A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.     

A characterization of egalitarian equivalence

Summary Consider a solution (an allocation rule) for an economy which satisfies the following criteria: (1) Pareto efficiency, (2) monotonicity, in the sense that if the set of attainable allocations of the economy becomes larger then the solution makes no consumer worse-off, (3) a weak and primitive notion of fairness with respect to some commodity, say commodityh, in the sense that in an exchange economy in which the aggregate endowment consists only of commodityh, the solution is equal division. We show that in the class of economies which includes non-convex technologies the only such solution is egalitarian equivalence with respect to commodityh. It is also shown that this characterization of egalitarian equivalence holds in convex exchange economies if we add a weak version of a positive association requirement.We are grateful to William Thomson and three anonymous referees for extensive comments on an earlier version. We also acknowledge helpful comments of the participants of the Social Choice and Welfare Conference held in Caen, June 1992.     

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties.     

Impossibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels: The "Extended Sympathy Approach" Reconsidered

We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity
JEL Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026     

Endogenous growth with a limited fossil fuel extraction capacity

Campbell (1980) and following authors have discussed a limited resource extraction capacity as an augmentation of the well‐known Hotelling model. We integrate a limited extraction capacity and related investments in the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) to study its effect on economic development. The capacity constraint gives rise to three effects. On the one hand, higher energy costs and the reallocation of production towards capacity investments decrease production available for consumption, research and/or capital investments (energy costs and reallocation effect). On the other hand, research investments may increase, which boosts available production (research effect). Depending on the capital endowment and the strength of the effects, long‐run consumption may be boosted or depressed. In particular, the capacity constraint may render everlasting consumption growth non‐optimal in a resource‐rich economy. Furthermore, we find that capacity investments may be postponed to later points in time if the capital endowment is high.     

Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set

Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions are necessary and sufficient for a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every chain. Actually, there are several interpretations of monotonicity and several corresponding single crossing conditions. We describe restrictions on the preferences that ensure a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every sublattice whenever a perturbation of preferences satisfies the corresponding single crossing condition. Quasisupermodularity is necessary if we want monotonicity in every conceivable sense; otherwise, weaker conditions will do.     

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies

We analyze the class of agency problems with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, in which hidden actions and hidden information (on the agent's efficiency) are jointly present. Technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule. We show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent's inputs. Together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs, separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent's actions and indirect utility.     

The potential of land rental markets in the process of economic development: Evidence from China

We develop a model of land leasing with agents characterized by unobserved heterogeneity in ability and presence of an off-farm labor market. In this case, decentralized land rental may contribute to equity and efficiency goals and may have several advantages over administrative reallocation. The extent to which this is true empirically is explored using data from three of China's poorest provinces. Land rental markets and administrative reallocation reallocate land to those with lower endowments but the former are more effective in doing so and have a bigger productivity-enhancing effect. Information on hypothetical market participation suggests that reducing transaction costs in land rental markets could help to realize significant additional productivity gains.     

Australian Poverty Quantified by a Family-Based Poverty Index*

We postulate a family-based poverty index (JD) possessing focus, symmetry, monotonicity and decomposability properties commonly required of individualistic indexes. JD also satisfies reformulated distribution and transfer sensitivity axioms which take account of differences between families in their sizes and poverty lines. We introduce a new axiom, substitution sensitivity, which is satisfied by JD but not by the well-known FGT index. Using JD, we describe Australian poverty in the 1980s. We find that head-count ratios and average income gaps dominate the explanation of differences in poverty across family types and across time. Differences in the distributions of poor incomes make minor contributions.     

Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing

Summary. We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule should be well defined (and continuous on) the set of threshold functions. We show that none of the standard "equitable" mechanisms satisfy any of these axioms and then present a constructive characterization of mechanisms which do. Using this we construct several new mechanisms. These are the Almost Flat mechanism, the Spread Aumann-Shapley mechanism, and the Spread Serial mechanism, which have many desirable properties.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 11 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, H4.I would like to thank Hervé Moulin, Rich Mclean, Yves Sprumont and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule

The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.     

The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance.     

On the prevention of manipulation via endowments

Postlewaite (1979) has argued that all individually rational, Pareto optimal resource reallocation mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation via endowments. In this paper we propose an ‘arbitration rule’ which renders such manipulation unprofitable.     

养老保险与公共财政领域的代际负担——四种测量模型简

以现收现付为例介绍“政府总财政平衡”、“养老金负债净额”、“代际核算”、“隐性税收”四种模型的基本内涵,以及测量人口老龄化对养老保险体系或财政体系收支平衡的影响,认为社会养老保险必然出现代际不公平,人口老龄化对代际负担的影响测量复杂,代际公平应成为研究人口老龄化影响、评价养老保险长期发展的关键。     

Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A , where the subset is interpreted as the set of "welfare optima". A game form (or "mechanism") implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties—monotonicity and no veto power—can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive.     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

法人财产制与居民收入差距:需要明确的问题

是否应当调整法人财产收益以缩小我国持续拉大的居民收入差距,这在理论界存在着一定争议.从法人财产的基本内涵入手,通过剖析法人财产制在收入分配过程中的实际作用,对优化我国收入分配体系,缩小居民收入差距提供了一个总体的思路.我们认为,法人财产源自于生产的社会化需求和市场经济的基本运作规律,并具有相当的效率优势,与收入分配公平间并不存在直接的冲突,因此,调整法人财产来缩小居民收入差距不仅不具备理论合理性,也缺乏现实可行性.缩小我国居民收入差距的正确路径是:完善法人财产制,强化再分配和三次分配,优化配套制度.     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

This paper introduces two new characterizations of the top trading cycles algorithm. The key to our characterizations is a new condition, independence of irrelevant rankings (IIR). Intuitively, a mechanism satisfies IIR if whenever an agent’s ranking at an object is irrelevant to her assignment, then it is irrelevant to the assignment of all agents. We demonstrate that a mechanism is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, IIR, and satisfies mutual best if and only if it is top trading cycles. This provides a new insight into what distinguishes top trading cycles from all other efficient and strategy-proof assignment mechanisms. We provide a second characterization in terms of weak Maskin monotonicity. A mechanism satisfies Pareto efficiency, weak Maskin monotonicity, IIR, and mutual best if and only if it is top trading cycles. This allows us to directly compare top trading cycles to known characterizations of the deferred acceptance algorithm in terms of weak Maskin monotonicity.