Executive Pay Matters: Looking Beyond the CEO to Explore Implications of Pay Disparity on Non‐CEO Executive Turnover and Firm Performance

Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Unionization and CEO turnover

This article investigates whether unions have power to influence turnover of poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs). Employing the transparency coalition framework, we develop hypotheses regarding CEO tenure given unionization, performance-turnover sensitivity, and firm performance following CEO turnover. We use Cox regression and a data set of US firms from 1993 to 2013 to show that CEO turnover is accelerated at firms that unionize. Discontinuity analysis suggests that the relationship is causal. Overall, the results show the significance of unions in the key corporate governance event of CEO turnover and suggest that, though they may proceed independently and for their own traditional goals of good pay and job conditions for their members, unions can be allies of investors and boards or directors when it comes to removing underperforming CEOs.     

Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending

abstract Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager‐controlled organizations as compared to owner‐controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

CEO overconfidence and agency cost of debt: An empirical analysis of CEO turnover events

We develop a model and characterize the differences between the investment policies of a rational CEO and an overconfident CEO. In the presence of risky outstanding debt, we show that an overconfident CEO has the incentive to overinvest more than that of a rational CEO. However, this incentive is mitigated by the discipline imposed by outside investors when an overconfident CEO seeks external financing. In contrast, when the firm has sufficient internal funds to meet its investment needs and outstanding debt is relatively safer, the overconfident CEO has no necessity to seek external funds and the overinvestment incentive persists. We examine bondholders’ and stockholders’ reaction around CEO turnover announcements and find evidence consistent with the over investment hypothesis.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.     

How work-related capabilities influence job performance: a relational perspective

Employee relationships with supervisors can be based upon both work-focused activities and outcomes, as exemplified by leader–member exchange (LMX), and personal, non-work activities, as exemplified by Chinese guanxi. The purpose of this study is to examine the mediating role of supervisor–subordinate guanxi (SSG) and LMX in the relationship between the work-related human and social capital of employees and supervisors’ ratings of their job performance. Data were collected from 372 employees and 127 supervisors in a range of companies in China. The study demonstrates how human and social capital might play differing roles in influencing SSG and LMX. In particular, LMX partially mediated the relationship between human capital and job performance, and the relationship between social capital and job performance was fully mediated by SSG and LMX. The findings enrich understanding of how personal capabilities influence work and non-work relationships and assessments of job performance. The unique content of the Chinese construct of guanxi has implications for research and practice in modern organizations where the barriers between work and non-work are permeable and relationships include affective attachment as well as instrumental considerations.     

CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance: A Multilevel Study

There has been much controversy concerning the relationship between outside CEO succession origin and firm performance. Some scholars take the organizational‐adaptation view to highlight the benefits of outside succession; yet others adopt the organizational‐disruption view to pose the selection of an outsider CEO as a disruptive and disadvantageous event for organizations. In this study, we develop an integrated multilevel framework that reconciles these opposing perspectives and examines the conditions under which the benefits of outside CEO succession outweigh the costs. Data from 109 CEO succession events in large international firms show that the performance advantages of outside succession materialize when the new CEO: (a) socio‐demographically resembles incumbent executives, (b) possesses a variety of experience, and (c) is hired by a well‐performing firm operating in a munificent industry. Overall, our research demonstrates that the performance implications of new CEO origin should not be considered in isolation, but in interaction with multilevel characteristics.     

CEO强制变更与公司业绩的相关性研究 ——基于国有上市公司数据

以2000年至2012年沪深两地A股国有上市公司为研究样本,探讨在国有上市公司存在多重目标的情况下公司业绩与CEO强制变更之间的相关性,实证结果表明:当国有上市公司处于亏损状态时,公司业绩和CEO强制变更之间显著负相关;对于经营状况良好的国有上市公司来说,公司业绩和CEO强制变更之间不存在显著的相关关系。进一步研究发现,CEO强制变更后,亏损公司的业绩会得到显著性改善,而盈利公司的业绩则没有显著变化。     

The evolution of CEO compensation over the organizational life cycle: A contingency explanation

There continues to be an intense debate in the public domain on executive compensation, usually centered on issues related to its effectiveness and fairness. While there are hundreds of publications on executive compensation, relatively few have investigated the role of organizational evolution on CEO compensation design. To address this research gap, we investigate CEO compensation design in the context of organizational life cycle (OLC). Beginning with an extensive review of the potential links between employee compensation and OLC, and of the theoretical explanations of such links, we introduce a contingency-based framework for explaining the relationships between CEO compensation and OLC stages. We further posit a series of propositions on the relationship between the level and mix of CEO compensation and the four OLC stages in terms of start-up, growth, maturity, and decline. We conclude with suggestions on future research directions.     

CEO Experience and Diversification Strategy Fit

Recent years have seen major progress on research into the concept of fit. Also emerging in the literature is an apparent interest in the importance of executive know-how and experience. This article combines the two areas by considering the impact of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) experience upon strategy adoption and corporate performance in the post-implementation strategy phase. Using a sample of 52 US companies from the top 1000, we have examined the relationship between CEO experience and the separate strategies of internal and acquisitive diversification. The results suggest that CEO experience is not a major factor in strategy selection but where a fit exists between the selected strategy and observed experience, post-implementation performance is affected.     

The impact of management on the engagement and well-being of high emotional labour employees

Australia, like many other countries, suffers high turnover of nurses and police officers. Contributions to effectively manage the turnover challenge have been called for, and there are few Australian studies of nursing/policing turnover intentions. The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of supervisor–subordinate relationships and perceived organisational support (POS) upon engagement, well-being, organisational commitment and turnover intentions. Second, we examined the similarities and differences between nursing and policing work contexts. The retention of nurses/police has been investigated from traditional management perspectives; however, we used a different theoretical approach – social exchange theory – and evaluated its utility as a framework. Findings are from Australian data collected during 2010–2011 from 510 nurses and 193 police officers, using a survey-based, self-report strategy. Partial least squares path modelling was used to analyse these data. Results indicated that for both samples, engagement predicts well-being and then, well-being predicts affective commitment and intentions to leave. MANOVA results suggested that nurses had significantly higher levels of satisfaction with their supervisor–subordinate relationships, POS, engagement, well-being and affective commitment than police officers. Only the intention to leave was similar for both groups. Given that turnover can be influenced by supervisors/management, this study provides new knowledge about targeted retention strategies.     

Riding off into the Sunset: Organizational Sensegiving,Shareholder Sensemaking,and Reactions to CEO Retirement

We test hypotheses derived from resource dependence and sensemaking/sensegiving theoretical lenses in the context of CEO succession, focusing on an under‐researched yet prevalent type of executive turnover – CEO retirement. Using event study methodology and a sample of CEO retirements from S&P 1500 firms during the 2003–12 period, we find that, all else equal, shareholders’ perceptions of organizations’ capacity to serve their interests are adversely affected when a retirement related change occurs in the leadership structure. Specifically, in line with resource dependence theory, we find that CEO retirement disclosures typically generate negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, in line with the sensemaking perspective, we find that the magnitude of shareholders’ reactions is contingent on the lexical sensegiving cues contained in the organizational narratives that are released to capital markets via executive retirement announcements. Overall, our theory and results point to CEO retirement events as consequential in the eyes of shareholders, challenging an important assumption of extant succession research. Moreover, they suggest that shareholders’ interpretation of these events is influenced by organizational sensegiving, highlighting the important role of organizational communication around succession events.     

CEO compensation: does it pay to be green?

The relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various organizational variables (i.e., size, length of tenure of the CEO, board composition and firm performance) has been explored in academic research. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and the firm's reputation based on the firm's commitment to the community and the environment has been relatively unexamined in the academic research. This study's purpose is to empirically examine this relationship using the Fortune Reputation Index as revised by Brown and Perry (1995) . Using a sample of 186 firms in 1990 and 188 firms in 1991, the relationships between CEO compensation and organization size, financial performance and environmental reputation are examined. The results of the study demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm environmental reputation, firm size and firm financial performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

CEO hometown identity and firm green innovation

Drawn on the upper echelons theory, this study investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) hometown identity drives firm green innovation. We propose that CEO hometown identity has a positive impact on a firm's green innovation performance. Furthermore, we explore the moderating role of managerial discretion determined by organizational and environmental factors (i.e., institutional ownership and market complexity). We propose that institutional ownership negatively moderates the positive relationship between CEO hometown identity and green innovation, but market complexity plays a positive moderating role. Using Chinese publicly listed firms from 2002 to 2016 in heavily polluting industries, our findings support these hypotheses. Our research contributes to the upper echelons theory and corporate social responsibility literature and has substantial practical implications.     

Top Management Team Functional Diversity and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of CEO Characteristics

Past research indicates that the effect of TMT functional diversity on firm performance is equivocal. We address this issue by focusing on the integrative role of the CEO, postulating that the CEO's expertise and background characteristics affect the TMT functional diversity–firm performance relationship, because of their impact on the exchange and integration of distributed knowledge within the TMT. Using a dataset of 33 Dutch and Belgian Information Technology firms we investigate the moderating role of three sets of CEO characteristics (functional background, status as founder, and shared experience with the other TMT members) on the relationship between TMT functional diversity and firm performance. Our results reveal that CEO and TMT characteristics do interact in realizing the potential advantages of distributed TMT functional expertise.     

Why does formal mentoring matter? The mediating role of psychological safety and the moderating role of power distance orientation in the Chinese context

Formal mentoring programs continue to gain popularity within various organizations due to their positive impact on protégés' career successes. However, to date, relevant research has focused on the benefits of informal mentoring relationships. To narrow the literature gap, this study was conducted to examine whether, how and when the amount of formal mentoring provided by mentors influenced protégés' work attitudes. Based on 208 formal mentor–protégé dyads from the People's Republic of China, we found that the amount of formal mentoring provided by mentors related positively to protégés' affective commitment and related negatively to turnover intention. Furthermore, perceived psychological safety of protégés partially mediated the relationship between the amount of formal mentoring and affective commitment, whereas it completely mediated the relationship between the amount of formal mentoring and turnover intention. Finally, protégés' power distance orientation moderated the relationship between the amount of formal mentoring and perceived psychological safety. Additionally, implications for research and practice from our findings are discussed.     

Bank systemic risk and CEO overconfidence

This study examines the relationship between CEO overconfidence and banking systemic risk. We employ the CoVaR (Conditional Value-at-Risk) approach to measure a bank's contribution to systemic risk and compute its MES (Marginal Expected Shortfall) and SRISK (Systemic Risk index) to measure the exposure to banking systemic risk. We use a stock options based measure for CEO overconfidence and explore how managerial overconfidence could be associated with banking systemic risk. Using data for U.S. banks from 1995–2014, we find evidence that banks with overconfident CEOs have a higher contribution and exposure to systemic risk than banks with non-overconfident CEOs. We also show that the impact of CEO overconfidence contributed significantly more to systemic risk during the financial crisis of 2008–2009.     

CEO duality,information costs,and firm performance

This study investigates the effects of CEO duality on firm performance and the moderating effect of information costs on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in Taiwan. By analyzing listed companies during the period from 2000 to 2012, our empirical results show that a lack of evidence for the links between leadership style and firm performance; however, this relationship is associated with information costs estimated by analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, we find that CEO duality has statistically significant negative impacts on firm performance when information costs are high. This result provides evidence for the coexistence of the agency hypothesis and stewardship hypothesis as determined by the extent of the information costs, and it tends to underscore the importance of corporate governance on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.     

How the CEO power and age dissimilarity shape the chair-CEO pay gap: Empirical evidence from China

Using data on China’s listed firms from 2009 to 2018, this paper investigates how the chair-CEO age dissimilarity and CEO power affect the chair-CEO pay gap from both managerial power theory and optimal contract theory. We find that CEO power and age dissimilarity have opposite effects on pay gap between the chairman and the CEO. And the cognitive conflict caused by age dissimilarity can effectively restrain the compensation-seeking behavior of CEO for non-performance compensation growth. More importantly, both the age difference and its sign have important value. When we consider age dissimilarity between the CEO and the entire board of directors, our hypotheses are still confirmed. Finally, we document that both CEO ability and co-working time between chairman and CEO could reduce the inhibition effect of age dissimilarity on compensation incentive from capability and relationship view. Overall, the results are beneficial to reform the top managers’ compensation incentive system and to improve the explicit and implicit supervision mechanisms.