Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting

We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings.     

CEO Hedging Opportunities and the Weighting of Performance Measures in Compensation Contracts

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.     

Not-for-Profit Provision of Job Training and Mediation Services: An Empirical Analysis Using Contract Data of Job Training Service Providers

Summary  This paper analyses the relative performance and selection behaviour of not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit (FP) job training service providers, using contract data of welfare-to-work trajectories of the Dutch social benefit administration. Our analysis takes full account of selection effects, both ex ante (i.e. during the contracting process) as well as ex post (i.e. at the start of the program). First, for each cohort type of unemployed clients, service providers are only informed on the broad characteristics of cohorts that are contracted, thus limiting the room for adverse selection here. At the start of trajectories, however, selection may occur (directly) by service providers sending back clients or (indirectly) by encouraging clients to start a program, so as to receive additional (fixed) payments at the start of the program. We find strong evidence for FP service providers to be more selective than NFPs in both ways. Regarding the estimation results for the job placement rates, however, we only find weak evidence for NFP job training service providers to outperform FPs in the durability of job contracts.      

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Enhancing macroeconomic resilience to natural disasters and climate change in the small states of the Pacific

Natural disasters and climate change are interrelated macro‐critical issues affecting all Pacific small states to varying degrees. In addition to their devastating human costs, these events damage growth prospects and worsen countries’ fiscal positions. This is the first cross‐country International Monetary Fund (IMF) study assessing the impact of natural disasters on growth in the Pacific islands as a group. A panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis suggests that, for damage and losses equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP, growth drops by 0.7 percentage points in the year of the disaster. The paper also discusses a multi‐pillar framework to enhance resilience to natural disasters at the national, regional, and multilateral levels and the importance of enhancing countries’ risk management capacities. It highlights how this approach can provide a more strategic and less ad hoc framework for strengthening both ex ante and ex post resilience and what role the IMF can play.     

Contracting: The Queensland Housing Commission Experience, 1945—1957

The practice of public sector contracting has a long history in Australia. The analysis of the experience of one agency, the Queensland Housing Commission (QHC), highlights the role of market conditions in shaping outcomes. The building industry had been severely disrupted by World War II and the demand for accommodation far exceeded supply. The QHC found it difficult to secure the services of builders and was forced to move away from competitive tendering. In these circumstances, it was forced to depend on the contract to protect its interests. However, the contracts between the QHC and its contractors did not accommodate all contingencies and failure carried economic and political costs for the Queensland Government.     

Nonrecurring Items in Debt Contracts

Using a large sample of debt contracts, we study the determinants of excluding nonrecurring items from covenant calculations. We investigate this choice across firms, across items, and through time. We find that nonrecurring items are more likely to be excluded when the agency costs of debt are higher and less likely to be excluded when they predict borrowers' performance. Our evidence further suggests that the interplay between agency costs and nonrecurring items' predictive ability affects the decision to exclude these items from covenant computations. Finally, when examining the exclusion by different nonrecurring item types, we find confirmatory evidence that the probability of exclusion decreases with the predictive ability for borrowers' future performance of major nonrecurring item types. Overall, our research extends the literature on the determinants of contract design and improves understanding of the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracting.     

Ex Post Settling Up in Cash Compensation: New Evidence

This paper provides new evidence on whether and how boards solve costly ex post settling up to recover CEO cash compensation for unrealized gains that fail to materialize. Our analyses are motivated by the likely expanding role for ex post settling up as the risk of compensating executives for unrealized gains that may never materialize increases in a more intangibles‐based economy, as well as by the conflicting evidence of prior research. We provide evidence consistent with ex post settling up by (i) using alternative truncation methods to derive observations most likely to fall within the theoretically motivated incentive zone; (ii) replicating and reconciling the conflicting results of prior research that supports (Leone et al. 2006) and fails to support (Shaw and Zhang 2010) ex post settling up; (iii) using Incentive Lab data with contract‐specific information, allowing strong identification of observations in the incentive zone; and (iv) documenting predictable cross‐sectional variation, with ex post settling up being more pronounced for firms with stronger corporate governance, less conservative accounting earnings, and a larger proportion of total pay in the form of cash compensation. Overall, we conclude that evidence is strong in support of the ex post settling up hypothesis.     

Interim Effective Tax Rate Estimates and Internal Control Quality

This study examines whether the volatility of interim estimates of the annual effective tax rate (ETR) provides ex ante information about the quality of firms' internal control environments. Recent research suggests that some firms selectively disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs). Given the negative consequences associated with ICWs, it is important for capital market participants to be able to identify firms with ineffective internal controls in a timely manner. We find that firms with more volatile annual ETR estimates are more likely to report both tax- and nontax-related ICWs in the current year. Our results also indicate that the volatility of annual ETR estimates declines following the remediation of tax-related ICWs, but not following the remediation of nontax-related ICWs. In addition, we find that ETR volatility in the current year is associated with the likelihood that a firm will report an ICW in the following year. Finally, we provide evidence that the volatility of annual ETR estimates is associated with the likelihood that a firm has an undisclosed ICW. In combination, our results suggest that the volatility of interim estimates of the annual ETR provides an ex ante signal of the likelihood that a firm's internal controls are ineffective.     

Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐FIN No. 48 period.     

Exchange Rate Volatility, Nominal Rigidities, and Persistent Deviations from PPP

It is shown how nominal exchange rate volatility can cause persistent deviations in the real exchange rate. The key to nominal rigidities is a capital market imperfection implying that agents cannot hedge perfectly against consumption risks. As a consequence, nominal changes have real effects by both affecting the ex post real purchasing power of savings and by affecting the ex ante incentives in savings and labor supply. The consequences of exogenous changes in the nominal exchange rate are considered in an OLG version of a two sector small open economy with competitive product and labor markets.J. Japan. Int. Econ.,December 1997,11(4), pp. 584–609. Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.     

Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

Using a propensity score matched sample and a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that stock price crash risk increases after a firm voluntarily incorporates clawback provisions in executive officers' compensation contracts. This heightened crash risk is concentrated in adopters that increase upward real activities‐based earnings management and those that reduce the readability of 10‐K reports. Based on cross‐sectional analyses, we also find that the increased crash risk is more pronounced for adopters with high ex ante fraud risk, low‐ability managers, high CEO equity incentives, and low dedicated institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that the clawback adoption per se does not curb managerial opportunism but rather induces managers to use alternative channels for concealing bad news, which may contribute to a greater stock price crash risk; and the increase in crash risk is more likely in cases where incentives are strong or monitoring is weak. Our results should be of interest to regulators and policymakers considering the effects of clawback adoption on the investing public.     

Remedies for misrepresentation in applications in the presence of fraudulent intent

Many contracts are based upon information provided in written applications, including insurance and employment contracts. However, the remedies used in these two contexts for material misrepresentation in the application differ. Insurers use the remedy of rescission and restitution, which returns the parties to status quo ante. Employers simply terminate the contract, leaving the parties where they are at the time of termination. This paper examines the role played by each remedy in the context of intentional misrepresentation. It is shown that rescission and restitution expands the situations in which mutually beneficial contracting will occur. It is also shown that insurers can offer lower premiums when the remedy of rescission and restitution is available.     

An empirical examination of IPO underpricing in the Chinese A-share market

Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. We consider three hypotheses that may explain the IPO underpricing in China. These are the winner's curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, the winner's curse hypothesis has not been tested in the Chinese market. Using IPO data for online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner's curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling hypothesis is not empirically supported in the Chinese market during the sample period.     

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN INDIA: THE ROLE OF RETURN,RISK, AND INFLATION

The present study examines the determinants of foreign institutional investments (FII) in India, which by January 2003 almost exceeded U.S. $12 billion. Given the huge volume of these flows and their impact on the other domestic financial markets, understanding the behavior of the flows becomes very important, especially at a time of liberalizing the capital account. By using monthly data, we found that FII inflow depends on stock market returns, inflation rates (both domestic and foreign), and ex‐ante risk. In terms of magnitude, the impact of stock market returns and the ex‐ante risk turned out to be the major determinants of FII inflow. Unlike some of the other investigations of this topic, our study has not found any causative link running from FII inflow to stock returns. Stabilizing stock market volatility and minimizing the ex‐ante risk would help to attract more FII, an inflow of which has a positive impact on the real economy.     

Quantifying Brexit: from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity

Review of World Economics - Exploiting changes in the geography of economic integration in Europe, this paper quantifies the effects of Brexit from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity. By...     

Criteria for contracting-out decisions when contractors can deceive

This paper presents a decision rule for contracting out that explicitly takes into account the possibility of contractor deception. In the model presented here, the contracting agency opts to contract out only when the production savings exceeds the sum of its optimal monitoring expenses, optimal fine collection costs, and the expected loss stemming from undetected cheating. Furthermore, in awarding contracts, the contracting agency explicitly takes into account the risk aversion of the contractor. The analysis suggests that effective contracts must consider the contractor's attitude toward risk and permit the contractor to retain some positive rent, conclusions that give rise to a number of nonintuitive policy implications.     

Money growth volatility and the demand for money in Germany: Friedman’s volatility hypothesis revisited

Money Growth Volatility and the Demand for Money in Germany: Friedman’s Volatility Hypothesis Revisited. — Recently, the Bundesbank claimed that monetary targeting has become considerably more difficult by the increased volatility of short-term money growth. The present paper investigates the impact of German money growth volatility on income velocity and money demand in view of Friedman’s money growth volatility hypothesis. Granger-causality tests provide some evidence for a velocity/volatility linkage. However, the estimation of volatility-augmented money demand functions reveals that — in contrast to Friedman’s hypothesis — increased money growth volatility lowered the demand for money.     

A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy

In a simple three-stage model of an international Cournot duopoly, optimal strategic trade policy is shown to be time inconsistent. If the domestic government first announces a production subsidy, firms then irrevocably commit resources to R&D, and finally play their output game, there is an incentive for the government to revise its ex ante optimal policy once R&D decisions have been made. If private agents anticipate this revision and if the government does not have the power to commit itself to the ex ante optimal policy, a credibility constraint has to be imposed.     

Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk Taking

We investigate the mechanism through which the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was associated with changes in corporate investment strategies. We document that the passage of the governance regulations in SOX was followed by a significant decline in pay‐performance sensitivity (Delta) and incentives to take risk (Vega) in CEOs' compensation contracts. These changes in compensation contracts are related to a decline in investments, including research and development expenditures, capital investments and acquisitions. Moreover, consistent with the rules in SOX directly affecting CEOs' incentives to take risk, we document that the decline in investments exceeds the amount that would be expected from changes in compensation packages alone. Finally, we also find evidence that the changes in investments are related to lower operating performances of firms, suggesting that these changes were costly to investors. Our evidence speaks to the debate on how corporate governance regulation interacts with firms' and managers' incentives, and ultimately affects corporate operating and investment strategies. Our study suggests that one indirect cost of such regulations in SOX is the significant reductions in corporate risk‐taking activities in the post‐SOX period. The changes in investments were in part due to changes in executive compensation contracts and in part related to increased executives' personal costs of engaging in risky activities.