Do NBFCs propagate real shocks?

Notwithstanding a smaller share of total loans vis-à-vis commercial banks, we investigate a possible role of Non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) in propagating a real shock to the rest of the economy. Our two-sector model captures emerging economy characteristics such as NBFC borrowings from commercial banks, heterogeneities in financial constraints, and labour market friction faced by firms. Our theoretical and simulation results, using Indian parameters, indicate that an idiosyncratic shock (i.e., higher realization of the failed firms) and a sectoral productivity shock (in the sector financed by NBFCs) increase the interest rate charged by the banks, and the unemployment rate while reducing the real wages and per capita capital formation. However, the reverse happens given a structural shock, assumed as an increase in the average number of failed firms. Early detection of such shocks and quick policy intervention are required to provide a cushion for capital formation and job creation.     

Do quits cause under-training?

A recent finding in the training literature is that there willbe under-investment in skills if there is a positive quit rate,training is at least partially transferable, and there is imperfectcompetition in the labour market. We explore the conditionsunder which this under-investment result might be reversed.In economies characterised by uncertainty about future productivity,we show that a higher quit rate may increase the number of workerstrained, by making firms wait less for information about futureproductivity before training new workers. At low quit rates,this offsets all of the under-investment effect.     

Do international shocks affect small wholesalers and retailers?

Previous research has suggested that the smallest firms are those most vulnerable to international competition, as measured by exchange rate fluctuations and import shares. However, that work—and the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature on determinants of exit or firm survival—dealt entirely with the manufacturing sector of the economy. This paper analyzes annual US data for 1989–2005 for about 50 wholesale and retail sectors to explain small firm exit rates in several employment size categories. The main result is that wholesalers respond negatively to a stronger currency in a manner similar to that of manufacturers, while retailers are generally unaffected.     

China's economic fluctuations and consumption smoothing: Is consumption more volatile than output in China?

This paper provides a fundamental study of China's consumption and output fluctuations. The most recent literature reports that, in the post-1978 period, detrended consumption is significantly more volatile than detrended output in China. This indicates the inability to impose consumption smoothing. However, in those previous studies, consumption of durables, which has some features of capital, as discussed in the real business cycle literature, was not separated from private consumption. This paper is the first to estimate consumer durables for China and their service values following the method introduced in Cooley and Prescott (1995). We adjust the consumption measure to make it consistent with the real business cycle literature, and find that consumption of durables is much more volatile than output, but non-durable consumption is less volatile than, and less correlated with, output that provides evidence that supports consumption smoothing in China.     

Correction to: Two worlds apart? Export demand shocks and domestic sales

Review of World Economics - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-021-00409-2     

Do local firms employ political activities to respond to political uncertainty?

Using hand-collected data in China from 2001 to 2019, we examine how political uncertainty affects corporate political activities, including corporate corruption and corporate charitable donations, and whether the anti-corruption campaign moderates the relationship between political uncertainty and corporate political activities. First, we find that when city government officials change, local firms significantly increase corporate charitable donations while reducing corporate corruption. Second, the anti-corruption campaign strengthens the effects of political uncertainty on corporate political activities. Third, our results also show that political uncertainty has stronger effects 1) when new government officials come from external appointments, and 2) when former government officials experience abnormal turnover. In addition, the effects of political uncertainty on corporate charitable donations are stronger in non-state-owned enterprises and firms belonging to regulated industries. Finally, political uncertainty increases firms’ government subsidies through corporate political activities. It’s clear that political activities have mediating effects.     

What explains the recent fluctuations in Japan’s output? A structural factor analysis of Japan’s industrial production

By applying the structural factor analysis developed by Foerster et al. (2011), we decompose the fluctuations of Japan’s industrial production (IP) into sectoral shocks and aggregate shocks, taking input–output relationships between sectors into account. Our results show that, except for the global financial crisis period, sectoral shocks explain, on an average, nearly half of the quarterly variations in Japan’s IP. Although the relative importance of sectoral shocks declined during the global financial crisis period, it increased again in the recent post-crisis period and, at this time, it contributes to the increased volatility of Japan’s IP. Specifically, our analysis suggests that the intersectoral spillovers brought about by disruptions of supply chain networks in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the declines in domestic production (or production capacity) in some sectors, as a result of a deterioration in global competitiveness, and a shift to overseas production have contributed to the recent increase in fluctuations of Japan’s IP.     

Do trade agreements increase Vietnam's exports to RCEP markets?

The paper reviews recent developments in trade relations between Vietnam and members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, and analyses the impacts on Vietnam's exports of tariff reductions in RCEP trading partners. The margin of tariff preferences is adopted as a proxy for the degree of trade liberalisation and a gravity model is used to assess the impacts of the tariff preferences under the AFTA and ASEAN+1 FTAs on Vietnam's major exports. The results show that the effects of tariff preferences differ between the types of preferences and products. The FTA tariff preferences do not exert a stimulating effect on the export of agricultural products but they have positive effects on several manufacturing exports such as garments and footwear.     

Why is Chinese provincial output diverging?

In a recent paper Pedroni and Yao (2006) present strong evidence suggesting that Chinese provincial per-capita output is diverging, a result that goes against the Chinese government’s goal of a balanced wealth-creation across provinces. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind this finding. Our main result is that the divergence does exist, even when new data and more advanced methods of analysis are used. We also find that it has both an idiosyncratic and a common component. Hence, the increased per-capita output inequalities observed at the provincial level is due to both province-specific disparities and to disparities between groups of provinces.     

Do oligopolistic firms benefit from being forced to act non-strategically?

The present study seeks to answer the question of whether acting non-strategically can benefit firms. In a static Cournot framework, if a subset of firms are constrained to the equilibrium level of output, being non-strategic will have no impact on profits of neither constrained nor strategic firms and provided that sufficiently large number of firms are restricted, a marginal quantity contraction can be to their benefit. In contrast, using a dynamic Cournot framework, we find that the constraint set at the equilibrium level or moderately deviated from it, leads to increased profits for all firms irrespective of the number of non-strategic ones.     

How Quickly Do Firms Adjust to Optimal Levels of Tax Avoidance?

The trade‐off literature asserts that managers weigh the direct benefits of tax avoidance against the associated nontax costs. This literature implies each firm has a unique optimal level of tax avoidance that balances these costs and benefits. Our study is the first to document how quickly the average firm moves toward its optimal level of tax avoidance. We find that the typical firm converges toward its optimum at a rate that ranges from approximately 69 to 84 percent over a three‐year period, depending upon model specifications. Consistent with asymmetric levels of frictions across the tax avoidance distribution, we find the speed of adjustment is greater for firms below their optimal level of tax avoidance than for firms above. We perform additional cross‐sectional analyses to provide insight into some of the frictions that prevent firms from adjusting completely to their optimal level of tax avoidance. We generally find growth firms exhibit slower adjustment speeds and provide limited evidence that both multinational firms and income‐mobile firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds.     

IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?

A central issue in the debate about a new international financial architecture has been whether programs of policy reform supported by the International Monetary Fund work. The Fund claims that “on balance” they do, because of their positive effect on the balance of payments. Others claim that programs are ineffective, and suggest that they should be discontinued. This paper reviews the econometric evidence dealing with the macroeconomic effects of IMF programs. It goes on to provide additional evidence and judges success against alternative criteria. Although the record is not good, the paper argues that it would be unwise for the Fund to cease lending and to abandon conditionality altogether. IMF programs need to be redesigned and refocused. The paper concludes by identifying a number of principles that should underpin reform.     

Can systemic risk measures predict economic shocks? Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate how the systemic risk affects macroeconomic activity in China and examines the forecasting power of 12 different measures of systemic risk. Quantile regression is employed to capture the nonlinear relationship between the systemic risk and the distribution of future macroeconomic shocks. We find that the systemic risk skews the distribution of future shocks, which cannot be identified in the central tendency analysis within the traditional linear regression. In particular, when the systemic risk builds up, the risk of severe economic downturns increases while the risk of moderate economic downturns barely changes. When comparing the forecasting power of different systemic risk measures, we use both a fixed rolling window and a time-varying method to make the result robust. We find that, of the 12 widely used measures, 8 demonstrate significant predictability for subsequent shocks to economic growth in China and can thus serve as early warning signals.     

Do Capital Inflows Matter to Asset Prices? The Case of Korea*

In the present paper, we investigate whether capital flows induce domestic asset price hikes in the case of Korea. This issue is relevant for crisis‐hit economies trying to prevent a boom–bust cycle as well as in the formulation of macroeconomic policy objectives in emerging market economies. Korea has recently experienced large capital inflows, in particular a surge in portfolio inflows. Furthermore, asset prices, including stock prices, land prices and nominal and real exchange rates, have also appreciated. The empirical results, obtained using a vector autoregression model, suggest that capital inflow shocks have caused stock prices but not land prices to increase. The effects on the nominal and real exchange rates have been limited, which relates to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.