How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.     

RISK DIFFERENCES AND FINANCIAL REPORTING

Financial leverage as reported by a consolidated financial statement may differ substantially from leverage for the parent company. To assess the financial risk for the parent (not the consolidated entity), employing consolidated data is hazardous; the problem is magnified by the fact that virtually all firms report only consolidated data. Consolidated leverage almost always equals or exceeds parent leverage for a wholly owned subsidiary, and many firms reporting only consolidated data have betas significantly greater than otherwise comparable firms that report both consolidated and parent company information.     

CAPTIVE FINANCE SUBSIDIARIES: OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS

A captive finance company is a wholly owned subsidiary whose primary business is to finance the sales of the parent's products and services. Despite the continued growth and long history of captive finance companies, the issue of the economic impact of forming a captive remains controversial. Some view captive finance subsidiaries as unnecessary structures that may actually reduce the value of the firm. Others hold that captives can produce benefits that will increase firm value. The primary purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the finance academic literature and to suggest direction for future research.     

PERSONAL TAXES,INFLATION AND MARKET VALUATION

In an inflation-non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation results in a “bracket-creep” effect that reduces the demand for corporate debt while the tax-deductibility of nominal interest makes the use of debt financing cheaper. The interactive effect of inflation and differential dividend and capital gains taxes on the value of a levered firm is analyzed in this paper. Under a non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation decreases the value of the unlevered firm but the effect of inflation on the firm's debt-to-asset ratio is theoretically indeterminate. The gain from leverage is also derived and compared with other valuation models.     

The Gap between the Theory and Practice of Corporate Valuation: Survey of European Experts

The valuation of companies or their assets is at the heart of most financing and investment decisions. Over the last five decades, academics have developed several simple and sophisticated models for corporate valuation. Yet valuation estimates of a firm or its assets appear to vary widely among practitioners. It is unclear whether these differences arise from practitioners' use of different valuation models or from differences in their assumptions about the inputs used in those models. To provide some insights into this issue, the authors recently surveyed 365 European finance practitioners with CFAs or equivalent professional degrees. They find that almost all survey respondents use the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model (along with some version of Relative Valuation that relies on the use of “comparables”). But the estimation methods of such practitioners for almost all inputs in the DCF model, including beta, the equity market risk premium, leverage, cost of debt, and terminal value, vary widely. This can be a serious problem because even small differences in inputs can cause huge variations in valuations. Such differences arise primarily because theory provides little guidance on how to estimate parameters, leaving practitioners to make their own assumptions and judgments. In sum, the authors' findings suggest that the process of estimating valuation parameters can be as important as the choice of the valuation model itself, and requires the serious attention of academics and practitioners. The authors recommend that key valuation parameter estimates be disclosed in financial and valuation reports. Their findings are also relevant to policy makers because the concept of “fair value” plays such a central role in post‐crisis regulation.     

Option Valuation with Systematic Stochastic Volatility

We use an extension of the equilibrium framework of Rubinstein ( 1976 ) and Brennan ( 1979 ) to derive an option valuation formula when the stock return volatility is both stochastic and systematic. Our formula incorporates a stochastic volatility process as well as a stochastic interest rate process in the valuation of options. If the “mean,” volatility, and “covariance” processes for the stock return and the consumption growth are predictable, our option valuation formula can be written in “preference-free” form. Further, many popular option valuation formulae in the literature can be written as special cases of our general formula.     

The “home bias” of corporate subsidiary locations

Analyzing hand-collected data on the corporate subsidiary locations of all publicly listed firms in China, we find that “hometown firms,” firms headquartered in the hometown of the key political leaders of the province, set up more subsidiaries in their home provinces. This effect is stronger for hometown firms that are non-state owned or without political connections, and more prominent in a political turnover year and the previous year. After a hometown firm sets up more subsidiaries in a key political leader's home province, the firm will enjoy more preferential government policies such as those related to subsidies and taxes. We find evidence consistent with the positive externalities of these subsidiaries for other firms in the cities where they reside, i.e., local firms. The number of these subsidiaries is also positively associated with the local employment rate. Various causality tests and robustness checks confirm the validity of our results. Our results provide some of the first evidence on the importance of corporate subsidiary locations, showing political geography significantly influences corporate geography.     

Financial Distress in the Great Depression

We use firm‐level data to study corporate performance during the Great Depression era for all industrial firms on the NYSE. Our goal is to identify the factors that contribute to business insolvency and valuation changes during the period 1928‐1938. We find that firms with more debt and lower bond ratings in 1928 became financially distressed more frequently during the Depression, consistent with the trade‐off theory of leverage and the information production role of credit rating agencies. We also document for the first time that firms responded to tax incentives to use debt during the Depression era but that the extra debt used in response to this tax‐driven “debt bias” did not contribute significantly to the occurrence of distress. Finally, we conduct an out‐of‐sample test during the recent 2008‐2009 Recession and find that higher leverage and lower bond ratings also increased the occurrence of financial distress during this period.     

Entry Mode Choice and Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese FDI in China

This paper examines entry mode choices between wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) and joint ventures (JVs) and the impact on performance for Taiwanese foreign direct investment in China. Taiwan and China share common cultural traits, so Taiwanese investors inherently prefer WOSs because these investors are acquainted with local conditions in China. This paper shows that even if WOSs are a natural choice, transaction cost theory is applicable in explaining the adoption of JVs by Taiwanese firms when investing in China. Firms that choose WOSs generally have higher sales growth and superior profitability. However, the smaller the subsidiary and the less experienced the firm, the more likely that JVs will have better performance.     

Specification and estimation of discrete time quadratic stochastic volatility models

I propose a new class of stochastic volatility models that nests the commonly used log normal autoregressive specification. As with the eigenfunction specification of Meddahi (Meddahi, Nour, 2001. An eigenfunction approach for volatility modeling. Unpublished.), the log-quadratic model can generate high kurtosis, a key feature of asset returns, even with Gaussian innovations. I discuss maximum likelihood estimation based on numerical integration of the log-quadratic specification that allows for leverage effects. A small Monte Carlo simulation experiment demonstrates the feasibility of maximum likelihood estimation and the importance of allowing for leverage effects. I fit the log-quadratic specification to the daily S&P 500 index return series and find that it provides a better fit than the commonly used log autoregressive specification with Gaussian and Student-t mean equation innovations.     

Political risk and international valuation

Measuring the impact of political risk on investment projects is one of the most vexing issues in international business. One popular approach is to assume that the sovereign yield spread captures political risk and to augment the project discount rate by this spread. We show that this approach is flawed. While the sovereign spread is influenced by political risk, it also reflects other risks that are likely included in the valuation analysis — leading to the double counting of risks. We propose to use “political risk spreads” to undo the double counting in the evaluation of international investment projects.     

Financial Intermediary Versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution Systems and Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies

An examination of the efficiency of the marketing distribution channel and organizational structure for insurance companies is presented from a framework that views the insurer as a financial intermediary rather than as a “production entity” which produces “value added” through loss payments. Within this financial intermediary approach, solvency can be a primary concern for regulators of insurance companies, claims‐paying ability can be a primary concern for policyholders, and return on investment can be a primary concern for investors. These three variables (solvency, financial return, and claims‐paying ability) are considered as outputs of the insurance firm. The financial intermediary approach acknowledges that interests potentially conflict, and the strategic decision makers for the firm must balance one concern versus another when managing the insurance company. Accordingly, we investigate the efficiency of insurance companies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) having as insurer output an appropriately selected (for the firm under investigation) combination of solvency, claims‐paying ability, and return on investment as outputs. These efficiency evaluations are further examined to study stock versus mutual form of organizational structure and agency versus direct marketing arrangements, which are examined separately and in combination. Comparisons with the “value‐added” or “production” approach to insurer efficiency are presented. A new DEA approach and interpretation is also presented.     

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program—one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework—can be a source of long‐run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a “macro” or company‐wide level and a “micro” or business‐unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are “owned,” and risk‐return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects—information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk‐return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk‐adjusted levels of “imputed” capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk “appetite,” measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit “non‐core” exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the “information‐intensive, insurance‐ specific” risks at the core of its business and competencies.     

Double leverage cycle,interest rate,and financial crisis

We view mortgage as a risky derivative of its underlying house collateral and combine no-arbitrage valuation with equilibrium valuation approaches to develop a dynamic model of leverage cycle and interest rate. This model provides a unified explanation to pro-cyclical optimism, asset prices, and leverage, and counter-cyclical volatility and interest rate. In addition, the model shows that tightening funding margin in the mortgage securities market dampens optimism, asset prices, and leverage, whereas it raises volatility and interest rate in the housing market. A double leverage cycle leads to more volatile markets and a severe leverage cycle, thus resulting in worse financial crises.     

What Does the CAPM Say About Operating Leverage?

We examine the issue of operating leverage and firm value. Johnstone (2020), in this issue, questions existing results which indicate that higher operating leverage results in lower firm value. We agree with Johnstone (2020) that this result is to be questioned and present a number of arguments which indicate that operating leverage is irrelevant to the valuation of the firm in the context of the CAPM model.     

The Net Benefits to Leverage

I estimate the market's valuation of the net benefits to leverage using panel data from 1994 to 2004, identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The median firm captures net benefits of up to 5.5% of firm value. Small and profitable firms have high optimal leverage ratios, as predicted by theory, but in contrast to existing empirical evidence. Companies are on average slightly underlevered relative to the optimal leverage ratio at refinancing. This result is mainly due to zero leverage firms. I also look at implications for financial policy.     

SOME ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION ON THE VALUATION AND LEVERAGE OF USA FIRMS: ESTIMATES FROM 1972 DATA

This paper estimates the effect of corporate diversification on market valuation and leverage. Using a data base which allows one to determine the product lines of companies on the 3-digit S.I.C. code level, a set of multi-industry firms was chosen. For each of these diversified firms, a portfolio of single industry firms was constructed which matched the component parts of the multi- industry firm. Tests showed that although diversified firms employ significantly greater financial leverage, their relative market value is significantly less than that of the matching portfolios of single industry firms with which they com- pete. This study does not support the view that corporate diversification creates synergistic benefits which can be translated into increased market value of the firm's securities.     

"Marking-to-Market" and Treasury-Bill Futures Prices: Some Empirical Evidence

Financial economists have not found empirical evidence of a “marking‐to‐market” effect in Treasury‐bill futures contracts, despite a firm theoretical basis for its existence. Therefore, we speculate that confounding effects, possibly due to liquidity preferences, influence futures‐forward price spreads. By using an empirical specification that allows for both effects, we present empirical evidence that Treasury‐bill futures‐forward price spreads are sensitive to the volatility of the underlying commodity in ways predicted by the theory of the marking‐to‐market effect.     

Valuation in Emerging Markets: A Simulation Approach

Most of the foundations of valuation theory have been designed for use in developed markets. Because of the greater, and in some cases different, risks associated with emerging markets (although recent experience might suggest otherwise), investors and corporate managers are often uncomfortable using traditional methods. The typical way of capturing emerging-market risks is to increase the discount rate in the standard valuation model. But, as the authors argue, such adjustments have the effect of undermining some of the basic assumptions of the CAPM-based discounted cash flow model. The standard theory of capital budgeting suggests that estimates of unconditional expected cash flows should be discounted at CAPM discount rates (or betas) that reflect only “systematic,” or “nondiversifiable,” market-wide risks. In practice, however, analysts tend to take what are really estimates of “conditional” expected cash flows—that is, conditional on the firm or its country avoiding a crisis—and discount them at higher rates that reflect not only systematic risks, but diversifiable risks that typically involve a higher probability of crisis-driven costs of default. But there is almost no basis in theory for the size of the increases in discount rates. In this article, the authors propose that analysts in emerging markets avoid this discount rate problem by using simulation techniques to capture emerging-market risks in their estimates of unconditional expected cash flows—in other words, estimates that directly incorporate the possibility of an emerging-market crisis and its consequences. Having produced such estimates, analysts can then discount them using the standard Global CAPM.