Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls

I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax‐related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial reporting objectives. Results indicate that, on average, firms with a tax‐related ICW have a 4 percent higher three‐year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses. Further estimates reveal that this negative relation stems from pervasive, company‐level tax ICWs. Analysis of remediation suggests a causal link. I find that after remediating tax‐related ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax avoidance in the future. Broadly, these findings support that internal control quality represents a proxy for internal governance, and thus the strength of alignment between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, tax‐related internal controls represent an important underlying determinant of tax avoidance with significant cash flow effects, and implications beyond financial reporting.     

Internal Control over Financial Reporting and the Safeguarding of Corporate Resources: Evidence from the Value of Cash Holdings

We test whether internal control weaknesses (ICWs) endanger cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash. Our results indicate that investors value liquid assets in ICW firms substantially less than they do in non‐ICW firms. The negative valuation effect of weak internal control mainly concentrates on ICWs related to the control environment or overall financial reporting process. While firms remediating ICWs reverse the value loss from holding cash, firms whose internal control deteriorates or remains ineffective exhibit a lower value of cash. The marginal effect of ICWs on the value of cash remains significant after controlling for existing governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism, highlighting a unique governance role of internal control in mitigating unresolved agency problems and safeguarding corporate resources.     

Acquirer Internal Control Weaknesses in the Market for Corporate Control

This paper examines how disclosures regarding internal controls, required by sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), affect the market for corporate control. We hypothesize that acquirers with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) make suboptimal acquisition decisions based on poor‐quality information generated by their ineffective controls over financial reporting. We expect that such acquirers will be more likely to misestimate the value of their targets or the potential synergies from mergers, thereby overpaying for completed deals. Using a treatment sample of acquisitions made by acquirers that have disclosed ICWs and two matched control samples without ICW disclosures, we document that ICW acquirers experience a substantially more negative market response to acquisition announcements and have lower future performance than the two matched control samples without ICW disclosures. Overall, our results suggest that ineffective internal controls hinder decision making related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A).     

When did firms become more different? Time-varying firm-specific volatility in Japan

We document how firm-specific volatility in sales, earnings and employment growth evolved year by year in Japan. Our volatility measure also indicates the evolution of firm turnover. We find that patterns in firm-specific volatility have changed when macroeconomic circumstances have. Firm turnover declined during the economic stagnation of 1991–1997. The deep downturn of fiscal years 1998–2002 coincided with a substantial increase in turnover in market, profit and employment shares. Firm volatility tended to decline during the recovery after 2002. We assess whether the rise in firm turnover and deep downturn in 1998–2002 indicate that after a period of stagnation, weak firms were finally allowed to shrink or fail. Our evidence suggests that the widening in the firm growth distribution at that time did not reflect weak firms shrinking relative to healthy firms, indicating that the two recessions in 1998–2002 were not “cleansing”.     

The productivity impacts of energy efficiency programs in developing countries: Evidence from iron and steel firms in China

We study the impact of a national energy efficiency program on total factor productivity (TFP) growth in firms in China's iron and steel industry. Using detailed firm-level survey data and multiple approaches to estimate program effects, we find participating firms experienced greater annualized TFP change. Our base specification estimates the program increased annual TFP growth by 3.1 percentage points, implying an annual private benefit of 148.7 million RMB/year per firm, with approximately equal contributions from technical change and scale efficiency change. Our results suggest that firms undervalued energy efficiency investments prior to the start of the program.     

Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐FIN No. 48 period.     

Employee Stock Option Fair‐Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?*

We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation‐model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair‐value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value‐increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair‐value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy.     

Balance Sheet Conservatism and Debt Contracting

We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

Uncertainty and Compensation Design in Strategic Interfirm Contracts

In strategic outsourcing contracts, a substantial portion of implementation occurs at the client's premises and requires integration of effort between the vendor and the client. Compensation design in such contracts involves trade-offs between the higher (lower) incentive properties of fixed-price (cost-plus) contracts and their higher (lower) ex ante contracting and ex post adaptation costs. Uncertainty influences these trade-offs and affects compensation design. We explore the compensation implications of two types of uncertainty—volatility and ambiguity—which are reflected in the client's accounting measures. Volatility reflects the unpredictability of changes in the future environment, which makes it difficult to contractually specify future contingencies. Ambiguity reflects lack of consensus about the nature, drivers, and value effects of uncertainty, which makes it difficult to contractually specify responses to contingencies if and when they occur. Volatility increases the likelihood of ex post adaptation costs, while ambiguity increases ex ante contracting costs; therefore, volatility and ambiguity decrease the attractiveness of fixed-price contracts. We use accounting and market measures to calibrate volatility and ambiguity and examine their implications for compensation design and ex post renegotiation. Analysis of archival data for 455 strategic outsourcing contracts valued over $15 million indicates that volatility and ambiguity influence contract compensation design and renegotiation likelihood. These results hold even after controlling for asset specificity, task complexity, and relational factors. We conclude that accounting measures can provide signals of volatility and ambiguity and thereby influence compensation design in strategic interfirm contracts.     

Internal Control and Operational Efficiency

In this study, we examine whether internal control over financial reporting affects firm operational efficiency. We find that operational efficiency, derived from frontier analysis, is significantly lower among firms with material weaknesses in internal control relative to firms without such weaknesses. We also find that the remediation of material weaknesses leads to an improvement in operational efficiency. Additional analyses indicate that the negative effect of material weaknesses on operational efficiency is stronger for firms with a greater demand for higher quality information for decision making, for weaknesses that are deemed to be more severe, and to a certain extent, for smaller firms. Overall, our study extends the literature by presenting systematic evidence on the effect of effective internal control on operational efficiency and informs the debate over the costs and benefits of the internal control reporting requirements under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002.     

Home Country Investor Protection,Ownership Structure and Cross‐Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX‐Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures

We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX‐mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICDs during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICDs in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.     

Benefits and Costs of Auditor's Assurance: Evidence from the Review of Quarterly Financial Statements

Even though there is a worldwide consensus as to the necessity of an audit of annual financial statements for public companies, there is divergence of views as to the review of interim financial statements. While some jurisdictions make it mandatory (e.g., Australia, France, United States), others allow the review without requiring it (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom). Using a sample of companies listed in Canada, we examine the costs associated with these reviews and the benefits they generate in terms of improvement in the quality of interim financial statements for the years 2004 and 2005. Controlling for the decision to purchase the reviews, we find that audit fees are 18 percent higher for firms with interim reviews and, contrary to many regulators' assumption, we find no evidence that this cost increase is proportionally higher for smaller firms. Regarding the benefits of interim reviews, we find no significant association between either accruals‐ or nonaccruals‐based measures of earnings management and the fact that the interim statements are reviewed by the auditor, neither in the interim reports nor in those of the fourth quarter. The results suggest that auditors' involvement with interim reports may not be as effective as previously thought at controlling the quality of interim financial statements.     

The Role of Pension Business Benefits in Institutional Block Ownership and Corporate Governance*

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi-exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension-providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.     

Whistleblowing Allegations,Audit Fees,and Internal Control Deficiencies*

We investigate whether audit fees and auditors' opinions on internal controls are associated with whistleblowing allegations externally filed to regulatory agencies. We find that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations have significantly higher audit fees, regardless of the substance of these allegations, whereas an auditor is more likely to issue an adverse opinion on internal controls when the allegation is substantiated, rather than frivolous. Further, our findings suggest that auditors are involved in the auditing of whistleblowing when the allegation is still in an internal stage. We also show that firms subject to external whistleblowing allegations have a lower likelihood of restating financial statements prepared in the allegation year when greater audit effort is made in that year. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of auditors in the context of whistleblowing.     

Do Chinese publicly listed companies adjust their capital structure toward a target level?

We study the determinants of capital structure for 650 Chinese publicly listed companies over the period from 1999 to 2004. We posit that a firm's decision on capital structure is inherently dynamic, and estimate the resulting dynamic capital structure model. The main findings of the paper are as follows: (i) Chinese firms adjust toward an equilibrium level of debt ratio in a given year at a very slow rate; (ii) firm size, tangibility and state shareholdings are positively associated with firm's leverage ratio, while profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth and volatility are negatively related to firm's leverage ratio; (iii) lagged profitability has a negligibly small and positive impact on firm's leverage ratio; (iv) for a firm experiencing a large reduction in its leverage ratio only about 11% of the discrepancy between its desired and actual leverage level is eliminated within a year (compared to more than 18% for full firm sample); (v) extending the basic model to allow for both the target level and the speed of adjustment to be endogenously determined, we find that Chinese firms tend to adjust faster if they are farther away from the equilibrium leverage level; and lastly (vi) extending the sample period to cover the earlier periods starting from 1993, when the Chinese stock markets were first developed, results in a slower speed of adjustment for firms in the below target sample.     

Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management: UK Evidence*

Using a sample of UK firms for the period 1996‐98, we provide empirical evidence on the relation between nonaudit services (NAS) purchase and three proxies for earnings management: (1) the likelihood that client firm accounting practices during the sample period were publicly criticized or subject to regulatory investigation; (2) the likelihood that client firms were required to restate prior financial statements or adjust current year results upon adoption of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 12, which was intended to curb opportunistic use of provisions; and (3) the mean absolute value of client discretionary working capital accruals over the sample period. The level of NAS purchase is measured, alternatively, as (1) the ratio of nonaudit to total auditor fees, (2) the natural log of NAS fees, and (3) the decile rank of a particular client's NAS fees given all NAS fees received by the audit firm practice office. With one exception, we find that all three measures of earnings management are positively and significantly associated with the three measures of NAS purchase.     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

Audit Partner Tenure and Internal Control Reporting Quality: U.S. Evidence from the Not‐For‐Profit Sector

This study examines the effects of audit partner tenure and audit partner changes on internal control reporting quality for large U.S. not‐for‐profit (NFP) organizations. Regulators contend that audit partners lose their objectivity over successive audits, reducing audit quality. A large body of research has examined this issue, primarily in non‐U.S. jurisdictions, with mixed results. We examine the associations between audit partner tenure and audit partner changes and the incidence of reported internal control deficiencies (ICDs), the quality of internal control reports (following PCAOB audit quality indicators), and the severity of reported ICDs. We find negative associations between audit partner tenure and the incidence of reported ICDs, the quality of internal control reports, and the severity of reported ICDs. Together, these findings indicate that internal control reporting quality deteriorates with audit partner tenure. However, we find no association between audit partner changes and internal control reporting, which is consistent with partners lacking client specific knowledge in their first year with a client. Finally, we find no association between either audit partner tenure or changes and the likelihood of remediation. Our findings contribute large‐sample U.S. evidence on the association between audit partner tenure and internal control reporting quality and provide useful information to government regulators, NFP boards charged with the oversight of the external auditor and internal controls, and NFP stakeholders.     

How Quickly Do Firms Adjust to Optimal Levels of Tax Avoidance?

The trade‐off literature asserts that managers weigh the direct benefits of tax avoidance against the associated nontax costs. This literature implies each firm has a unique optimal level of tax avoidance that balances these costs and benefits. Our study is the first to document how quickly the average firm moves toward its optimal level of tax avoidance. We find that the typical firm converges toward its optimum at a rate that ranges from approximately 69 to 84 percent over a three‐year period, depending upon model specifications. Consistent with asymmetric levels of frictions across the tax avoidance distribution, we find the speed of adjustment is greater for firms below their optimal level of tax avoidance than for firms above. We perform additional cross‐sectional analyses to provide insight into some of the frictions that prevent firms from adjusting completely to their optimal level of tax avoidance. We generally find growth firms exhibit slower adjustment speeds and provide limited evidence that both multinational firms and income‐mobile firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds.