Should the dangers of deflation be dismissed?

Deflation has emerged as a concern for Asian policy makers. The traditional view is this concern is warranted – that deflation can lead to a vicious cycle of falling demand and prices, and is therefore a dangerous condition. However, another revisionist school of thought emphasizes the role of positive supply shocks in deflation and takes a more benign view of the phenomenon. In a recent paper, Borio et al. (2015) find some evidence which casts doubt on the traditional view. In this paper, we re-visit these findings using alternative measures of deflation. While we find some grounds for concern about the harmful effect of deflation on growth, our results also raise significant questions about the revisionist view.     

What Should be Taught in Intermediate Macroeconomics?

A lack of consensus remains on what should form the theoretical core of the undergraduate intermediate macroeconomic course. In determining how to deal with the Keynesian/classical divide, instructors must decide whether to follow the modern approach of building macroeconomic relationships from micro foundations, or to use the traditional approach based on aggregate models of the macroeconomy. In this article, the authors discuss the advantages and shortcomings of each approach in the context of course objectives. Because there is significant heterogeneity in textbook coverage, the authors summarize some of the approaches taken in current intermediate-level textbooks, which should serve as a useful starting point for new instructors. The authors also discuss how each approach can be extended to analyze the recent recession in the United States.     

Should environmental R&D be prioritized?

An innovator may not be able to capture the full social benefit of her innovation and, therefore, governments support private R&D through various measures. We compare a market good innovation—to develop a more efficient technology to produce a standard market good—with an environmental innovation—to develop a more efficient abatement technology—that has the same potential to increase the social surplus. In the first-best outcome, which can be achieved by offering an R&D subsidy and a diffusion subsidy, the R&D subsidy should be greatest for an environmental innovation, whereas the diffusion subsidy should be greatest for a market good innovation. The ranking of the two types of subsidies reflects that the appropriability problem is greater for an environmental innovation than for a market good innovation.     

How Should the Graduate Economics Core be Changed?

The authors present suggestions by graduate students from a range of economics departments for improving the first-year core sequence in economics. The students identified a number of elements that should be added to the core: more training in building microeconomic models, a discussion of the methodological foundations of model-building, more emphasis on institutions to motivate and contextualize macroeconomic models, and greater focus on econometric practice rather than theory. The authors hope that these suggestions will encourage departments to take a fresh look at the content of the first-year core.     

Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?

Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will substantially weaken the impact of the Central Bank's actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than undermine each other.     

Why is child labor illegal?

We present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws. We find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children, child-labor laws can increase the welfare of higher-income parents in an ex ante sense. On the basis of an empirical analysis of Latin-American household surveys, we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply, even after controlling for other household characteristics.     

Should public policy respond to positional externalities?

A nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment. More generally, a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category.¹A positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated.² For example, if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful.In such cases, however, it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions. Do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern? In attempting to answer this question, I employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by John Stuart Mill³, who wrote the state may not legitimately constrain any citizen's freedom of action except to prevent harm to others. I argue that many positional externalities appear to meet Mill's test, causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill-equipped to avoid them. I also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities, one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution.The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races. Section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position. Section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns. Section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights. Section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities.     

Public-private partnerships in micro-finance: Should NGO involvement be restricted?

This paper examines public–private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e. the NGO, is a motivated agent. We find that whenever the project is neither too productive, nor too unproductive, reducing such distortion requires unbundling borrower selection and project implementation, with the NGO being involved in borrower selection only. Further, we compare and contrast two alternative credit delivery mechanisms, the linkage mechanism (which is the focus of this paper), with the ‘Grameen’ one.     

Should Commodity Exporters Peg to the Export Price?

To account for the specific situation of commodity exporters, pegging to export prices (PEP) has been proposed elsewhere as an alternative to other conventional monetary regimes such as an exchange rate peg or inflation targeting. PEP is supposed to deliver automatic accommodation to terms‐of‐trade shocks, while retaining the credibility gain from a nominal anchor. This paper analyzes the PEP proposal in a dynamic general‐equilibrium model and compares it with a standard Taylor rule, consumer price index (CPI)‐level targeting and a nominal exchange rate peg. Judged by the degree of output stabilization, PEP performs very similar to CPI targeting for export demand as well as domestic demand shocks and underperforms in the case of shocks to the export price. The results suggest that PEP is not superior to conventional CPI targeting from a macroeconomic stabilization perspective.     

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator

We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling the innovation to any one of the firms who further licenses it to the rival firm. The result holds irrespective of the size of the innovation (drastic or non-drastic) and the degree of cost asymmetry between the licensees. Social welfare is greater under selling than licensing.     

Should we reallocate patent fees to the universities?

In knowledge economies, patent agencies are often viewed as a relevant instrument of an efficient innovation policy. This paper brings a new support to that idea. We claim that these agencies should play an increasing role in the regulation of the relation between private R&D labs and public fundamental research units especially concerning the question of the appropriation of free usable research results. Since these two institutions work with opposite institutional arrangements (see P.S. Dasgupta and P.A. David. 1987. Information disclosure and the economics of science and technology. In Arrow and the accent of modern economic theory, ed. G.R. Feiwel, 519–42. New York: State University of New York Press), we essentially argue that there is, on the one hand, an over-appropriation of these results while, on the other hand, there is also an under-provision of free usable results issued from more fundamental research. We show how a public patent office can restore efficiency.