accounting Standards,and Market Structures*

In this study I use a principal-agent framework to analyze optimal contracting under two accounting standards, referred to as historical cost (HC) and market value (MV), and under differing asset market assumptions. I distinguish HC from MV by the way revenue is recognized and in the reporting discretion allowed. The MV standard recognizes both realized and unrealized holding gains; HC recognizes only realized holding gains. MV allows the manager reporting discretion; the HC standard does not. Also, distinguishing an asset's value-in-use (VIU) from its net realizable value (NRV), I consider markets where the asset's VIU and NRV are always equal as well as markets where VIU and NRV differ. I show the following. If an asset's NRV and VIU are equal and if the manager's available reporting discretion is known, the principal prefers the MV standard because it provides better information about the manager's effort. However, the principal may prefer the HC standard if sufficiently uncertain about the manager's reporting discretion or if the asset's NRV exceeds its VIU, so that expected revenue is sufficiently enhanced by selling the asset earlier. Using an example (normal distribution and mean/variance preferences with linear contracts), I provide a case where the principal prefers the HC standard. Also, I compare the optimal effort and contract under each standard, and provide comparative static results that show how expected revenue, cost, and net income change due to changes in certain model parameters.     

流动性和条件资产定价:理论和实证检验

选择适当的工具一直是条件资产定价研究的中心,目前国内外尚没有研究从这个角度探讨流动性对资产定价的影响。本文在Breeden-Lucas随机折现因子框架下建立了以市场流动性为工具的条件CAPM,并使用1996．1．2-2004．12．31期间的沪深A股日度交易数据构造了Amihud（2002）的非流动性测度、Farm-French组合、定价因子等。一阶段GMM估计表明,该滞后工具可有效捕获资产回报的可预测变化。模型解释这种变化的能力显著优于Fama-French三因子模型和CAPM．且几乎没有统计显著的残留规模效果和价值效果。     

Competition,asset build up and export incentives: The role of imperfect credit market

This paper studies the export incentive of credit rationed, competitive and homogenous firms through asset build up highlighting the generic trade-off between competition and asset value in an imperfect credit market where poor and rich firms have different levels of assets. It is a contribution to the issues related to finance and trade in developing countries as raised first in Jones and Marjit (2001, AER). Our theoretical and empirical results indicate that although firms in more competitive industries are likely to be exporters, history of greater local competition before the entry of firms into export market i.e. under autarky, hurts export incentive by limiting cash flows and asset build up. In our set up more intense local competition hence lower price is an advantage to access global markets, but associated low profits and hence lower assets acts a detriment.     

Do exchange rate arrangements and capital controls influence international capital flows and housing prices in Asia?

This paper investigates the influence of international capital flows on housing prices in eight Asian countries, including China. We focus on determining whether exchange rate arrangements and capital regulations influence capital inflows and housing prices. Our results show that an arrangement to restrain the fluctuation of the exchange rate and capital controls has the potential to raise housing prices in Asia. The strong prospect of the Chinese yuan's appreciation also pushed up housing prices in China. Another expected reason for the increase in capital inflows into Asian markets is the expansion of global liquidity. Such capital flows often have a sensitive reaction to market sentiment, and an increase in asset market volatility caused by the liquidity squeeze decreases Asian housing prices. These results suggest the need to review capital controls and future exchange rate system options for Asian countries.     

Marginal Distance: Does Export Experience Reduce Firm Trade Costs?

Are the costs of exporting to a market reduced if a firm has experience of exporting to a neighbouring market? If so, does this effect operate through reducing entry barriers or by increasing sales once the firm is operating in the market? This paper examines linkages between current export destinations and entry, sales and exit for new markets. We find that measures of exporting experience in geographically nearby markets increase the probability of entry into a market and reduce the probability of exit. However, these same measures have very limited effect on the firm’s export sales in the market. The effect of related experience on sales tends to be negative for recently entered firms. We interpret this result in the context of the Melitz heterogeneous-firm model of trade by showing that lower fixed costs reduce the entry threshold, but this lower threshold has the effect of allowing lower-sales marginal firms to be present in the market.     

Competitive blind spots and the cyclicality of investment: Experimental evidence

We report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of profit-enhancing investment in a competitive environment. In our setting, optimal investment is counter-cyclical when investment costs fall following market downturns. However, we do not observe counter-cyclical investment. Instead, we see much less strategic behavior than our rational investment model anticipates. Our participants exhibit what Porter (1980) terms a competitive blind spot, and heuristic investment models where individuals invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity, or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand, better fit our data than does optimal investment. We also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity. Both of these extensions support our main result.     

A Quantitative Assessment of the Role of Incomplete Asset Markets on the Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rate

I develop a two-country New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and incomplete international asset markets that provides novel insights on the effect that imperfect international risk-sharing has on international business cycles and RER dynamics. I find that business cycles appear similar whether international asset markets are complete or not when driven by a combination of non-persistent monetary shocks and persistent productivity (TFP) shocks. In turn, international asset market incompleteness has sizeable effects if (persistent) investment-specific technology (IST) shocks are a main driver of business cycles. I also show that the model with incomplete international asset markets can approximate the RER volatility and persistence observed in the data, for instance, if IST shocks are near-unit-root. Hence, I conclude that the nature of shocks, the extent of financial integration across countries and the existing limitations on asset trading are central to understand the dynamics of the real exchange rate and the endogenous international transmission over the business cycles.     

A Multiperiod Model and Experimental Evidence of Independence and “Lowballing”*

Abstract. Auditors, regulators, and academics are interested in the pricing practice of “lowballing” and its relationship to auditor independence. Several analytical models have examined these issues. However, these theories have gone untested primarily due to a lack of field data concerning important environmental variables. In this study, a multiperiod model of lowballing and independence is developed and tested in laboratory markets via the experimental economics methodology. The study contributes to the literature in two respects. First, it represents one of the first studies providing empirical evidence and theory testing of the relationship between lowballing and independence. Second, the model presents a new rationale for low-ball pricing and its relationship to auditor independence. Lowballing and impairment of independence, occurring without exogenous transaction costs, are caused by positing cross-sectional variation in audit cost and quality and an informational advantage that accrues to an incumbent auditor-client pair regarding future variation in these audit dimensions. The model is operationalized in a multiperiod laboratory market consisting of multiple sellers and buyers. Sixteen markets are conducted to test price and reporting predictions of the model. The markets strongly exhibit lowballing behavior, but the exact price predictions are generally not supported. The markets also support reporting predictions, with sellers deviating from truthful reporting (impairing their independence) only when additional future profits are greater than the additional cost of misreporting. Data availability. The laboratory market data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.     

Geography and firm exports: new evidence on the nature of sunk costs

This paper presents an examination of the trading patterns of individual firms, looking at their coverage of export markets and movements into and out of destinations. This analysis is made possible by access to a new survey data set of Irish firms, which includes detailed information on firm characteristics and on the destinations of their exports over a 2-year period. In line with Eaton et al. (Am Econ Rev 94:150–154, 2004), we find that a large number of firms serve only the domestic market and many exporting firms export to a single foreign market. Although there is little movement of firms into and out of exporting, firms’ involvement in individual export markets is much more dynamic. Over one-third of firms change their market coverage, usually by entering or exiting one additional market. This is consistent with an interpretation where the bulk of any sunk cost encountered in exporting is incurred during the initial entry to the export market. Subsequent entry to additional markets may be made easier by prior export experience, which could help reduce the sunk cost of extending market coverage.