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Keynes distinguishes three concepts: voluntary, frictional and(Keynesian) involuntary unemployment. Frictional unemploymentis a Classical form of involuntary unemployment (not voluntary,as Lucas suggests), and reflects the Marshallian, rather thanWalrasian, treatment of time and equilibrium. Lucas contradictsboth Keynes and Pigou in asserting that there are always immediatevacancies for unskilled labour, and abstracts from the veryproblem that Keynes seeks to address. If voluntary unemploymentis re-defined appropriately, as De Vroey helpfully suggestselsewhere, the prefix involuntary is dispensable,not because all unemployment is voluntary, as Lucas would haveit, but because it is all involuntary. 相似文献
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Pierre Dehez 《Journal of Economic Theory》1985,36(1):160-165
This note provides a simple example of an economy in which involuntary unemployment may be the consequence of monopolistic behavior on the product market. 相似文献
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We estimate a model of intertemporal male labor supply behavior which explicitly accounts for the effect of income taxation and the transfer system. Moreover, we model the demand-side driven rationing risk that prevents agents from choosing the optimal labor supply state. Our results show that elasticities derived in an unconstrained pure choice model are significantly higher compared to a model with involuntary unemployment. This holds true for short-run and long-run labor supply elasticities. 相似文献
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Summary. This paper considers optimal insurance schemes in a principal-agent multi-dimensional environment in which two types of risk
averse agents differ in both risk and attitude to risk. Risk corresponds to any pair of distribution functions (not necessarily
ordered by any of the usual dominance relations) and attitudes to risk are represented by any pair of non-decreasing and concave
utility functions (not necessarily ordered by risk aversion). Results obtained in one-dimensional models that considered these
effects separately and under more restricted conditions, are preserved in the more general set-up, but some of the questions
we study can only be posed in the more general framework. The main results obtained for optimal insurance schemes are:
(i) Insurance schemes preserve the order of certainty equivalents; consequently, the latter constitute a one-dimensional representation
of types.
(ii) Agents with the lower certainty equivalent are assigned full insurance. Partial insurance assigned to the others may entail
randomization.
(iii) Partially insured positions are an increasing function of the ratios of the probabilities that the two types assign to the
uninsured positions. Most of these properties are preserved when, due to competition or other reasons, the insured certainty
equivalents can not be set below pre-determined levels.
Received: January 13, 1998; revised version: October 10, 1998 相似文献
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Emily Oster Ira Shoulson Kimberly Quaid E. Ray Dorsey 《Journal of public economics》2010,94(11-12):1041-1050
Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation. 相似文献
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The equilibrium nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz's insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting. Insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised: profitable competitors' contracts are imitated and loss-making contracts are withdrawn. Occasionally, a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts. We show that Rothschild and Stiglitz's candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long-run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently “similar” to those currently on the market. 相似文献
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Summary. We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.Received: 21 May 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, E24.Correspondence to: Leo KaasWe thank an anonymous referee, Woojin Lee, Klaus Ritzberger and seminar participants in Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Prague, Vienna, and Warwick for helpful comments. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grant L138251030 and from the Manchester School Visiting Fellowship Scheme is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
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Prof. Dr. Enrico Zaghini 《Journal of Economics》1977,37(1-2):67-82
Conclusion We have proved the existence of equilibria implying involuntary unemployment of labour in non-competitive economies with fixed wage rate. We notice that model (II) and its extensions have not been presented as aninterpretation of Keynes' theory. We may define them as Keynesian models only in the sense that they admit involuntary unemployment equilibrium, which concept is basic to Keynes' theory. In any case, we think that these models are a first step in the development of more realistic microeconomic foundations for short-run macroeconomic theory.A first draft of this paper was presented in December 1972 at the Institute of Political Economy, Faculty of Economics and Banking, Siena University. 相似文献
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Pierre W. C. Koning 《Applied economics》2013,45(5):575-588
In this article, we estimate the degree of substitution between enrolment into Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) in the Netherlands. Starting in the 1990s many policy measures aimed at reducing DI enrolment, and increase labour force participation. We quantify whether these policy measures have led to a reduction in hidden unemployment in DI. A side effect of the reforms may be increased pressure on UI. Therefore, we simultaneously estimate reverse substitution, that is, hidden disability in UI. To this end, we employ a sample of firms in the Dutch AVO database from the period 1993 to 2002. Using instrumental variables in a bivariate Tobit specification, we identify the hidden components in both respective schemes. The estimation results indicate that about 3% of all dismissals took place through DI, which implies that about one quarter of the DI enrolments observed in our sample in fact consists of hidden unemployment. We find no evidence for reverse substitution of disabled persons ending up in UI. 相似文献
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《Journal of public economics》2005,89(11-12):2037-2067
This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other. 相似文献
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We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature. 相似文献
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In this response to Mark Hayes's criticism of his article, Lucason involuntary unemployment, the author insists on theneed to draw a distinction between labour rationing (a marketoutcome) and unemployment (the activity of job seeking). Economictheory is mainly concerned with the former. Yet the issue ofthe voluntarity versus the involuntarity of unemployment pertainsto unemployment as an activity. Failing to make this distinctioncannot but lead to semantic confusion. 相似文献
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This paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance, income taxation and experience rating. It argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance. When the government wishes to use redistributive taxes, but cannot enforce lump-sum transfers, it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes: one distortion should be used to off-set another. The state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs. 相似文献
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Rajeev K. Goel 《Applied economics》2013,45(20):2593-2599
Using recent state-level data from the United States, this article examines new influences on cigarette demand. In particular, we uniquely focus on the effects of unemployment and health insurance coverage on smoking. Results show that higher cigarette prices, a lack of health insurance and restrictions on smoking at home, all lead to reduced smoking. On the other hand, literacy, income, unemployment, workplace smoking restrictions, smokeless tobacco taxes and tobacco-producing states do not seem to have an appreciable impact. The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand is greater than that found in the pre-MSA era. Policy implications are discussed. 相似文献
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Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex ante. The problem of characterizing constrained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled. The model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobservable job-search. Absent wealth effects on behavior, we derive closed-form solutions showing that when the moving/retraining incentive constraint binds, unemployment benefits should increase over the unemployment spell, with an initial period with low benefits and an increase after this period has expired. 相似文献
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The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision. 相似文献