Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

Characterization of additive cost sharing methods

The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents

We consider an extension of minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems in which some agents do not need to be connected to the source, but might reduce the cost of others to do so. Even if the cost usually cannot be computed in polynomial time, we extend the characterization of the Kar solution (Kar, 2002) for classic mcst problems. It is obtained by adapting the Equal treatment property: if the cost of the edge between two agents changes, their cost shares are affected in the same manner if they have the same demand. If not, their changes are proportional to each other. We obtain a family of weighted Shapley values. Three interesting solutions in that family are characterized using stability, fairness and manipulation-proofness properties.     

Cost information sharing with uncertainty averse firms

Summary. A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of uncertainty aversion on the readiness of the duopolists to share cost information is analyzed. Uncertainty aversion is modeled according to the Choquet utility theory. It is shown that low uncertainty aversion leads the firms to share information, while high uncertainty aversion leads the firms not to share. A simple economic explanation for this result is given.Received: 5 January 2001, Revised: 7 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D81, D82.I wish to thank Jürgen Eichberger, Volker Krätschmer, Willy Spanjers, seminar participants at Universität des Saarlandes, seminar participants at University College London, participants in the conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Mainz 1999 and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank.     

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good.GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and MIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good.Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.     

Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing

Summary. We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule should be well defined (and continuous on) the set of threshold functions. We show that none of the standard "equitable" mechanisms satisfy any of these axioms and then present a constructive characterization of mechanisms which do. Using this we construct several new mechanisms. These are the Almost Flat mechanism, the Spread Aumann-Shapley mechanism, and the Spread Serial mechanism, which have many desirable properties.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 11 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, H4.I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Rich Mclean, Yves Sprumont and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

企业剩余分享及其产权机理

企业剩余由资本所有者独享向其他要素所有者共同分享的演进是现代企业治理结构发展的一个重要趋势。本文对剩余和剩余分享进行了界定,分析了剩余分享的几种情形,阐释了剩余分享的内在产权机理及其主要途径。     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

实施施工项目精益成本管理

现代企业的竞争,己是企业的整个供应链之间的较量,处于供应链上的各节点企业的成本随着供应链成本的优化而降低。成本管理目标应定位在客户满意上,立足于为客户创造价值。本文运用价值流分析法研究施工项目精益成本管理的特点与精益成本管理的基本内容,探讨精益成本管理的方法与思路,充分动员和组织企业全体人员,在保证产品质量的前提下,对企业经营过程进行科学合理的管理,力求以最少经营耗费取得最大的成果,从而提高企业的竞争力。     

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games—FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games—GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)—strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members—in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.     

The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

We compute the price of anarchy (PoA) of three familiar demand games, i.e., the smallest ratio of the equilibrium to efficient surplus, over all convex preferences quasi-linear in money. For any convex cost, the PoA is at least in the average and serial games, where n is the number of users. It is zero in the incremental game for piecewise linear cost functions. With quadratic costs, the PoA of the serial game is , and for the average and incremental games. This generalizes if the marginal cost is convex or concave, and its elasticity is bounded.      

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.     

Cost comparison of radiofrequency catheter ablation versus cryoablation for atrial fibrillation in hospitals using both technologies

Objective: The objective of this study was to compare the cost of radiofrequency (RF) ablation vs cryoablation (Cryo) for atrial fibrillation (AF).

Methods: This retrospective cohort study used 2013–2014 records from the Premier Healthcare Database for adults with AF catheter ablation. Exclusions included non-AF ablation, surgical ablation, valve replacement or repair, or cardiac implant. Hospitals were required to perform ≥20 procedures using each technology, with the technology identifiable in at least 90% of cases. The primary endpoint was total variable visit cost, modeled separately for inpatient and outpatient visits, and adjusted for patient and hospital characteristics. Technology was categorized as RF or Cryo, with dual-technology procedures classified as Cryo. The Cryo cohort was further divided into Cryo only and Cryo with RF for sensitivity analyses. A composite adverse event endpoint was also compared.

Results: A total of 1261?RF procedures and 1276 Cryo procedures, of which 500 also used RF, met study criteria. RF patients were slightly older and sicker, and had more cardiovascular disease and additional arrhythmias. Adjusted inpatient costs were $2803 (30.0%) higher for Cryo, and adjusted outpatient costs were $2215 (19.5%) higher. Sensitivity models showed higher costs in both Cryo sub-groups compared with RF. Procedural complication rates were not significantly different between cohorts (p-values: 0.4888 inpatient, 0.5072 outpatient).

Conclusion: AF ablation using RF results in significantly lower costs compared with Cryo, despite an RF population with more cardiovascular disease. This saving cannot be attributed to a difference in complication rates.     

交易费用计量研究述评

交易费用的计量是交易费用经济学从理论研究走向实证研究的关键。根据交易费用的不同定义,可以将交易费用分为宏观层面上的交易费用和微观层面上的交易费用,同时将微观层面上的交易费用分为市场型、管理型和政策型交易费用。在此基础上,对有关交易费用计量的文献进行了梳理分析。分析表明,尽管近年来在交易费用的计量方面已取得不少成就,但总的来说,方法还是比较单一,尤其对非市场交易费用和政策型交易费用的计量仍然停留在经验层次,缺少对企业内部交易费用的直接计量。     

Online sales, Internet use, file sharing, and the decline of retail music specialty stores

This paper uses phonebook records of music retailers in the United States for the years 1998 and 2002 to examine how Internet use, file sharing, and online sales of records have affected the entry and exit of brick and mortar music specialty retailers. By merging music store information with data on Internet activity and broadband connectedness at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, with the number of broadband providers at the zip code level, and with a database of the location of universities, I analyze how online purchases, broadband, and Internet use affected the survival probability and the change in the number of music stores between 1998 and 2002. I further study whether the number of employees and chain membership affected the survival probability. I find that broadband connectedness increased the death rate of brick and mortar music stores and reduced their number. I also find that the presence of a university led to a reduction in the number of music specialty stores in the zip code.     

Determinants of patent value: Insights from a simulation analysis

This paper contributes to understanding the determinants of patent value. By drawing on a real options approach, we develop a theoretical model of patent value, which explicitly considers the uncertainty about future value. On this basis, we rely on Monte Carlo simulations with data from a case study in a large chemical firm to estimate patent value according to our model. In the simulation analyses, we compare an R&D project with patent protection and the same project without patent protection. The difference of the values of the two projects is the surplus in profit that may be expected from having a patent covering the project. This surplus is regarded as the value that is directly attributable to the patent. The results of the simulation analyses indicate that the development costs and expected net cash flows of a patent-protected project are higher than of an unpatented project. The higher net cash flows outgrow the increased development costs, and patent value is positive. However, this value is smaller than the overall project value of the patent-protected R&D project.     

Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points

In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by “unanimity for the grand coalition” and translation covariance, these axioms characterize the Nash solution on the class of n-person choice problems with reference points. A classical bargaining problem consists of a convex feasible set that contains the disagreement point here called reference point. The feasible set of a choice problem does not necessarily contain the reference point and may not be convex. However, we assume that it satisfies some standard properties. Our result is robust so that the characterization is still valid for many subclasses of choice problems, among those is the class of classical bargaining problems. Moreover, we show that each of the employed axioms – including independence of irrelevant alternatives – may be logically independent of the remaining axioms.     

Strategy-proof risk sharing

We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and a finite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preference. When aggregate certainty holds, we show that “fixed price selections” from Walrasian correspondence are the only rules satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, when aggregate uncertainty holds, we show that there exists no rule satisfying the three requirements. Moreover, in the two agents case, we show that dictatorial rules are the only efficient and strategy-proof rules. Dropping the common prior assumption in the model, we show that this assumption is necessary and sufficient for the existence of rules satisfying the three main requirements in the two agents and aggregate certainty case.     

联产品协同生产的成本驱动实证研究

实证研究证明，联产品生产的协同作用也是产品成本的驱动因素。协同成本的动因在于联产品的组成变量。在联产品协同生产过程中，所采取的基于非线性成本函数的边际成本计算法，应该是数理依据严谨、实务应用可行的方法。