Audits of Complex Estimates as Verification of Management Numbers: How Institutional Pressures Shape Practice

Auditors and regulators have invested heavily in improving audits of estimates in recent years, but problems in this area persist. We examine the causes of these problems and why they persist. To do so, we interview 24 very experienced auditors about how they audit complex accounting estimates such as fair values and impairments and what problems they experience in the process. We find that auditors overwhelmingly choose to audit the details of management's estimate rather than use other allowable approaches. The steps auditors describe and the language they use to describe those steps indicate that they follow a process of verifying individual elements of management's assertions on a piecemeal basis, resulting in overreliance on management's process, rather than engaging in a critical analysis of the overall estimate. The problems that auditors identify are consistent with this view, and include failures to notice inconsistencies among the estimate and other internal data or external conditions and overreliance on specialists to identify, evaluate, and challenge critical assumptions. We interpret these processes and problems using institutional theory and identify two root causes: standards' and firm policies' emphasis on verifying management's model, and audit firms' division of knowledge between auditors and specialists. Institutional theory proposes these conventions arise from firms extending use of procedures that are legitimate in one area (i.e., auditing accounts without significant uncertainty) to a new area (i.e., auditing complex estimates), even though they are likely less effective in the new area. These conventions are reinforced by regulators' method of inspection and by firms' reluctance to change methods without a prompt to change to a clearly better method. We argue that these institutionalized conventions thwart auditors' good‐faith attempts to engage in skeptical analysis of estimates. Thus, audit quality problems are likely to persist.     

Some Obscurities in Indonesia's New National Accounts

Indonesia's national accounts are subject to regular revisions. Some of these revisions have resulted in different estimates of GDP on both the output and the expenditure side of the economy in overlapping years. Unfortunately, the explanations accompanying the published national accounts make it difficult to understand the exact reasons why this is so. This article explores the possible explanations. It also discusses the consequences of changes to the base year used in the calculation of constant price series. The paper draws attention to several new national accounting initiatives developed at Indonesia's Central Statistics Agency that underscore the Agency's advanced professionalism in national accounting. It concludes with a call for greater openness in explaining national accounting procedures.     

The Role of Informal Controls and a Bargaining Opponent's Emotions on Transfer Pricing Judgments

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.     

How Do Auditors Address Control Deficiencies that Bias Accounting Estimates?

Auditors commonly rely on reviewing management's estimation process to audit accounting estimates. When control deficiencies bias the estimation process by creating omissions of critical inputs, standards require that auditors replace or supplement review of management's estimation process with tests that can identify the omissions. Importantly, overreliance on reviewing management's estimation process when it has been biased by a control deficiency can result in auditor acceptance of an inappropriate accounting estimate. We use an experiment to examine whether auditors recognize the insufficiency of increased sampling of a biased estimation process and their selection of alternative tests to replace or supplement review of the biased estimation process. We find that a significant minority (33 percent) of Big 4 senior auditors erroneously increase tests of management's biased estimation process. We also find that auditors have difficulty selecting alternative tests to replace or supplement review of management's biased estimation process, frequently choosing tests that are either ineffective or inefficient. Our findings suggest that auditors often reach inappropriate judgments about the capability of audit evidence to address control deficiencies and that nonsampling risk (judgment risk) may be a larger risk than auditors realize.     

Vertical Pay Dispersion,Peer Observability,and Misreporting in a Participative Budgeting Setting

In this study, we examine the joint effect of vertical pay dispersion and peer observability on subordinates' misreporting choices. We adopt a participative budgeting setting in which two subordinates report to one superior, and we manipulate vertical pay dispersion (low/high) and peer observability (absent/present). Subordinates have private information about actual project costs and can over-report project costs to the superior without detection and thus create budgetary slack. When a peer's reporting choices are observable, we predict and find that peer reporting choices have an asymmetric influence on the focal subordinates' reporting choices, and this asymmetric influence depends on the level of vertical pay dispersion. Specifically, we find that when vertical pay dispersion is low, subordinates who observe peer reports containing low slack misreport less, whereas observing peer reports that contain high slack has no significant effect. However, when vertical pay dispersion is high, subordinates who observe peer reports containing high slack misreport more, whereas observing peer reports that contain low slack has no significant effect. Driven by these asymmetric effects, subordinates misreport less in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is low and misreport more in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is high. Overall, our findings suggest that when a firm has a more egalitarian pay structure (i.e., low vertical pay dispersion), an open information policy is conducive to a more honest reporting environment, whereas under a more hierarchical pay structure (i.e., high vertical pay dispersion), open information policies can compromise the honesty of subordinates' reports.     

The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting

Vertical pay dispersion is the difference in pay across different hierarchical levels within an organization (Milkovich and Newman 1996 ). While vertical pay dispersion may be useful in attracting, retaining, and motivating highly skilled employees (Lazear and Rosen 1981 ; Lazear 1995 ; Prendergast 1999 ), our study investigates a potential disadvantage; specifically, the negative impact of perceived unfairness of vertical pay dispersion on employees' budgeting decisions. We predict and find that high vertical pay dispersion motivates subordinates to misreport costs to a greater extent than low vertical pay dispersion. Furthermore, we predict and find that superiors, on average, exercise more lenient cost controls when vertical pay dispersion is high rather than low. Supplemental analysis indicates superiors are more lenient on average because of their aversion to inequity caused by vertical pay dispersion. Our results suggest that high vertical pay dispersion can compromise the overall corporate budgeting environment, where higher levels of misreporting by subordinates goes unchecked by superiors.     

CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay

Prior studies on Japanese executive compensation have been constrained by the lack of longitudinal data on individual CEO pay. Using unique 10-year panel data on individual CEO's salary and bonus of Japanese firms from 1986 to 1995, we present the first estimates on pay-performance relations for Japanese CEO compensation. Specifically we find consistently that Japanese CEO's cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting measures), and that the “semi-elasticity” of CEO's cash compensation with respect to ROA is 1.3 to 1.4, which is in general agreement with prior estimates elsewhere. As such, our estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually defunct with regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting profitability. On the other hand, to be consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance that tends to downplay the role of shareholders and stress the role of banks and employees, we find that stock market performance tends to play a less important role in the determination of Japanese CEO compensation. Finally, we find that the bonus system makes CEO compensation more responsive to firm performance in Japan. The finding is in contrast to the literature on compensation for regular employees in Japan which often argues that bonus is a disguised base wage. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (1) (2006) 1–19.     

Additional Information in Accounting Reports: Effects on Management Decisions and Subjective Performance Evaluations Under Causal Ambiguity

Organizations have often been criticized for reliance on a single item of accounting information (e.g., profit) in evaluating performance, because of its incompleteness. We provide theory‐based experimental evidence that under frequently occurring performance‐evaluation conditions (subjective performance evaluation, causal ambiguity, and individual differences in cognitive ability, knowledge, and/or motivation that lead to different interpretations of information), reliance on a single item of accounting information (profit), rather than profit plus additional (e.g., nonfinancial or external) information, can provide two potential benefits which offset the costs of information incompleteness. First, subordinates are more likely to make the management decisions that superiors will evaluate and reward highly—that is, there are fewer coordination failures in management decisions. Second, even after controlling for the presence or absence of coordination failures, subordinates experience less negative surprise about their performance evaluations.     

Do Auditors Accurately Predict Litigation and Reputation Consequences of Inaccurate Accounting Estimates?

To effectively manage audit risk, auditors must correctly predict the potential litigation and reputation consequences associated with inaccurate accounting estimates. Accurate predictions are critical because underestimation of negative consequences leads to excess legal exposure and overestimation leads to overauditing. Our paper examines whether auditors correctly anticipate these litigation and reputation outcomes. We provide manager‐ and partner‐level auditors with case facts from an auditor negligence lawsuit and ask them to predict the proportion of juries that will return verdicts against their firm. We then compare auditors' predictions to the actual verdicts we observe when we provide the same set of case facts to mock jurors who deliberate as part of juries. We find that auditors overestimate the likelihood of negligence verdicts, especially when audit quality is relatively high. Our supplemental measures help explain the reasons for this overestimation: auditors tend to underestimate jurors' perceptions of audit quality and willingness to attribute inaccurate estimates to situational factors. Finally, we examine auditors' predictions about how a news article about the litigation will affect their reputation with the general public. Similar to our litigation results, we find that auditors tend to overestimate the article's negative impact on auditor reputation. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors overestimate litigation and reputation consequences resulting from inaccurate accounting estimates. This overestimation is consequential as it leads to inefficient allocation of audit resources.     

Improving Auditors' Consideration of Evidence Contradicting Management's Estimate Assumptions

Auditors have difficulty evaluating the assumptions underlying management's estimates. One source of these problems is that auditors appear to dismiss evidence contradicting management's assumptions because their initial preference to support management's accounting biases their preliminary conclusions and, thus, their interpretation of evidence. We experimentally examine whether auditors with a balanced focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports and contradicts their preliminary conclusion) are less likely to dismiss evidence that contradicts management's assumptions than auditors with a supporting focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports their preliminary conclusion). We expect and find that, compared with auditors with a supporting focus, auditors with a balanced focus create documentation that is less dismissive of evidence contradicting management's estimate. Importantly, a balanced focus changes auditors' cognition and affects how auditors interpret contradicting evidence rather than merely increasing their documentation of this evidence. The effects of reduced dismissiveness persist to improve auditors' evaluations of a biased estimate and subsequent actions, improving audit quality in an important and difficult area.     

Discussion of “The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting”

Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self‐serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay‐level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.     

The Switch-Up: An Examination of Changes in Earnings Management after Receiving SEC Comment Letters

The SEC has long asserted that earnings management practices result in adverse consequences for investors. We examine whether SEC oversight affects firms' accounting quality in terms of earnings management trade-offs. We expect that increased firm-specific regulatory scrutiny, in the form of an SEC comment letter, will induce management to switch from accrual-based earnings management (AEM), which is a main focus of the SEC, to real-activities-based earnings management (REM), which is not likely to be commented on in the SEC's review process. Consistent with our predictions, we find that AEM is lower and REM is higher following the receipt of a comment letter, relative to non-comment-letter years and a propensity-score-matched sample of non-comment-letter firms. However, we do not find a significant difference in total earnings management (i.e., the sum of AEM and REM), suggesting that the higher REM acts as a substitute for lower AEM activity. We further find that our results are driven by accounting comments relating to estimates and accruals and not by classification-only comments, which suggests that a comment letter that does not question specific issues associated with estimates and accruals is not a strong enough signal to induce the firm to change earnings management behavior. Additionally, the shift to REM is attenuated for firms with high institutional ownership. These results collectively suggest that the comment letter process effectively constrains AEM but has the unintended consequence of firms, on average, switching to REM.     

Managing Perceptions of Technical Competence: How Well Do Auditors Know How Others View Them?*

We investigate factors that influence an auditor's accuracy in knowing how subordinates, peers, and superiors view his or her own technical competence (metaperception). Extant literature on reputation management in auditing contexts depicts preparers of audit workpapers as strategic agents (subordinates) who stylize workpapers and engage in behaviors that enhance their reputations with reviewers (superiors). These superiors, in turn, are represented as strategically engaging in coping behaviors in response to such stylization attempts. One of the necessary conditions for auditors to enhance their reputations on a sustainable basis is accurate metaperception. We report the results of an experiment that investigates determinants of auditors' metaperception accuracy. Our participants comprise teams of audit partners, managers, and seniors who work together in the field. Each auditor performs two tasks of varying complexity and then predicts whether other team members can accurately perform the task and how other team members assess his or her performance on the tasks. Results show that accuracy in knowing what others think of one's technical proficiency (metaperception) is generally high, particularly when the predictor auditors are partners and managers; however, metaperception accuracy is asymmetric and varies depending on the predictor auditor, the target auditor being predicted, and task complexity. Implications are discussed.     

Retesting the Separability of China＇s Rural Households

This article retests the separability of China’s rural households in light of growing doubt about the sustainability of high economic growth in China.If a household’s production decisions are "separable "from the household’s consumption decisions,generally this suggests there is no surplus labor.Many scholars aver that China’s surplus rural labor has spurred rapid economic growth,but concerns have arisen as to whether China still has surplus labor available.We investigate this issue using rural household panel data from 1993 to 2009.The regression results confirm that households in rural China have progressed from being non-separable to separable.The estimation results for both the entire country and regions reject the separability hypothesis before 2004 but fail to reject the hypothesis after 2004(with the exception of the central region).These results suggest that China ’s surplus labor supply is dwindling,especially in the eastern and the western regions.The sustainability of China’s high economic growth is questionable in the absence of a large reservoir of surplus rural labor.     

The ASEAN Free Trade Area: Implications for Indonesia's Imports

The Singapore Declaration of 1992, announcing the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), effectively brings down tariff levels on intra-ASEAN trade to 0–5% by the year 2008. This paper estimates the changes in Inonesia's imports that will result from trade creation generated by AFTA. Our results show that Indonesia's imports from other ASEAN partners will increase by 6%, based on 1990 figures. This is far greater than the estimated effects of the existing PTA scheme. However, these results are upper- bound estimates and include only static changes.     

The Role of Auditor Narcissism in Auditor-Client Negotiations: Evidence from China

This paper reports the results of three studies (archival, experimental, and qualitative) designed to examine the effects of auditor narcissism on auditor-client negotiations in China. We contend that narcissistic characteristics fuel auditors' competitiveness and embolden them to stand firm in negotiations, potentially lengthening the negotiation process but leading to more conservative negotiation outcomes. As predicted, our archival results suggest that auditor narcissism is positively associated with audit delay and negatively associated with clients' absolute and positive discretionary accruals. Our experimental results document that narcissistic auditors are more likely to be involved in negotiations that reach an impasse or take longer to resolve and that narcissistic auditors negotiate reported asset values that reflect less aggressive reporting choices. Our qualitative results from field interviews with practicing audit partners corroborate our archival and experimental findings. Overall, the data collected using three different research methods yield consistent results in support of our theory. Our findings shed light on factors that influence audit efficiency and quality in China. We discuss the key cultural and contextual differences between China and the West as well as the implications of these differences for future research.     

The Short‐Term Economic Impact of Levying E‐Tolls on Industries

TERM is used to analyse the short‐term regional economic impact of an increase in industries' transport costs when paying E‐Tolls. Market‐clearing and accounting equations allow regional economies to be represented as an integrated framework, labour adjusts to accommodate increasing transportation costs, and investments change to accommodate capital that is fixed. 1 1 TERM is a bottom‐up CGE model designed for highly disaggregated regional data. The Enormous Regional Model's originate from Horridge et al. ( 2005 ) and are better explained in Horridge ( 2011 ).
We concluded that costs from levying E‐Tolls on industries are small in comparison to total transport costs, and the impact on economic aggregates and most industries are marginal: investments (?0.404%), gross domestic product (GDP) (?0.01) and consumer price inflation (?0.10%). This is true even when considering costs and benefits on industries as well as consumers. Industries that experienced the greatest decline in output were transport, construction and gold. Provinces that are closer to Gauteng and have a greater share of severely impacted industries experienced larger GDP and real income reductions. Mpumalanga's decrease in GDP was 17% greater than Gauteng's.     

Targets' Accounting Conservatism and the Gains from Acquisition*

We present evidence on the effects of target firms' accounting conservatism in a merger and acquisition transaction. Conservatism is distinct from other accounting or accrual quality constructs examined in prior work. Its unique features can lead to potential benefits for both the targets and the acquirers. The use of conservatism by targets reduces acquirers' risks of acquiring underperforming assets or overpaying for well-performing assets. In addition, targets' conservatism results in greater production of verifiable information that can help the acquirers better estimate and realize synergies of the combined firm. Consistent with these arguments, we find that firms with greater accounting conservatism are more likely to receive a bid. We also find that targets' conservatism increases the deal premium and the announcement returns of both the targets and the acquirers, respectively. Overall, these results indicate that conservatism provides benefits to both sellers and buyers of equity in an acquisition transaction.