The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.     

Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8‐K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10‐K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex ante derivative litigation risk and higher operating uncertainty, as well as firms for which shareholder litigation is a more important mechanism to discipline managers.     

股票风险警示对同行企业盈余管理行为的影响研究

依据2007-2018年中国沪深A股被实施风险警示企业的同行企业样本,考量企业被实施股票风险警示对同行企业盈余管理行为的影响。结果发现：风险警示信息具有同行企业治理效应,即行业中有企业被实施风险警示后,同行企业盈余管理程度会显著降低,这种效应在非国有企业和市场竞争地位较低的企业中更为明显。作用路径分析表明：风险警示信息增加了债权人对同行企业的行业风险感知,提高了同行企业的债务资本成本,同行企业为了降低债务资本成本会主动增加信息透明度,降低盈余管理程度。     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

The effect of auditor litigation risk on clients' access to bank debt: Evidence from a quasi-experiment

We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing.     

环境不确定性对盈余管理的影响

环境不确定性会导致公司报告盈余的波动性很大,管理层试图通过盈余管理降低环境不确定性对公司盈余波动性的影响,公司的成长趋势会影响人们对公司环境不确定影响的评估。本文探讨公司环境不确定性和成长趋势以及它们的交互效应对公司盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明,环境不确定性越大,公司的盈余管理程度越高;相对于衰退型的公司,增长型公司的环境不确定性与公司正向盈余管理程度正相关程度较低;衰退型公司与增长型公司的环境不确定性对公司负向盈余管理的影响无显著差异。基于不确定性来源的不同,进一步研究发现,衰退型公司更关注公司的可预测变动,而增长型公司更关注随机因素。     

上市公司业绩预告偏差对股价崩盘风险的影响—基于内部控制的视角

利用我国A股2012-2018年上市公司数据,探讨上市公司业绩预告偏差与偏离方向如何影响股价崩盘风险,以及内部控制质量对两者的调节作用。研究发现:公司业绩预告偏差与股价崩盘风险显著正相关;与悲观偏差相比,业绩预告乐观偏差才会加剧股价崩盘风险,高质量的内部控制能够缓解业绩预告乐观偏差加剧的股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,当上市公司业绩预告需要强制披露、披露越及时及披露坏消息时,内部控制质量的调节作用更加显著。由此证明,高质量内部控制在缓解因业绩预告乐观偏差加剧的股价崩盘风险中发挥重要作用。     

Asset Disposal as a Method of Real Earnings Management: Evidence from the UK

We examine asset sales as a method of real earnings management around the benchmarks of loss avoidance and last year's earnings. Evidence is reported of asset sales to boost or reduce earnings near the benchmark of last year's earnings. For the zero earnings benchmark our results are moderated by the opening balance of accruals: only firms with high levels of accruals use asset sales to boost earnings to avoid a loss and only firms with low levels of accruals use asset sales as part of a big bath. We suggest that firms with high accrual balances find it difficult to use additional income-increasing accruals but find it more convenient to write off accruals rather than sell assets to artificially reduce earnings. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are associated with reduced use of asset sales for gains and especially with reduced asset sales for losses. We ascribe this to IFRS introducing additional judgement and estimation in relation to the valuation of both long-lived and current assets on a recurring basis.     

The Accrual Effect on Future Earnings

Earnings manipulation has become a widespread practice for US corporations. However, most studies in the literature focus on whether certain incentives would facilitate managers to manipulate earnings and there has been little evidence documenting the consequences of earnings manipulation. This paper fills this gap by examining how current accruals affect future earnings (the accrual effect) and measuring the size of this effect. We find that the aggregate future earnings will decrease by $0.046 and $0.096, respectively, in the next one and three years for a $1 increase of current accruals. Over the very long-term (25 years), 20% of current accruals will reverse. This negative accrual effect is more significant for firms with high price-earnings ratios, high market-to-book ratios and high accruals where earnings management is more likely to occur. We show that incorporating the accrual effect is useful in improving the accuracy of earnings forecasts for these firms. Accordingly, the empirical results are consistent with the notion that earnings management causes the negative relationship between current accruals and future earnings. In addition, this paper shows that one recently developed accrual model has better performance than the popularly cited model in identifying manipulated earnings.     

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from non‐forecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

The Timing of Asset Sales: Evidence of Earnings Management?

This paper presents empirical evidence from a sample of publicly traded Singaporean firms on the question: to what extent do firms manage earnings through the timing of asset sales? Previous studies have focused on accounting motives behind asset sales, ignoring the need to also consider economic motives. Some empirical evidence is provided to support the hypothesis that managers of firms with decreasing net earnings–per–share smooth earnings upwards using asset sales.     

The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This paper investigates the earnings management activities in Chinese listed firms and the impact of the split share structure reform (SSSREF). We demonstrate that Chinese listed firms exhibited a long-term positive relationship between real and accrual-based earnings management activities over the 2002–2011 period. This reflects the environment of weak investor protection and lack of effective corporate governance in China. Our results also indicate that the SSSREF in China has not fundamentally improved firms' quality of financial information. This may be because ownership concentration remains high. However, it is of interest that the reform has created an incentive alignment effect exogenously. We find that firms' use of discretionary accruals was constrained, and they have consequently shifted to less detectable and under-scrutinized real earnings activities after the reform. This shift is similar to that seen with the direct regulatory changes in accounting reporting rules on firms' earnings behaviors in developed countries where the investor protection environment is strong. We suggest that firms' shifting between the accrual and real-based earnings methods is an overlooked area for investors to consider in the emerging market context, and may require the attention of regulators.     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

Consistent Analyst Expectation Error and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

Using data from the Chinese A-share market in 2004–12, we show how cognitive bias of individual analysts led to counterproductive effect in less-developed financial markets. We form an ex ante measure of analysts’ expectation error, a measure suitable for markets with a short history. We find that star analysts tend to be more optimistic than ordinary analysts, and their biased opinions influence other analysts because of analyst herding behavior. Two-stage least square regression results suggest that consistent expectation errors among analysts can lead to earnings management. These insights are valuable to investors and regulators.     

Earnings Management in IPO Lockup and Insider Trading: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper examines the hypothesis that the timing of lockup expiration is crucial to earnings management (EM) behavior in the period after an initial public offering (IPO). Taiwan's unique two-stage lockup regulations make the Taiwanese sample an excellent candidate for examining this hypothesis. Three main results are reached. First, we find positive discretionary accruals (DAs) from the IPO quarter to the quarter after the expiration of the first-stage lockup. The DA in the quarter of the second-stage lockup expiration is significantly positive. The evidence shows that the lockup provision is key in the findings of significant EM in the IPO year and the following year. We also find a positive association between DAs in first-stage lockups and subsequent insider selling activity, indicating that insiders' selling after lockup expiration accounts for EM in the lockup period. Third, the extent of EM in first-stage lockup is negatively related to that around the IPO, consistent with the reversal nature of DAs.     

Earnings Management and Annual General Meetings: The Role of Managerial Entrenchment

We examine earnings management around the annual general meeting (AGM) and assess the influence of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with prior research, we show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding AGMs regardless of the level of managerial entrenchment. We find evidence of significant earnings manipulation primarily among entrenched managers. Specifically, they manage abnormal accruals downward two quarters prior to the AGM and significantly increase abnormal accruals in the quarter immediately before the AGM. Our evidence is consistent with AGMs triggering managers to disseminate information in a manner that shapes the market's perception of the firm.     

Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting? Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits

Class action lawsuits can be detrimental to debtholders because they deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower these firms’ value. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ litigation risk in debt contracting. We find that banks charge 19% higher interest spreads on loans to lawsuit firms after litigation. In addition, banks monitor lawsuit firms more closely by using tighter non‐price terms. The results are robust after correcting for possible endogeneity issues using the propensity score matching approach. We further find that the effects of lawsuit filing are more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. Following a lawsuit in the industry, banks also perceive an increased likelihood of litigation for industry peer firms and adjust price and non‐price terms accordingly. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the lawsuit filing effect is greater for firms with lower ex‐ante litigation risk. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that banks, as informed stakeholders, perceive litigation risk to be detrimental and price this risk in debt contracting.