Information or Opinion? Media Bias as Product Differentiation

Two aspects of media bias are important empirically. First, bias is persistent: it does not seem to disappear even when the media is under scrutiny. Second, bias is conflicting: different people often perceive bias in the same media outlet to be of opposite signs. We build a model in which both empirical characteristics of bias are observed in equilibrium. The key assumptions are that the information contained in the facts about a news event may not always be fully verifiable, and consumers have heterogeneous prior views ("ideologies") about the news event. Based on these ingredients of the model, we build a location model with entry to characterize firms' reports in equilibrium, and the nature of bias. When a news item comprises only fully verifiable facts, firms report these as such, so that there is no bias and the market looks like any market for information . When a news item comprises information that is mostly nonverifiable, however, then consumers may care both about opinion and editorials, and a firm's report will contain both these aspects—in which case the market resembles any differentiated product market . Thus, the appearance of bias is a result of equilibrium product differentiation when some facts are nonverifiable. We use the model to address several questions, including the impact of competition on bias, the incentives to report unpopular news, and the impact of owner ideology on bias. In general, competition does not lead to a reduction in bias unless this is accompanied by an increase in verifiability or a smaller dispersion of prior beliefs.     

Competing for the Public Through the News Media

Interest groups seek to influence economic activity through public and private politics. Public politics takes place in the arena of public institutions, whereas private politics takes place outside public institutions often in the arena of public sentiment. Private politics refers to action by interest groups directed at private parties, as in the case of an activist group launching a campaign against a firm. This paper presents a model of informational competition between an activist and an industry, where both interest groups seek to influence public sentiment and do so by advocating their positions through the news media. Citizen consumers make both a private consumption decision and a collective choice on the regulation of a product that has an externality associated with it. In the absence of the news organization, the collective choice is not to regulate. The activist and the industry obtain private, hard information on the seriousness of the externality and provide favorable information to the news media and may conceal unfavorable information. The news media can conduct investigative journalism to obtain its own information, and based on that information and the information it has received from its sources, provides a news report to the public. Because of its role in society, the media has an incentive to bias its report, and the direction of bias is toward regulation. Its bias serves to mitigate both market failure by decreasing demand and a government failure by shifting votes in favor of regulation. The activist then has incentive to conceal information unfavorable to its interests, whereas the industry fully reveals its information.     

广播媒体重大事件、突发事件新闻报道应急机制初探

作为广播媒体,要想在众多媒体特别是同类媒体的竞争中脱颖而出,除了媒体记者自身过硬的素质和敏锐的新闻洞察力,还需要靠什么抓住瞬间出现的新闻机遇?如何面对相同新闻素材做出与众不同的新闻报道?笔者认为,建立一套行之有效应急机制是非常必要的。本文结合实践,探讨了建立和完善重大事件、突发事件新闻报道应急机制的几点思路。     

Small sample properties of the mixed regression estimator

In this paper, the small sample properties of the mixed regression estimator are examined when prior information may be biased and when the ration of the variance of the prior restriction errors to the variance of the sample errors is unknown. The mean square error of the mixed regression estimator is derived, and it is shown that the mixed regression estimator gets dominated by the ordinary least squares estimator in terms of the mean square error as the bias of prior information gets larger.     

Who Gets on the News? The relation between media biases and different actors in news reporting on complex policy processes

Abstract

Having a voice in media is important to gain power and legitimacy in policy processes. However, media are biased in transmitting information. Using a quantitative content analysis of ten years’ news reporting around water management policies in the Netherlands, we study how much media attention different groups of actors receive and how media biases relate to this attention. Executive politicians get on the news because of their authoritative position; less authoritative actors getting on the news is more related to information biases. Information biases can thus function as a form of checks and balances in news reporting on policy processes.     

Chamberlin's Experimental Markets Revisited: A Computerized Journey

A bstract . Professor Edward Hastings Chamberlin conducted many experiments about imperfect markets at Harvard University, using his students as bargaining agents. He found that transaction volumes ( i.e. number of units sold) were consistently higher in these "imperfect" markets than would have been the case if the markets were "perfect." This he found surprising but explainable. He also found, however, that the average transaction prices were consistently lower than their equivalents in perfect markets. That he found both surprising and unexplainable. He finally assumed that the biased behavior of his students caused that phenomenon. In the present study, his experiments were replicated but the alleged bias was eliminated by replacing the students with a computer which was programmed to deal impartially and objectively with all buyers and sellers. On completion of the simulation, it was found that the transaction volumes were indeed significantly higher than their perfect market equivalents, but average prices were very comparable to their counterparts in perfect markets. Thus Chamberlin's hypothesis was correct on both counts. This verification of the suspect results we consider very significant, because they may have far reaching effects on welfare economics. As more 'transactions may be completed at essentially the same average price, perhaps the efficiency of these markets could be improved by making these markets less perfect rather than less imperfect.     

Informational efficiency and behaviour within in-play prediction markets

Studies of financial market informational efficiency have proven burdensome in practice, because it is difficult to pinpoint when news breaks and is known by some or all the participants. We overcome this by designing a framework to detect mispricing, test informational efficiency and evaluate the behavioural biases within high-frequency prediction markets. We demonstrate this using betting exchange data for association football, exploiting the moment when the first goal is scored in a match as major news that breaks cleanly. There are pre-match and in-play mispricing and inefficiency in these markets, explained by reverse favourite-longshot bias (favourite bias). The mispricing tends to increase when the major news is a surprise, such as a goal scored by a longshot team late in a match, with the market underestimating their chances of going on to win These results suggest that, even in prediction markets with large crowds of participants trading state-contingent claims, significant informational inefficiency and behavioural biases can be reflected in prices.     

The role of interpersonal affect in performance appraisal: evidence from two samples – the US and India

The interpersonal affect, a li ke–dislike relationship between a supervisor and his/her subordinate, has traditionally been conceptualized as a source of bias in performance appraisals. However, some researchers have argued that the interpersonal affect may not be a bias, especially where it develops as a result of past performance. In this field study, using data from 190 supervisors in the US, and 113 supervisors in India, we delineate the relationship between interpersonal affect and performance ratings. In both samples, interpersonal affect and performance level were found to have significant effects on performance ratings. Results from the US sample indicated that raters are able to separate their liking for a subordinate from actual performance when a ssigning performance ratings, suggesting that the interpersonal affect does not operate as a bias in the appraisal process. Results from the Indian sample, however, suggest that supervisors inflate ratings of low performers, suggesting that local cultural norms may be operating as a moderator.     

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There is a socially optimal allocation, which is commonly known by the agents but not observable by the designer. The designer possibly has information about the existence of responsible agents. A responsible agent, when indifferent between his objects at two different allocations, prefers the first allocation to the second if the first allocation is closer to the optimal allocation than the second, in the sense that all the agents who are allocated their optimal objects in the second allocation are allocated their optimal objects also in the first allocation, and there is at least one more agent in the first allocation receiving his optimal object. We show that, if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited.     

Risk reporting and stock return in the UK: Does market competition Matter?

This study examines the extent to which market competition influences risk reporting practice. It also explores how market competition affects the usefulness of risk reporting. The automated textual analysis measures the level of risk reporting [how much to report] and its tone [how it is reported] of UK FTSE 350 firms. The abnormal stock return is used as a proxy for the usefulness of risk reporting. In contrast to the proprietary cost hypothesis, our results indicate that the level of risk reporting is a positive function of market competition. Besides, UK firms are likely to disseminate more (less) negative (positive) news about their risks when market competition increases. However, after examining the informativeness of this reporting, we provide evidence that the level of reported risk information does not significantly enhance the abnormal stock returns of UK firms. Nevertheless, the tone of the reported risks carries incremental information indicative of a firm’s abnormal stock return, especially when market competition decreases. The findings suggest that firms are likely to alleviate their proprietary costs by framing their reporting of risk information in a way that deters potential competitors from entering their market and that market competition diminishes the perceived informativeness of such reporting. The results provide implications for investors as they should not acknowledge the disclosure of higher risk information when asking for more corporate transparency, as it lacks informativeness. Besides, policymakers may impose extra compulsory requirements on the UK firms to avoid reporting overly optimistic risk news to protect investors and avoid the adverse effects of this reporting.     

News on inflation and the epidemiology of inflation expectations in China

Inflation expectations are important elements in monetary policy analysis. This paper examines how inflation expectations of Chinese consumers and professional forecasters are affected by media sentiments based on the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model. Rather than assuming professional forecasts are identical to newspaper forecasts, we assume news media are a common source for the transmission of typical people's inflation expectations. We collect media data from 30 leading newspapers and magazines in China and code news reports into three types of inflation: rising, falling, and unchanged. More importantly, we categorize the media pool into comprehensive, economic, and politically oriented media sources. We find a fundamental connection between news media and inflation expectations. However, there are significantly different impacts of news reports in different media sources on expectations. The difference is mainly concentrated in politically oriented media sources, and may be a reflection of China's unique media administration system.     

On-the-job human capital investment and intertemporal substitution: New evidence on intertemporal substitution elasticity

This paper argues that estimates of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) obtained from standard life-cycle models are subject to a downward bias because they neglect the life-cycle and demographic patterns of on-the-job human capital investment. Taking into account the fact that part of a worker's time at work goes to acquiring human capital in addition to his main task of producing goods, we extend the standard life-cycle model to include time spent on investing in on-the-job human capital and propose a new framework for identifying the IES. We obtain statistically significant evidence that conventional estimates of IES for total hours at work are biased downward about 20% at the intensive margin. The corresponding IES estimates for production hours are biased downward even more, which provides an explanation for why output fluctuation is greater than hours/employment fluctuation over the business cycle.     

Web content mining for comparing corporate and third‐party online reporting: a case study on solid waste management

This study investigates the coverage of solid waste management on 1142 websites maintained by companies, news media and non‐governmental organizations to validate an automated approach to content and language analysis. First, a frequency analysis of waste management terms sheds light on the breadth and depth of their environmental discourses, revealing that corporate and media attention to waste management is small compared with that of non‐governmental organizations. Second, an investigation of their attitudes toward waste management suggests that companies avoid negative information in environmental communication, unlike news media or non‐governmental organizations. Ultimately, an automated tool for ontology building is employed to gain insights into companies' shared understanding of waste management. The ontology obtained indicates that companies conceptualize waste management as a business process rather than framing it from an ecological perspective, which is in line with findings from previous research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Learning and stability of the Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium

Under the Bayesian–Walrasian Equilibrium (BWE) (see Balder and Yannelis, 2009), agents form price estimates based on their own private information, and in terms of those prices they can formulate estimated budget sets. Then, based on his/her own private information, each agent maximizes interim expected utility subject to his/her own estimated budget set. From the imprecision due to the price estimation it follows that the resulting equilibrium allocation may not clear the markets for every state of nature, i.e., exact feasibility of allocations may not occur. This paper shows that if the economy is repeated from period to period and agents refine their private information by observing the past BWE, then in the limit all agents will obtain the same information and market clearing will be reached. The converse is also true. The analysis provides a new way of looking at the asymmetric equilibrium which has a statistical foundation.     

Advertising and Political Bias in the Media: The Market for Criticism of the Market Economy

Many observers of the media argue that advertiser support of the news insulates business from critical scrutiny. News organizations know better than to bite the hand that feeds them. I examine several weaknesses in this corporate advertising bias argument. Most significantly, a favorable political climate for business is a public good, so individual businesses have an incentive to support anti–business messages that generate an audience. Transmission of messages that fail to generate sufficient demand is inefficient. In short, advertising does not create a significant political bias.     

General equilibrium in markets for lemons

This paper studies exchange economies in which agents have differential information about the goods that the other agents bring to the market. To study such a setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical characteristics, but also by the agent that brings them to the market. Equilibrium is shown to exist, with agents receiving the cheapest bundle among those that they cannot distinguish from the truthful delivery. An example is presented as an illustration.     

Media Content,Accounting Quality,and Liquidity Volatility

We examine how the linguistic content of news items affects the volatility of a firm's liquidity, and we consider whether accounting quality moderates the media content-liquidity volatility relation. Regarding the unconditional relation between media content and liquidity volatility, one view is media content could reduce liquidity volatility by providing additional information about fundamental values; another view is it could increase liquidity volatility by increasing investor uncertainty, particularly for negative news. Using data from Thomson Reuters News Analytics, we find evidence supporting the view that media content, positive and negative, has incremental information. Regarding the moderating role of accounting quality, pre-existing accounting information of higher quality could enhance investors' reactions to media content by providing a more precise baseline, or it could reduce investors' reactions to the news if investors anchor on higher quality financial statements. Our findings are consistent with more credible accounting information serving an anchor role, and suggest that investors condition their reaction to media content based on the quality of a firm's pre-existing accounting information.     

On solving bias‐corrected non‐linear estimation equations with an application to the dynamic linear model

In a seminal paper, Mak, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 55, 1993, 945, derived an efficient algorithm for solving non‐linear unbiased estimation equations. In this paper, we show that when Mak's algorithm is applied to biased estimation equations, it results in the estimates that would come from solving a bias‐corrected estimation equation, making it a consistent estimator if regularity conditions hold. In addition, the properties that Mak established for his algorithm also apply in the case of biased estimation equations but for estimates from the bias‐corrected equations. The marginal likelihood estimator is obtained when the approach is applied to both maximum likelihood and least squares estimation of the covariance matrix parameters in the general linear regression model. The new approach results in two new estimators when applied to the profile and marginal likelihood functions for estimating the lagged dependent variable coefficient in the dynamic linear regression model. Monte Carlo simulation results show the new approach leads to a better estimator when applied to the standard profile likelihood. It is therefore recommended for situations in which standard estimators are known to be biased.     

Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Because firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.     

Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity

We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our model, boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors’ expressed opinions, but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or counter-conforming with their neighbors. We show that an agent׳s social influence on the long-run group opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in conformity. Concerning efficiency of information aggregation or “wisdom” of the society, it turns out that misrepresentation of opinions need not undermine wisdom, but may even enhance it. Given the network, we provide the optimal distribution of conformity levels in the society and show which agents should be more conforming in order to increase wisdom.