Outrunning the gender gap—boys and girls compete equally

Recent studies find that women are less competitive than men. This gender difference in competitiveness has been suggested as one possible explanation for why men occupy the majority of top positions in many sectors. In this study we explore competitiveness in children, with the premise that both context and gendered stereotypes regarding the task at hand may influence competitive behavior. A related field experiment on Israeli children shows that only boys react to competition by running faster when competing in a race. We here test if there is a gender gap in running among 7–10 year old Swedish children. We also introduce two female sports, skipping rope and dancing, to see if competitiveness is task dependent. We find no gender difference in reaction to competition in any task; boys and girls compete equally. Studies in different environments with different types of tasks are thus important in order to make generalizable claims about gender differences in competitiveness.     

Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.     

Competitive experience and gender difference in risk preference,trust preference and academic performance: Evidence from Gaokao in China

This study examines whether and how competitive experience affects gender difference in the preferences for risk and trust as well as academic performance. By utilizing the provincial differences in college admission rates as an indicator of competitive experience for students, we assess its relationship with gender difference in risk preference, trust preference, and academic performance. We find that females from provinces with lower college admission rates are more risk averse and less trustful, and perform better in more competitive environment, compared with their male counterparts. Our study suggests that observed gender differences may partially reflect the effects of schooling environment rather than inherent gender traits.     

THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS*

This paper investigates the incentives for candidates to make informative campaign speeches concerning their policy intentions. Electoral competition is modeled as a game of communication in which candidates’policy preferences are private information and they compete by making pre-electoral policy announcements. An equilibrium is shown to exist in which candidates reveal their true policy intentions. We find that campaign messages are more likely to be informative, the less powerful is the elected office, the more attractive are candidates’opportunities outside of office, and the more uniform are candidates’prior beliefs as to the median voter's preferred policy.     

Gender differences in selection into self-competition

While previous studies demonstrated that, in many settings, women tend to be less willing than men to engage in interpersonal competition, this study focuses on selection into self-competition. Competing against own past performances can be an integral part of life, including job and sports. Using data obtained from a lab-in-the-field experiment, we find empirical evidence that women are, on average, more reluctant than men to compete against their own past performance. Our results suggest that this difference can be mainly explained by gender differences in risk preferences.     

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence

Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs.     

Women,Children and Patience: Experimental Evidence from Indian Villages

Researchers have observed that women in developing countries often make more development friendly choices than men. We implemented experimental tasks among a large and diverse sample of married individuals in rural India and found women to make on average more patient and more risk‐averse choices than men. We find important heterogeneity in gender differences in patience: there is no difference for spouses with no children but patience levels diverge if there are small children in a family. The findings imply that conflicting spousal preferences are most likely in poor families with children.     

Heterogeneous preferences and investments in energy saving measures

We investigate whether risk, time, environmental, and social preferences affect single-family homeowners’ investments in the energy efficiency of their house using established experimental measures and questionnaires. We find that homeowners who report to be more risk taking are more likely to have renovated their house. Pro-environmental and future-oriented renovators, i.e. renovators with lower discount factors, live in homes with higher energy efficiency. Pro-social preferences as measured in a dictator game relates positively to the energy quality of renovated houses. Controlling for the energy efficiency of houses, we further find that energy consumption as measured by heating and electricity costs is lower for future-oriented and pro-environmental individuals.     

Experimental Estimates of Taxpayer Ethics

This paper extends the existing literature on taxpayer ethics in three ways. First, we construct a two-stage model of decision making, which allows us to disentangle risk preferences from ethical motivations for income tax compliance. Second, we develop a new experimental data set, which permits us to estimate the magnitudes of the relevant personality traits, risk aversion and morality, at the individual level. Third, we combine the experimental data with participant surveys so that ethical preferences are not only measured but also linked to demographic characteristics. We find that ethical preferences are correlated with risk aversion, age, gender, and marital status, among other characteristics.     

Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.     

Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior

We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games. We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are “mice,” behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our experimental design shows that the standard ultimatum game can mask significant inter- and intra-gender differences in strategic behavior. These behavioral patterns in strategic environments are shown to be correlated with preferences for altruism in non-strategic settings. Such gender differences could well manifest themselves in real-world large-stakes transactions, such as salary negotiations.     

One model fits all? — On the moderating role of emotional engagement and confusion in the elicitation of preferences for climate change adaptation policies

Environmental economic and psychological studies often implicitly assume homogeneity of respondents' decision strategies in questionnaire-based surveys. However, social psychology and behavioural research suggest that there is a wide variety of approaches that individuals use to make such choices.We explore this heterogeneity against the backdrop of so-called ‘dual process models’, analysing participants' responses in a survey of public beliefs about and preferences for climate change adaptation policies. We find that the postulate of two different types of decision-making, the systematic-analytical and the heuristic-holistic, does indeed help us to understand patterns in respondent behaviour that are, in turn, underpinned by respondents' motivation and ability to process information. Participants who were motivated and able to process the information provided were more likely to express preferences in line with their beliefs about adaptation policies, whereas those less motivated and more confused were more likely to use generalised rules-of-thumb that were not specific to the policy issue at hand. Depending on the theoretical framework of a study, such heterogeneity in response consistency and use of generic rules-of-thumb might have implications for the usefulness of survey outcomes. We discuss the implications of our findings, and draw conclusions for survey-based environmental research.     

Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior

We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games. We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are “mice,” behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our experimental design shows that the standard ultimatum game can mask significant inter- and intra-gender differences in strategic behavior. These behavioral patterns in strategic environments are shown to be correlated with preferences for altruism in non-strategic settings. Such gender differences could well manifest themselves in real-world large-stakes transactions, such as salary negotiations.     

Citizens’ support for inter-municipal cooperation: evidence from a survey in the German state of Hesse

Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) is often proposed as a politically feasible way by which rural municipalities can cope with intensified interregional competition and demographic change. We provide first evidence on citizens’ support for IMC using survey data from rural Germany. We find little evidence that citizens are more willing to support IMC in munici-palities that can – by the logic of economic theory – expect higher net benefits from IMC. Citizens’ support for IMC is primarily shaped by individual-level factors like the level of education, trust in local politicians and the degree of emotional attachment to the home mu-nicipality. Citizens’ beliefs regarding the economic and political consequences of IMC are found to have the largest marginal effect by far. Regressions predicting interpersonal differ-ences in these beliefs show that these beliefs have to be considered independent drivers of policy preferences. This result suggests that more research is needed to better understand the factors shaping citizens’ understanding of how economic policy works. This lack of under-standing applies to virtually all fields of economic policy.     

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.     

Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.     

The dynamics of environmentalism and the environment

We study the relationship between environmental preferences and the environment. Preferences are transmitted intergenerationally and through social interactions, where we assume that agents are more likely to adopt environmental preferences the larger the amount of pollution. In the basic setting we find that both converge non-monotonically towards an interior steady state. When including technical change we notice that there will be no change in the steady state level of the environment unless technical change is sufficiently strong, which stands in stark contrast to the literature. Upon introducing environmental laws we find that these may lead to a virtually pollution-free environment. This happens if environmental laws are implemented when public support is strong enough.     

GDP competition and corporate investment: Evidence from China

This study examines whether and how macroeconomic performance competition is related to investment at firm level. We use GDP competition as a proxy of dynamic macroeconomic conditions. We find that the effect of GDP competition on firm investments is significantly positive. We also find that GDP competition destroys investment efficiency significantly, especially by increasing overinvestment. Further tests show that GDP competition is more likely to affect the investment decisions of firms controlled by governments and firms located in regions with low marketization. In addition, our analyses reveal that the provincial officials facing competitive pressure are more likely to be promoted if firm investments accelerate. We use alternative proxies to measure GDP competition and find similar results that support our inference. Our findings support the notion that GDP competition of governments distorts investment behaviour. The present paper also elucidates investment problems and dilemmas faced by emerging economies.     

Storm Damage and Risk Preferences: Panel Evidence from Germany

Individuals’ risk preferences may change after experiencing external socio-economic or natural shocks. Theoretical predictions and empirical studies suggest that risk taking may increase or decrease after experiencing shocks. So far the empirical evidence is sparse, especially when it comes to developed countries. We contribute to this literature by investigating whether experiencing financial and health-related damage caused by storms affects risk preferences of individuals in Germany. Using unique panel data, we find that household heads were more risk-seeking after they experienced storm damage. We do not find evidence of exposure to storm per se (regardless of damage experience), which suggests that household heads have to suffer damage for their risk preferences to be affected. These results are robust across a battery of alternative model specifications and alternative storm damage measures (magnitude of financial damage). We rule out other potential explanations such as health-related and economic shocks. The self-reported storm damage data is broadly confirmed by regional storm damage data provided by the insurance industry. While we cannot identify the channels through which experiencing storm damage affects risk preferences from our data, we suggest and discuss some potential channels. The results may have important policy implications as risk preferences affect, for instance, individuals’ savings and investment behaviour, adoption of self-protection and self-insurance strategies, and technology adoption.     

Is there selection bias in laboratory experiments? The case of social and risk preferences

Laboratory experiments are frequently used to examine the nature of individuals’ social and risk preferences and inform economic theory. However, it is unknown whether the preferences of volunteer participants are representative of the population from which the participants are drawn, or whether they differ due to selection bias. To answer this question, we measured the preferences of 1,173 students in a classroom experiment using a trust game and a lottery choice task. Separately, we invited all students to participate in a laboratory experiment using common recruitment procedures. To evaluate whether there is selection bias, we compare the social and risk preferences of students who eventually participated in a laboratory experiment to those who did not, and find that they do not differ significantly. However, we also find that people who sent less in a trust game were more likely to participate in a laboratory experiment, and discuss possible explanations for this behavior.