Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions. Further it is assumed that in such cases they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as spillover effects increase until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached.     

The clean development mechanism versus international permit trading: The effect on technological change

The clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol may induce technological change in developing countries. As an alternative to the clean development mechanism regime, developing countries may accept a (generous) cap on their own emissions, allow domestic producers to invest in new efficient technologies, and sell the excess emission permits on the international permit market. The purpose of this article is to show how the gains from investment, and hence the incentive to invest in new technology in developing countries, differ between the two alternative regimes. We show that the difference in the gains from investment depends on whether the producers in developing countries face competitive or noncompetitive output markets, whether the investment affects fixed or variable production costs, and whether producers can reduce emissions through means other than investing in new technology.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

中国海外直接投资中的贸易保护因素实证研究

贸易保护因素历来是企业进行海外直接投资的重要动因。研究表明,国外关税壁垒的升级导致了近年来中国海外直接投资的增加;反倾销、反补贴及特保措施等贸易救济措施均使得中国加大了对贸易壁垒较少的中低收入国家的直接投资;中国的对外直接投资与东道国市场规模、中国对东道国的出口规模成正比,但没有更多地流入欧盟、东盟及北美自由贸易区等区域贸易组织的成员国中。因此在当前中美及中欧等贸易摩擦频繁的背景下,中国企业应对欧美等发达国家加大直接投资的力度,借此化解国外的贸易保护压力。     

A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action

In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the environmental benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand energy consumption, and the incentive to adopt the cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game-theoretic structure we find that the equilibrium abatement of the coalition composed by OECD countries would be moderate, in line with the Pledges subscribed in Copenhagen, but increasing. The mitigation strategy would consist of investments in energy R&D and deployment of cleaner technologies with high learning potentials. International knowledge and technology externalities would facilitate the diffusion of cleaner technologies in non-signatory countries, offsetting the free-riding incentive and reducing their emissions. If the OECD group curbs emissions beyond the optimal equilibrium level, reaching reduction rates between 40 and 45 % below 2005 levels in 2050, the benefits of technology externalities would no longer compensate the effect of lower fossil fuel prices. Our results suggest that a moderate unilateral climate policy could induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatory countries and that policies promoting the international transfer of technologies and knowledge could represent an effective complement to mitigation targets.     

Energy Transition Under Irreversibility: A Two-Sector Approach

This paper analyses the optimal energy transition of a two-sector economy (energy and final goods) under irreversible environmental catastrophe. First, it proposes a general appraisal of optimal switching problems related to energy transition showing: (1) the possibility of a catastrophe due to accumulation of pollution; and (2) technological regimes with the adoption of renewable energy. Second, it numerically shows that for given baseline parameter values, the most profitable energy transition path may correspond to the one in which the economy starts using both resources, crosses the pollution threshold by losing a part of its capital, and never adopts only clean energy. Third, it extends the model to allow for additional investment in energy saving technologies. We then find that this additional investment favours full transition to the sole use of renewable energy. It is then profitable to take advantage of these synergies by jointly promoting deployment of clean energy and providing incentives for investment in energy saving technologies.     

Policy Framework for Transition to a Low-Carbon World Economy

Climate change mitigation policy is the most difficult to come before our polity in living memory. There can be no solution without international agreement involving all substantial economies, and yet each country has an incentive to free ride on others. The international agreement must have five parts: agreement on the objective in terms of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, agreement on allocation of an emissions entitlements budget among countries, agreement on rules for international trade in entitlements, agreement on developed countries taking the lead on development of low-emissions technologies, and agreement on assistance from developed countries for climate change mitigation in developing countries. Two sources of market failure must be corrected to achieve emissions reduction targets efficiently: the external costs of emitting greenhouse gases and the external benefits of private investment in innovation in relation to low-emissions technologies.     

Time substitution for environmental performance: The case of Swedish manufacturing

We extend recent advances in time substitution modeling to a directional distance function framework, in order to examine the environmental performance of firms in Sweden’s pulp and paper industry for the years 2002–2008. Our data allow us to estimate the optimal reallocation of environmental investments, expenditures and energy use to simultaneously maximize production output and minimize emissions in the years immediately before and after the implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. We find some evidence of overall productivity decline when considering both emissions and output objectives, due primarily to technological decline, and that cumulative dynamic inefficiency outweighs static inefficiency. A comparison of optimal investment with observed investment indicates that firms could have improved their performance by reallocating environmental investments to early periods and production-oriented investment to later periods.     

A wait‐and‐see approach to investments: Do elections play a role?

Unlike previous studies on electoral investment cycle—the tendency for firms to reduce investment expenditure during an election year relative to nonelection years—that have primarily focused on developed countries, this study documents cycles in private investments in relation to the timing of national elections across a broader set of African countries. The estimation results indicate that during election years, private investment decreases by an average of 16% relative to nonelection years. The results also reveal that private investment falls in the year leading up to an election and increases in the immediate year after an election, consistent with the view that electoral uncertainty deters investments. These findings suggest that electoral investment cycles apply strongly to African countries.     

The international business cycle as intertemporal coordination failure

Where investments are irreversible and the future is uncertain, people in two countries can make investment decisions that turn out to be mutually inconsistent. I argue that this intertemporal coordination failure explains international business cycles in a two-currency-area setting with a floating foreign exchange rate. The sequence of events starts with an expansionary domestic monetary shock, which decreases the domestic real interest rate. Facing low transactions costs, people spend the new money relatively early in the foreign exchange market and in the foreign market for loanable funds. Domestic monetary expansion thereby changes the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods and also of goods of earlier and later stages of production. The relative price changes lead to intertemporal and international coordination failures once the monetary expansion ends and relative prices change. Domestic monetary policy thereby causes the comovement across different currency areas we observe of business cycles.     

我国公共农业R&D投资变化及其国际比较研究

研究了我国公共农业RD投资现状及其变化趋势,并从全球各地区、金砖国家及新兴国家层面进行了国际比较。结果表明,我国公共农业RD投资增长迅猛,投资总额位居金砖国家及新兴国家之首,但投资稳定性不容乐观且投资强度明显不足;公共农业RD投资以政府部门为主,重点扶持农业和农、林、牧、渔服务业。政府应提高公共农业RD投资强度,确保投资稳定性,使资金适量向林业、畜牧业及渔业倾斜,同时鼓励私人部门对公共农业RD进行投资。     

Optimal Investment in Clean Production Capacity

For the mitigation of long-term pollution threats, one must consider that both the process of environmental degradation and the switchover to new and cleaner technologies are dynamic. We develop a model of a uniform good that can be produced by either a polluting technology or a clean one; the latter is more expensive and requires investment in capacity. We derive the socially optimal pollution stock accumulation and creation of nonpolluting production capacity, weighing the tradeoffs among consumption, investment and djustment costs, and environmental damages. We consider the effects of changes in the pollution decay rate, the capacity depreciation rate, and the initial state of the environment on both the steady state and the transition period. The optimal transition path looks quite different with a clean or dirty initial environment. With the former, investment is slow and the price of pollution may overshoot the long-run optimum before converging. With the latter, capacity may overshoot.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

Where Do Australians Invest?

In this article, we analyse the geography of Australia's international portfolio investment using the International Monetary Fund's Co‐ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey dataset. Preliminary results suggest that Australia's external holdings of equity and debt as a percentage of national income almost doubled between 1997 and 2001. However, Australia's international investment position as a percentage of national income is one of the lowest amongst the major OECD countries. In 2001 approximately two‐thirds of Australia's total investments were in the United States and the United Kingdom. By contrast Australia's trade share (exports plus imports as a percentage of Australia's total world trade) with these countries was approximately 20 per cent in the same year. The major determinants of Australia's geographical allocation of portfolio investment indicate a broad correspondence between stock market capitalisation of destination countries and the allocation of Australian financial investments but with some deviations from that baseline, where the deviations are correlated with Australian trade patterns.     

双边投资协定、制度环境和企业对外直接投资区位选择

双边投资协定是两国政府为了促进和保护双边投资签署的协议。作为特定的联系两国的双边制度因素,双边投资协定给企业提供了不同于国家制度环境的保护,因而对企业的投资区位决策产生影响。本文建立了关于双边投资协定、东道国制度环境与母国制度对发展中国家企业对外投资区位选择作用的研究框架。基于中国上市公司2003年至2009年对外直接投资的数据,本文有三点发现:首先,双边投资协定能够促进企业到签约国投资;其次,双边投资协定能够替补东道国制度的缺位,对于促进企业到制度环境较差的签约国投资的作用更大;此外,双边投资协定还能够弥补母国制度支持的不均衡性,对于帮助非国有企业到签约国投资有着显著的积极作用。     

An evolutionary model of energy transitions with interactive innovation-selection dynamics

We develop a stylized application of a new evolutionary model to study an energy transition in electricity production. The framework describes a population of boundedly rational electricity producers who decide each period on the allocation of profits among different energy technologies. They tend to invest in below-average cost energy technologies, while also devoting a small fraction of profits to alternative technological options and research on recombinant innovation. Energy technologies are characterized by costs falling with cumulative investments. Without the latter, new technologies have no chance to become cost competitive. We study the conditions under which a new energy technology emerges and technologies coexist. In addition, we determine which investment heuristics are optimal in the sense of minimizing the total cost of electricity production. This is motivated by the idea that, while diversity contributes to system adaptability (innovation) and resilience to unforeseen contingencies (keeping options open), a high cost will discourage investments in it.     

Product R&D Investment Policies in an International Duopoly

This study analyzes the optimal product R&D investment policies of a developed and a developing country in an international Cournot duopoly where firms from these two countries compete through endogenous quality–quantity decisions. We explore a new international trade model by using demand functions derived from utility functions. We find that the optimal product R&D investment policies for both countries are subsidies. This study counters a finding that used Hotelling‐type demand functions and it partially modifies another result that adopted the same demand functions but with an international Bertrand duopoly.     

The role of infrastructure investment and factor productivity in international tax competition

In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity.     

How international financial flows affect stock markets?

Relying on the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, which reports countries’ bilateral investments in financial assets at end-2001 to end-2015, this article shows that a country’s stock market growth is not only spatially correlated with those of nearby countries, but also positively associated with the magnitude of connectedness of the country’s international investments in debt within a dynamic financial investment flow network. The positive relation arises because debts have become an increasingly important source of capital for developing countries.