TIME-SERIES PROPERTIES OF THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

In this paper we use time-series models to investigate the presence of autoregression, random variation, and random walk movements of historic equity risk premiums. An autoregressive risk premium is found for 1926–58, but random variation around a much lower risk premium mean is found for 1959–90. This finding is not sensitive to holding-period length, the choice of the risk-free rate proxy, or January/July seasonal effects.     

GLOBAL EVIDENCE ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

The size of the equity risk premium—the incremental return that shareholders require to hold risky equities rather than risk-free securities—is a key issue in corporate finance. Financial economists generally measure the equity premium over long periods of time in order to obtain reliable estimates. These estimates are widely used by investors, finance professionals, corporate executives, regulators, lawyers, and consultants. But because the 20th century proved to be a period of such remarkable growth in the U.S. economy, estimates of the risk premium that rely on past market performance may be too high to serve as a reliable guide to the future.
The authors analyze a 103-year history of risk premiums in 16 countries and conclude that the U.S. risk premium relative to Treasury bills was 5.3% for that period—lower than previous studies suggest—as compared to 4.2% for the U.K. and 4.5% for a world index. But the article goes on to observe that the historical record may still overstate expectations of the future risk premium, partly because market volatility in the future may be lower than in the past, and partly because of a general decline in risk resulting from new technological advances and increased diversification opportunities for investors. After adjusting for the expected impact of these factors, the authors calculate forward-looking equity risk premiums of 4.3% for the U.S., 3.9% for the U.K., and 3.5% for the world index. At the same time, however, they caution that the risk premium can fluctuate over time and that managers should make appropriate adjustments when there are compelling economic reasons to think that expected premiums are unusually high or low.     

DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECTS: A TEST OF THE INFORMATION TIMING HYPOTHESIS

Many explanations have been offered for the negative Monday effect. An obvious conjecture is that the negative return might be due to firms timing the release of information after the market closes on Friday. We test this conjecture on a sample of 233 firms for 1986. Using a firm's board meeting date as a proxy for high information days we find that a firm's Monday return near a board meeting date is more likely to be negative than other Monday returns. Also the remaining days of the week tend to be more positive than similar days further away from the board meeting. Our results appear to explain part of the negative Monday effect.     

ON THE NEGATIVE RISK PREMIUM FOR RISK ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATES: A REPLY

This short paper shows that the results of Professor Booth's application of the Time State Preference framework to the negative risk premium problem are in fact consistent with the analysis presented in Berry and Dyson (1980). Professor Booth's criticisms of this earlier paper are thereby shown to be invalid. Some further comments are then offered about the phenomenon of negative risk premia.     

ON THE NEGATIVE RISK PREMIUM FOR RISK ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATES: A COMMENT AND EXTENSION

This paper develops conditions necessary for negative risk premia to emerge at the market level, and at the individual level in imperfect markets. It also correctly shows how to discount cash outflows. The model used to integrate these topics is the state-preference model of security valuation; the most general model available. The paper corrects serious errors contained in recent work published in the journal.     

A TEST OF THE EASTERBROOK HYPOTHESIS REGARDING DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS

Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payments may be an ambiguous signal unless the market can distinguish growing firms from disinvesting firms. Shares of growing firms that announce both financing and dividend increases are predicted to rise more in value than shares of firms announcing a dividend increase alone. We examine the relation between prior financing activity and the market response to initial dividends and find evidence consistent with the Easterbrook agency cost model.     

TIME VARYING RISK PREMIUM AND THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE AUSTRALIAN TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES

Using weekly data on bank accepted bills over the 1976 to 1993 period, this paper provides direct evidence of the presence of a term premium in the Australian term structure. The term premium is shown to vary over time and have an adverse effect on the predictive power of the term structure. The variance of the expected term premium is quantified in terms of its lower bound relative to the upper bound of the variance of the rational expectations error. This ratio is observed to vary over sample sub periods and rise to a high of one in some periods which include the period immediately prior to the market crash.     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PROXY HYPOTHESIS

In this study we examine whether the proxy hypothesis can explain the puzzling negative relation between real stock returns and expected inflation. Our study improves upon previous tests that suffer from model misspecification and are incomplete. With correctly specified models, we provide a comprehensive test using data from four major industrialized nations during the period of floating exchange rates. Results do not support the proxy hypothesis.     

ESTIMATING THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM AND EQUITY COSTS: NEW WAYS OF LOOKING AT OLD DATA

This article examines three alternative ways of estimating the expected return on the equity market in using the CAPM or some other risk premium model. The three techniques are (1) direct estimation of the average nominal equity return for use as a forecast nominal equity return; (2) estimation of the average real equity return, which can then be added to a forecast inflation rate; and (3) estimation of an average equity risk premium, which is then added to a current risk-free rate. Ibbotson and Sinquefeld's data on annual holding period returns are used to test the validity of their assumption that the equity risk premium follows a random walk and that the third of these approaches is thus the best method.
The paper reaches three major conclusions. First, each of these three techniques involves a bias of some kind. The use of average equity returns as a forecast is subject to risk-free rate and inflation rate biases, while the use of an average equity risk premium is subject to a term premium bias. As a result, only the data can tell us which approach is best. Second, from analyzing equity and bond return data and the trend in interest rates, the author concludes that the term premium bias when using average historic equity risk premium is by far the largest of the three sources of bias. Indeed, the popular practice of adding an historic average equity risk premium to the 30-year Treasury bond rate significantly overstates equity costs. Third, after examining equity rates of return back to 1871, the author concludes that the real equity return seems to follow a process that is close to a random walk and is thus the best of the three techniques to use as a naive forecast.     

THE REINSURANCE DECISION IN LIFE INSURANCE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RISK-BEARING HYPOTHESIS

Several explanations have been advanced in the financial economics literature to explain the reinsurance decision in insurance firms. Prominent amongst these is the risk-bearing hypothesis which holds that reinsurance is motivated by the ability of residual claimants to effectively hedge against operational risk. Since the efficiency of risk-bearing is influenced by organisational factors, such as ownership structure and firm size, the amount of reinsurance should also vary according to the characteristics of insurance firms. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that reinsurance is related to firm-specific factors. Using 1988–1993 data gathered from New Zealand's life insurance industry, a fixed-effects covariance regression model is estimated. Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that reinsurance is associated with smaller and more highly leveraged life insurance entities, and companies with greater underwriting risk. However, contrary to predictions, it also appears that it is stocks and companies with diversified production that tend to reinsure. The risk-bearing hypothesis thus receives only partial support.