Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation.     

Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach

Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.     

International Environmental Agreements as Evolutionary Games

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to international environmental agreements (IEAs). Contrary to stage game models (Barrett in J Theor Politics 11:519–541, 1999, Eur Econ Rev 45:1835–1850, 2001), in an evolutionary equilibrium (EE) no signatory prefers to be outside the IEA and the EE is robust to trembles. With two populations, there is a unique interior EE when there is decreasing returns to abatement and small asymmetry in the externality differences across populations. At the interior EE, transfers from the poor to the rich can increase payoffs for all nations, but come at the expense of greater payoff inequality. Transfers can also eliminate the basin of attraction for the payoff inferior EE with decreasing returns to abatement and large asymmetry. Thus IEAs, such as the Kyoto Treaty, predicated on the polluter-pays and ability-to-pay principles may result in Pareto inferior outcomes.     

企业集团子公司协同治理的合作博弈分析

通过对企业集团子公司协同治理的合作博弈模型进行描述和分析,动态的重复博弈使得在子公司所采取的策略中,博弈双方均采取合作策略或均采取背叛策略,因双方合作能带来协同效应,协同治理中的子公司最优的选择为采取合作策略。     

Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making others' behaviour a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.     

淮河流域环境污染治理的多重博弈与永续发展

该文探讨了政府、企业和环保NGO在淮河污染治理中的结构与作用力,分析了中央政府与地方政府、企业环保NGO之间多重博弈关系,发现污染治理陷入了"囚徒困境",并基于"永续发展"的环境理念,构建了三大行为主体环境污染治理的关系模型,以走出"囚徒困境"。     

从经济学及博弈角度分析环境污染

环境资源是一种公共资源,是典型的公共财产,其特点表现为产权规定不明晰、外部性及资源配置的市场失灵,这些特性导致环境资源的过渡使用、环境污染、生态破坏。从博弈角度分析:环境污染事实上是囚徒困境;污染治理的方法是大型企业采取内部治理,小型企业通过税收政府集中治理。     

出口企业应对反倾销搭便车行为分析

在国际贸易中,当出口企业面临国外的反倾销指控时,出口国同类产品出口企业都有义务积极应诉,但是每个企业都存在搭便车倾向。本文通过一个博弈论模型分析这种免费搭车现象的存在动因,讨论了哪些企业最易搭便车,市场结构对企业应诉反倾销行为的影响以及政府如何激励出口企业积极应诉。     

关于环境科学国际合作影响因素的探讨

2008年英国相继发布了多份关于科学研究效果的评估报告,其中对于环境科学的一个重要结论是：英国一直很重视环境科学领域的国际合作和国际化,把增强其国际影响力作为一个重要目标。鉴于此,本文首次提出应从全球资源配置的角度来看待环境科学的国际合作。在环境科学的内在科学因素和外在非科学因素的驱动下,通过国际合作,促使全球科学资源和社会资源向有利于环境学科自身发展的方向流动和积聚。其中,配置科学资源遵循“要素择优原则”,配置社会资源遵循“最小省力原则”,这两种因素和两个调节手段共同构成了环境科学国际合作的理论机制。希望这些研究结果能对我国制定环境科学国际合作规划提供一些不同视角和看法。     

集群供应链环境治理与政府监管博弈分析

笔者研究了集群供应链跨链合作与政府监管的博弈模型,通过在不同单链式供应链在不同策略下各自的成本和收益基础上,运用博弈理论研究了政府环境管制与集群供应链跨链合作的关系。研究结果表明:原材料的采购价格和单位副产品的排污收费是集群供应链实施跨链合作的驱动力;再利用固定成本以及废弃物的产出规模是集群供应链跨链合作能否实施的先决条件;政府的法制监管成本、环境管制失职招致的信誉损失、政府对核心企业副产品排放而进行的罚款直接影响到博弈结果。     

环境保护的国际合作：以SARS为例

SARS危机反映了当前环境问题日渐国际化的趋势,其根源是资源紧缺和经济全球化之间的矛盾。面对这一问题,各国应通力合作、寻求对策,实现环境保护的国际合作。但环境责任在各国间的分配问题阻碍了国际环境合作的进展。本文指出,基于环境和国力的全球合作机制可合理分配各国的代际责任和代内责任,有利于促进环境保护的国际合作,是一种可行的环境保护国际合作模式。要实现这一目标,首先要各国在代际和代内责任的问题上达成共识,二是要增加国际机构、国际公约对合作各方的约束力。     

The Abatement Market A Proposal for Environmental Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries

We present a model of interaction among technologically asymmetriccountries whose use of an open-access environmental resource generatesmutual externalities. We show that countries can improve bothenvironmental quality and their individual welfare levels by buying/sellingpollution abatement. This market mechanism, which reduces incentive forfree-riding, is more effective the larger the technological gap betweencountries.     

Common Pool Games are Convex Games

For the class of cooperative common pool games the paper focuses on the question of how, during the preplay negotiation process, the ability of coalitions to enforce their claims imposes externalities on the opposition by having an impact on the jointly produced resource. One of our main results is that common pool games are clear games. Based on this result we are able to derive sufficient conditions for the convexity of the characteristic function, which establishes the second main result in the paper, namely that cooperative common pool games are characterized by increasing returns with respect to the coalition size.     

Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each party can opt out at any time, and the outside option outcome is assumed to depend on the offers made in the negotiation phase. Specifically, we assume that (1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party's outside option pay-off and (2) the outside option outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement. The main finding is that the mere presence of such history-dependent outside options forces equilibrium concessions in the negotiation phase to be gradual, and the degree of gradualism is characterized. The model also applies to contribution games in which the outside option may be interpreted as the option to implement a partial project using the total contributions made so far.     

Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

I define neologism-proofness, a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cheap-talk games. It applies when players have a preexisting common language, so that an unexpected message′s literal meaning is clear, and only credibility restricts communication. I show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism-proof; in some games, no equilibrium is. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: D83 D82 C73.