Bank Performance and Credit Availability in the Bulgarian Banking Sector, 1997-2001

Abstract

The 1997 financial crisis wiped out 30% of the Bulgarian banking sector and created severe strains on corporations. With the establishment of the currency board in 1997 and the new Banking Law, which set the legal framework for proper bank supervision, major Bulgarian banks were rapidly privatized through sales to foreigners, now controlling around 80% of bank assets. Since 1997, the Bulgarian banking sector has recovered from the crisis by improving its profitability and efficiency and adopted a legal framework compatible with the European Union standards. Based on a regression analysis of bank balance sheets and income statements, this paper shows that low level of credit volume during 1997-1999 derived from banks' cautious stance towards credit making reflecting both the ongoing risks in the real sector, and the stringent new banking regulations. Large banks, however, benefited from scale economies in improving profitability in the same period.     

Corporate environmental responsibility and bank loans

Drawing on both qualitative analyses of banks' sustainability reports and quantitative analyses of 11,538 bank loans from 1993 to 2018, we explore interactions between corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and bank loan contracting. We find CER dominates how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects bank loans. We propose a two-way relationship between CER and bank loans. Firms with strong CER performance receive cheaper bank loans due to banks' environmental risk management efforts. These banks provide services to corporate borrowers that have a positive influence on borrowers' ongoing environmental performance.     

Monetary policy and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies

This paper addresses the impact of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking by using bank-level panel data from more than 1000 banks in 29 emerging economies during 2000–2012. We find that, consistent with the proposition of the “bank risk-taking channel” of monetary policy transmission, banks' riskiness increases when monetary policy is eased. This result is robust when we adopt alternative measures of monetary policy and bank risk, and use different econometric methodologies. In addition, we find that bank risk-taking amid expansionary monetary policy is less conspicuous in a more consolidated banking sector and when monetary policy is more transparent.     

The effect of stimulus policy on lending behavior and bank risk: Evidence from the Chinese banking sector

Considering China's stimulus policy in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment, our study attempts to provide evidence to understand how expansionary monetary policy is likely to influence bank risk-taking in emerging markets, specifically in China. Using data on Chinese counties from 2006 to 2011, we theoretically discuss and empirically observe a positive relationship between the stimulus policy and bank risk-taking, as measured by nonperforming loans. Such a nexus stems from the negative effect of the stimulus policy on banks' lending standards and the positive effect on banks' credit support to small and medium sized enterprises. In addition, our study is enriched by estimating the moderating effects of bank capitalization based on the “risk-shifting” effect and “search for yield” effect caused by the stimulus policy. Specifically, we find important differences across banking groups, such that small and medium-sized banks with low capitalization increase their exposure to risk, while large state-owned banks with high capitalization notably reduce their risk tolerance. The results of this study may help to characterize monetary policy and macro prudential regulation, especially for emerging economies.     

Mexico's integration into the North American capital market

We explore a model of time varying regional market integration that includes three factors for the North American equity market, the local Mexican equity market and the peso/dollar exchange rate. We argue that a useful instrument for the degree of integration is the sovereign yield spread. Applying our methodology to Mexico over the 1991–2002 period, we show that the degree of market integration was higher at the end of the period than at the beginning but that it exhibited wide swings that were related to both global as well as local events. We also discover that Mexico's currency risk is priced. Further, the currency returns process reveals strongly significant asymmetric volatility that is strongly related to the asymmetric volatility of the Mexican equity market returns process. A plausible reason for these results is that currency devaluations in emerging markets like Mexico can cause default-risk crises in local banking systems that mismatch local-currency assets and hard currency liabilities, whereas appreciations produce no such problems. Devaluations that destabilize banking systems are, therefore, more likely than appreciations to increase the volatilities of both the currency's and the equity market's returns.     

Banking sector reforms and corporate leverage in emerging markets

Using a large panel of non-financial firms in emerging markets, we study the relation between detailed measures of banking sector reforms and corporate leverage. We find that banking sector reforms are associated with lower corporate debt in emerging market firms, consistent with the notion that these reforms improve banks' risk management and result in tighter lending standards, leading firms to use less bank debt in their capital structure. These effects are less pronounced for financially constrained firms, suggesting a relative increase in the supply of bank credit to firms which were rationed prior to the banking sector reforms.     

‘No Arbitrary Discretion’: Specialisation in Short-Term Commercial Lending by Banks in Late Nineteenth-Century New England

In the late nineteenth century banks in New England embraced an increasingly specialised role in the economy, focusing on the provision of short-term loans to commercial borrowers and eschewing long-term relations with industrial enterprises. This drive to specialise resulted from a particular combination of circumstances: a tremendous expansion in the number of banks, and an equally dramatic rise in deposits as a source of lendable funds. The latter development incresed the interdependence of the banking system, making each institution vulnerable to runs provoked by the unsound practices of its competitors. The former made it difficult to regulate the lending practices of individual banks. By promoting strict standards for short-term commercial loans, bank reformers sought to increase the ablity of directors and stockholders to monitor the decisions of their banks' managers and, at the same time, to limit the damage to the system that unscrupulous bankers could inflict. Similar problems of control arose in the British banking system in the last few decades of the century, and may explain the simultaneous shift toward short-term commercial loans that occurred in that nation. By contrast, large German banks were able to limit the independence of their smaller competitors and hence the threat to the security of the banking system that they posed.     

Fear of floating and domestic liability dollarization

Previous attempts to analyze the effect of liability dollarization on “fear of floating” have focused exclusively on the role played by foreign liabilities. Liability dollarization of the domestic banking system, however, poses a similar risk as dollar-denominated deposits and credit impose a source of currency risk on domestic banks and firms, respectively. Findings from a large cross-country sample indicate that domestic liability dollarization plays a central role in producing a “fear of floating” among emerging market countries and developing nations. This is an important result because domestic liability dollarization is more reversible than the dollarization of foreign liabilities, providing a reason for optimism that these countries can regain flexibility in the choice of exchange rate regime and overcome their “fear of floating”.     

Wages, inflation, and mortgage design

By virtue of creating asset-liability mismatch, conventional long-term, fixed-rate mortgage loans inherently introduce excess interest risk to the financial systems. Considering that inflation is in part the reason for this excess interest risk, it seems natural to redesign mortgages in such a way that over time mortgage payments could, at least in part, reflect inflation. In this paper, I show that by allowing payments to adjust to inflation, particularly that of wages, by incorporating a prespecified growth rate into mortgage payments, mortgage loans become more affordable while bank interest spreads become less volatile, making the banking system less unstable.     

Revisiting the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging countries

This is the first attempt to address the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking behavior. This study is conducted on 730 banks from 19 emerging countries covering the period 2011–2016. We used six indicators of good governance as a proxy for institutional quality. Both static panel and Dynamic GMM estimation are used to identify the impact of these variables on bank risk-taking; measured by Z-score. We evidenced that increasing government effectiveness, controlling corruption, and improving agents' confidence and adherence to the rule of law reduce banks' risk exposure and improve banks' stability. Besides supporting the Z-score model, the robustness test using σ(NIM) also provides evidence of the impact of regulatory quality on reducing bank risk. Surprisingly, both models tend to indicate that improving voice and accountability increase bank risk-taking in emerging countries. Furthermore, our study provides an interesting reconciliation to the major debate on the impact of size on bank risk.     

Political career concerns and bank lending in China

This study examines how politician's career concerns affect the bank loans using a sample of bank branches at the county-level in China. We use politician tenure to measure an important dimension of the politician incentives to intervene in the local economy, which is determined by their career concerns about perceived promotion probability. We find that there is a curvilinear relationship between politician tenure and bank loans (i.e., reversed U-shape). We also construct a promotion pressure index and document a positive relationship between this promotion index and bank loans. These results are more significant for banks located in counties with underdeveloped institutions or weak government capacity, and those with political ties. These results support the view that politicians have strong incentives to utilize local banks to promote local economic growth if it is also consistent with their private goals, especially in the environment with significant government ownership in banking systems.     

Economic policy uncertainty,non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk

At present, the structural contradiction between Economic Financialization and the real economy's long-term weakness has become increasingly prominent. As China enters a “new normal” stage of economic growth, the real investment rate drops, non-financial enterprises continuously allocate resources to the shadow banking system. The financial economy becomes increasingly divorced from reality. This leads us to the questions: will the shadow banking behavior of non-financial companies exacerbate the risk of stock price crash risk? How does the increase in economic policy uncertainty affect the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk?This article uses non-financial listed companies' data from 2007 to 2017 and conducts empirical analysis to answer this question. The study finds that companies engaged in high-leverage, high-risk shadow banking business exacerbate stock crash risk. This effect is only pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and low social trust regions. The increase in the degree of economic policy uncertainty positively impacts the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking business and stock price crash risk. The theoretical mechanism is as follows: the rise in economic policy uncertainty amplifies the positive relationship between shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and stock price crashes by increasing bank loans, investors' sensitivity to external information, risk cross-contagion, and inefficient investment mechanisms. Various robustness tests do not change the research conclusion. This paper has important theoretical and policy guidance significance for reviewing the existing diversified shadow banking system and preventing systemic risks.     

Banking,bureaucracy and the career: the curious case of Mr Notman

The cornerstone of banks' internal control was the inspection system that fanned out from the centre to examine all local transactions and records. A critical aspect of the inspection system was reporting on staff performance. Inspection was the lynchpin of the banks' surveillance systems that reached into all aspects of their employees' professional and personal lives before 1939. The nature of this control was revealed by a court case involving a Scottish bank clerk refused permission to marry by his employer. The rationale for this marriage bar lay in the nature of the banking career which was pursued in strictly ‘closed’ internal labour markets. Promotion was governed by professional competence and the organisation's assessment of the individual's personal development.     

Economic policy uncertainty,bank deposits,and liability structure

This study used data from 2009 to 2017 to investigate the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the liability side of Chinese commercial banks. The results show that the increase in EPU leads commercial bank customers to shift from term to demand deposits, which shortens deposit maturity and triggers commercial banks' liquidity-hoarding behavior. Our research provides insights into the motives and strategies behind commercial banks' liquidity hoarding and offers implications for risk management, monetary policy, and systemic financial risk prevention.     

商业银行偿付能力风险、流动性风险与银行体系风险

宏观审慎监管需要微观基础.研究商业银行偿付能力风险与流动性风险和银行体系风险的关系,有助于监管当局制定合适的监管工具,有效管理银行业的系统性风险.中国未曾爆发过真正意义的银行业危机,因而研究影响银行业系统性风险的因素成为难题.在借鉴风险二维定义属性基础上,本文对商业银行偿付能力风险和流动性风险如何影响银行业稳定进行了实证分析.分析结果表明,当商业银行偿付能力上升时,银行风险承担会上升,进而增加银行倒闭的预期损失;商业银行流动性风险的上升也会增加银行倒闭的预期损失;商业银行偿付能力提高时,流动性风险会降低;商业银行流动性风险上升时,偿付能力风险也上升.     

The contribution of macroprudential policies to banks' resilience: Lessons from the systemic crises and the COVID-19 pandemic shock

This study examines the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing the banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic and compares these results with the systemic banking crises years. Based on a sample of 624 banks across 40 countries during the period 2006–2020, we find that loosening capital-aimed macroprudential policies effectively reduced banks' risk during the COVID-19 pandemic, while this behavior led to increased risk during the systemic crises years. In contrast, tightening the remaining macroprudential policies during the systemic crises years and during the pandemic proved effective in reducing banks' risk. Furthermore, we show that the magnitude of the impact of macroprudential policies was stronger during the systemic crisis than that during the pandemic. Finally, we show that the results are driven by the capital requirement prudential policy, both during the systemic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, although the conservation buffer and the leverage limit also contributes to the ineffectiveness of these policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. The banks' leverage and loan growth also play an enhancing role of the effects of the macroprudential policies.     

Bank Loan Announcements and Borrower Stock Returns: Does Bank Origin Matter?

Banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and value of their borrowers. Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as the banks' selection and monitoring abilities may differ. Using an event study methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of the banks for the investors' assessments of firms' credit quality and economic worth following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank loans to US firms over the period of 1980–2003. We find that investors react positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm's headquarters state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign. Our evidence suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. These results are applicable also to the European markets where regulatory and economic borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem to matter a great deal.     

Does inside debt alleviate banks' risk taking? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in the Chinese banking industry

This paper investigates the causal effects of inside debt on banks' risk-taking behavior by using a quasi-natural experiment of compensation deferring policy in the Chinese banking industry. We find that the policy reduces banks' risk-taking by approximately 16.25%. Banks with high levels of government control significantly reduced their risk-taking after the compensation deferring policy was enacted, while those with low levels did not have the same response. By showing that CEOs' compensation deferring significantly reduces banks' risk-taking in an emerging market, we offer direct evidence for the academic understanding of the governance role of inside debt in emerging markets with weak country-level investor protection. Our results provide timely empirical evidence for government regulators who are concerned about the costs and benefits of banks' risk shifting or the risk of the financial system.     

Bank Work Experience Versus Political Connections: Which Matters for Bank Loan Financing?

This paper examines how bank lending decisions are affected either by executives’ connections with banks, through their former banking experience, or by their political connections with governments, using a sample of bank loans granted to Chinese listed non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2003 to 2010. We find that bank loans are more closely related to profitability for firms with bank connections, while firms’ political connections weaken this relationship. We further find that the influence of bank connections is more significant for firms from less supported industries or less developed regions. Furthermore, firms with bank connections are less likely to become financially distressed after the initiation of their bank loans and experience higher future stock returns, while firms with political connections experience the opposite outcome. Overall, our results indicate that in the context of a relationship‐based economy like China, firms’ connections with banks create value by alleviating information asymmetry and improving banks’ lending decisions, while political connections result in capital misallocation and subsequent deterioration in performance.     

Twin dollarization and exchange rate policy

This paper develops a small open economy general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities to study twin dollarization in East Asian economies, a phenomenon where firms borrow in US dollars and also set export prices in US dollars. In this model, we endogenize both the currency of liability denomination and the currency of export pricing. We show that a key factor that affects firms' dollarization decisions is exchange rate policy. Twin dollarization is an optimal strategy for all firms when exchange rate flexibility is limited, which implies that a fixed exchange rate regime may lead to an equilibrium with twin dollarization. Furthermore, we find that twin dollarization can reduce the welfare loss caused by the fixed exchange rate regime, as it helps to cushion the economy against domestic nominal risk.