What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Cost of Capital for Exempt Foreign Private Issuers: Information Risk Effect or Earnings Quality Effect? It Depends

We examine whether the information risk accompanying Foreign Private Issuers' (FPIs) exemptions from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirements is associated with capital market penalties (measured by a higher cost of equity capital) and, further, the extent to which this information risk is mitigated by earnings quality. Our overall results indicate that exempt FPIs exhibit a higher cost of equity capital than reporting FPIs, and this relation still persists after controlling for earnings quality. Furthermore, we partition our sample into firms from strong and weak investor protection environments. Interestingly, similar to the results in Francis et al. (2008), for FPIs from strong investor protection regimes we find no difference in the cost of capital between exempt and filing FPIs, even after controlling for earnings quality. To the contrary, for FPIs from weak investor protection regimes, we find that the exemption is associated with a higher cost of equity capital, and that earnings quality does not significantly reduce the premium paid by these issuers.     

Internal control material weakness disclosure and misstatement duration

Only a small proportion of companies that announce restatements disclose existing internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) over financial reporting during misstatement periods. Using a sample of 1939 restatements related to misstatements between 2003 and 2015, we find that misstatement duration decreases with the disclosure of ICMWs during misstatement periods. Our results are robust to different samples and different measures of the dependent and test variables. We also find that the number of ICMWs disclosed is negatively related to misstatement duration. The disclosure of both entity-level and process-level ICMWs is associated with misstatements of shorter duration. Moreover, we find that the negative association between ICMW disclosure frequency and misstatement duration is more salient when restatements are intentional. Despite the negative consequences of reporting existing ICMWs found in prior studies, our results suggest that the disclosure of ICMWs can shorten the duration of misstatement periods, leading to more timely improvement in financial reporting. Hence, our evidence provides context and complements prior research suggesting that companies are penalized for disclosing ICMWs.     

How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model

This paper uses data on detected misstatements—earnings restatements—and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.     

信用评级变动能反映企业真实财务信息吗?——基于财务重述的视角

本文以2007-2018年拥有主体信用评级的A股上市公司为研究对象,利用企业财务错报在未来被重述这一场景,检验主体信用评级变动能否反映企业真实财务信息。研究发现,评级机构在发债企业财务错报年显著下调了主体信用评级,而在重述公告发布年没有上述现象,这表明主体信用评级下调反映了企业的真实财务信息。在控制内生性影响后,结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,发债企业当期财务错报涉及盈余时,主体信用评级被下调的幅度更大,说明评级机构更加关注与盈余相关的财务信息。机制分析表明,评级机构维护自身声誉是主体信用评级变动能够反映企业真实财务信息的主要机制。此外,主体信用评级被下调还导致了资本市场投资者的负面反应。本文的研究结果为主体信用评级变动反映企业真实财务信息提供了直接的证据支持,揭示了主体信用评级的信息含量,也对理解中国情境下评级机构调整主体信用评级的行为动机提供参考。     

Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Using a sample of seventy-two firms that adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, I test whether management estimates of fresh start equity values are misstated and whether such misstatements are related to characteristics of individual firms' bankruptcy process. I predict that the reported fresh start value reflects a tension between managerial incentives to promote the acceptance of the plan of reorganization, and incentives to enhance future reported performance. I test whether the tendency to overstate the fresh start equity value is increasing in factors affecting the acceptance of the reorganization plan (i.e., bankruptcy claimants' relative bargaining power) and decreasing in factors affecting postbankruptcy reported performance (i.e., the probability of future losses). I find that, relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from Chapter 11, the fresh start equity value is, on average, understated by about 4%. The difference between the fresh start equity value and market value also exhibits significant cross-sectional variation (an average absolute error of 11%). Consistent with my first prediction, the misstatement is increasing in the relative bargaining power of junior claimants. In contrast to my second prediction, the misstatement is also increasing in the likelihood of future reported losses. This result suggests that firms that are more likely to experience postbankruptcy financial distress are more concerned with obtaining acceptance for their plan than with the effects of the fresh start equity value on postbankruptcy performance. Finally, I document that the misstatement in the fresh start equity value is negatively related to whether firms have undergone prepackaged bankruptcies, and positively related to replacement of a prebankruptcy CEO.     

Valuing Loss Firms: What Can Be Learned From Analysts' Forecasts?

Prior research documents an anomalous negative price–earnings relation when a simple earnings capitalization model is estimated for loss‐making firms. Collins et al. (1999 ) suggest that the model is misspecified due to the omission of book value of equity. However, results from previous studies are confusing. We try to enrich prior literature by focusing on analysts' forecasts. In particular, we assess the role of earnings and book value in valuing loss firms using several measures based on the information provided by analysts. We hypothesize that the role of accounting figures depends on whether the loss firm is supported or not by investors. According to this argument, we construct several measures of investor support based on analysts' forecasts, and then test the value relevance of accounting information depending on the degree of support. Our results confirm the usefulness of the notion of ‘investor support’. For those loss firms that are expected to liquidate, we find that the inclusion of book value of equity in the model removes the negative sign on the earnings coefficient. However, for those loss firms that are expected to reverse current losses, we find that the coefficient on earnings remains negative despite the inclusion of book value.     

Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting

A detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to AAERs suggests that approximately one-quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias, however, in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are compelled to intentionally misstate earnings. Overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements. Evidence from a high-tech sample and a larger and more general sample support the overconfidence explanation for this path to misstatements and AAERs.     

Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News

Recent studies propose that limited investor attention causes market underreactions. This paper directly tests this explanation by measuring the information load faced by investors. The  investor distraction hypothesis  holds that extraneous news inhibits market reactions to relevant news. We find that the immediate price and volume reaction to a firm's earnings surprise is much weaker, and post-announcement drift much stronger, when a greater number of same-day earnings announcements are made by other firms. We evaluate the economic importance of distraction effects through a trading strategy, which yields substantial alphas. Industry-unrelated news and large earnings surprises have a stronger distracting effect.     

The effects of disclosure type and audit committee expertise on Chief Audit Executives’ tolerance for financial misstatements

This study involves an experiment where 73 Chief Audit Executives and deputy Chief Audit Executives determine the amount of adjustment required to correct a misstatement. We manipulate the financial reporting location of the misstatement (recognized vs. disclosed) and the level of audit committee expertise (high vs. low). The results indicate that financial reporting location has significant effects on internal auditors’ decisions to correct misstatements. Specifically, internal auditors are more willing to waive disclosed misstatements relative to recognized misstatements. Contrary to expectations, the results do not indicate that increased audit committee expertise and associated increases in audit committee members’ perceived powers cause internal auditors to be less willing to waive misstatements.     

Do Weather‐Induced Moods Affect the Processing of Earnings News?

We investigate whether unpleasant environmental conditions affect stock market participants’ responses to information events. We draw from psychology research to develop a new prediction that weather‐induced negative moods reduce market participants’ activity levels. Exploiting geographic variation in equity analysts’ locations, we find compelling evidence that analysts experiencing unpleasant weather are slower or less likely to respond to an earnings announcement relative to analysts responding to the same announcement but experiencing pleasant weather. Price association tests find evidence consistent with reduced activity due to weather‐induced moods delaying equilibrium price adjustments following earnings announcements. We also use our analyst‐based research design to re‐examine an existing prediction that unpleasant weather induces investor pessimism, and find evidence of both analyst pessimism and reduced activity in the presence of unpleasant weather. Together, our study provides new evidence that both extends and reaffirms findings of a relation between unpleasant weather and market activities, and contributes to the broader psychology and economics literature on the impact of weather‐induced mood on labor productivity.     

Information,uncertainty, and behavioral effects: Evidence from abnormal returns around real estate investment trust earnings announcements

In this study, we examine the influence of real estate market sentiment, market-level uncertainty, and REIT-level uncertainty on cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns over the 1995–2009 time period. We first document the relative coverage of analysts' earnings forecasts on U.S. REITs, as well as REITs from several countries (i.e., Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, and UK). We show that coverage outside of the U.S. is limited, and we consequently focus our analysis on U.S. REITs. We find strong evidence that earnings announcements contain pricing relevant information, with positive (negative) earnings surprises relative to analysts' forecasts resulting in significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns around the announcement date. Consistent with the findings from the broader equity market literature, we find limited evidence of a pre-announcement drift in the cumulative abnormal returns. However, in sharp contrast to the existing equity literature, we find no evidence of a post-earnings announcement drift in our aggregate sample or when the sample is restricted to the largest negative surprises. We find evidence of a post-earnings announcement drift for only the largest positive earnings surprises. These results are consistent with REIT returns more quickly impounding information relative to the broader equity market, in part because of the parallel private real estate market and because of the U.S. REIT structure and information environment. Finally, in our conditional regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns, we find that real estate investor sentiment, market-wide uncertainty, and firm-level uncertainty significantly affect the magnitude of abnormal announcement returns and also influence the effect of unexpected earnings on abnormal returns.     

Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.     

Does Earnings Quality Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Performance? Empirical Evidence of the Causal Link

The study examines the causal links between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance using a large sample of United States (US) firms from 1992 to 2013. We first find that the association between earnings quality and CSR performance is positive and significant. We then test the flow of causality using Granger's (1969) lead–lag analysis to determine whether changes in earnings quality cause changes in CSR performance or vice versa. Our findings show that changes in earnings quality cause changes in a firm's CSR performance but not vice versa. Further analysis shows that earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with higher CSR performance. These findings suggest that one plausible means by which firms with higher earnings quality can maintain better CSR performance is to reduce their cost of equity capital.     

The effect of CEO ownership on the information content of reported earnings

This paper examines the relation between capital market perceptions of earnings quality and CEO equity ownership. Using the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) from annual returns–earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we find that ERCs first increase and then decline across higher levels of CEO ownership with an inflection point around 25% ownership. Using analyst behavior as another proxy for the perceptions of financial analysts, we find that earnings forecasts are more accurate as ownership increases, but once ownership levels reach about 25%, accuracy declines with further increases in ownership. Forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and analyst following decline and then increase across increasing levels of CEO ownership. Our results suggest that, for low levels of CEO ownership, earnings are perceived as being more informative about future firm performance as ownership increases. However, once ownership levels are high, earnings are perceived as being less informative with further increases in ownership.     

Too Good to be True? An Analysis of the Options Market's Reactions to Earnings Releases

Using option implied risk neutral return distributions before and after earnings announcements, we study the option market's reaction to extreme events over earnings announcements. While earnings announcements generally reduce short‐term uncertainty about the stock price, very good news does not reduce uncertainty and slightly bad news actually increases uncertainty. We also find that left tail probabilities decrease over earnings releases while right tail probabilities increase. We interpret these findings as evidence of maintained investor expectations that very good news is generally not released during earnings announcements, combined with skepticism in the form of lingering uncertainty at the release of such very good news.     

The spillover effect of fraudulent financial reporting on peer firms' investments

We investigate how high-profile accounting frauds affect peer firms' investment. We document that peers react to the fraudulent reports by increasing investment during fraud periods. We show that this finding is not driven by frauds that have a higher ex ante likelihood of detection or by an association between fraud and investment booms. In addition, we find that peers’ investments increase in fraudulent earnings overstatements, and in industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher private benefits of control. We also find evidence consistent with equity analysts potentially facilitating the spillover effect.     

Payout policy in the 21st century

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956. American Economic Review 46, 97–113). However, 50 years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase earnings per share. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role.     

The Effects of International Financial Reporting Standards on the Accounts and Accounting Quality of Australian Firms: A Retrospective Study

We examine the effect of Australian equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the accounts and accounting quality of 1,065 listed firms, relying on retrospective reconciliations between Australian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (AGAAP) and IFRS. We find that IFRS increases total liabilities, decreases equity and more firms have earnings decreases than increases. IFRS earnings and equity are not more value relevant than AGAAP earnings and equity and while adjustments for changes in accounting for provisions and intangibles other than goodwill are value relevant, they weaken associations with market value. Goodwill adjustments improve associations with market value. We also find that the reconciliation note for the earnings adjustments contained no new information.     

THE INFLUENCE OF PREDICTABILITY ON DIFFERENCES IN THE MARKET REACTION TO DEBT AND EQUITY ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENTS

Existing empirical evidence suggests that the announcement-day reaction to equity issuance is about 2.88 percent more negative than the reaction to debt. However, announcement-day returns do not accurately reflect investor reaction if issue announcements are anticipated. I re-examine the announcement-day reaction to equity and debt issues after controlling for the predictability of security type and for firms' previous issue experience. Results indicate that the reaction to a first-time seasoned equity issue is more than 4.15 percent more negative than the reaction to debt. This increase over the conventional estimate suggests that the reaction to equity may be more negative, relative to debt, than previously believed. The evidence supports the assertion that giving preference to debt over equity could reduce issue costs when asymmetric information is a problem. Timing and certification strategies for lowering issue costs appear to be relatively unimportant for debt issues.