Sinking Funds and the Agency Costs of Corporate Debt

This paper examines whether a firm's sinking fund decision is affected by agency costs. The paper argues that sinking funds can be an effective device to resolve the problems of information asymmetry, risk incentives, and suboptimal investments. Empirical tests are provided. Results show that firms with certain characteristics related to agency problems tend to adopt a sinking fund provision in the bond indenture.     

两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究——来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据

在改进国内学者对债务治理效应实证研究不足的基础之上,我们对深圳证券交易所中小企业板上市的102家公司2004—2006年三年数据共306个观测值进行实证分析发现:(1)我国中小上市公司债务对显性代理成本具有显著抑制作用(表明债务客观上存在一定的治理效应),而对隐性代理成本却无抑制作用或者抑制作用不显著,因此,无法形成债务治理可观测的债务治理财务绩效;(2)短期负债主要抑制显性代理成本,而长期负债主要抑制隐性代理成本。我国中小上市公司债务期限结构极其不平衡是债务治理整体效应不显著的一个重要原因;(3)虽然我国中小上市公司债务治理效应难以形成其可观测的财务绩效,但由于财务杠杆效应的原因,存在可观测的债务综合财务绩效。     

Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

Dividends,Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs

We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings.     

XBRL、代理成本与绩效水平——基于中国开放式基金市场的证据

从2010年开始,中国证监会强制要求所有基金公司采用XBRL在唯一指定的官方网站上披露年报等信息,同时提供在线XBRL阅读器以方便投资者查阅相关信息。基于此,本文考察XBRL的采用对于开放式基金代理成本及其相关经济后果的影响,研究发现,强制采用XBRL,降低了开放式基金的代理成本,同时提升了开放式基金的绩效水平。研究表明这一新的披露方式,减少了投资者的信息搜索成本以及投资者与基金经理之间的信息不对称,从而促进了投资者作为委托人对于代理人行为的有效监督。     

Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs

This study examines the market value of REIT dividends conditional on transparency of operating structure and effectiveness of boards. Results suggest that total, mandatory and discretionary dividends are valued by the market. Consistent with agency cost theory, results provide some evidence that discretionary dividends paid by REITs with greater principal-agent conflicts have greater market value. Specific results suggest an increased value of excess dividends paid by firms with more complex organizational structures (UPREITs) and, to some degree, less independent boards. This evidence implies the equity market recognizes REITs’ substitution of discretionary dividends for stronger governance.     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.     

The Choice of Call Provision Terms: Evidence of the Existence of Agency Costs of Debt

An examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years, after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm. A substantial number of firms, however, also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate. The additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities, informational asymmetry, and the risk incentive problem. Using a sample of newly issued bonds, statistical tests are performed to show that there are, in fact, differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption. This paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs.     

家族企业特征、代理成本与审计费用

本文以2016-2020年上市家族企业的数据为研究样本,从代理成本角度出发,实证检验我国家族企业特征对审计费用的影响。研究发现：家族成员在最高管理团队中的比例和家族实际控制人持有股份的比例越高,支付的审计费用越低,且代理成本在其中发挥中介效应;家族成员在监事会中比例与审计费用呈显著的正相关关系,且代理成本在其中也发挥中介效应。本文为家族企业的治理以及审计师确定审计收费提供了经验证据。     

股权结构、动态内生性与公司代理成本

本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。     

Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity

I define and analyze the agency costs of overvalued equity. They explain the dramatic increase in corporate scandals and value destruction in the last five years; costs that have totaled hundreds of billions of dollars. When a firm's equity becomes substantially overvalued it sets in motion a set of organizational forces that are extremely difficult to manage—forces that almost inevitably lead to destruction of part or all of the core value of the firm. WorldCom, Enron, Nortel, and eToys are only a few examples of what can happen when these forces go unmanaged. Because we currently have no simple solutions to the agency costs of overvalued equity this is a promising area for future research.     

Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt

We adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt. An underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen. We identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change. The model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt.     

Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration

Abstract:  Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more private equity firms invest together in an investee firm and share a joint pay-off, and are an enduring feature of the leveraged buyout (LBO) and private equity industry. This study examines the relationship between syndication and agency costs at the investor-investee level, and the extent to which the reputation and the network position of the lead investor mediate this relationship. We examine this relationship using a sample of 1,122 buyout investments by 80 private equity companies in the UK between 1993 and 2006. Our findings show that where agency costs are highest, and hence ex-post monitoring by the lead investor is more important, syndication is less likely to occur. The negative relationship between agency costs and syndication, however, is alleviated by the reputation and network position of the lead investor firm.     

Risky Debt,Investment Incentives,and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium

The agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information. The incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context. In a sequential equilibrium of the model, a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment. The incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market. This anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium. Some empirical implications of the model for bond rating, debt covenants, and bond price response to investment announcements are explored.     

Ownership Structure, Agency Costs, Specialization, and Efficiency: Analysis of Keiretsu and Independent Insurers in the Japanese Nonlife Insurance Industry

This article uses the nonparametric frontier method to examine differences in efficiency for three unique organizational forms in the Japanese nonlife insurance industry—keiretsu firms, nonspecialized independent firms (NSIFs), and specialized independent firms (SIFs). It is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that efficiencies are equal, with one exception. Keiretsu firms seem to be more cost‐efficient than NSIFs. The results have important implications for the stakeholders of the NSIFs. An examination of the productivity changes across the different organizational forms reveals deteriorating efficiency for all three types of firms throughout the 1985–1994 sample period. Finally, the evidence also suggests that the value‐added approach and the financial intermediary approach provide different but complementary results.