Auction choice

While there is a big literature that compares revenue in common auctions, very little attention has been paid to the economic significance of revenue rankings. In this paper we develop a robust method for computing equilibrium bid functions and comparing revenue from the sealed high-bid and open auctions. We use our program to show that the effects of affiliation and risk aversion are typically small, while the effects of asymmetry are economically large unless the auctioneer has as much information about bidders as they do about each other.We also characterize the effects of asymmetry for the n-bidder case.     

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.     

Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication

This paper examines the feasibility of collusive mechanisms in single-unit auctions. A model is constructed with private and common value information asymmetry and continuous type space. We show that an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism (BCM) does not exist if common value uncertainty is present. This result contradicts actual antitrust cases, where common effects or resale opportunities created uncertainty about valuations, but a price-fixing cartel was formed. We solve the puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all bidder types truthfully reveal their private information. The introduced Bayesian bid coordination mechanism (BBCM) exists if the main source of information asymmetry is private value. In that case, a designated ring member can signal high valuation and suppress competition. Our results demonstrate the rationale behind cartel mechanisms with pre-auction knockouts.     

Spectrum value

Radio spectrum is a scarce resource; understanding its economic value is one piece of information needed to manage it efficiently. Estimating the value of radio spectrum, however, creates significant challenges not found in valuing some other assets. Spectrum is somewhat of a special case; market transactions provide a basis for valuation, but almost always require significant adjustments. Some adjustments are best made using discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis or econometric evidence. A review of past work on spectrum valuations suggests that focusing on a single valuation technique leaves critical information about spectrum value unused.     

Uncertainty and Auction Outcomes: Evidence from Used Car Actions

I study the sequence of bidding in an open-outcry English auction to examine how uncertainty affects auction outcomes. I do this by analyzing a data set that was collected from a series of public auctions of used cars in New Jersey. I conjecture that the uncertainty is related to the auction’s progress and demonstrate that, empirically, an increase in the uncertainty is associated with an increase in the number of rounds that is required to sell an object and with a reduction in the ratio of the selling price to the presale estimate.     

Auction design and bidding strategy for the note issuance facility

Three auctioning methods are considered for the Note Issuance Facility. They are (i) the discriminatory auction where each winning bidder is paid his own interest rate bid, (ii) the stop-out-rate auction where all winners are paid the interest rate that clears the market, and (iii) the lowest-rejected-bid auction in which all winners are paid the lowest rejected interest rate bid. For each auctioning method, the bidder's optimal bidding strategy is derived and the note issuer's corresponding expected interest rate is obtained. The results under these three auctioning methods are then compared.     

eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace

This survey brings together theoretical and empirical questions that have been addressed in the economic literature on eBay, focusing on understanding the behavior of buyers and sellers. We discuss several puzzles of bidder behavior and the explanations that have been put forward by the literature for each. We then discuss structural estimates of bidder behavior and measuring the consumer surplus derived from eBay. We then try to understand why there are so many selling formats being used simultaneously, and then focus on the critical decision variables for a seller in an eBay English auction. Finally we analyze how trustworthy eBay sellers are on average, and whether the feedback system provides strong incentives for good behavior.     

基于帕累托最优配置的碳排放许可证拍卖机制

兑现2020年碳减排目标的承诺为我国碳交易市场的建立提供了新的契机,同时使得"如何以最小化经济增长冲击降低二氧化碳排放量"成为一个焦点问题。本文针对"如何有效配置碳排放许可证"做一个前瞻性研究,把帕累托最优概念引入碳排放许可证拍卖—交易框架,设计一个新的碳排放许可证拍卖机制,其规则相对简单,仅有四步构成,易于被市场参与者理解和接受,而且在有限时间内此机制收敛于一个帕累托最优配置,从而实现了碳排放许可证资源的有效利用,在没有平局出现的约束下,最终的均衡配置是唯一的。此外,文中的拍卖机制不仅能最大化卖方的收益,而且买方还拥有占优竞标策略,这些优点决定了此机制在将来的商业应用中能被买卖双方所青睐。最后,用一个具体案例解释新机制的操作过程及其在实践中的可行性,为环境交易所提供一个备选的交易方案。     

How to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly When Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possible

A seaport is awarded in a Demsetz auction to the operator bidding the lowest cargo-handling fee. The competitive auction is irrelevant if the port operator integrates into shipping and sabotages competitors, thus providing a motive for a ban on vertical integration. The paper shows that such a ban increases welfare even when underhand agreements with shippers are possible. For this result to attain, the auction must be combined with a sufficiently high floor on the cargo-handling fee that operators can bid in the auction. With no floor, a Demsetz auction is worse than an unregulated bottleneck monopoly.     

An Analysis of Resolution Trust Corporation Transactions: Auction Market Process and Pricing

This article describes the operations of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), examines the procedures it employs to resolve distressed Savings and Loan scenarios and investigates the pricing of transactions undertaken by the RTC. The RTC has been criticized for allegedly transferring properties to acquirers at "bargain" prices. The transactions involving publicly traded acquirers in RTC sales are examined from an auction theory perspective. Overall, there is little evidence that winning bidders experience stock price gains. There are, however, subsets of bidders for which the outcomes are predominantly negative. The only category of transactions which provide statistically significant gains to acquirers are Insured Deposit Transfers.     

Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation

This paper characterizes the payoffs and pricing policies of auction hosting sites when both the bidders’ and the sellers’ participation is endogenous. Sellers have heterogeneous opportunity costs and make a listing decision depending on the listing fee and the expected revenue from the sale. On the other side of the market, factors such as facility in navigating an interface layout and prior bidding experience result in bidder heterogeneity with respect to participation costs. Bidders participate if their ex ante expected payoff from searching the site exceeds their participation costs. The auction site earns revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller resulting from a higher fee with the revenue reduction from the loss of sellers. Though this appears to be a classic monopoly problem, there are important differences. The reduction in the number of sellers participating in a site has feedback effects, as it affects the number of bidders who choose to visit that site, which in turn again affects the attractiveness of the site to sellers, and thus further reduces seller participation. In this environment the monopolist’s ability to extract rents is severely limited, even if one considers rent extraction from the seller side of the market only. It is demonstrated that the inverse demand curve is flatter than the demand curve obtained from the (inverse) distribution of seller costs. Moreover, the inverse demand curve has at least one and possibly multiple flat segments, leading to discontinuities in the profit function. Thus, small changes in the environment can lead to large changes in the optimal fee and market participation.     

Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation

Over the past 80 years, the Federal Communications Commission has been responsible for the allocation of non-governmental use of the radio frequency spectrum. Over that time, here have been significant changes in spectrum use that have been driven by changes in demand and technology. The technical, regulatory, and business obstacles in past reallocations shed light on some of the FCC’s implementation decisions for its upcoming two-sided auction.     

Spectrum management reform: Rethinking practices

Unparalleled growth in wireless communications has increased the pressure for more spectrum to support more users, more uses and more capacity. To alleviate that pressure, major regulatory changes were introduced in several countries in two key areas of spectrum management, namely spectrum assignment and allocation. This paper analyzes those changes and discusses strategies and tactics for deregulating the use of radio spectrum. Spectrum management reforms are considered within the theoretical framework of transition economics, which is concerned with optimal reform speed and sequencing. The paper shows how Anglo-Saxon and European countries have been implementing gradual reforms. Meanwhile, Central American reformers have chosen a fast transition from command-and-control regulation to market mechanisms. Transition economics is used to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of different spectrum reform strategies.     

Spectrum sharing in the gray space

There has been considerable effort to let more wireless devices operate in white space spectrum, that is within frequency bands and geographic areas where no wireless devices are active. Making white space available is certainly useful, but there are other sharing opportunities as well, some of which have been obscured by dangerous misconceptions about the concept of unused spectrum. This paper discusses allowing more devices to operate safely in gray space spectrum, that is spectrum that is actively being used in that transmissions are underway—something many economic models assume is impossible. The paper focuses on primary–secondary sharing, so devices gaining access to spectrum operate on a secondary basis in a way that never causes harmful interference to primary systems. Examples of primary–secondary gray space sharing mechanisms are described in which devices are allowed to share spectrum with broadcasting, radar, and cellular systems. Quantitative analysis shows that it is technically possible to support significant communications among secondary devices in spectrum that is already heavily used by cellular or radar. However, gray space sharing generally causes primary and secondary systems to be more technically interdependent than white space sharing, so different policy and governance structures are needed. Secondary market rules can support gray space sharing in cases where there is a single primary spectrum user, such as a cellular carrier. In cases where technology is static, the regulator may be able to control access for secondary devices. However, in cases with multiple primary users and multiple secondary users of spectrum, as might be seen in bands with radar for example, a new kind of governance body will be needed to facilitate spectrum sharing.     

Spectrum allocation and its relevance for competition

Spectrum is one of the most important production factors for mobile telecommunications operators. Spectrum policy is paramount as spectrum is a scarce resource allocated by regulatory authorities. Hence, when allocating spectrum and determining the potential use of spectrum, the regulatory authorities have a significant influence on the competitive situation in mobile markets.     

Measuring the Economic Effect of Global Warming on Viticulture Using Auction,Retail, and Wholesale Prices

In this paper we measure the effect of year-to-year changes in the weather on wine prices and winery revenue in the Mosel Valley in Germany in order to determine the effect that climate change is likely to have on the income of wine growers. A novel aspect of our analysis is that we compare the estimates based on auction, retail, and wholesale prices. Although auction prices are based on actual transactions, they provide a thick market only for high quality, expensive wines and may overestimate climate’s effect on farmer revenues. Wholesale prices, on the other hand, do provide broad coverage of all wines sold and probably come closest to representing the revenues of farmers. Overall, we estimate a 1°C increase in temperature would yield an increase in farmer revenue of about 30%.     

基于Labwindows/CVI的频谱分析仪

本文介绍了虚拟频谱分析仪的设计和实现。这个虚拟仪器是基于图形化编程语言——Labwindows/CVI而编写的,可以执行在线测量和离线处理,包括数据采集、显示、进行时域分析、频域分析和数据存储等功能。同时,这个虚拟仪器具有友好的人机界面。     

频谱分析技术在球磨机上的应用

利用状态监测技术对球磨机进行频谱分析,准确掌握故障严重程度,结合生产实际和设备运行状况,选择恰当的处理措施,大大减小设备故障的损失和影响。     

Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.