THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS

This paper proposes a model of audit fee determination based upon size and other characteristics of the auditee and the auditor, and upon whether there has been a recent change of auditor (which might lead to a low-balling effect). A novel feature of the model is that auditee size is measured in two dimensions, sales and assets, and is allowed to have a quadratic relationship with audit fee. The model was estimated for a sample of large listed UK companies for the years 1981 to 1988. The results support the low-balling hypothesis and also provide insights into the distinctive role of the Big 8 firms in the audit market.     

DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES FOR QUOTED UK COMPANIES

This study reports further evidence as to the determinants of the audit fees paid by quoted companies in the UK. It outlines a framework based on the findings from semi-structured interviews with partners in four large audit firms and the results of previous research, and tests this framework by means of multivariate analysis using 1987 data for a large sample of quoted UK companies. A model explaining 87 per cent of the variation in audit fees is constructed. The principal explanatory variables are found to be auditee size, return on shareholders equity, the number of subsidiaries, the lag between the year end and the date of the audit report, the size of the auditor, a measure of auditee diversification, the ownership structure of the auditee, and whether the auditor was based in London, with the last three being new variables introduced in this study.     

TEMPORAL CHANGES IN THE DETERMINANTS OF MUTUAL FUND FLOWS

We examine how the relation between mutual fund performance and fund flows has changed over time by separating our sample into two periods (1978–87 and 1988–97). We document an increase in the flow‐performance asymmetry in the second period that exacerbates the adverse incentive for fund managers to increase portfolio risk. We develop a measure of the elasticity of fund flows with respect to performance, which filters out the confounding influence of greater aggregate fund flows in the second period and allows an examination of whether current investors place more emphasis on prior performance when selecting funds. We conclude that, though top performing funds are rewarded with greater fund flows in the second half of our sample, the change is due solely to the increase in aggregate fund flows and not to an increased reliance on performance by individual fund investors. JEL classification: G1, G2, L1.     

THE BROKERAGE FIRM EFFECT IN HERDING: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

We examine herding behavior of domestic and foreign investors in the Indonesian stock market. We document that both domestic and foreign investors from a particular brokerage firm tend to herd. The foreign investors exhibit a greater propensity to herd than domestic investors. However, when examining investor trading across brokerage firms, we find only weak evidence of herding by domestic investors and no herding by foreign investors. Our overall findings suggest a strong brokerage firm effect on herding but a weak marketwide effect. Moreover, we find evidence that the strong brokerage effect on herding is likely driven by acting on common information.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING POLICY CHOICE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY INDUSTRY: A PORTFOLIO APPROACH

The objective of this research is to explain accounting policy choice in the Australian property industry by reference to costly contracting theory. This paper makes three departures from the predominant literature. First, instead of focusing on a single policy choice, it focuses on a portfolio of 15 choices. Second, instead of measuring each policy choice dichotomously, it measures the dollar effect of each policy choice. Finally, the research focuses on the impact of policy choices on owners' equity as well as income. The results confirm the importance of compensation arrangements as a determinant of accounting policy choice but fail to provide evidence that debt constraints or political costs are significant determinants of accounting policy choice. These results suggest that including property firms in a more heterogeneous sample may reduce the power of tests on the debt constraints and political costs hypotheses. More generally (when compared to previous research) the results suggest that the determinants of policy choice are likely to be industry specific.     

转轨时期我国银行业竞争的层次分析

在市场经济中,规范化的竞争对竞争主体的利远远大于弊.对我国银行业来说,竞争实质上包括了三层含义:即如何形成竞争、如何规范竞争和如何提高竞争能力.随着我国金融体制改革的推进,尤其是入世的日益临近,我国银行业的竞争从深度和广度上不断增强.从目前的竞争主体来看,基本上可以分为国有商业银行、非国有商业银行和外资银行三类,由于不同竞争主体之间竞争的表现形式是不一样的,而不同表现形式所内涵的意义也各有差别,在这种情况下,要充分利用银行竞争对我国银行业乃至整体经济运行的积极作用,必须对不同层次的竞争进行全面分析,并在此基础上提出有针对性的对策措施.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE TARGET SHAREHOLDER PREMIUM IN TAKEOVERS

While a considerable amount of research in Australia, the United States and elsewhere shows that takeovers create value for target shareholders, there is relatively little research investigating the explanations for cross-sectional differences in the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. This paper tests various arguments proposed to explain some of the sources of this premium. One such explanation is the removal of inefficient target management. Takeovers have been recognised as a mechanism that allows management teams to compete for the right to manage corporate assets. We test the associations between bidder and target managerial ownership (proxied by director's holdings), the prior performance of the bidder and target and the size of the premium paid to target shareholders. Other potential influences on the premium include a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow and the provision of financial slack or reserve borrowing capacity to the target firm by the bidder. Using a sample of seventy-eight Australian takeovers occurring between 1981 and 1989 our tests indicate that the provision of financial slack to the target is associated with a significantly higher premium, while high bidder ownership results in a significantly lower premium. The premium is found to be positively related to the performance of the bidder in the period prior to the bid. The tests disclose an association between the agency costs of free cash flow and the target premium which is inconsistent with the theory, and reveal only weak evidence that the takeover premium is higher when inefficient target management is removed.