Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.     

THE EFFECT OF THE 1986 TAX REFORM ACT ON EX-DIVIDEND DAY RETURN BEHAVIOR

In this study I examine whether the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has an effect on ex-date stock return behavior. Results indicate that the tax reform has a significant effect on ex-date returns for NASDAQ stocks, but not for NYSE/AMEX stocks. Further analysis suggests that the ex-date returns on NASDAQ stocks are primarily determined by the tax premium. However, the ex-date returns on NYSE/AMEX stocks are more influenced by short-term trading.     

S&P 500 trading strategies and stock betas

This paper shows that S&P 500 stock betas are overstatedand the non-S&P 500 stock betas are understated becauseof liquidity price effects caused by the S&P 500 tradingstrategies. The daily and weekly betas of stocks added to theS&P 500 index during 1985-1989 increase, on average, by0.211 and 0.130. The difference between monthly betas of otherwisesimilar S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stocks also equals 0.125during this period. Some of these increases can be explainedby the reduced nonsynchroneity of S&P 500 stock prices,but the remaining increases are explained by the price pressureor excess volatility caused by the S&P 500 trading strategies.I estimate that the price pressures account for 8.5 percentof the total variance of daily returns of a value-weighted portfolioof NYSE/AMEX stocks. The negative own autocorrelations in S&P500 index returns and the negative cross autocorrelations betweenS&P 500 stock returns provide further evidence consistentwith the price pressure hypothesis.     

UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES,LIQUIDITY, AND STOCK RETURNS

In this study we examine the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges (UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. Stocks with UTPs trade in a different market structure than stocks listed and traded only on the AMEX and NYSE. Differences in market structure may affect stock returns through liquidity services provided by the competing markets. The sample comprises 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, Pacific, Midwest, or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. The results show significantly positive abnormal returns around the SEC's announcement of a regional exchange's filing for UTPs. The results also suggest that increased competition improves trading liquidity. Only stocks with low liquidity before UTPs announcements experience significantly improved liquidity and positive stock returns.     

The Operating Performance of Firms that Switch Their Stock Listings

In this article we examine the operating performance of stocks that switch from NASDAQ to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the New Stock Exchange (NYSE) and from AMEX to the NYSE. Specifically, we investigate whether post‐listing operating performance is consistent with the reported negative long‐term drift of post‐listing stock returns and whether there is evidence of self‐selection of the listing time. We find evidence of negative post‐listing changes in operating return on assets and sales, which, on a match‐adjusted basis, are significant for the relatively small NASDAQ stocks switching to AMEX. We also find evidence that firms self‐select the time of listing changes.     

A NOTE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF SECURITY RETURNS: A TEST OF STOCK MARKET OVERREACTION AND EFFICIENCY

Researchers have debated stock market efficiency for years and have found several apparent anomalies, among them the overreaction investment strategy. In a sample of virtually all AMEX and NYSE stocks over twenty-one years, it is demonstrated that abnormal returns earned in one year are positively related to the abnormal returns earned in the next year. This evidence is contrary to the overreaction investment philosophy.     

On the Stability of the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns in the Cross‐Section: Understanding the Curious Role of Share Turnover

In this paper, we shed further light on cross‐sectional predictors of stock return performance. Specifically, we explore whether the cross‐section of expected stock returns is robust within stock groups sorted by past monthly return. We find that the book/market and momentum effects are remarkably robust to sorting on past returns. However, share turnover is negatively related to future returns for stocks with abnormally low stock price performance in the recent past, but postively related to returns for well‐performing stocks. This casts doubt on the use of turnover as a liquidity proxy, but is consistent with turnover being a proxy for momentum trading which pushes prices in the direction of past price movements. Our results are robust to both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, and also robust to stratifying the sample by time period.     

Return dispersion and expected returns

This paper proposes a two-factor asset-pricing model that incorporates market return and return dispersion. Consistent with this model, we find that stocks with higher sensitivities to return dispersion have higher average returns, and that return dispersion carries a significant positive price of risk. In particular, the return dispersion factor dominates the book-to-market factor in explaining cross-sectional expected returns. The return dispersion model outperforms the CAPM, MVM, IVM, and FF-3M when using a set of 5×5 test portfolios constructed from NYSE and AMEX stock returns from August 1963 to December 2005. Return dispersion continues to play an important role in explaining the cross-sectional variation of expected returns, even when market volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, size, book-to-market factors, and a momentum factor are included. This study sheds some light on the ability of return dispersion to explain expected returns beyond the standard asset-pricing factors. Our finding suggests that return dispersion captures two dimensions of systematic risk: the business cycle and fundamental economic restructuring.     

Why are stock returns and volatility negatively correlated?

The literature documents that low stock returns are associated with increased volatility, but two competing explanations have proved difficult to disentangle. A negative return increases leverage, making equity value more volatile. However, an increase in volatility that persists causes stock prices to drop. We follow Bekaert and Wu [Bekaert, G., Wu, G., 2000. Asymmetric volatility and risk in equity markets. Review of Financial Studies 13, 1–42.] in controlling for leverage, but distinguish between volatility regimes that persist from less persistent changes using GARCH. For post-World War II returns on the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE stocks, we find that changes in the volatility regime are reflected in stock returns but not in GARCH.     

The Market Reaction to Discontinuing Regular Stock Dividends

This paper investigates the behavior of returns to share-holders of NYSE and AMEX firms that publicly announce the discontinuance of regular stock dividends. Using event-type methodology, the results show that the average abnormal return for NYSE and AMEX firms is negative but not statistically significant on the event date. Partitioning the sample by stock-related characteristics shows that for small firms with low stock prices and low institutional ownership, management's decision to drop regular stock dividends conveys a significantly negative signal, which, in turn, causes stock prices to decline. Firms that drop a stock payment and simultaneously initiate or increase cash dividends experience a significant increase in shareholder wealth. However, firms that drop the stock dividend policy and do not begin a cash dividend policy experience a sharp decline in shareholder wealth.     

EXCHANGE LISTING AND STOCK LIQUIDITY

Two measures are used to estimate the liquidity of stocks that switch their places of trading (from OTC to NYSE, from OTC to AMEX, and from AMEX to NYSE). Using an event-type methodology, results are obtained that indicate a decline in liquidity for stocks leaving the OTC market. Stocks switching from the AMEX to the NYSE experience an initial increase in liquidity, followed by a decline almost to previous levels.     

Stock Splits, Tick Size, and Sponsorship

A traditional explanation for stock splits is that they increase the number of small shareholders who own the stock. A possible reason for the increase is that the minimum bid-ask spread is wider after a split and brokers have more incentive to promote a stock. I document a large number of small buy orders following Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX splits during 1993 to 1994. I also find strong evidence that trading costs increase, and weak evidence that costs of market making decline following splits. This is consistent with splits acting as an incentive to brokers to promote stocks.     

Microstructure and reverse stock splits

In this paper we show that, similar to NYSE/AMEX stocks, NASDAQ stocks exhibit significant ex date returns for reverse stock splits. Although the 10-day cumulative return after the ex date is close to –10%, this does not violate market efficiency, because the average bid-ask spread for the reverse split stock is at least double this return. We also document that these large negative returns are mostly due to a drop in the ask price while bid prices barely change at all. Furthermore, the ex date returns are negatively related to trading volume.These results suggest that there is abnormal selling and a significant buildup of market makers' inventories near the ex date. To reduce the inventory buildup, market makers lower ask prices to induce buying by investors, resulting in the observed negative returns. Lowering bid prices, an alternative strategy for reducing inventories, is not attractive to market makers due to competitive factors and the reduction of commissions associated with a smaller number of transactions. Notably, selling investors have no incentives to sell their stocks early to avoid the observed negative ex date return, since this return is largely an ask price phenomenon and does not represent realized returns to sellers.     

Asymmetric reverting behavior of short-horizon stock returns: An evidence of stock market overreaction

This paper investigates the uneven mean reverting pattern of monthly return indexes of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, using asymmetric non-linear smooth-transition (ANST) GARCH models. It also evaluates the extent to which time-varying volatility in the index returns support the stock market overreaction hypothesis. The models illuminate patterns of asymmetric mean reversion and risk decimation. Between 1926:01 and l997:12, not only did negative returns reverse to positive returns quicker than positive returns reverted to negative ones, but negative returns, in fact, reduced risk premiums from predictable high volatility. The findings support the market overreaction hypotheses. The asymmetry is due to the mispricing behavior on the part of investors who overreact to certain market news. The findings also corroborate arguments for the “contrarian” portfolio strategy.     

Transaction costs and the small firm effect: A comment

Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest large transaction costs may be responsible for the large risk-adjusted returns earned by small firm stocks. This study, using data from the AMEX as well as the NYSE, shows that investors can earn risk-adjusted excess returns after transaction costs by holding small firms for relatively short holding periods. Other literature that provides evidence that is inconsistent with the transaction costs hypothesis is cited.     

A Dividend Payment Effect in Stock Returns

This paper presents evidence for the period 7/62-12/89 that individual NYSE and AMEX stocks provide relatively high average excess returns on the payment dates of quarterly cash dividends and several subsequent trading days. Additional results indicate that returns during the payment period: (a) are not a manifestation of the January, monthly or dividend yield anomalies; (b) are positively related to the stock's dividend yield; and (c) are higher for firms that have dividend reinvestment plans. These findings are consistent with a tendency by stock-holders to reinvest dividend income into the stock of the paying firm, thereby increasing demand for the stock and raising its price. Additional evidence links the returns on these days with (previously-documented) excess returns around the ex-dividend date.     

Dynamic Volume-Return Relation of Individual Stocks

We examine the dynamic relation between return and volume ofindividual stocks. Using a simple model in which investors tradeto share risk or speculate on private information, we show thatreturns generated by risk-sharing trades tend to reverse themselves,while returns generated by speculative trades tend to continuethemselves. We test this theoretical prediction by analyzingthe relation between daily volume and first-order return autocorrelationfor individual stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX. We find thatthe cross-sectional variation in the relation between volumeand return autocorrelation is related to the extent of informedtrading in a manner consistent with the theoretical prediction.     

Information,trading and stock returns: Lessons from dually-listed securities

This paper compares the intra-day patterns on the NYSE and AMEX of volatility, trading volume and bid-ask spreads for European and Japanese dually-listed stocks with American stocks of comparable average trading volume and volatility. It is shown that the intra-day patterns for these stocks are remarkably similar even though public information flows differ markedly across these stocks during the trading day. In the early morning, all stocks have higher volatility than later in the day, but this phenomenon is most pronounced for Japanese stocks and affects American stocks the least. We argue that these patterns are consistent with markets reacting to the overnight accumulation of public information but are inconsistent with the view that early morning volatility can be attributed to monopolistic specialist behavior.     

S&P 500 Cash Stock Price Volatilities

S&P 500 stock return volatilities are compared to the volatilities of a matched set of stocks, after controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm attributes known to affect volatility. No significant difference in volatility is observed between 1975 and 1983—before the start of trade in index futures and index options. Since then, S&P 500 stocks have been relatively more volatile. The difference is statistically, but not economically, significant. The relative increase occurs primarily in daily returns and only to a lesser extent in longer interval returns. Other factors besides the start of derivative trade could be responsible for the small increase in volatility.     

Empirical Analyses of Three Explanations for the Positive Autocorrelation of Short-Horizon Stock Index Returns

This paper provides empirical analyses of three explanations for the observed positive autocorrelation of short-horizon stock index returns, using NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ data. Results indicate that index autocorrelation cannot be substantially explained by either autocorrelated, time-varying expected returns, or nonsynchronous trading. The third explanation for index autocorrelation, the nonsynchronous information transfer hypothesis, states that stocks incorporate market-wide information on a nonsynchronous basis due to information and transaction costs. Evidence from analyses of mean returns on various portfolios following large returns on the S 500 futures contract, as well as regressions of portfolio returns on current and lagged futures returns, support this explanation. Small (large) firms collectively require approximately 7 (1-2) weeks to fully incorporate new market information on average, and this delayed impoundment accounts for the bulk of the observed autocorrelation.