Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

A multisectorial matching model of unions

We develop an equilibrium matching model where unions have an important institutional presence. Monopolistic competition characterizes the goods market, where only some sectors are unionized. Thus, the model can vary the coverage of collective bargaining. It can vary the degree of coordination between unions, and alternatively consider “national” and “sectorial” unions. Calibration to the union premium implies a workers’ rent extraction parameter much lower than assumed in the matching literature. We introduce unemployment insurance to study the interactions of policies with unions and find that unions only push for more generous benefits if this does not entail higher payroll taxes.     

Unemployment and workers' compensation programmes: rationale,design, labour supply and income support

I examine the unemployment insurance (UI) and workers' compensation (WC) insurance programmes, concentrating on labour supply, insurance and income redistribution. UI and WC increase the time employees spend out of work. Elasticities of lost work time that incorporate both the incidence and duration of claims are centred at 1.0 for UI and between 0.5 and 1.0 for WC. These elasticities are larger than elasticities typically found in studies of wage effects on hours worked by men, probably because UI and WC lead to short‐run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect and the programmes alter the participation margin. Some good evidence suggests that UI smooths the consumption of the unemployed and more clearly indicates that UI progressively redistributes resources. There is substantial evidence that injured workers suffer material hardships even with WC programmes, but research has not provided an overall picture of the insurance and redistributive aspects of WC.     

中国失业保险支出水平的测度模型与实证分析

中国失业保险制度应该保持合理的支出水平,衡量标准主要看其是否为失业者提供了适度的收入保障以及是否对就业起到积极的促进作用。本文建立了测量失业保险支出水平的数理模型,根据国外典型国家的经验数据大体确定了失业保险支出水平的适度界限,并对中国现实的失业保险支出水平及其影响因素进行了分析,最后提出了完善失业保险制度以及合理提高失业保险支出水平的政策建议。     

State Dependent Unemployment Benefits

Optimal design of unemployment insurance is considered in a search setting where the state of nature (business cycle) affects the unemployment risk and thus the return to search. The incentive effects or distortions of individual job search arising due to the unemployment insurance scheme are crucial for optimal policies, so is the scope for risk diversification that depends critically on whether the balanced budget requirement applies to each state of nature or across states of nature. In the former case a basic budget effect tends to cause optimal benefits to be procyclical. If risk diversification across states of nature is possible, the fact that incentives are more distorted in good than bad states of nature tends to make both benefits and contribution rates countercyclical. It is shown that countercyclical benefits exacerbate employment fluctuations but increase average employment by aligning benefits more with states of nature where the incentive costs are small.     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

Labor Unemployment Concern and Corporate Discretionary Disclosure

We investigate how firms strategically vary their disclosure policies in response to labor unemployment concern. Using changes in state unemployment insurance laws as exogenous variations of labor unemployment concern, we show that firms provide more bad news forecasts when unemployment concern is low. This relation is stronger when firms are financially constrained, when CEOs and CFOs have higher equity incentives, and when workers are likely to be affected more by unemployment. Our findings are not driven by earnings management reversal or underlying performance changes, and are robust to a battery of identification tests. Finally, we find a similar effect of unemployment concern on disclosure using the tone of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings as an alternative proxy for corporate disclosure. Overall, our findings suggest that labor unemployment concern is an important consideration for corporate discretionary disclosure.     

失业保险与公司财务杠杆

我国劳动力市场化程度日益加深导致劳动者职业转换愈加频繁,失业保险的作用日益突出。本文探究了失业保险金水平对企业财务杠杆的影响。运用2009—2019年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果发现失业保险金上升会导致公司财务杠杆下降。渠道检验显示,提高失业保险金可以降低员工失业风险溢酬,公司劳动力成本下降,公司有更多自由现金流和盈利进行内源融资和偿还债务,公司财务杠杆下降。进一步分析发现,失业保险金的作用在失业率高的地区更加显著。主要结果在分别运用《社会保险法》和《关于调整失业保险金标准的指导意见》构造双重差分模型和工具变量解决内生性问题、更改模型设置、排除投资水平影响、删除特殊省份、更换样本期间后,依然成立。本文结果说明加大失业保险保障力度有助于降低企业财务风险。     

Real exchange rate, productivity and labor market frictions

We extend the classic Balassa-Samuelson model to an environment with search unemployment. We show that the classic Balassa-Samuelson model with the assumption of full employment emerges as a special case of our more generalized model. In our generalized model, the degree of labor market matching efficiency affects the strength of the structural relationship between the real exchange rate and sectoral productivity through influencing labor’s choice between employment and unemployment as well as movement across sectors. When the relative labor market matching friction is high, search unemployment is high and the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect may not hold. Empirical evidence supports our theory: controlling for differences in labor market frictions across countries provides a better fit in estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect.     

Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage–risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.     

Optimal retirement with unemployment risks

This paper investigates the optimal retirement of an individual in the presence of involuntary unemployment risks and borrowing constraints in a complete market with frictions. We use an intensity model and loading factors to illustrate the involuntary unemployment risks and frictions in unemployment insurance markets. Using reasonably calibrated parameters, we observe that high involuntary unemployment intensity and loading factors could be important explanations for the empirical findings emphasized in recent studies. We also find that an individual with high leisure demand after retirement reduces consumption during retirement and increases stockholdings as retirement time approaches.     

Employment and Welfare Effects of a Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System

In Germany, as in many OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom, unemployment compensation consists of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance. Unemployment assistance is provided subsequent to the expiration of entitlement to unemployment insurance and is lower. The effects of this two-tier unemployment compensation system are studied in a general equilibrium job search model with endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and employment which is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the German economy. Our results are as follows: (i) employment is a decreasing function of both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance. (ii) Aggregate savings are (not) a monotone decreasing function of unemployment assistance (unemployment insurance) payments. (iii) Optimal unemployment compensation payments are found to be a decreasing function over time.     

中国失业保险制度改革方向:纳入社会救助——基于历史背景与功能定位的分析

失业保险在建立和长期发展过程中,具有缓和劳资矛盾、天然双向平滑经济波动、提供失业保障和平滑个人收入的基本功能。但随着各国劳动保护及福利制度的发展,失业保险在政治和经济方面的功能减弱,且其失业收入损失补偿功能常常引发失业陷阱,于是各国进行了以促进积极就业为导向的改革。中国失业保险制度曾经为经济体制转型起到了“减震器”的作用。随着劳动保护和社会保障制度的发展和政府就业政策的完善,在二元就业结构、户籍制度、公共部门人力资源管理制度及政府承担就业促进任务的影响下,我国失业保险的政治、经济、失业人口收入补偿、就业促进功能未能有效发挥。在比较了若干改革方案后,本文认为,取消失业保险并将其功能并入社会救助体系是新时代背景下我国失业保险制度的最优改革路径。     

How important is intra-household risk sharing for savings and labor supply?

While it is recognized that the family is a risk-sharing institution, little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply. In this paper, we present a model where workers (females and males) are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete. A household is formed by a female and a male, who decide on consumption, savings and labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model we find that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, for low-wealth households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes up 9% of lost family income. We also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell, precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household.     

Policy-induced internal migration: An empirical investigation of the Canadian case

We investigate the influence of public policy on interprovincial migration in Canada using new aggregated migration data for 1974–1996, the longest period studied so far. We consider the consequences of regional variation in a variety of policies, and also investigate the effects of certain extraordinary events in Quebec and in the Atlantic provinces. The results indicate that while the changing bias in the unemployment insurance system may have induced some people to move to the relatively high unemployment Atlantic region, the resulting flows are likely too small to have altered regional unemployment rates. In contrast, political events in Quebec in the 1970's and the closing of the cod fishery in 1992 appear to be associated with large changes in migration patterns. JEL Classification H0 · H7 · J41 · J65 · R23 · R58     

“Understanding Relationships Using Copulas,” by Edward Frees and Emiliano Valdez,January 1998

Presenteeism occurs when employees are present at the workplace but cannot perform at their best because of ill-health or other reasons, while absenteeism occurs when employees are absent from the workplace. Although absenteeism is important, researchers now say presenteeism can be more costly to businesses and may be responsible for as much as three times the health-related lost productivity as compared to absenteeism and may cost the U.S. economy as much as $150 billion per year. Given the cost of absenteeism and presenteeism, one of the objectives of this article is to provide actuaries with the techniques and insights needed to design disability insurance policies that take into account the dynamics of absenteeism and presenteeism. To this end we develop a simple multistate sickness-disability model of the evolution of an employee’s health over time. We assume employees receive sick pay, the size of which depends on their health state, and there is a government-sponsored unemployment insurance program. In our model it is possible for employees in good health to avoid work by staying home, which is called shirking. To reduce shirking, the employer decides to check the health status of a certain percentage of employees who “call in sick.” Given the sick-pay structure, the probability of a health check, and the existence of unemployment insurance, employees develop rational strategies about whether to engage in shirking, absenteeism, or presenteeism. These strategies are captured in a set of Volterra integral equations. We use these Volterra integral equations to show how the employer can design a disability insurance plan that can incentivise employees to eliminate shirking and to act in a manner that will maximize the employer’s expected profits.     

The Swedish State unemployment insurance and the reinsurance problem of the funds

Abstract

In 1901 the town of Gent appropriated a municipal grant to societies paying benefit to their members in case of unemployment. The decision was founded on a committee report principally written by the lawyer Louis Varlez. The societies should claim individual contributions of the members constituting the right to unemployment allowance under certain conditions. In order to prevent a dissipating risk selection the sphere of activity of a society should join with some society existing before. Such societies had been erected at several places as well in Belgium as in other states, in Gent as early as in 1867. In most cases they were attached to trade unions. It may thus be said that a subsidized unemployment insurance was — for the first time — introduced in Gent 1901. The principles applied are usually called the »Gentsystem». In general accordance with this system state subsidized unemployment insurance was introduced in France 1905, in Norway 1906 and in Denmark 1907. Later several states have established unemployment insurance on a voluntary basis. In modern voluntary state insurance, however, a decisivestress is laid upon the fact that the allowance shall be regulated in accordance with the general rules for public relief of unemployment. Some conditions of the insurance scheme are thus compulsorily laid down in the regulations concerning the subsidy. In some states the unemployment insurance has been wholly established on a compulsory basis. For the first time a compulsory insurance was introduced in England in 1911 covering certain occupational groups. Compulsory unemployment insurance has then been erected in Italy 1919, Poland 1924, Bulgaria 1925 and Norway 1938. In 1938 a law bearing on a change of the voluntary unemployment insurance of Belgium to a compulsory one is being prepared.     

Unemployment insurance and capital accumulation

In this paper, I examine a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insurance. The introduction of capital into the economy of Wang and Williamson (J. Monetary Econom. 49(7)(2001)1337) generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero. The result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance: both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise. Unlike most of the literature, I compute explicitly the cost of the transition path; agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance, but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half. Only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path. I then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios.     

Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market

We consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in a repeated moral hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed individuals can secretly participate in a hidden labor market. This extension modifies the standard problem in three dimensions. First, it imposes an endogenous lower bound for the lifetime utility that a contract can deliver. Second, it breaks the identity between unemployment payments and consumption. And third, it hardens the encouragement of search effort. The optimal unemployment insurance system in an economy with a hidden labor market is simple, with an initial phase in which payments are relatively flat during unemployment and with no payments for long-term unemployed individuals. This scheme differs substantially from the one prescribed without a hidden labor market and resembles unemployment protection programs in many countries.     

Employer Health Insurance Mandates and the Risk of Unemployment

Employer health insurance mandates form the basis of many health care reform proposals. Proponents make the case that they will increase insurance, while opponents raise the concern that low-wage workers will see offsetting reductions in their wages and that in the presence of minimum wage laws some of the lowest wage workers will become unemployed. We construct an estimate of the number of workers whose wages are so close to the minimum wage that they cannot be lowered to absorb the cost of health insurance, using detailed data on wages, health insurance, and demographics from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We find that 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the minimum wage, putting them at risk of unemployment if their employers were required to offer insurance. Assuming an elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage increase of -0.10, we estimate that 0.2 percent of all full-time workers and 1.4 percent of uninsured full-time workers would lose their jobs because of a health insurance mandate. Workers who would lose their jobs are disproportionately likely to be high school dropouts, minority, and female. This risk of unemployment should be a crucial component in the evaluation of both the effectiveness and distributional implications of these policies relative to alternatives such as tax credits, Medicaid expansions, and individual mandates, and their broader effects on the well-being of low-wage workers.