The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.     

Fundamentals,beliefs, and financial contagion

We study contagion in a model in which financial crises can occur due to both weak fundamentals and adverse self-fulfilling expectations. Contagion emerges only if a crisis in one country leads international investors to rationally update beliefs about fundamentals in other countries. But purely expectational crises may be contagious, as investors may infer that fundamentals are weak. Hence, the structure of information is crucial. The analysis delivers useful lessons for assessing which countries are more vulnerable to contagion, which types of crises are more infectious, and whether increased transparency ameliorates contagion effects.     

Crises and the International System

This paper reviews the recent experience of financial crises since 2007, including the continuing crisis in the euro zone. I seek to answer three main questions: In what respects (if any) is the recent experience of crises novel? How special is the euro crisis? And what changes in the international financial architecture can reduce the chances of future crises?     

Lessons from the 1997 and the 2008 Crises in Korea

The Korean economy was hit harder than anticipated by the global financial crisis. In the first phase, large capital outflows led to a severe liquidity strain in the foreign exchange market, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. Then, in the second phase, the contraction of global demand led to a collapse of exports and a sharp decline in economic activity, raising concerns about a full‐fledged financial crisis in Korea. This paper describes how the global financial crisis spilled over into the Korean economy and how the Korean government responded to the financial turmoil. It also provides the background and rationale for the Korean government's decisions to adopt specific policy measures. Based on Korean experiences during the 1997 and the 2008 crises, this paper documents the lessons learned from the past two crises and identifies several important policy issues.     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MONETARY COOPERATION: LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA*

This paper analyses the mechanisms of, and draws lessons from, currency crises in Asian and Latin American countries in the 1990s and 2000s. In Asian countries fiscal deficits were insignificant in size, and were not part of a crisis trigger, while in Latin America they played a major role in the crisis story. Crisis management by international financial institutions has been evolving over the last 10 years, and private‐sector involvement (PSI) has occupied centre‐stage in efforts to reform the international financial architecture. Sovereign debts, a focus of PSI discussions, were neither a cause nor a propagation of the Asian crises.     

Once Bitten: The Effect of IMF Programs on Subsequent Reserve Behavior

Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the accumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought to self‐insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of using IMF credits. This paper offers an empirical investigation of these ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. We find that IMF programs have had a significant positive effect on subsequent reserve accumulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this effect endures over time. We also find that the effect differs between Latin America and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.     

The IMF as just One Creditor: Who’s in Charge When a Country Can’t Pay?

ABSTRACT

The international community’s management of the 2010 financial crisis in Greece revealed a major gap in the international financial system. No single institution is any longer unambiguously in charge. Consequently, the path is open for narrow interests to predominate over global interests. An examination of postwar history shows that this problem has been growing gradually since the 1970s and has become much greater since the mid-1990s. To alleviate the problem, the International Monetary Fund needs to develop an effective strategy for reducing the opportunities for creditor countries to intervene in decisions on how crises should be resolved.     

Asset Prices and the Financial Crisis of 2007–09: An Overview of Theories and Policies

The financial crisis of 2007–09 has led to a rethinking of the role of monetary and financial regulatory policy. It has also called into question the benefits of financial innovation and monetary policy that focuses solely on inflation and the output gap. This paper discusses financial instabilities in general, the recent financial crisis as well as the appropriate role of monetary and financial regulatory policy in dealing with asset bubbles. The paper concludes by evaluating appropriate policies to reduce the economic impact of future financial crises.     

Asset Prices and the Financial Crisis of 2007–09: An Overview of Theories and Policies

The financial crisis of 2007–09 has led to a rethinking of the role of monetary and financial regulatory policy. It has also called into question the benefits of financial innovation and monetary policy that focuses solely on inflation and the output gap. This paper discusses financial instabilities in general, the recent financial crisis as well as the appropriate role of monetary and financial regulatory policy in dealing with asset bubbles. The paper concludes by evaluating appropriate policies to reduce the economic impact of future financial crises.     

Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey

The determination of international reserve balance for emerging economies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study, the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However, early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any future economic and/or financial shocks.     

基于BP神经网络的高校声誉危机预警研究

随着新媒体形式的繁荣,高校所处的社会环境日益复杂,这一变化为高校发展带来机遇的同时,也使得一些不确定因素迅速增加,高校越来越频繁地面临各种声誉危机。要降低危机危害,在"平时"做好声誉危机管理的规划工作显得尤为重要,尤其是着重关注危机发生前的预警体系构建,做到花少量的钱预防,而不是花大量的钱治疗。在总结已有相关文献基础上,文章采用BP神经网络方法,利用数据挖掘等新技术手段,研究在新媒体环境下高校声誉危机预警机制,同时以工信部属高校为例,分析目前高校危机预警机制的构建现状,以期提出相应的改进建议。     

危机时刻：姿态决定信任

本文从分析导致产品危机的根本原因出发，通过正反案例分析了企业对于产品危机表现出的不同姿态导致截然不同的顾客信任，为企业管理者化解危机提供了有价值的参考。     

Applying the Lessons of Asia: The IMF's Crisis Management Strategy following the Global Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT

The paper reviews the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) non-concessional lending programs following the global financial crisis, with a view to understanding how the IMF applied the lessons of the Asian crisis in designing its approach to crisis management. For this purpose, the paper focuses on the 2008 programs in Hungary, Iceland, Latvia and Ukraine – the first of its kind since the early 2000s – and compares them with the 1997 programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. Our analysis finds the European programs better funded and their structural conditionality more focused. Other than these, the overall thrust of the programs was similar: fiscal and monetary tightening, coupled with banking reforms. The real difference was not so much about content but about philosophy. Relative to the Asian programs, the European programs were characterized by more emphasis on ownership, greater collaboration among stakeholders, more realistic assumptions and greater transparency about the risks and the logic of policy actions, and more built-in flexibility of targets and policy options. This approach to crisis management incorporated the changes that had been made since the Asian crisis in the IMF's policies and procedures to manage capital account crises more effectively.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

Local versus International Crises and Bank Stability: does bank foreign expansion make a difference?

We investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability in the MENA region and examine the effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries. We consider banks that experienced both types of crises during our sample period. Our findings highlight a negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 on bank stability but, on the whole, no negative impact of the local crisis. A deeper investigation shows that owning bank subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility during normal times, yet a source of higher stability during the local crisis but not during the international crisis. Moreover, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world regions is insufficient to neutralize both types of crises, while being present in three or more regions is more stabilizing during a local crisis but also more destabilizing during an international crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature examining bank stability and have several policy implications.     

Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview*

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.     

A Comparative Study of Two Global Crises

This article identifies the differences and common features of two global crises: the Great Depression of 1929 and the international financial crisis of 2008. The circumstances of the two crises differ in terms of the demographic structure, the technological conditions, the economic and social systems in developed countries, the extent of globalization and other global economic situations. Among the common features, both crises were preceded by unprecedented economic booms, laisse-faire regulatory policies, easy monetary and credit policies, asset bubbles and yawning income gaps. Moreover, the crises had a strong redistribution effect, which would cause shifts of power among large countries and major changes in international economic order.     

Lessons from the crisis in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s

This paper discusses the lessons of the Nordic financial crisis which hit Sweden and Finland in the beginning of the 1990s. The main causes of this exceptionally deep recession were the deregulation of the financial markets in the 1980s and the subsequent overheating, during which the asset prices and debts doubled. The consequences of the bursting of this financial bouble were currency and banking crises, collapsing asset prices, mass unenployment and large fiscal deficits. There are some lessons which can be learnt by analyzing these events, and they are presented in this paper. Among the lessons are the importance of asset prices and wealth effects to the stability of the whole financial system.     

基于通胀压力分析政府救市政策的退出

在国际金融危机中,我国政府出台了大规模的救市计划以应对冲击.而在后金融危机时期,由于一些宏观经济因素发生变化,例如通货膨胀压力增大等,政府救市政策自然应逐步退出.笔者选择基于防范通货膨胀的视角来分析政府应如何选择最佳的救市政策退出方式,通过建立脉冲响应函数,分析金融危机中三类主要的政府救市政策即财政政策、货币政策和流动性政策对通货膨胀率的影响,并根据三类救市政策不同的影响力度和滞后期,判断其合理的退出方式.