Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy

Lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress. This article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy, describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post "disaster relief" and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails. Absent ex ante government policy, ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance, which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under-production by operating farmers. Ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance, price supports, and a program participation fee.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production has been a topic of considerable debate. We consider multiequation structural models of acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage. Our analysis focuses on corn and soybean production in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains. Our results confirm that increased participation in insurance programs provokes statistically significant acreage responses in some cases, though the response is very modest in every case. In the most extreme cases, 30% decreases in premiums as a result of increased subsidies provoke acreage increases ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%. A number of policy simulations involving increases in premium subsidies are considered.     

Hog producer income losses under contagious animal disease restrictions

Eradication measures of a contagious animal disease may force farmers to keep ready-to-slaughter animals on the farm. As feeding heavy animals may reduce carcass quality and farmer income, farmers can adjust their feeding policy in order to decrease losses from delayed slaughter. The problem is interesting also from society's point of view because eradication measures can affect a large number of farms when a single farm is infected. A dynamic programming model is developed to study optimal hog feeding strategies when the timing of slaughter is restricted. The model takes into account carcass quality, its effects on timing of slaughter under given prices, and animal density on the farm. The results show that farmers suffer substantial losses due to delayed slaughter, and can minimize the losses by reducing energy feeding. The results give information on designing compensation schemes so that all farmers have economic incentives to implement preferred eradication policy.     

Area Yield Index Insurance or Farm Yield Crop Insurance? Chinese Perspectives on Farmers' Welfare and Government Subsidy Effectiveness

We evaluate the performance of area yield crop insurance (AYCI) and farm yield crop insurance (FYCI) using farm-level yield data from China, focusing on their effects on farmers' welfare, and their cost-effectiveness in terms of government subsidy. Given a subsidy rate sufficient to generate a politically acceptable participation level, the price advantage of AYCI may no longer offset its higher basis risk, and consequently FYCI may be preferred by farmers. From the government's perspective, AYCI is the cheapest option to maintain reasonable farmer participation in insurance, but is not necessarily the most cost-effective choice. Our findings suggest that, contrary to an assumption that informs many developing country agricultural insurance programmes, AYCI schemes are not necessarily preferred to FYCI. Decisions on the structure of a national agricultural insurance programme should be based on careful consideration of local conditions.     

Is There a Viable Market for Area-Based Crop Insurance?

The performance of area yield insurance and farm-level multiple peril crop insurance is analyzed for cotton and soybean production in Georgia and South Carolina. The analysis improves on many previous studies by utilizing actual farm-level yield data and by comparing the two types of insurance products not only for actuarially fair premium rates but also for actual unsubsidized and subsidized premium rates. Results suggest that, even in heterogeneous production regions, area yield insurance may be a viable alternative to farm-level insurance when premium rates for farm-level insurance contain large positive wedges.     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.     

植物品种权交易中的“囚徒困境”博弈分析

借助"囚徒困境"博弈模型分析植物品种权交易中普遍存在的道德风险问题。结果表明:在没有任何监督、惩罚措施的情况下,最终的博弈均衡只能是交易双方都选择不遵守策略,以实现各自利益的最大化;但通过对博弈模型进行适当的改进,就会发现只要监督和惩罚措施得当,提高其违约成本,交易双方就会为实现各自利益最大化而选择遵守策略,并据此得到实现植物品种权交易良性循环运作的有效条件,提高交易成功率。