Adjusted accounting beta,operating leverage and financial leverage as determinants of market beta: A synthesis and empirical evaluation

This article reexamines and synthesizes two streams of research dealing with the relationship between market beta and accounting risk measures. It is shown that, with some minor rearrangement the Mandelker and Rhee (1984) model can be shown to be as a decomposition of the familiar accounting beta (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970) into operating leverage, financial leverage, and an adjusted accounting beta. The adjusted accounting beta can be further decomposed into productivity gains and the relative cyclical sensitivity of the accounting flows of the firm. Empirical estimates of this extension made using three accounting flow measures in addition to earnings show that the intrinsic business risk factor not identified in the original Mandelker and Rhee model is the most significant explanatory factor related to market beta.     

What explains the value premium? The case of adjustment costs,operating leverage and financial leverage

This paper empirically examines and compares the different theoretical predictions on how adjustment costs, operating and financial leverage influence the value premium. Consistent with Ozdagli (2012), financial leverage plays a dominant role, supported by adjustment costs (which represent the degree of investment irreversibility). Specifically, the observed value premium is driven by the financial leverage differences between value and growth firms, partially neutralized by investment irreversibility. The relation between the value premium and investment irreversibility is contrary to the intuition in Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006). Operating leverage does not significantly influence the value premium.     

An additional analysis of estimation techniques for the degree of financial leverage

This study compares three different empirical proxies for the financial leverage component of a systematic risk‐composition model employed in prior financial research. We consider one static accounting measure and two elasticity‐based measures. We find that the traditional static accounting measure of financial leverage provides statistically different estimates of financial leverage when compared to estimates from elasticity‐based measures of the degree of financial leverage. The findings are important because the elasticity‐based models for the degree of financial leverage have clear theoretical links to market‐based models of systematic risk, while the static accounting measure of financial leverage does not. Practitioners and researchers should carefully consider why they are estimating financial leverage and choose the appropriate method for doing so given the goals and potential consequences for biased estimation.     

The leverage effect and the basket-index put spread

Benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis. However, theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a “leverage effect” that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution. The leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index, thus increasing the basket-index spread. Time-series and cross-sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well.     

The leverage effect without leverage

We use experimental stock markets to add more evidence that Black's [1976. Proceedings of the 1976 Meeting of the Business and Economic Statistics Section. American Statistical Association, pp. 177–181] leverage effect in financial markets does not necessarily stem from the financial leverage of the firm. We surprisingly find a large number of markets in which the leverage effect is observed although the underlying asset does not exhibit any financial leverage at all.     

Corporate social responsibility and degrees of operating and financial leverage

We examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms’ degrees of operating (DOL) and financial leverage (DFL). Combining the enlightened value maximizing and capital structure theories, we hypothesize that CSR as firms’ strategic choice to internalize the cost from implicit contracts between the firms and their non-investing stakeholders affects firms’ operating and financial leverage. We find empirical evidence that CSR and CSR strengths are positively (negatively) related to firms’ DOL (DFL). CSR concerns are positively related firms’ DOL and DFL. We also document that CSR is positively related to firms’ operating cost and we find evidence that CSR acts as a substitute for corporate debt tax shield when firms’ financial leverage is low.     

Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers

We empirically examine whether firms increase financial leverage following mergers. Firms could increase financial leverage either because of an increase in debt capacity or because of unused debt capacity from pre-merger years. We find that financial leverage of combined firms increases significantly following mergers. A cross-sectional analysis shows that the change in financial leverage around mergers is significantly positively correlated with the announcement period market-adjusted returns. Further tests indicate that the increase in financial leverage is an outcome of an increase in debt capacity, although there is weak evidence that some of the increase in financial leverage is a result of past unused debt capacity.     

Properties of time-series estimates of degree of leverage measures

Empirical studies suggest that time-series regression estimates of the degrees of operating and financial leverage have a tendency to produce measures less than one. According to ex ante theory, these measures should be greater than one for firms operating above the breakeven point. There have also been suggestions that the biases in these estimates may be attributable to an underlying increase in unit sales. This work presents evidence that these counter-intuitive measures are produced by changes in the firm's operating parameters (unit price, variable cost, fixed cost and interest payments). It further suggests that attempts to control for the underlying change in unit sales substantially increase the volatility of predicted estimates.     

The role of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in the late 2000s crisis

Extensive regulatory changes and technological advances have transformed banking systems to a great extent. Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by creating new products and expanding their activities to some uncharted business areas. In this paper, we study how modern banking which gave birth to the off-balance-sheet leverage activities affected the risk profile of U.S. banks as well as the level of systemic risk before and after the onset of the late 2000s financial crisis. Towards this, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage and capture the latter with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in the current literature. Special attention is paid on the deleveraging process that occurred in the banking market after the crisis erupted, which is an additional innovative feature of this study. Our findings reveal that leverage, both explicit and hidden off-the-balance-sheet, increases the individual risk of banking firms making them vulnerable to financial shocks. Reverse leverage, on the other hand, is beneficial for individual banks’ health, but is found to be harmful for financial stability. We also demonstrate that the banks which concentrate on traditional lines of business typically carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments.     

Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage

We find that firms behave consistently with how their CEOs behave personally in the context of leverage choices. Analyzing data on CEOs' leverage in their most recent primary home purchases, we find a positive, economically relevant, robust relation between corporate and personal leverage in the cross-section and when examining CEO turnovers. The results are consistent with an endogenous matching of CEOs to firms based on preferences, as well as with CEOs imprinting their personal preferences on the firms they manage, particularly when governance is weaker. Besides enhancing our understanding of the determinants of corporate capital structures, the broader contribution of the paper is to show that CEOs' personal behavior can, in part, explain corporate financial behavior of the firms they manage.     

A comparative analysis of proxies for an optimal leverage ratio

Previous studies that test the tradeoff theory commonly use one of the following debt ratio measures to proxy for a firm's hypothesized optimal ratio: firm's time-series mean leverage, moving average leverage based on a firm's historical debt ratios, industry median leverage, and predicted leverage ratio based on cross-sectional regressions. We find that these alternative proxies yield results that are significantly different from each other. Further, regression results of models that use the optimum target leverage and the conclusions drawn from the findings are sensitive to the model's proxy. Of the proxies that are commonly used in the literature, the moving average debt measure exhibits characteristics that are most consistent with the theoretical optimal leverage ratio.     

The relative influence of competitive intensity and business strategy on the relationship between financial leverage and performance

This study empirically investigates the effects of competitive intensity and business strategy on the relationship between financial leverage and the performance of firms. Based on a sample of US manufacturing firms, this study confirms the hypothesis that the cost of debt is higher for product differentiation firms than cost leadership firms. Furthermore, the results indicate that competitive intensity has a negative effect on the leverage-performance relationship, suggesting that competition acts as a substitute for debt in limiting manager's opportunistic behavior. These findings reinforce the need to consider moderating factors such as strategic choice and the environment in which a firm operates when investigating the effects of leverage on performance.     

A resolution of the distress risk and leverage puzzles in the cross section of stock returns

We revisit findings that returns are negatively related to financial distress intensity and leverage. These are puzzles under frictionless capital markets assumptions but are consistent with optimizing firms that differ in their exposure to financial distress costs. Firms with high costs choose low leverage to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states. Empirical results are consistent with this explanation. The return premiums to low leverage and low distress are significant in raw returns, and even stronger in risk-adjusted returns. When in distress, low-leverage firms suffer more than high-leverage firms as measured by a deterioration in accounting operating performance and heightened exposure to systematic risk. The connection between return premiums and distress costs is apparent in subperiod evidence. Both are small or insignificant prior to 1980 and larger and significant thereafter.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies

This paper focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008 period between firms with levered owners and other firms. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the pyramidal entities.     

Employee representation and financial leverage

We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.     

Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How It Informs About Profitability and Price-to-Book Ratios

This paper presents a financial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage that arises in financing activities from leverage that arises in operations. The analysis yields two leveraging equations, one for borrowing to finance operations and one for borrowing in the course of operations. These leveraging equations describe how the two types of leverage affect book rates of return on equity. An empirical analysis shows that the financial statement analysis explains cross-sectional differences in current and future rates of return as well as price-to-book ratios, which are based on expected rates of return on equity. The paper therefore concludes that balance sheet line items for operating liabilities are priced differently than those dealing with financing liabilities. Accordingly, financial statement analysis that distinguishes the two types of liabilities informs on future profitability and aids in the evaluation of appropriate price-to-book ratios.     

Financial accounting return on investment and financial leverage

This note presents a method for teaching the concept of financial leverage and its relationship to accounting rates of return. Typically, financial leverage is only briefly mentioned in introductory accounting textbooks, and it is rarely related explicitly to rates of return on total assets and on common stockholders' equity. Yet the concept is an important one for financial managers. We have developed and class tested a numerical illustration to explain in a conceptually sound manner why the two rates of return differ. Accounting instructors who share our view that financial leverage should be covered more thoroughly in the introductory accounting course will find this example to be a useful supplement. The example can also be used as a way to develop critical thinking skills or to enhance a user orientation.     

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility – and subsequent costs – of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.     

Job satisfaction and firm leverage: Evidence from the “China’s Best Employer Award 100” winners

In this study, we examine the relationship between job satisfaction and firm leverage using a sample of Chinese listed firms. We find that in a sample of “China’s 100 Best Employers Award” winners during 2011–2017, job satisfaction is negatively associated with firm leverage. The effect is more pronounced in firms with higher distress risk and operating in human capital intensive industries. We confirm the validity of the main findings using a matched sample and a series of robustness checks. Overall, our results indicate that firms can credibly demonstrate their commitment to stakeholders and re-shape their capital structure by improving job satisfaction.