The effect of external reporting on managerial decision making: Some antecedent conditions

Behavioral research in accounting has largely been concerned with examining the effects accounting information has on its recipients. One area which has received little attention despite its potential importance, however, concerns the process by which the behavior of the information sender may be influenced by the act of communicating information to recipients. Within this paper, it is hypothesized that the decision impact of the act of communicating information is conditioned by the extent to which information senders perceive external recipients as relying on financial accounting information and by the cognitive style of the information sender. Results obtained from a questionnaire distributed to corporate managers and to independent auditors provide support for accepting both of these hypotheses. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Imperfect Information and Credible Communication

This paper analyzes a communication game between a sender and receiver with misaligned incentives. Because of the misalignment, in equilibrium, the sender's privately observed information is not perfectly communicated. We study the relation between the quality of the sender's information and the quality of the information communicated. We establish that the quality of information communicated is a non-monotonic function of the quality of the sender's information, and it is maximized when the sender has imperfect information. We suggest that our model applies to a setting where an equity research analyst communicates information about a firm's value to investors.     

Word-of-mouth communication,noise-driven volatility,and public disclosure

This paper examines how a firm adjusts its disclosure quality in response to technological innovations that improve investors' private information. We show that more precise private information can endogenously amplify supply shocks and, hence, increase noise-driven (or non-fundamental) price volatility. We study how the firm reacts to such changes and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm improves its disclosure quality when investors are informed with better private signals. We then apply our model to study investors' private word-of-mouth communication. Our analysis highlights a “dark side” of word-of-mouth communication and a call for better public disclosure even if private communication is assumed to be unbiased and truthful. We provide empirical predictions regarding how price volatility, market depth, and firms’ disclosure qualities would change as technological innovations, such as social media, facilitate information sharing among investors.     

圣域神地情归西藏

编辑曾听闻西藏“驴友”这样形容：“进藏的那一刻,仿佛走出了地球。”也曾听一位摄影师说：“我不敢去西藏拍,因为我怕拍完了,世间就再也没有值得拍的景色了。”本文作者驻藏工作近5载,对藏域文化有着深厚的情感,希望他对西藏的解读,能将这片传奇的西域圣地真实地还原在大家面前。     

Dynamic information disclosure

We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver‐type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.     

Macroeconomic news and acquirer returns in M&As: The impact of investor alertness

We investigate the extent to which the scheduled release of macroeconomic indicators affects the acquirer's value in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). We find that M&As announced on days of the release of key macroeconomic indicators (i.e. indicator days) realize higher announcement period risk-adjusted returns compared to counterparts announced on non-indicator days. The positive wealth effect is due to the higher market attention on indicator days, which is particularly relevant for smaller M&As that are not usually exposed to significant investor scrutiny. The results hold after addressing self-selection bias concerns. We also find that firms announcing M&As on indicator days are more likely to “listen” to the market's feedback.     

Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

A sender‐receiver game a la Crawford‐Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff‐relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.     

Analyst Reputation,Communication, and Information Acquisition

Earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents' opportunistic behavior. However, a recent study by Morris argued that analysts' (experts') reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors. In this paper, I examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously. Because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future, both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned. In equilibrium, aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts. As a result, investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts' type when the report is proven to be accurate. Therefore, both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully. The paper also derives conditions under which the analysts' reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts' equilibrium precision choices and investors' welfare.     

Costly Information Acquisition,Social Networks,and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence

We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks for incentives to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors' earnings, and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social communication crowds out information production as a result of an agent's temptation to free ride on the signals purchased by her neighbors. Although information exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity, and enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the available information in the market, it fails to improve price informativeness. Net earnings and social welfare are higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.     

Do cryptocurrencies feel the music?

The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of global mood on cryptocurrencies trading activity. Following an original way, we construct a real-time language-free proxy of sentiment on the basis of songs investors choose to listen to. We use a sample of daily data spanning a period of four years and we find that our music-based measure is a reliable proxy of sentiment being responsive to mood swings of individuals. Interestingly, we show that music sentiment is negatively and significantly correlated with contemporaneous trading volume and price volatility, does not suffer from a recall bias, is not driven by any specific cryptocurrency and is robust to listeners' preferences. The effect is significantly persistent to up to four lags for price volatility and reverts at day 3 with respect to trading volume.     

Disagreement and the informativeness of stock returns: The case of acquisition announcements

We examine whether disagreement between managers and investors, in the context of mergers and acquisitions, affects the information contained in bidder returns. We test the disagreement hypothesis, which posits that disagreement causes investors to be less certain about their revaluation of acquiring firms, making bidder returns less informative. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find an inverse relation between bidder returns, which proxy for the degree of disagreement, and the change in the bidders' implied volatility. Also consistent with the hypothesis, we find that the significant inverse relation between bidder returns and the change in implied volatility holds only for cases of negative bidder returns. We test for alternative explanations of this relation, but continue to find robust support for the disagreement hypothesis. Finally, the relation between bidder returns and the likelihood of deal completion is stronger when announcement returns are more informative, suggesting managers “listen to the market” more when the market response is more informative.     

Canadian Financial Reporting Institutions

The recently published Easy Prey Investors: Why Broken Safety Nets Threaten Your Wealth lambastes virtually every aspect of Canadian financial reporting in exceptionally harsh terms. Although the authors' assertions about the implications of financial reporting violations they have seen are mostly unsubstantiated or overblown, publications like theirs are useful if they stimulate continual, thoughtful consideration of Canada's institutional arrangements. I discuss various methodologies for doing this and present some novel evidence indicating that some of the authors' assertions are simply incorrect. Canada's financial reporting institutions, like all institutions, are not perfect, so we must always listen to their critics' suggestions for reforming them; however, our institutions are in much better shape than Easy Prey Investors asserts.     

Voluntary disclosure of financial information by French firms: Does the introduction of IFRS matter?

This paper addresses the relationship between mandatory and voluntary information. The introduction of IFRS in 2005 modified mandatory information requirements and influenced the content and level of the discretionary information disclosed by firms. This background allows us to test whether the complementary or substitution hypothesis dominates. A French firm data panel is used to empirically analyze the consequence of IFRS introduction. Referring to the 2003–2008 period gives a long-term perspective and allows us to identify discretionary communication policies by building a proprietary voluntary disclosure score. We find that voluntary disclosure policies experienced an upward swing with the introduction of IFRS, giving support to the complementary hypothesis. We also demonstrate a dynamic relationship between disclosure and the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. The practical implication of the paper is to show that firms' discretionary communication policies follow both a long-term and a short-term component to meet analysts' demands for information. Our contribution is to refer to a long-term sample in one country where the environment and regulation context is homogenous. Our disclosure score index seems to be a good measure to outline that idiosyncratic communication policies are complex and strategic.     

The influence of partners' known preferences on auditors' sceptical judgements: The moderating role of perceived social influence pressure

We examine the moderating effect of auditors' perceived social influence pressure on the influence of partners' known preferences on auditors' sceptical judgements in China. We invoke social influence theory to provide complementary insights into the driving forces behind auditors' judgements, over and above the pressure arising from accountability. We hypothesise that the influence of partners' known preferences on auditors' sceptical judgements is stronger for auditors who perceive higher social influence pressure than those who perceive lower pressure. Our results support the hypothesis and establish the value of understanding auditors' perceived social influence pressure in managing partners' communication with audit teams.     

Factors influencing Japanese auto suppliers’ predictions about the future of new technologies – An exploratory study of electric vehicles

This article investigates the effects of different characteristics of supplier–customer relationships in the Japanese automotive industry, and how these influence predictions about future technologies of a disruptive nature, such as Electric Vehicles (EVs). We conducted a survey of a broad set of suppliers in the Japanese automotive industry and another survey of suppliers registered with Toyota's two supplier associations. The data were used to analyse the influence of particular relationships and practices on information gathering about new technologies, preparations for R&D and production of new components, and predictions about new technologies. The study shows that suppliers’ R&D intensity and the usage degree of the drawing-supplied parts system lead to predictions favouring the uptake of new technologies. Moreover, communication between automakers and suppliers and arm's-length relationships simultaneously lead to favourable views on the future of new technologies, especially with regard to EVs. Moreover, we find that Japanese-style cooperative relationships, arm's-length relationships, communication between automakers and suppliers, and communication among suppliers all lead to less favourable views on new technology uptake (in this case, EVs). We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice, specifically for EVs.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

Earnings communication conferences and post-earnings-announcement drift: Evidence from China

Earnings communication conferences in China have become the main platform for direct communication between listed firms and individual investors. This study investigates whether hosting an earnings communication conference and its tone affect post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). We find that hosting an earnings communication conference increases PEAD. One possible explanation for our results is that investors overreact to the stock prices of firms that hold earnings communication conferences. We also conclude that the conference tone is negatively correlated with PEAD. In addition, the market reacts more strongly to the managers’ tone than it does to the investor's tone.     

Hedge fund networks,information dissemination,and stock price comovement: Evidence from China

We define a hedge fund network as consisting of weak ties based on common holdings. By creating a filtered dataset of stocks held by hedge funds in China from 2010 to 2019, we examine the effect of the network on stock return comovement and further test the incentive-compatible conditions for honest communication between competitors (Stein, 2008). First, we find that the weak ties in a social network affect the behaviour of hedge fund managers, when formal institutions are imperfect. Second, we find that listed firms held by hedge funds are exposed to an information network that is composed of hedge funds. The higher the hedge fund network density is, the more likely information dissemination is, and the weaker the stock price comovement is. Third, our results support Stein's (2008) two major conclusions: a network effect exists only within stable relationships, and the more central a stock is in the network, the stronger the network effect is. After controlling for various external factors that might influence the hedge fund network's information diffusion mechanism, all the results meet our theoretical expectations. Overall, we contribute to the literature by determining the role of the hedge fund network as an information transmitter in weak ties and by providing empirical evidence on the theory of honest communication among competitors.