Gas transportation, geopolitics and future market structure

Recent studies have shown the important role of geography, politics and technology for the evolution of markets for natural gas. Gas market differs from other markets due to high share of transport and infrastructure costs. Since investment is location specific, it involves also geopolitical aspects as a consequence. Future market structure becomes path dependent on the investment decisions, particularly in gas infrastructure (pipelines and LNG). Another important aspect that shapes future gas market is heterogeneity in reserve-production ratios across gas producing countries that will eventually lead to the emergence of narrow oligopoly formed by countries with the largest reserves: Russia, Iran and Qatar. The goal of this paper is to analyse a long run gas game. There exist several time scales, and by backward induction we arrive at the conclusion that some time during the 21st century (we name it long run) there will be an oligopoly consisting of only three major gas reserve holders: Russia (26%), Iran (15%) and Qatar (14%). They will face the demand from three major gas importers: EU, USA and Core Asia. While the development paths and market structures are highly uncertain in the middle run (when temporal competition with rivals having 3% or less of gas reserves is feasible), the cloud of uncertainty shrinks in the long run. But investment strategies of major players in the middle run will determine the topology of gas infrastructure in the long run. All the players have a vector of strategic choices where geography, politics and technology set their limitations. Putting it in a simple formal framework, we can say that players choose: intensity of exploitation and shares of investment in transport infrastructure (LNG and location-specific pipelines). Geographical analysis of gas fields of Russia shows that it has moderate flexibility, but still can control the future share of LNG and pipeline flows to Europe and Asia. Pipelines to EU are slightly preferred to pipelines to Asia but political aspects may play crucial role. Qatar is likely to invest only in LNG, but has the flexibility in the speed of its field exploitation (it may be lower that for Russia). Iran has the highest technological and geographical freedom in choices. Future market structures for gas can vary from oligopolistic to monopolistic–monopsonistic relationship, with possibly different prices.     

Sequential location games

We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and—under some additional restrictions—hump‐shaped and U‐shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner‐take‐all competition, trade‐offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.     

Market Cycles and the Performance of Relative Strength Strategies

We study the effect of market cycles on both medium‐run and long‐run relative strength trading strategies. We find that payoffs for both strategies tend to be relatively higher within a market state (rising or falling markets), but substantially lower over transitions between states. Since shorter duration strategies are relatively less likely to include market transitions, our results help reconcile the puzzling fact that medium‐run strategies are profitable, but long‐run strategies are not. We find that the market's cross‐sectional return dispersion: 1) tends to be higher around market transitions, and 2) is negatively related to the subsequent payoffs for both medium‐run and long‐run strategies.     

Land-releasing policy and welfare in a dual economy

This article examines a variety of impacts of the policy of releasing public land for agricultural in the Harris-Todaro economy for the short run as well as the long run. We contrast the effects for the economy under import quotas versus tariffs. Our analysis suggests that the land-grant policy in the presence of a tariff is effective in promoting welfare for both the short run and the long run. However, the policy in the presence of an import quota may not be effective in the long run.     

The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Short- and Long-run Response to Cash Distributions

We examine both the short‐run and long‐run responses to the following corporate cash flow transactions: dividend increases and decreases, dividend initiations, and tender offer repurchases. Our focus is the short‐run and long‐run effects of managerial ownership. We hypothesize that ownership plays an important role in explaining the announcement effects for these events, owing to signaling effects and the reduction of agency problems. Our short‐run results accord well with the earlier work on announcement effects for these events and show that firms with high insider ownership exhibit higher excess returns. Our long‐term results indicate a drift over a three‐year period following the announcement, with the excess returns for the high insider‐ownership group becoming more pronounced.     

Long‐Run Risk and Its Implications for the Equity Premium Puzzle: New Evidence from a Multivariate Framework

This paper investigates the empirical evidence of long‐run risk and its implications for the equity premium puzzle. We find that the long‐run risk model is generally weakly identified and that standard inferences tend to underestimate the uncertainty of long‐run risk. We extend the LM‐type test of Ma and Nelson (2010) that remains valid under weak identification to the bivariate VARMA‐GARCH model of consumption and dividend growth. The results cast doubt on the validity of long‐run risk as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle. We also evaluate the approach of Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2007a), which extracts long‐run risk by regressing consumption growth and its volatility on predictive variables. The results using the Bonferroni Q‐test of Campbell and Yogo (2006) suggest that consumption and dividend growth are generally unpredictable by the price‐dividend ratio and risk‐free rate. This casts doubt on the validity of the BKY approach.     

Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

STOCK PRICES AND INFLATION

Numerous empirical studies establish that inflation has a negative short‐run effect on stock returns but few studies report a positive, long‐run Fisher effect for stock returns. Using stock price and goods price data from six industrial countries, we show that long‐run Fisher elasticities of stock prices with respect to goods prices exceed unity and range from 1.04 to 1.65, which tends to support the Fisher effect. We also find that the time path of the response of stock prices to a shock in goods prices exhibits an initial negative response, which turns positive over longer horizons. These results help reconcile previous short‐run and long‐run empirical evidence on stock returns and inflation. Also, they reveal that stock prices have a long memory with respect to inflation shocks, such that investors should expect stocks to be a good inflation hedge over a long holding period. JEL Classification: G12     

Consolidation and value creation in the insurance industry: The role of governance

We examine the long run performance of M&A transactions in the property–liability insurance industry. We specifically investigate whether such transactions create value for the bidders’ shareholders, and assess how corporate governance mechanisms, internal and external, affect such performance. Our results show that M&A create value in the long run as buy and hold abnormal returns are positive and significant after 3 years. While tender offers appear to be more profitable than mergers, our multivariate evidence does not support the conjecture that domestic transactions create more value than cross-border transactions. Furthermore, positive returns are significantly higher for frequent acquirers and in countries where investor protection is weaker. Internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence, and CEO share ownership, are also significant determinants of the long run positive performance of bidders.     

Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle

This paper explores the business cycle implications of financial distress and bankruptcy law. We find that due to the presence of financial imperfections the effect of liquidations on the price of capital goods can generate endogenous fluctuations. We show that a law reform that ‘softens’ bankruptcy law may increase the amplitude of the cycle in the long run. In contrast, a policy of bailing out businesses during the bust or actively managing the interest rate across the cycle could stabilize the economy in the long run. A comprehensive welfare analysis of these policies is provided as well.      

Collusion under monitoring of sales

Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price‐fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas. In practice, cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.     

Catastrophic Losses and Insurer Profitability: Evidence From 9/11

We examine the effects of 9/11 on the insurance industry, hypothesizing a short‐run claim effect, resulting from insufficient premium ex ante for catastrophic losses, and a long‐run growth effect, resulting from ex post insurance supply reductions and risk updating. Following Yoon and Starks (1995) we use short‐ and long‐run abnormal forecast revisions to measure both effects, analyzing them as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that firm type, loss estimates, reinsurance use, and tax position are important determinants of the short‐run position. Firm type, loss estimates, financial strength, underwriting risk, and reinsurance are key determinants of the firm's long‐run position.     

Numerical methods for dynamic Bertrand oligopoly and American options under regime switching

Bertrand oligopolies are competitive markets in which a small number of firms producing similar goods use price as their strategic variable. In particular, each firm wants to determine the optimal price that maximizes its expected discounted lifetime profit. The oligopoly problem can be modeled as nonzero-sum games which can be formulated as systems of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) partial differential equations (PDEs). In this paper, we propose fully implicit, positive coefficient finite difference schemes that converge to the viscosity solution for the HJB PDE from dynamic Bertrand monopoly and the two-dimensional HJB system from dynamic Bertrand duopoly. Furthermore, we develop fast multigrid methods for solving these systems of discrete nonlinear HJB PDEs. The new multigrid methods are general and can be applied to other systems of HJB and HJB-Isaacs PDEs arising from American options under regime switching and American options with unequal lending/borrowing rates and stock borrowing fees under regime switching, respectively. We provide a theoretical analysis for the smoother, restriction and interpolation operators of the multigrid methods. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by numerical examples from the dynamic Bertrand problem and pricing American options under regime switching.     

The impacts of futures trading on volatility and volatility asymmetry of Bitcoin returns

The impact of Bitcoin futures introduction on the underlying Bitcoin volatility has been a controversial topic. Conflicting results had been obtained from different sample periods and methodologies. To address this debate, this study examines the impact of futures trading on volatility and volatility asymmetry of Bitcoin returns in the short and long run. Using exponential GARCH models, we introduce a dummy in the variance equation to capture the changes in the volatility after the introduction of Bitcoin futures. We find that after the introduction, spot return volatility decreases in the short run, but increases in the long run. Besides, in the short run, there exists an inverse leverage effect before and after the introduction; in the long run, the inverse leverage effect before the introduction changes to a usual level effect after the introduction. Finally, we examine whether greater futures trading activity, proxied by trading volume and open interest, is associated with greater Bitcoin volatility. To do so, we decompose each proxy into expected and unexpected components and document that, in the long run, Bitcoin volatility covaries positively with unexpected futures trading volume, but negatively with unexpected futures open interest.     

A tale of values-driven and profit-seeking social investors

The segmentation of the socially responsible investing (SRI) movement with a values-versus-profit orientation solves the puzzling evidence that both socially responsible and controversial stocks produce superior returns. We derive that the segment of values-driven investors primarily uses “negative” screens to avoid controversial stocks, while the profit-driven segment uses “positive” screens. As the result of an empirical analysis over the period 1992-2008, we base our segmentation on investment screens that help us to examine whether values affect prices. We find that, although the profit-driven segment earns abnormal returns in the short run, these profit-generating opportunities do not persist in the long run for SRI stocks. However, our conclusions highlight the observation that different views on SRI can be complementary in the short run.     

Modeling Space Market Dynamics: An Illustration Using Panel Data for US Retail

Real estate research has a long and extensive history of analyzing space market dynamics. Nonetheless, two areas have been under researched. Regional panels of data have been rarely analyzed. Moreover, due to data constraints, the retail market has been studied much less than other market segments. This paper addresses both of these topics through an analysis of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level panel data. Our study covers almost three decades of annual retail data for 11 of the largest MSAs of the United States. We estimate a long run rent model and use Error Correction Models for short run rent, vacancy and supply adjustments. We test for differences in local market behavior in both the long run equilibrium relationships and in the short run adjustment processes. We identify two groups of similar markets.     

Irreversible investment in oligopoly

We take a general perspective on capital accumulation games with open loop strategies, as they have been formalized by Back and Paulsen (Rev. Financ. Stud. 22, 4531–4552, 2009). With such strategies, the optimization problems of the individual players are of the monotone follower type. Consequently, one can adapt available methods, in particular the approach of Bank (SIAM J. Control Optim. 44, 1529–1541, 2005). We obtain consistency in equilibrium by proving that with common assumptions from the oligopoly literature on instantaneous revenue, equilibrium determination is equivalent to solving a single monotone follower problem. In the unique open loop equilibrium, only the currently smallest firms invest. This result is valid for arbitrary initial capital levels and general stochastic shock processes, which may be non-Markovian and include jumps. We explicitly solve an example, the specification of Grenadier (Rev. Financ. Stud. 15, 691–721, 2002) with a Lévy process.     

On the Instability of Long‐Run Money Demand and the Welfare Cost of Inflation in the United States

We evaluate the policy implications of measuring the welfare cost of inflation accounting for instabilities in the long‐run money demand for the United States over the period 1900–2013. We extend the analysis and reassess the results reported in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009), also considering the recent theoretical contributions of Lucas and Nicolini (2015) and Berentsen, Huber, and Marchesiani (2015). Breaks in the long‐run money demand give rise to regime‐dependent welfare cost estimates. We find that the welfare cost is about 0.1% of annual income over 1976–2013, as compared to 0.8% over 1945–75. Overall, these values are substantially lower than those reported in the literature.     

Board Share‐Ownership and Takeover Performance

Abstract:   We investigate the relation between takeover performance and board share‐ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 363 UK takeovers completed in the period 1985–96. In investigating this relationship we pay particular attention to the composition of board shareholdings as well as their size. Thus, in addition to the analysis of total board holdings, we analyse the separate impact of CEO shareholdings and of the pattern of non‐executive and executive holdings within the board. In addition to our detailed examination of board holdings we assess the impact of non‐board holdings. Our analysis controls for a number of non‐shareholding constraints on discretionary director behaviour and for a variety of other influences on takeover outcomes including: the means of payment; acquirer size and market to book value; the relative size of the acquirer and the target; the nature of the bid in terms of hostility and industrial direction; and the pre‐takeover performance of the acquiring company. We assess performance in terms of announcement returns, long run share returns and a portfolio of accounting measures. We find evidence that overall board ownership has a strong positive impact on long run share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. However, much stronger effects are found when the overall board measure is split into CEO, executive, and non‐executive directors. We find strong evidence of a positive relation between takeover performance and CEO ownership, which holds for both long run returns and operating performance measures. This finding is robust to controlling for other factors that determine takeover performance and holds in a two stage least squares framework that controls for endogeneity effects. Shareholdings of other executive directors, non‐executive directors, and non‐board holdings are found to have no significant effect on takeover performance.     

Cross-listing and subsequent delisting in foreign markets

Employing a sample of stocks cross-listed and subsequently delisted from foreign markets, we examine the consequences of delisting to investors in terms of price, risk, and liquidity. We also provide a direct comparison between the firm's performance after a foreign cross-listing and after its subsequent delisting. We find a positive cross-listing and negative delisting effect on stock price, both of which dissipate in the long run. No significant changes in the market risk are found for either event. Foreign cross-listing and delisting are associated with increasing and decreasing long term trading volume respectively. Further analysis reveals that firms delist in response to low host market return and low firm trading volume in the host market. The changes in liquidity and market risk from delisting relate those from cross-listing. Finally, our results show that the bonding hypothesis fails to explain the listing premium and the delisting loss.