The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation

Abstract

Although defined benefit (DB) pension plans constitute a significant portion of both annual compensation and firm-related wealth for many CEOs, prior studies of CEO compensation contracts generally exclude these plans from their analyses due to lack of data. Taking advantage of recently increased disclosure requirements, we analyse the role of DB pension plans in these contracts. We find that firms with CEO DB pension plans grant the CEO annual compensation that is larger than predicted by economic determinants. We also find that more powerful CEOs, identified by their extraordinary pension benefits, receive higher total pay in addition to the pension benefits. We find no evidence that CEO pension benefits contribute to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the annual pay.     

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF WORKERS’ RETIREMENT DECISIONS

The landscape for older workers has changed dramatically in recent decades. Governments have made cuts to public pension programs, private pensions have shifted from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, equity and housing markets have been unusually volatile, and workers have experienced declining morbidity and mortality. At the same time, the labor force participation rate for older men and women has been rising over the past two decades, implying later retirement. Are these phenomena related? This paper reviews the large and growing body of literature exploring the economic determinants of workers’ retirement decisions, including public and private pensions, wealth and savings, health and health insurance, and labor demand.     

The determinants of hiring older workers: UK evidence

This is the first research using UK establishment data to examine the relationship between back loading of compensation, training and the hiring of older workers. Recognizing that many firms employ older workers but do not hire older workers, we argue this may reflect strategic deferred compensation or the role of specific human capital. Using the combined establishment and employee data of the 1998 WERS, we identify that firms which defer compensation hire a smaller share of older workers and present somewhat weaker evidence that firms which require greater specific human capital also hire a smaller share of older workers.     

The impacts of benefit plans on employee turnover: a firm-level analysis approach on Taiwanese manufacturing industry

Employee turnover is a serious problem and the question of how to retain highly talented and valued people is very important. Previous employee turnover studies were mostly focused on the individual level but rarely from the standpoint of the business or firm. This study examines the impacts of four kinds of benefit plans on firm-level employee turnover issues, namely, retirement fund, pension, severance pay and fringe benefit. The present study uses the Census Bureau Employment Movement Survey of the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics in Taiwan. The two models used to examine the overall manufacturing industry were: (1) the inducement model which tests the ‘with or without’ effect; and (2) the investment model which tests the ‘the more the better’ effect. Results reveal that, with respect to the firm's employee turnover rate, retirement fund and fringe benefits are negative while severance plans are significantly positive. These results are consistent with the transaction costs theory that total expenditure on these plans to retain employees (bureaucratic cost) is less than the market arrangements (transaction cost). In addition, the impact of pension plans is negative in respect of employee turnover in larger or more highly educated firms, but positive in firms with a lower educational level. Moreover, the firm size is negative while the firm's average employees' educational level is positive with respect to the workforce leaving their jobs. These results are consistent with the perspective of resource-based theory and human capital theory. Incidentally, this study also reveals insignificant differences between the ‘with or without’ effect and the ‘the more the better’ effect existing as a sub-group industry rather than across the entire industry.     

Pensions: theories of underfunding

The widespread underfunding of private defined benefit pensions has generated concern over the viability of employers' promises of retirement benefits. Years ago, similar concerns led to the creation of pension benefit insurance plans by governments in the United States and a number of other countries. This paper studies the causes of underfunding in an environment without pension benefit insurance. We find that the optimal level of retirement benefits will be offered and fully funded if the employer has sufficient internal funds or is able to borrow all it needs. If loans are not enforceable, an employer with limited resources will generally underfund pensions. Further, if pension investments earn lower returns than other investments, pensions will be underfunded. Thus, the paper highlights the link between financial markets and the underfunding of pensions.     

Using simulation as a tool in selecting a retirement age under defined benefit pension plans

This paper examines how simulation modeling can be used to select a retirement age under defined benefit pension plans. This approach construes the variables affecting pension benefits as probabilistic variables. Simulations are then run to generate probabilistic values for the real value of pension benefits for alternative retirement ages. By construing variables affecting pension benefits as probability distributions, this approach reflects the uncertainty facing individuals contemplating retirement. By generating estimates of retirement benefits as probability distributions rather than as single deterministic values, the model provides individuals with a more realistic and complete frame of reference for making the retirement decision. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee and Joachim Zietz. JEF editor, for helpful comments.     

How are pension integration and pension benefits related?

Pension integration is the ability to allow differentiated pension benefits across earnings groups. In the academic literature, it is often described as a way for firms to reduce pension benefits (and therefore costs). Justified by the requirement that firms pay half of Social Security payments, integrated pensions are typically found to reduce benefits for lower income workers. Data on retirees from the Health and Retirement Study, however, reveal a more complex picture where some individuals receive more benefits when one of their pension plans is integrated, ceteris paribus. Some reasons are discussed why this might be the case.     

Pay progression in routinised service sector work: navigating the internal labour market in a fast food multinational company

The United Kingdom's widespread use of low-skill, low-paid employment has been well documented. It has been argued internal labour markets (ILMs) benefit such workers, affording them with opportunities for progression. Relatively little is known, however, about the impact of ILMs on entry level workers undertaking routinised service sector work. Drawing on qualitative data, this article explores the prospects on offer in a market leading, fast food multinational company. Potential enabling features include on-the-job training, a transparent and integrated pay structure and a professed culture of progression . Occupational movements to positions above the low-pay threshold are, however, relatively rare. We conjecture this contradiction is the result of the business context in which the firm operates. The findings suggest that in sectors where price leadership strategies dominate, escape from low pay is likely to be exceptional, even within large organisations featuring some of the classic characteristics of ‘pure’ or strong ILMs.     

Discrimination,technology and unemployment

I study the interaction between discrimination and investment using a directed search model where firms decide the capital intensity of their production technologies before being matched. Discrimination makes some workers cheap to hire. As a consequence, some firms might save on capital costs adopting labour intensive technologies. This framework allows one to reconcile search models with three well-known facts regarding the labour market outcomes of minority workers: low wages, high unemployment and occupational segregation. Furthermore, the model questions the role of equal pay legislation in reducing inequality since removing this restriction, i.e., allowing firms to post type-contingent wages, eliminates the negative effects of discrimination on investment and wages.     

Learning by doing: Active employer sponsored retirement savings plan participation and household wealth accumulation

This paper investigates the impact of household exposure to employer pension plan features using the Health and Retirement Survey. We investigate whether exposure to active management (choice) or participation in plan-sponsored financial education seminars impacts household portfolio allocations and wealth. We consider interactions between pension design and investment patterns outside of workers’ pension plans, utilizing two parametric estimators: the random effects probit and the multivariate probit. We extend our results non-parametrically via propensity score matching. We find repeated evidence that both of the plan features improve asset allocations and financial outcomes for recent retirees, especially when used together.     

Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence

Lazear recently suggested that firms that do not expect to live for a long time will hire only safe workers. Hence their worker turnover will be lower. In this paper we test this hypothesis using both the industry growth rate and industry-average age of establishments as measures of the horizon for a particular firm. We find mixed results, both at the industry level and at the establishment level. Establishments in growing industries do indeed exhibit higher churning flows, but a high average age of establishments reduces rather than increases churning.     

The impact of changes in second pension pillars on public finances in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of Poland

This paper studies the impact of the recent weakening of Poland's fully funded defined contribution second pension pillar on (i) the long-term sustainability (the deficit and implicit debt) of the full pension system and (ii) the implications for pension benefits (gross replacement rates). Simulation results, based on a stylised version of the Polish pension system, show that, in the baseline scenario, the weakening of the second pillar would permanently lower future pension system debt, chiefly as a result of a cut in replacement rates. But using a combination of pessimistic assumptions including strong population ageing, low real wage growth and an indexation of existing pension benefits on nominal wage growth rather than inflation coupled with bringing in tax expenditures related to the third voluntary pension pillar and an increase in the share of minimum pensioners leads to higher pension system deficits and eventually more public debt at a very long horizon. The simulation results also suggest that if Poland had not transformed its pay-as-you-go first pension pillar into a defined contribution from a defined benefit system, the weakening of the second pillar would deteriorate fiscal sustainability relatively quickly in the baseline scenario. This result suggests that the Hungarian pension reversal would reduce deficit and debt only temporarily, mainly because of Hungary's costly defined benefit first pension pillar: the weakening of the second pillar is tantamount to swapping low current replacement rates (in the defined contribution second pillar) against high future replacement rates in the defined benefit first pension pillar.     

Trade-offs in means tested pension design

The means-testing of age pension programs allows governments to control the receipt of pension benefits (extensive margin) and the benefit level (intensive margin). We investigate how the presence of the extensive margin influences the trade-off between protecting the poorer elderly and the economic costs of distorting incentives to work and save of young individuals. The means-test effect via the extensive margin improves the insurance aspect but introduces opposing impacts on incentives that potentially have ambiguous welfare outcomes. We characterize combinations of the maximum pension benefit and taper rate that balance the negative incentive effects and positive insurance effects.     

Misallocation,informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions

The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of formal-sector institutions in shaping the demand for human capital and the level of informality. We propose a firm dynamics model where firms face capital market imperfections and costs of operating in the formal sector. Formal firms have a larger set of production opportunities and the ability to employ skilled workers, but informal firms can avoid the costs of formalization. These firm-level distortions give rise to endogenous formal and informal sectors and, more importantly, affect the demand for skilled workers. The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by relatively lower stocks of skilled workers, larger informal sectors, low allocative efficiency, and measured TFP. Moreover, we find that the interaction between entry costs and financial frictions (as opposed to the sum of their individual effects) is the main driver of these differences. This complementarity effect derives from the introduction of skilled workers, which prevents firms from substituting labor for capital and in turn moves them closer to the financial constraint.     

Uncertainty,hiring and firing costs,and the determinants of profit‐sharing rules

We consider a firm run by a manager who acts on behalf of shareholders. The firm produces a commodity whose demand evolves stochastically over time. The firm's employees possess firm‐specific skills and knowledge and thus can bargain over profits with shareholders immediately before the firm hires or fires workers. The firm will distribute more portions of profits to employees when it incurs higher costs to hire or fire workers. In addition, as uncertainty in demand increases, the firm will distribute smaller (larger) portions of profits to employees if the firm does not have the option to fire (hire) workers.     

Economics of personnel and human resource management

The new economics of personnel and human resource management is analysed, including its current prominence as well as its historical antecedents. The economic paradigm as applied to personnel and human resource economics is illustrated through a variety of examples in the personnel area. These involve economic phenomenon (e.g., fixed hiring costs, asymmetric information, option values) highlighting their implications for personnel issues, as well as personnel phenomenon (e.g., deferred compensation, pensions, mandatory retirement) highlighting their economic rationale. Other phenomenon that otherwise seem difficult to explain or paradoxical are analysed including: superstar salaries; long-hours and overtime coexisting with unemployment and underemployment often within the same organisation; the reluctance of seemingly risk averse workers to accept small wage cuts to avoid the possibility of a layoff; the payment of fringe benefits that may not be valued by many employees; the “regular” hiring of temporary workers when permanent workers are available; egalitarian pay structures and fairness in compensation; the persistent reporting of vacancies on the part of firms but a reluctance to raise wages to fill those vacancies; the use of piece rates in some jobs and salary structures that are based on relative ranking of workers in other jobs; and tenure or “up-or-out” rules where people who are not promoted are required to leave rather than work for lower pay. The concluding section focuses on elements that are common across these applications.     

我国城镇低收入群体养老保险适度缴费基数研究

研究目标：提出一个关于城镇低收入群体的养老保险适度缴费基数实施方案。研究方法：通过建立人口结构预测模型和社会养老保险精算模型,从理论上预测养老保险缴费基数的合理区间。研究发现：预计2024~2030年,统筹账户养老保险基金收支缺口将不断拉大,城镇低、中和高收入群体存在内部不公平问题,有必要调整城镇低收入群体缴费基数,经测算当缴费基数占在岗职工平均工资的45%~50%时较为合理。研究创新：发现城镇低收入群体养老保险缴费基数的适度区间。研究价值：为改革我国城镇低收入群体的养老保险缴费制度,提高城镇低收入群体参保积极性,实现社会保障收入再分配功能,促进全面小康社会建成提供合理建议。     

Barriers to Entry of a Vertically Integrated Health Insurer: An Analysis of Welfare and Entry Costs

I investigate the reasons why market expansion attempts by vertically integrated health insurers have largely failed. I use an econometric model of consumer demand for hospitals and insurers to simulate entry of an integrated plan into 28 new markets. The results indicate that entry would increase social surplus by over $34 billion per year. I then investigate several potential barriers to entry. Three are particularly important. Integrated plans cannot attract enough enrollees to support their provider networks unless they exceed competitor quality levels and convince consumers of this benefit. Regulatory restrictions on plans building new facilities may also be important.     

Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction

We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.