知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励

本文构建了一个扩展的具有自主创新的南北产品周期模型,讨论了知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体影响。本文发现,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体效应依赖于南方的初始技能劳动水平和北方创新性质导致的市场结构。在垂直创新的寡头市场,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新没有激励效应,它对南北双方都造成伤害;在水平创新的垄断竞争市场,当南方技能劳动短缺时,严格知识产权保护在短期有利于南北双方,但并不激励南方自主创新。当南方技能劳动充裕时,适度的知识产权保护会激励南方的自主创新,并在长期对南北双方都有利。研究发现,南方存在一个最优知识产权保护强度,其依赖南方的技能水平以及市场的竞争程度。     

Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights: A Note on Helpman's Model

This note analyses the effect of the policy of tightening Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on the rate of innovation in the North and on the welfare in both North and South in a model which is otherwise identical to Helpman (1993) except in the concept of knowledge capital. We assume that the South based imitated products do not contribute to the knowledge capital in the North. It is shown that the tightening of IPR raises the rate of innovation in the North and may improve the welfare of both North and South. These results are significantly different from those in Helpman (1993).     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

Economies of Scale, International Capital Mobility, and North-South Inequality

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with a continuum of goods, external economies of scale and international capital mobility. The North-South wage gap must exceed any difference in labor quality for South to overcome the established external economies in North. In equilibrium North retains the goods with the largest external economies and South specializes in the remaining goods. While Northern product innovation leads to the production of additional goods in South, it is possible for South to experience a terms-of-trade deterioration, a reduction in foreign investment, and an increase in wage and income inequality.     

A tale of two countries: Directed technical change,trade and migratory movements

We propose a North-South model that reconciles trade and production strategies, flows of innovators and the path of economic divergence, or convergence, between countries. We explain the mechanisms behind these forces and show how the technological and economic gaps can be reversed if southern countries stop imitating northern goods and, instead, produce complementary goods. Such a strategy of complementarity on production yields the necessary incentives to innovators to engage in research in southern countries, which enhances the catching-up process between countries. It is also shown that migratory movements of unskilled labor between countries are also relevant to understand the dangers and benefits of different trade strategies for economic growth. This paper suggests a positive (negative) correlation between technological innovation in the North (South) and the level of substitutability in production, while under complementarity, technological innovation catches up in the South, therefore fostering the economic catching up process. A positive correlation between inflows of skilled and unskilled labor and substitutability of production between countries is also verified.     

Patent Enforcement, Innovation and Welfare

This paper analyzes how the Southern patent enforcement affects the Northern firm's choice of licensing, subsidiary production or exports for serving the Southern market, and the innovation rate in the North and ultimately the welfare in the South. We show that for imperfect patent enforcement, licensing contract leads to more innovation in the North relative to subsidiary or exports. When both subsidiary and exports are very costly options, no patent enforcement in the South is best for the South. However, when either subsidiary operation or exports can be organized cheaply, the Southern government chooses some positive degree of patent enforcement. We also establish that strengthening of patent enforcement in the South may lead to more licensing and less subsidiary operations or exports.     

A welfare analysis of global patent protection in a model with endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment

This paper constructs a North–South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms, and examines analytically how strengthening patent protection in the South affects welfare in the South. Strengthening patent protection increases the South's welfare by enhancing innovation and FDI, but it also allows the firms with patents to charge higher prices for their goods, which decreases welfare. However, the model shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect. Moreover, introducing the strictest form of patent protection in the South, that is, harmonizing patent protection in the South with that in the North, may maximize welfare in the South as well as in the North. Further, a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model.     

Globalization,socio-institutional factors and North–South knowledge diffusion: Role of India and China as Southern growth progenitors

Nexus between income inequality and technology capture is explored in a global CGE model to explore the ricochet effect of technology transmission and its capture. In particular, the model shows that exogenous technology shock from developed North, vehicled via trade, transmits to developing Souths and induces productivity growth. This spillover capture, aided by human capital based adoptive capability, better governance and institution, causes increase in income and welfare and subsequently, leads to decline in income inequality. Dynamism of Southern Engines of Growth – India and China – caused them to emerge as ‘core’ South. Thus, triangular innovation diffusion between dynamic and peripheral South is also simulated to show how the backward or peripheral South could catch up via South–South Cooperation in a declining North–South trends in trade. This accrual of benefits could lead to sustained productivity growth and consequential relief of incidence of poverty in low-income countries.     

International Transmission of Government Spending,Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade

This paper utilises a North–South general equilibrium model where South exports an intermediate good to North in exchange for differentiated goods. The model is used to examine international transmission of government spending and its welfare implications. It is shown that an increase in government spending in North (South) can increase (decrease) the number of differentiated goods produced, thereby decreasing (increasing) the degree of monopoly power in North. Furthermore an increase in government spending in South can decrease the welfare North, but the impact of an increase in government spending in North the welfare of South cannot be unambiguously determined. [F11, H41]     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

Imported technologies,urban unemployment and the North-South dialogue

This paper extends the Harris-Todaro model with intersectoral capital mobility to include sector specific imported technologies. Technologies are assumed to be embodied in imported capital goods. The small economy in the South, for which the model is defined, can import any amount of these technologies from the North at given royalty rates. We find that if the North agrees to reduce the royalty rate on the industrial technology, both the level and the rate of urban unemployment would rise and the income distribution change against the wage earners, whereas such a reduction for the agricultural technology would have just the opposite effects. A decrease in either royalty rate would increase the national income in the South, although the magnitude of the increase in income would be larger with reduced royalty rate for agricultural rather than industrial technology. The policy implication is that the South should emphasize the import of agricultural technology over the industrial technology.     

How and where to offshore: a productivity comparison at the firm level

Using recent survey data on South Korean firms’ strategies for sourcing intermediate goods from abroad, we investigate whether there exists a productivity premium of offshoring by considering organizational forms (insourcing versus outsourcing) and the income level of offshored countries (North versus South) altogether. Thus, we consider the following four offshoring types: outsourcing from South, insourcing from South, outsourcing from North and insourcing from North. Unlike previous studies, we give particular attention to the comparison between outsourcing from North and insourcing from South and find that firms outsourcing from North are more productive than firms sourcing from their own affiliates in South. We offer three critical conditions to incorporate our empirical findings into the standard firm heterogeneity model: the fixed cost is higher for insourcing than for outsourcing and is higher in North than in South, the headquarters receive a larger share of the final revenue through insourcing than through outsourcing, and sourcing from North guarantees better profitability (or a bigger share) in the market for the headquarters than sourcing from South. Thus, this article contributes to the literature by identifying a new productivity order.     

Innovation,imitation and multinationalisation in a North–South model: a theoretical note

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium product variety model of international product cycle with endogenous rate of imitation in the South; and find that a policy of strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South lowers the rate of product innovation, rate of multinationalisation and South–North relative wage if multinationalisation [or, foreign direct investment (FDI)] is the channel of production transfer. These results are significantly different from those obtained in the exogenous imitation model of Lai (J Dev Econ 55(1): 133–153, 1998). So a stronger IPR protection policy adopted by the South may not be interpreted as an incentive to encourage Northern FDI in the South and to raise the rate of innovation in the North.      

Endogenous Imitation and Technology Absorption in a Model of North–South Trade

Abstract

This paper considers the transfer of technology from the North to the South that occurs through trade in high-technology goods and explicitly models the ‘reverse-engineering’ process that allows the South to assimilate new technologies. A key finding of this study is that the South's rate of growth is dictated by the size of the country's human capital, which determines its absorptive capacity and its ability to assimilate knowledge from the North. We find that while a Southern country that is poor in human capital can only imitate, Southern countries that possess sufficiently large human capital endowments, beyond a certain threshold, signal the onset of innovation. We also find that the North enjoys a higher rate of innovation and growth with trade than without. North's gains are the highest when it trades with a human-capital ‘poor’ South, because imitation increases South's demand for Northern intermediates. But trade with the Southern countries that are human capital rich (and therefore involved in innovation), dampens their demand for Northern imports, adversely affecting North's growth. The model predicts growth convergence between the North and a South that is well passed the threshold for innovation.     

Outsourcing and Wage Inequality in a Dynamic Product Cycle Model

This paper constructs a dynamic North–South trade model with outsourcing and endogenous innovation. Production of high quality goods is first performed in the North (Northern phase), then split between the North and the South (Outsourcing phase), and finally shifted to the South (Southern phase). This cycle is reignited whenever a Northern firm innovates a higher quality product. We find that an increase in the fraction of outsourced production raises the Northern skill premium unambiguously, while raising the Southern skill premium if and only if the skill intensity of outsourced production is higher than that of local Southern production.     

Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Product‐cycle Model of Skills Accumulation

This paper examines the effects of stronger intellectual property rights protection in the South based on a North–South general‐equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI). Two types of innovation are considered – innovation targeting all products and innovation targeting only imitated products. We show that for both types of innovation, there will be increases in the innovation rate and Northern wage inequality and a decrease in the proportion of Northern unskilled labor if imitation intensity is sufficiently low. As regards the pattern of production, the extent of FDI will increase while the extent of Northern production and Southern production will decrease.     

中国区域绿色创新效率演进轨迹及形成机理研究

运用非期望Minds模型和灰色系统动态方程对我国内地7大区域30个省份2012-2017年绿色创新效率时空演进轨迹及其形成机理进行探究。研究发现：我国绿色创新效率整体偏低,还存在较大提升空间,省域之间绿色创新效率不均衡的特征比较明显;我国7大区域绿色创新效率演化发展轨迹存在较强的异质性,华东、西南和华南地区交替领先,西北地区一直垫底;我国七大区域绿色创新系统可持续发展能力由高到低排序为：华南＞华东＞华中＞西南＞华北＞东北＞西北;华中和西北地区绿色创新效率提升的首要阻力在于政府支持不足,华北、东北和华东地区的主要阻力是环境规制,华南和西南地区的主要障碍因素分别是信息化和市场化。     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

Labor Market Integration, Unemployment, and Transfers

Integration of the labor markets between a rich country (North) and a poor country (South) often leads to high unemployment in the South and transfers from North to South; for instance: United States versus Puerto Rico, West versus East Germany, Northern versus Southern Italy. This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which workers finance a transfer to the unemployed in the South in order to limit migration. In addition, it extends the framework to consider: the difference in efficiency between natives and immigrants, taxes on fixed factors in the North with internal transfers, and subsidies to the employed in the South.     

The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies*

We construct a two‐country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product‐cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long‐run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global‐growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.