Policy coordination in East Asia and across the Pacific

In this paper, we construct a macro-econometric model that describes the economic activity in the Asia-Pacific area and provide quantitative insights into the recent policy debates on monetary and currency coordination among the East Asian economies. The model includes a wide variety of monetary and currency policy rules that the East Asian economies adopt and allows for one country's policymaking to have substantial effects on foreign countries. We apply the model to three current policy issues: (1) the desirability of currency basket pegs in East Asia, (2) the anticipated effects of China's currency policy reform, and (3) the non-negativity constraint on Japanese nominal interest rates. The simulation analyses show the external economy effects of policy rules quantitatively and suggest the difficulty of monetary and currency policy coordination among the East Asian economies.

---

太平洋彼岸美国长滩,青岛的姊妹城市

青岛与长滩于1985年结成友好城市,25年来教育、文化、体育、志愿者和经贸交流频繁。1997年4月该市时任市长奥尼尔率政府和经贸代表团访问了青岛,并促成了长滩港和青岛港的结好。     

Bargaining with multinationals

This paper analyses the process of bargaining between multinational companies and host governments in developing countries. It describes the sources of bargaining power for the government and the problems of coordinated action on the part of several developing countries on the basis of collective self-reliance.     

Can Prior Offers and Arbitration Outcomes Be Used to Predict the Winners of Subsequent Final-Offer Arbitration Cases?

The purpose of interest arbitration is to encourage bargainers to negotiate their own mutually agreeable settlement. In final-offer arbitration (FOA), the bargainers exchange final offers. If a settlement is not reached, an independent arbitrator selects one of the final offers as the award. At the beginning of each arbitration period, the only information available to bargainers relating to arbitrator preferences is past outcomes. Given its goal of driving negotiated settlements, an effective FOA process requires bargainers to infer useful information about arbitrator preferences from past outcomes. Using data from major league baseball, this article provides evidence that past FOA decisions are positively correlated with the outcomes of future FOA cases.     

审批、谈判与反公共地悲剧

本文研究了在企业投资项目审批程序中,企业审批机构的收益模式,审批权的分割程度以及不同的信息结构如何影响"反公共地悲剧"的发生和经济效率.本文发现,如果不允许谈判且审批机构的收益仅来自固定的审批费份额,则较高的审批权分割程度容易导致反公共地悲剧.在对称信息条件下,企业与每个审批机构的纳什合作谈判可以减轻甚至杜绝反公共地悲剧的发生,但审批权的分割程度以及企业和审批机构的相对谈判力会影响总剩余在企业和机构间的分配:审批权分割程度越高,企业获得的剩余越少.然后在不对称信息条件下,谈判定价也不能避免净效率损失,而且此时降低审批权分割程度反而可能会进一步增加经济效率损失.     

资产专用性与谈判力基础的关系

在企业内部,资产专用性既不增强也不削弱其所有者谈判力基础。真正决定它们谈判力的是要素自身对企业的重要性。对于物质资本来说是它的抵押功能,而对于人力资本来说,是它的稀缺性。各要素谈判力基础的计量是一个博弈的过程,而没有一个首先设定的伦理标准。     

Current Accounts and Coordination of Wage Bargaining

Open Economies Review - This study provides novel evidence on the impact of labor market institutions on current account dynamics. Our results suggest that a high degree of coordination of wage...     

Reputation Effects in Bargaining Games

This paper studies reputation effects in a dynamic simultaneous-offer bilateral bargaining game in which one player might have some kind of irrational commitment that compels him to insist on some particular bargaining allocation. It is shown that if this player insists on this allocation, then the bargaining game will end within the first few rounds and he can get an expected payoff close to that allocation. More importantly, the upper bound within which the bargaining game ends does not depend on the relative strength of the two players.     

谈判势力与中间品关税政策研究

中间品国际贸易对全球贸易举足轻重。当前文献聚焦于最终品关税政策的研究,对中间品关税政策的模型研究关注不足。构建拥有一体化企业和中间品生产企业的D国和拥有依赖中间品进口才能完成生产的最终品生产企业的F国在第三国市场开展产量竞争的博弈模型,分析企业同时或先后进入市场时中间品生产企业的谈判势力对两国中间品关税政策的影响。研究发现：①无论企业是否同时进入第三国市场,一体化企业所在国家均会选择对中间品选择出口征税干预政策,其社会福利与企业进入顺序相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场或一体化企业与最终品生产企业同时进入市场时,D国社会福利相较于自由贸易时得到优化,当一体化企业先进入市场时,D国社会福利遭到恶化,两国实行的贸易政策陷入“囚徒困境”。②当F国实行贸易干预时,中间品关税政策与企业进入顺序密切相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场时,F国将对中间产品进口征税;当一体化企业先进入市场或双方同时进入市场时,若谈判势力相对较强,F国将实行征税,反之则会实行进口补贴。     

考虑讨价还价和经理能力的有效激励研究

在委托代理理论中,由于委托人与代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化,且他们之间存在着信息不对称、契约不完备等不确定性因素,委托人应对代理人进行有效的激励和引导,使其充分发挥自身的能力,达到企业业绩最优。本文建立了一个动态的经理激励合同设计模型,假设经理在完成第一期任务后,可以与委托人重新谈判,进而对经理的有效激励问题进行了研究。根据计算和分析得出,经理能否得到满意的固定薪酬对经理人的行为选择和企业的长期业绩有重要的影响。     

以比例原则为指导的集体谈判制度构建

集体谈判被认为是以制度方式化解劳动者与资方两大对立阶级矛盾、有序化解劳资冲突的一项伟大的社会发明。这项制度在中国转化为集体协商,但实际效果差强人意。深究之,有集体协商截取了集体谈判的部分功能、制度不完整的创制因素,也有对集体谈判的内涵、价值和机理阐述探讨不足的原因,为此,笔者运用比例原则作为分析工具对集体谈判进行了阐释,揭示了劳资双方围绕经济利益进行博弈的原则、规程,在此基础上提出了构建集体谈判制度的系统思考。     

Financial Management, Bargaining and Efficiency within the Household; an Empirical Analysis

This paper analyzes data from the British Household Panel Survey on households' financial management and financial decision-making. Direct subjective information was collected by asking questions like ‘Who has the final say in big financial decisions?’. All questions were answered separately by both partners. We consider two competing models explaining how finances are organized. The first model is based on a household production approach, in which behaviour is determined by an efficient allocation of both partners' time to market work, financial management, and leisure. In the second model, which is game-theoretic in nature, financial management is a reflection of bargaining power. The two models have different implications for the effect of explanatory variables, in particular wages, on the dependent variables. Empirical results indicate that financial management is primarily determined by bargaining considerations.     

A Bargaining Model of Auditor Reporting*

In this paper, I demonstrate that the quasi-rents earned in audits undermine an auditor's independence By considering the incentives of the auditor and the client and the interaction between them, I conclude that auditor will maintain his or her independence if the firm-specific quasi-rents are zero, but compromise his or her independence if the quasi-rents are positive. The extent of the compromise is an increasing function of the quasi-rents, since the auditor will propose that a higher value be reported in the financial statements when the quasi-rents increase. I also show that disputes between the auditor and the client increase as the scope for errors for an auditor's test increases. When the error scope is large, the client becomes more aggressive in preparing a proposal while the auditor becomes more cautious.     

On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

It has frequently been noted in the wage bargaining literature that increasing average labour taxes may in fact be over-shifted in the pre-tax wage that is negotiated between unions and firms, raising workers post-tax wages. In this paper, we study the precise conditions for such tax over-shifting to occur under both Nash and Right-To-Manage bargaining structures, and considering both competitive and imperfectly competitive output market conditions. In the case of competitive output markets, we derive and interpret the conditions for over-shifting to occur and show that they hold for an entire class of commonly used production functions. Moreover, under monopolistically competitive output markets we show that tax over-shifting will occur when the firm has sufficient market power. The conditions on the production function, that were necessary and sufficient for tax over-shifting to occur under perfect competition, are shown to be no longer necessary. These findings hold for all bargaining structures considered.

论国际商事合同中仲裁条款的转让

本文探讨国际商事合同转让情况下,合同中包含的国际商事仲裁条款是否随之转让的问题。本文首先分析被用来排斥仲裁条款转让的仲裁条款独立性理论;其次,探讨了仲裁条款独立性与仲裁条款转让的关系,提出仲裁条款独立性是相对的独立,其与仲裁条款转让具有同一性;再次,分析并阐述了国际商事合同发生转让后,仲裁条款也随之移转。最后,笔者立足于中国现行法律框架分析国际商事仲裁条款转让在中国的现状以及提出自己观点。