总会计师与舞弊

舞弊已日益成为严重制约和阻碍社会经济发展的“毒瘤”。如何有效发现舞弊、如何对舞弊相关问题进行研究,已到了刻不容缓的地步。无论是雇员舞弊还是管理层舞弊,总会计师都有义务发现并纠正。本文主要对总会计师如何有效发现并制止舞弊进行探究。     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

The organizational influence of the Chief Technology Officer

The proposition that the Chief Technology Officer's (CTO) primary bases for power and influence are in technical expertise and position power is critically analyzed from the perspective of upper echelons research. This fresh perspective suggests that CTOs who aspire to have significant influence in their organizations should also build their power bases on broad knowledge of the firm and its environment, a network of personal relationships inside and outside the firm, ownership position in the firm, and intuitive understanding of the business. The CEO's leadership style can also enhance or curtail the influence of the CTO. Research and managerial implications are drawn.     

Executive succession: Organizational antecedents of ceo characteristics

Based on 195 succession events in Business Week 1000 firms, this study examines the organizational antecedents of CEO demographic characteristics. Study findings suggest that antecedent conditions of lower firm profits and firm growth are associated with the selection of outsider CEOs. Additionally, R&D intensity is associated with the selection of CEOs having technical functional backgrounds and higher levels of education.     

Chief executive scanning emphases,environmental dynamism,and manufacturing firm performance

Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

澳门代表团访问考察汕头澄海展览中心国家主席胡锦涛作为礼物的智能玩具“澄海创造”

在汕头澄海展览中心的骅威公司常年展位上，通过工作人员熟练的演示，可以对话，会表达喜乐，还能“长大”的智能玩具公仔让澳门特别行政区行政长官崔世安看的入神，特首夫人霍慧芬更是童心大发，开心地与公仔对起了话……     

When is human capital a valuable resource? The performance effects of Ivy league selection among celebrated CEOs

We investigate whether and when highly trained human capital constitutes a rent‐sustaining resource. Our study of 444 CEOs celebrated on the covers of major U.S. business magazines found an advantage accruing to graduates of selective universities. Such CEOs led firms with higher and more sustained market valuations. The advantage was strongest for undergraduate programs as these related to the kinds of talent demanded of a CEO. The advantage also was greatest in smaller firms where CEO discretion might be highest and for younger CEOs who may benefit most from college and are less able to appropriate rents. Finally, the advantage accrued to graduates of more recent years, when selective schools had become less socially elitist and increasingly meritocratic, thus favoring human versus social capital. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of board human and social capital on investor reactions to new CEO selection

This study extends work on independent directors to examine the influence of their human capital and social capital on investor reactions to the board's CEO selection decision. We predict that human capital, as represented by the board's CEO experience and industry experience, and social capital, as represented by directors' co‐working experience on the board and external directorship ties to other corporate boards, will influence the stock market reactions to new CEO appointments. In a sample of 208 new CEO appointment events in U.S. manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2003, we found that the stock market reacted favorably to the appointments made by boards with higher levels of human and social capital. We also found that the effect of internal social capital was stronger when the new CEO was an insider rather than an outsider. The implications of the results for director selection and CEO succession are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal,firm size,and firm profits

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据

董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示：（1）董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;（2）董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;（3）进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。     

How stigmatized are dismissed chief executives? The role of character questioning causal accounts and executive capital in dismissed CEO reemployment

Research Summary: Despite the prevalence of CEO dismissal, theory only briefly explores its consequences. Past research indicates few fired CEOs regain employment. We suggest dismissal stigmatizes executives; however, stigmatization is greatest when character questioning causal accounts exist, which affect the likelihood of regaining a CEO position. Furthermore, we argue that reputational and social capital provide signals of executive quality that moderate the level of stigmatization experienced when character questioning causal accounts exist. Following 280 dismissed CEOs, we find that social capital increases the likelihood of rehiring for those with character questioning causal accounts, but negatively impacts those without causal accounts. Alternatively, we find reputational capital positively influences those without causal accounts, while having a slight negative relationship for those with causal accounts. Managerial Summary: Dismissed CEOs often desire second chances to run companies; however, few are ever afforded the opportunity. We explore what allows some dismissed CEOs to regain employment as a CEO. We find that reasons surrounding a CEO's dismissal influence such prospects depending on the CEO's prior reputation and social capital. In particular, social capital through elite education increases the likelihood of regaining a position when the CEO's character is called into question. Alternatively, a strong reputation increases the likelihood of regaining a CEO position when a CEO's character has not been called into question. These findings suggest that dismissed CEOs can regain a CEO position; however, this likelihood is strongly influenced by how others perceive the executive and their concerns about prior behavior.     

Board social capital and excess CEO returns

Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures—corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO Dismissal: The role of investment analysts

While poor firm performance has been shown to be a predictor of CEO dismissal, little is known about the role of external constituents on the board's decision to dismiss the firm's CEO. In this study, we propose that investment analysts, as legitimate third‐party evaluators of the firm and its leadership, provide certification as to the CEO's ability, or lack thereof, and thus help reduce the ambiguity associated with the board's evaluation of the CEO's efficacy. In addition, the board tends to respond to investment analysts because their stock recommendations influence investors, whom the board wants to appease. Using panel data on the S&P 500 companies for the 2000–2005 period, we find that negative analyst recommendations result in a higher probability of CEO dismissal. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Once an outsider,always an outsider? CEO origin,strategic change,and firm performance

In this study, we examine how the relationship between the level of strategic change in the pattern of resource allocation and firm performance differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. Based on longitudinal data on the tenure histories of 193 CEOs who left office between 1993 and 1998, we find that the level of strategic change has an inverted U‐shaped relationship with firm performance. As the level of change increases from slight to moderate, performance increases; as the level of change increases from moderate to great, performance declines. Further, we find that this inverted U‐shaped relationship differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. That is, both the positive effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively low and the negative effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively high are more pronounced for outside CEOs than for inside CEOs. Supplementary analyses also suggest that this difference between outside and inside CEOs exists in later years but not in the early years of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: an empirical investigation

Why are some newly appointed CEOs (i.e., those with tenure of three years or less) dismissed while others are not? Drawing upon previous reseach on information asymmetry and adverse selection in CEO selection, I argue that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession, and as a result, must dismiss the appointee after succession when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of succession increases the likelihood of dismissal. With data on 204 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support this argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal (e.g., firm performance and political factors), the results show that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs is higher in outside successions and/or if the succession follows the dismissal of the preceding CEO. Further, if at the time of succession, the firm's board has a nominating committee that is independent and/or on which outside directors have few external directorships, the likelihood of dismissal is lower. Contributions to the CEO dismissal/succession literature are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism,CEO tenure,and company performance

Scholars have characterized CEO tenures as life cycles in which executives learn rapidly during their initial time in office, but then grow stale as they lose touch with the external environment. We argue, however, that the opportunities for adaptive learning are limited because (1) a CEO assumes office with a relatively fixed paradigm that changes little thereafter; (2) inertia limits the speed at which an organization can align itself with a new CEO's paradigm; and (3) for any within‐paradigm learning to occur, the external environment must be stable enough so that the cause–effect relationships that CEOs glean today remain relevant tomorrow. In a longitudinal study of 98 CEOs in the relatively stable branded foods industry and 228 CEOs in the highly dynamic computer industry, we found results that strongly supported our hypotheses. In the stable food industry, firm‐level performance improved steadily with tenure, with downturns occurring only among the few CEOs who served more than 10–15 years. In contrast, in the dynamic computer industry, CEOs were at their best when they started their jobs, and firm performance declined steadily across their tenures, presumably as their paradigms grew obsolete more quickly than they could learn. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International experience in the executive suite: the path to prosperity?

Attention is increasingly focused on the potential individual career and firm‐level benefits of international experience for upper level executives. This research examines the relationships between CEO international experience, CEO tenure, firm internationalization, succession events, and corporate financial performance. Results indicate a significant interactive effect between CEO tenure and outside succession on CEO international experience. In addition to a relationship with CEO international experience, there are two additional interactive effects in the examination of corporate financial performance: (1) CEO international experience and the degree of firm internationalization, and (2) CEO international experience and CEO succession. These interactive effects are evident in accounting and market indicators of corporate financial performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance consequences of new CEO ‘Outsiderness’: Moderating effects of pre‐ and post‐succession contexts

This study seeks to reconcile inconsistent findings on the performance consequences of new CEO origin. Drawing on five decades of empirical research on CEO succession outcomes, I develop a more refined theoretical conceptualization and a finer‐grained measurement of the underlying construct of the insider vs. outsider CEO, and build and test a more comprehensive and nuanced framework of the succession context. A longitudinal investigation of the U.S. airline and chemical industries (1972–2002) indicates that new CEO ‘Outsiderness’, conceptualized as a continuum raging from new CEOs who have a greater combination of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the firm and the industry, has no main effect on post‐succession firm performance. However, significant moderating effects are found when environmental munificence, pre‐succession firm performance, and concomitant strategic and senior executive team changes are considered. Together, these findings highlight the need to consider both pre‐ and post‐succession contextual factors for evaluating the performance effects of new CEO outsiderness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.