Privatization and capital formation in developing countries: an empirical analysis

The spur for privatization and its impact on economic performance have been analysed from many perspectives, including microeconomics, macroeconomics, and institutional economics. Previous research has focused on efficiency reasons for privatization at the level of the firm, and the relative performance of state‐owned enterprises and privately owned firms. This article investigates the macroeconomic facet of privatization with particular attention paid to the relation between privatization and capital formation in developing countries. Our study uses recent World Bank data on privatization for 105 countries over the time period 1988–2003. We explore the impact of privatization on capital formation by conducting two‐stage least squares and ordinary least squares estimations within three time frames. Our findings indicate that the effect of privatization on capital formation varies across regions and time frames. In general, privatization is neutral with regard to investment.     

Optimal Privatization and Economic Growth in a Schumpeterian Economy

This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of the privatization of public firms in a Schumpeterian growth model. Two alternative definitions of privatization are proposed in our model. The first is the ratio of mixed R&D firms’ equity shares owned by the household, which is dubbed vertical privatization. The second is the number of unmixed R&D firms, which is called horizontal privatization. We find that, under both definitions, privatization is beneficial to economic growth while the effect of privatization on social welfare is ambiguous. Accordingly, our analysis reveals that a partial privatization could be an optimal policy. Moreover, we also discuss how the extent of patent protection is related to optimal privatization.     

Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu telecommunications

Abstract ** :  In many countries infrastructure liberalization proceeded faster than the privatization of former state monopolies. Regulatory agencies, established to oversee the transition and safeguard the preconditions for competition, therefore monitor state‐owned firms in addition to privately owned firms. The research on public‐private firms has generated heterogeneous findings, with some pointing to the advantages and other to the disadvantages of this arrangement. Government regulation of mixed public‐private firms raises additional complicated issues, of which the paper studies two using the example of European telecommunications between 2000 and 2004. It examines, first, whether the dual role of the state as owner and regulator could be abused to disadvantage private competitors. Second, it probes whether, conversely, the combination of government ownership and regulation might help overcome some of the shortcomings of the regulation of private firms. We find weak evidence that public and mixed regulated firms were subject to more favourable regulation of interconnection prices. However, this effect weakened as more independent regulation was established. In the area of universal service provision, there is no clear evidence that public and mixed telecommunication service providers were more likely than private ones to be utilized in pursuit of social output goals without explicit compensation. Overall, it seems that the presence of independent regulation, appeals processes, and competition review is a safeguard against capture of the regulator, by public and mixed firms .     

国企民营化与企业创新效率：促进还是抑制?

文章基于混合所有制改革的背景，从创新效率的视角考察了微观创新主体民营化前后创新行为的变化。研究发现，民营化抑制了企业的创新效率，企业的专利数量显著减少，这种影响在缺乏原国有大股东制衡、无系族的上市公司以及外部产权保护较弱的地区更加显著，而且相对于创业型企业，民营化企业的创新效率更低。进一步研究发现，民营化抑制企业创新效率的一个重要途径是关联交易显著增加、投资显著减少，民营化后非国有大股东更多地表现出掏空动机，减少了创新活动，降低了创新效率。文章的研究结论为理解民营化企业的效率提供了新视角，有助于我们正确认识和理解新兴转轨经济体的民营化行为，而且对于监管层如何推进混合所有制改革具有重要的政策启示。     

Privatization and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: the Lessons So Far

The privatization of utilities has grown in developing countries in recent years. Privatization transactions for the utilities sector have accounted for over a third of all sales in developing countries since 1988. The introduction of privatization has not necessarily meant more competition. Consequently, utility privatization has led in many cases to the creation of regulatory structures that aim to protect consumers from monopoly abuse and to provide incentives to firms to maintain efficiency. Case studies drawing on examples from the telecommunications, electricity and water sectors indicate that creating effective regulation and a competitive environment is a difficult and slow process. The cases have shown that regulation rather than privatization achieved the largest gains. Similarly, although the variety of regulatory measures that have been introduced have made a difference, the most tangible benefits, particularly to consumers, result from the establishment of competition. The case studies have shown that privatization has preceded the development of effective regulation and competition. The development of regulatory structures is constrained by the capacity of governments to enforce regulatory rules and monitor contracts. Fostering conditions that encourage competition and lessen anti-competitive behaviour by incumbents is a beneficial but slow process.     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem

We determine the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the environmental problem exists. With regard to the ownership of the private firms, we analyze two cases: (h) the private firm is owned by domestic private investors and (f) it is owned by foreign private investors. A comparison of the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is always desirable in (h), and the optimal degree of privatization is independent of the degree of environmental damage. However, in (f), whether partial privatization is desirable or not depends on the degree of environmental damage: there are cases where full privatization or full nationalization is optimal.     

PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: TECHNOLOGY AND GENDER IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This paper examines the impact of privatization on gender discrimination in China across firms with different technology intensities. Using a comprehensive firm‐level survey, the paper identifies gender wage‐productivity differentials by directly estimating the relative productivity levels of workers from the production function of firms. The panel structure of the survey is taken advantage of by following firms that were fully state‐owned in the initial year, and distinguishing them from firms that were later privatized. The main results show that privatization was associated with an increase in relative productivity of female workers in high technology industries, and a reduction in relative productivity of female workers in low technology industries. Time varying coefficient results suggest that the improvements in gender outcomes in high technology industries may not be maintained in the long run as the relative wage and productivity ratios tend to deteriorate, potentially due to low supply of highly educated female workers. At the same time, outcomes in privatized low technology industries increase over time, lowering the wage and productivity gaps between male and female workers. (JEL J16, J31, P20)     

国有企业改制对就业的影响——来自11个城市的证据

在20世纪90年代中后期,中国工业企业的就业规模大幅度下降,许多人认为,企业改制是其主要原因。本文通过对11个城市386家企业从1995年到2001年的面板数据的研究,评估了企业改制对就业的影响。我们的面板数据回归结果显示,和一般印象相反,改制显著地减缓了就业的下降趋势。我们还发现,改制对企业的就业增长有持续的和递增的积极作用。即使在控制了企业的绩效、就业条件、资产结构以及改制前就业历史之后,我们仍然得到相同的结论。另外,我们还使用了倾向分值匹配基础上的差分内差分方法对我们的结果进行了验证,也得到了相似的结论。     

A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.     

Restructuring outcomes and the evolution of ownership patterns in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper begins from the proposition that ‘deep restructuring’ requires both finance and managerial expertise. It addresses the question of how this second stage of enterprise restructuring will come about in the majority of state-owned or former state-owned firms that are not owned by foreigners. In particular, it seeks to identify how the initial post-privatization ownership and control structure impinges on the likelihood that deep restructuring takes place. Conclusions for the design of privatization policy are drawn. The initial post-privatization ownership structures in the Visegrad countries and Russia are surveyed along with evidence of the transfer of ownership from insiders to outsiders.     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.     

Privatization and contaminated site remediation in Central and Eastern Europe: Do environmental liability policies matter?

This paper examines the effects on site remediation decisions after state-owned firms have been privatized of providing environmental information to potential investors and undertaking site remediation planning prior to privatization. The literature suggests that to minimize distortions created by uncertain environmental problems, governments should invest in environmental information for potential investors, inventory problems and develop plans for remediation. One of the believed benefits is a higher probability of site remediation, because with uncertainty resolved potential conflicts after privatization are less likely. Few countries in Central Europe, which has experienced both environmental problems and privatization on enormous scales, have adopted this advice. Using firm-level data, empirical analysis is presented, which suggests providing only information to investors is insufficient to spur remediation. Inventorying site contamination and planning remediation prior to privatization is a much more effective measure. Combining provision of information with remediation planning is found to be the most powerful policy package for encouraging remediation.     

Institutional environment,ownership and firm taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese‐listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state‐owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.     

HOW DID STATE‐OWNED BANKS RESPOND TO PRIVATIZATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN EXPERIMENT

ABSTRACT ** : The paper examines the response of banks to privatization. Using data on all state‐owned banks for the period 1990–2006, the findings indicate that fully state‐owned banks are significantly less profitable than partially privatized ones. The improvements in performance by partially privatized banks are, in fact, sustained after privatization. In addition, the analysis indicates that privatization improves profitability, efficiency and improves bank soundness, while lowering bank risk. While the improvement in bank risk is typically spread out over a much longer period, the progress in terms of profitability and economic efficiency typically occurs in the post‐privatization period.     

WELFARE-IMPROVING PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

This article considers the vertical structure of the telecommunications industry and examines the welfare effects of privatization on the public enterprise, where the public enterprise supplies the essential network service of the upstream market and competes against private, independent firms in a mixed downstream market. It is shown that the cost advantage of the independent rivals improves welfare postprivatization. Several relevant and current policy issues on the process of privatization in the telecommunications industry are also discussed. (JEL L50, D42)     

Does Autonomy Matter in State Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Performance Contracts in India

Empirical evidence on the effect of managerial autonomy on the performance of state‐owned enterprises (SOE) is surprisingly scant despite autonomy being a preferred reform instrument over partial privatization in many countries. Using longitudinal data on performance contracts of state‐owned enterprises in India, this paper finds that managerial autonomy is associated with significant increases in enterprise profitability and efficiency. Further, using India's unique reform experience where both managerial autonomy and partial privatization were pursued side by side, the paper finds that while the positive effects of autonomy continue post‐partial privatization, the effects of partial privatization on performance are ambiguous. Specifically, once autonomy is controlled for, partial privatization has a positive effect on SOE profitability only after it crosses a critical level of government disinvestment. The findings suggest that organizational reforms such as granting managerial autonomy can be an important policy instrument in improving SOE performance particularly in cases where governments are unable to make substantial disinvestments.     

Implementation of computer-integrated manufacturing in small manufacturing firms

Even though small firms are the most fertile institutions in terms of job creation and also comprise the larger part of the manufacturing base of most countries, small firms have been generally quite slow in adapting computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) technology. This is especially problematic in taday's consumer-oriented market-place, where global competitive pressures are forcing firms to develop highly integrated information systems. In this paper, we will discuss the main reasons for this state of affairs and the steps needed for the implementation of such new methodology. In addition, we explore the advantages of establishing a CIM system as it relates primarily to two areas of operation; logistics planning, and human competence engineering.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

How to Increase R&D in Transition Economies? Evidence from Slovenia

The recent initiative of the European Union Lisbon Agenda to increase levels of R&D investment is addressed by studying the determinants of R&D investment in one of the recent EU entrants, Slovenia. Previous empirical literature—mainly cross‐sectional in nature—has tested the demand–pull hypothesis and found that overall R&D expenses may be driven by output demand. We use a panel of more than 150 of the largest Slovene firms over the period 1996–2000, modeling firms' R&D behavior within an error‐correction framework and estimating it in a system GMM specification. While we find that sales have a significant role in inducing R&D expenditures, we also show that the availability of internal funds and wage bargaining represent important factors determining R&D expenses. Moreover, firms owned by insiders (workers and/or managers) and/or firms with dispersed ownership (small shareholders) display higher R&D investments than firms owned by privatization investment funds or by other firms.