Investor Sentiment and the Closed‐end Fund Puzzle: Out‐of‐sample Evidence

In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed‐end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out‐of‐sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998) , who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

Closed-End Fund Expenses and Investment Selection

Investment returns on closed‐end funds are highly volatile. Because expenses have a definite negative impact on closed‐end fund returns, investors should include the expense ratio as a criterion for fund selection in addition to performance, investment objective, and risk of the fund. This paper constructs a model of the expense ratio of closed‐end funds to explain cross‐sectional differences in the expense ratios for the period between 1989–1996. We relate closed‐end fund expenses to fund characteristics and identify the factors that can help investors choose low expense closed‐end funds.     

Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed-End Funds

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed-end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.     

Sentiment Metrics and Investor Demand

Recent work suggests that sentiment traders shift from safer to more speculative stocks when sentiment increases. Exploiting these cross‐sectional patterns and changes in share ownership, we find that sentiment metrics capture institutional rather than individual investors’ demand shocks. We investigate the underlying economic mechanisms and find that common institutional investment styles (e.g., risk management, momentum trading) explain a significant portion of the relation between institutions and sentiment.     

Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure

This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment‐induced biases in expectations. Proxying for sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, we show that during low‐sentiment periods, managers increase forecasts to “walk up” current estimates of future earnings over long horizons. In contrast, during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long‐horizon forecasting activity. Further, while there is an association between sentiment and the biases in analysts' estimates of future earnings, management disclosures vary with sentiment even after controlling for analyst pessimism, indicating that managers attempt to communicate with investors at large, and not just analysts. Our study provides evidence that firms' long‐horizon disclosure choices reflect managers' desire to maintain optimistic earnings valuations.     

Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.     

Investor Sentiment and REIT Returns

Recent advances in the field of behavioral finance have given a fillip to the use of behavioral factors in asset pricing models. This study adds to the understanding of the REIT return generating process by exploring the behavioral impact of investor sentiment on REIT returns. The results show that when investors are optimistic (pessimistic), REIT returns become higher (lower). These findings are robust when conventional control variables are considered. Empirical analysis indicates steady erosion in the importance of the default and term structure interest rate variables previously considered as important determinants of REIT returns. Previous noise trading papers that consider the impact of institutional traders conclude that institutional investors cannot arbitrage away noise trader risk. The results of this paper find an exception in the case of small REITs. Examination of REITs based on size reveals that the return generating process of small REITs differs from that of mid-size and large REITs. Analysis of the return generating process by performance shows high performance REITs are more sensitive to the independent variables in the model as compared to the low and mid performance REITs.     

Investor Sentiment and Option Prices

This paper examines whether investor sentiment about the stockmarket affects prices of the S&P 500 options. The findingsreveal that the index option volatility smile is steeper (flatter)and the risk-neutral skewness of monthly index return is more(less) negative when market sentiment becomes more bearish (bullish).These significant relations are robust and become stronger whenthere are more impediments to arbitrage in index options. Theycannot be explained by rational perfect-market-based optionpricing models. Changes in investor sentiment help explain timevariation in the slope of index option smile and risk-neutralskewness beyond factors suggested by the current models.     

International Investment Restrictions and Closed-End Country Fund Prices

Some closed-end country funds trade at large premiums relative to their net asset values. This paper examines whether international investment restrictions raise country fund price-net asset value ratios by segmenting international capital markets. We test whether a relation exists between announcements of changes in investment restrictions and changes in these ratios using weekly data from May 1981 to January 1989. The results provide evidence that some foreign markets are at least partially segmented from the U.S. capital market.     

Closed-End Fund Discounts with Informed Ownership Differential

We develop a multiasset trading model to examine the closed-end fund discount. The model shows that the discount can arise if the quality of private information in the underlying assets is sufficiently better than in the fund. The model also indicates that a discount (premium) can arise if the excessive volatility of the fund dominates (is dominated by) the fund's diversification benefit. Moreover, the model predicts a negative relation between the discount and the institutional ownership differential, as arbitrageurs prefer funds with large discounts. Using a sample of U.S. equity closed-end funds, we test these predictions and find supporting evidence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G10, G12, G14.     

Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements

Using a database of more than 1.85 million retail investor transactions over 1991–1996, we show that these trades are systematically correlated—that is, individuals buy (or sell) stocks in concert. Moreover, consistent with noise trader models, we find that systematic retail trading explains return comovements for stocks with high retail concentration (i.e., small‐cap, value, lower institutional ownership, and lower‐priced stocks), especially if these stocks are also costly to arbitrage. Macroeconomic news and analyst earnings forecast revisions do not explain these results. Collectively, our findings support a role for investor sentiment in the formation of returns.     

Investor Reaction to Salient News in Closed-End Country Funds

We use panel data on prices and net asset values to test whether dramatic country-specific news affects the response of closed-end country fund prices to asset value. In a typical week, prices underreact to changes in fundamentals; the (short-run) elasticity of price with respect to asset value is significantly less than one. In weeks with news appearing on the front page of The New York Times , prices react much more; the elasticity of price with respect to asset value is closer to one. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that news events lead some investors to react more quickly.     

Evidence on the Mean-Reverting Tendencies of Closed-End Fund Discounts

Closed‐end fund (CEF) discounts vary widely over time due to changes in share price, net asset value (NAV), or both. Prior studies suggest discounts are mean‐reverting. We examine the mean‐reversion issue by employing cointegration procedures. Specifically, we identify bond and equity CEFs that exhibit stationary time‐series properties and find statistically significant error correction terms that quantify the speed of mean reversion. The results indicate that mean reversion is caused by changes in both share price and NAVs. However, CEFs can only provide excess returns when the discount narrows due to share price increases.     

Positive Feedback Trading and Investor Sentiment

This article examines how investor sentiment affects positive feedback trading behavior. By analyzing the daily closing total return of CSI 300 index and its individual returns of stocks, we find that relatively high or low sentiment induces active positive feedback trading. With a specific indicator of sentiment, we explain the microstructure setting of the relationship between positive feedback trading and sentiment. We adopt the classical feedback model from Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) to measure positive feedback trading behavior. By adding sentiment factor to the model, we successfully explain how sentiment influences the behavior of both feedback traders and rational investors. The empirical findings suggest that positive feedback traders are more likely to trade when the prices of most securities move forward together. When the sentiment of feedback traders is at an intermediate level, the feedback trading behavior is insignificant.     

Market Response to Investor Sentiment

This paper reconsiders the effect of investor sentiment on stock prices. Our main contribution is that, in addition to the intermediate term return predictability, we also analyze the immediate price reaction to the publication of survey‐based investor sentiment indicators. We find that the sign of the immediate market response is the same as that of the predictability at intermediate time horizons. This is consistent with underreaction to cash flow news or with investor sentiment being related to mispricing. It is inconsistent with the alternative explanations of a rational response to cash flow news or sentiment indicators providing information about future expected returns.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

We study how investor sentiment affects the cross‐section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning‐of‐period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non‐dividend‐paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.